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LAW REFORM COMMISSION’S ROLE 
The Law Reform Commission is an independent statutory body established by the Law Reform 
Commission Act 1975. The Commission’s principal role is to keep the law under review and to 
make proposals for reform, in particular by recommending the enactment of legislation to clarify 
and modernise the law. Since it was established, the Commission has published over 190 
documents (Working Papers, Consultation Papers, Issues Papers and Reports) containing 
proposals for law reform and these are all available at lawreform.ie. Most of these proposals 
have contributed in a significant way to the development and enactment of reforming legislation. 
 
The Commission’s role is carried out primarily under a Programme of Law Reform. Its Fourth 
Programme of Law Reform was prepared by the Commission following broad consultation and 
discussion. In accordance with the 1975 Act, it was approved by the Government in October 
2013 and placed before both Houses of the Oireachtas. The Commission also works on specific 
matters referred to it by the Attorney General under the 1975 Act.  
 
The Commission’s Access to Legislation project makes legislation in its current state (as 
amended rather than as enacted) more easily accessible to the public in three main outputs: the 
Legislation Directory, the Classified List and the Revised Acts. The Legislation Directory 
comprises electronically searchable indexes of amendments to primary and secondary 
legislation and important related information. The Classified List is a separate list of all Acts of 
the Oireachtas that remain in force organised under 36 major subject-matter headings. Revised 
Acts bring together all amendments and changes to an Act in a single text. The Commission 
provides online access to selected Revised Acts that were enacted before 2006 and Revised 
Acts are available for all Acts enacted from 2006 onwards (other than Finance and Social 
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1. This Report, which forms part of the Commission’s Third Programme of Law Reform,1 
contains its final recommendations concerning the law and procedure relating to search 
warrants and bench warrants.  
A Recommendation that over 300 provisions on search warrants should be replaced 
by a general Search Warrants Act 
2. As of 2015, more than 300 separate legislative provisions (143 Acts and 159 Statutory 
Instruments) provide for powers to issue search warrants.2 A large number of legislative 
provisions also permit members of An Garda Síochána and officers of various regulatory 
authorities to enter, search and inspect premises without a warrant.3 Provisions relating to 
powers of entry without warrant are usually followed by provisions stating that a search 
warrant is required where the location in question is a private dwelling. 
3. The search warrant provision with the widest application is section 10 of the Criminal 
Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1997, as amended by the Criminal Justice Act 
2006. It provides that the District Court may issue a search warrant where there are 
reasonable grounds for suspecting that evidence of or relating to an arrestable offence (an 
offence carrying at least 5 years imprisonment on conviction) is to be found at a place. 
4. As discussed in this Report, the 300 existing legislative search warrant provisions contain 
significant differences of detail, resulting in a lack of consistency in the search warrant 
process. Persons involved in the search warrant process, such as members of An Garda 
Síochána, officers of regulatory bodies, legal practitioners and judges, must engage with 
many pieces of legislation. The need for the Oireachtas to enact a new legislative 
provision for each new piece of legislation that requires a search warrant power also 
involves inefficient use of resources.  
5. Against this background, in Chapter 1 of the Report the Commission recommends the 
enactment of a generally applicable Search Warrants Act, a draft Bill for which is included 
in Appendix C of the Report.  
A Recommendation that Search Warrants Act should apply to indictable offences and 
other offences which currently provide for search warrant powers  
6. In Chapter 1 the Commission discusses the need to ensure that the proposed Search 
Warrants Act must take into account fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution of 
Ireland and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The use of a search 
warrant involves the entry and search or inspection of a private dwelling or business 
premises and therefore constitutes an interference with certain rights. Where the location 
                                               
1
  Report on Third Programme of Law Reform (LRC 86-2007), Project 3. This Report follows the Commission’s 
Consultation Paper on Search Warrants and Bench Warrants (LRC CP 58-2009), which examined the great 
majority of the matters that form the basis for the subsequent chapters of this Report. Subsequently, the 
Commission published its Issues Paper on Search Warrants (LRC IP 4-2014), which discussed the scope of a 
Search Warrants Act (see Chapter 2 of the Report) and a number of technology-related issues in connection 
with search warrants (see the relevant parts of Chapters 3, 4 and 5 of the Report).  
2
  See Appendix A to this Report for a list of search warrant legislative provisions. 
3
  See Appendix B to this Report for a list of warrantless legislative powers of entry and search. 
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is a private dwelling, a search must be compatible with the guarantee in Article 40.5 of the 
Constitution that a private dwelling is inviolable and cannot be forcibly entered except in 
accordance with law. A search or inspection of a private dwelling or a business may also 
interfere with the rights to privacy and property under Article 40.3 of the Constitution and 
the right to private life under Article 8 of the ECHR. Such rights are not absolute and may 
be restricted. Any interference with these rights must, however, be proportionate. 
7. Chapter 2 of the Report discusses the scope of the proposed Search Warrants Act, 
which the Commission recommends should encompass a broad range of offences, 
applying an appropriate balance between the rights of the accused person to privacy and 
protection of the dwelling and society’s interest in the investigation of criminal offences.     
8. The Commission therefore recommends that the Search Warrants Act should apply to all 
indictable offences. This would allow for the repeal of existing legislative provisions that 
authorise the issuing of search warrants for the investigation of specific indictable 
offences. The majority of existing legislative search warrant provisions, listed in Appendix 
A of this Report, concern indictable offences and could therefore be repealed. 
9. It is important to note, however, that some statutory provisions contain search warrant 
powers that apply to summary offences only, such as powers relating to immigration law4 
or those in pre-2007 Regulations made under section 3 of the European Communities Act 
1972.5 Provision for a search warrant power does not apply to every summary offence, 
and therefore those to which it has been applied have been selected on a case-by-case 
basis. Because of this selective approach the Commission does not therefore make any 
recommendation concerning the repeal of these existing provisions. To ensure a 
consistency of approach to search warrants, however, the Commission recommends that 
the generally applicable Search Warrants Act should also apply to those existing search 
warrant provisions that refer to summary only offences, and that these should be listed in 
a Schedule to the proposed Search Warrants Act. The benefit of this approach is that a 
person involved with a search warrant process would be subject to one Act, whether 
dealing with indictable offences or with the specific summary offences to which a search 
warrant power applies. 
10. In the future, no further separate statutory search warrant provisions would need to be 
enacted. All that would be required in any future legislation that creates an indictable 
offence and that authorises search and entry, whether by An Garda Síochána or officers 
of a regulatory authority, would be to provide that the powers in the proposed Search 
Warrants Act apply to such a search. Similarly if future legislation provides for a search 
warrant power for a summary offence, this would simply be added to the Schedule to the 
Search Warrants Act.  
11. The repeal of existing search warrant provisions applicable to specific indictable offences 
would reduce the overall number of search warrant provisions, as would the application of 
the Search Warrants Act to existing provisions applicable to summary only offences.  
12. It is also necessary to bear in mind that a large number of search warrant provisions allow 
authorised officers and inspectors of regulatory bodies to enter, search and/or inspect a 
                                               
4
  See section 4 of the Immigration Act 2003, which provides that a judge of the District Court may issue a 
search warrant if satisfied that evidence of or relating to an offence under sections 3, 4, 5 or 8 of the 
Immigration Act 1999 is to be found at a specified place.  Section 9 of the Immigration Act 1999 contains 
summary penalties for all offences under the Act. 
5
  Section 3 of the European Communities Act 1972, as amended by the European Communities Act 2007, 
empowers Ministers to make Regulations for the purposes of implementing EU law which, since 2007, may 
create indictable offences.  Prior to the 2007 Act, the 1972 Act prohibited the creation of indictable offences by 
such Regulations.  Consequently, a large number of pre-2007 Regulations made under section 3 of the 1972 
Act contain search warrant powers that apply to summary offences only.   
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location for reasons not necessarily linked to the investigation of a criminal offence. Such 
persons are often empowered to enter and inspect premises for routine or unannounced 
inspections that form part of general regulatory supervision and oversight to determine 
whether the occupier of the premises complies with the relevant legislation.6  In many 
instances, such inspections may lead to a finding that there is compliance, so that no 
enforcement action or criminal prosecution arises.   
13. The main procedural elements of the Search Warrants Act (including the mode of 
application, the requirement that documents be retained and the time or times during 
which a search warrant may be executed) would therefore apply to such search warrant 
provisions, which would be included in a Schedule to the Act. The full statutory framework 
in the Search Warrants Act (notably, matters related to arrest of persons during a search) 
would therefore only apply where such entry powers were being used in connection with a 
suspicion or belief that evidence relating to an offence was present at the premises in 
question.   
14. Similarly, the proposed Search Warrants Act would apply as the default provision unless 
otherwise specifically provided. For example, the Report recommends that search 
warrants should, in general, remain valid for 7 days from the date they are issued, and this 
would apply unless there was a particular need for a longer period, such as the 30 day 
period prescribed in the Companies Act 2014.7 
C Recommendations on applying for search warrants 
15. Chapter 3 of the Report deals with the procedure for applying for search warrants. The 
Commission recommends that this should involve the following elements: 
 applicant: the person empowered to apply for a search warrant should be a 
member of An Garda Síochána, or other person such as an inspector of a 
statutory regulatory body, authorised to apply for a search warrant under an 
enactment listed in a Schedule to the Act. 
 grounds for application: “reasonable grounds for suspicion” should be the 
standard requirement in respect of an application for a search warrant. 
 affirmation of the opinion of the applicant: the term “information on oath and 
in writing” should be the standard phrase as to the requirement for an applicant 
to affirm his or her opinion.   
 requests for additional information: the power of issuing authorities to request 
further information from the applicant should be placed on a statutory footing.  
 information forms: a standard “information for search warrant form” should be 
used when applying for a search warrant, for which electronic filing should be 
possible. 
 personal appearance by the applicant, except in cases of urgency: as a 
general rule a person applying for a search warrant should continue to be 
required to appear personally before a judge to affirm his or her opinion under 
oath. This requirement may, however, be dispensed with where circumstances of 
urgency give rise to an immediate need for a search warrant and the delay in 
appearing in person would frustrate the effective execution of the search warrant.   
  
                                               
6
  See for example, sections 39 and 40 of the Communications Regulation Act 2002 (authorised officers of 
ComReg), section 64 of the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005 (Health and Safety Authority 
inspectors) and section 45 of the Animal Health and Welfare Act 2013 (authorised officers of the Minister for 
Agriculture). 
7
  Section 787(9) of the Companies Act 2014 provides for a validity period of 30 days.  This replaces section 20 
of the Companies Act 1990, as amended by section 30 of the Company Law Enforcement Act 2001 and 
section 5 of the Companies (Amendment) Act 2009, which provided for a validity period of one month.    
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D Recommendations on issuing search warrants 
16. Chapter 4 of the Report concerns the procedure for issuing search warrants. The 
Commission recommends that this should involve the following elements:  
 issuing authority: the issuing authority should in general be a judge of the 
District Court. Urgent situations may arise where the applicant is unable to 
appear personally before a judge of the District Court to apply for a search 
warrant. In those circumstances, an application should be permitted to be made 
electronically to the High Court and the applicant should affirm his or her opinion 
under oath by video link or telephone.   
 search warrant form: a standard and generic search warrant form should be 
used. 
 records of issued search warrants: records should be kept by the Courts 
Service of all issued search warrants. 
 electronic issuing and transmission: the executing authority, whether a 
Garda, an authorised officer or an inspector of a regulatory authority, should 
possess the search warrant so that he or she can show it to the owner or 
occupier. Where the applicant has not personally appeared before the issuing 
authority (that is, in the urgent circumstances mentioned above where a delay in 
applying in person would frustrate the effective execution of the warrant), it 
should be possible for the search warrant to be transmitted electronically to the 
executing authority so that he or she can show the owner or occupier the search 
warrant on a device or a printed copy of the electronically transmitted warrant. 
E Recommendations on executing search warrants 
17. Chapter 5 of the Report deals with the procedure for executing search warrants. The 
Commission recommends that this should involve the following elements:  
 standard validity period: the standard validity period for a search warrant 
should be 7 days, with provision for an extension on application to a judge of the 
District Court. 
 the use of force: where it is necessary to use force when executing a search 
warrant, only force that is reasonable in the circumstances may be used.  
 copy of the search warrant to owner or occupier: a copy of the search 
warrant should be given to the owner or occupier, subject to the exception that 
where the executing officer believes that it is not advisable to give a copy of the 
warrant, it may be withheld from the person.   
 occupier’s notice: the occupier of a location that is the subject of a search 
should be provided with an occupier’s notice outlining the nature of the authority 
afforded to the executing officer, the procedure for seizing material under the 
warrant and the rights and obligations of the occupier. 
 search usually carried out at reasonable hours, with break facility: a search 
will usually be carried out at reasonable hours (between 6 am and 9 pm), unless 
there are specific reasons why it is needed at a different time; and the executing 
authority should be able to leave the premises and re-enter following a short 
break or overnight break if necessary. 
 assistants at the execution of a search: the search warrant may be executed 
by a named member of An Garda Síochána, or another authorised person such 
an inspector of a regulatory authority as listed in a Schedule to the Act, 
accompanied by such member or members of An Garda Síochána as the 
authorised person thinks necessary, or such other persons as authorised by the 
Court. Where a non-Garda member is required to assist with the execution of a 
search warrant, specific permission should be sought from the Court. 
 persons present at location being searched:  where it is necessary and 
justified in the circumstances, executing officers may: (a) search persons present 
at a search location (where the executing officer is a Garda only); (b) request 
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basic personal details from persons present at a search location; (c) request 
assistance from persons present so as to gain access to materials sought under 
the search warrant; and (d) require any person that appears to be in a position to 
facilitate access to information held in a computer to take certain steps to assist 
the executing officer to access that information.     
 offence of failure to comply with a request or obstruction: failure to comply 
with a permissible request by an executing officer, or attempting to obstruct or 
obstructing the execution of a search warrant is an offence. 
 seizure of material: an executing officer may seize material found during the 
execution of a search warrant where he or she reasonably believes it is: (a) 
evidence of the offence or suspected offence to which the warrant relates, (b) 
material which may be seized under a scheduled enactment or (c) evidence, 
found by the executing authority in the course of executing the warrant, of 
another offence or suspected offence.  
 protection of material subject to privilege: where material is found during the 
course of a search that appears to be privileged (such as material subject to legal 
privilege or litigation privilege), this may not be examined (this includes where 
there is a need to “search and sift” privileged material mixed with non privileged 
material); such material will be referred to the High Court to decide whether it is, 
in fact, subject to privilege. 
 inventories of seized materials: an inventory of all seized or copied items must 
be given to the person concerned upon completion of the search. 
F Recommendations on admissibility of evidence obtained under search warrants 
18. Chapter 6 of the Report deals with the admissibility of evidence obtained under search 
warrants. The Commission recommends that the Search Warrants Act should provide that 
failure to comply with its provisions will not, of itself, render any evidence obtained 
inadmissible. Whether the evidence is admissible or inadmissible will remain a matter for 
a court to determine in accordance with the relevant law in this area. This includes 
considerable case law on the admissibility of evidence obtained illegally and of evidence 
obtained unconstitutionally. 
19. As to evidence obtained illegally, the Commission outlines the current position, which 
involves a two-stage approach. In the first stage the court may determine that any error or 
defect in the search warrant is not sufficient to render the search illegal (because, for 
example, the error consisted of a misdescription, was otherwise of a trivial or technical 
nature, did not mislead the person to whom the warrant was directed or that the error was 
unintentional). If, however, the court finds that the evidence did not fall below this 
threshold of illegality, the second stage will involve a decision whether, in the court’s 
discretion, the evidence should be excluded in the interests of justice and having regard to 
a range of factors (because, for example, the error involved was not trivial or technical, 
that it did mislead the person to whom the warrant was directed, that the error was 
intentional or that the prejudicial effect of the evidence would outweigh its probative 
value).  
20. As to evidence obtained unconstitutionally on foot of a search warrant, the Commission 
refers to the rule governing the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence (the 
exclusionary rule), as set out most recently by the Supreme Court in 2015 in The People 
(DPP) v JC.8 Given the complexity of the exclusionary rule as set out by the Supreme 
Court, it is likely that the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence or unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence will be subject to further refinement and development in future cases. 
21. The Commission has therefore concluded that the proposed Search Warrants Act should 
not include a statutory test for the admissibility of illegally or unconstitutionally obtained 
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  [2015] IESC 31.  
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evidence, but that this should remain a matter for judicial application and development 
through case law.  
G Recommendation on Statutory Code of Practice on Search Warrants 
22. Various bodies involved in the execution of search warrants, such as An Garda Síochána, 
the Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement and the Revenue Commissioners, 
have their own practice and procedural guidelines that govern searches and seizures. In 
Chapter 6 the Commission also recommends that the proposed Search Warrants Act 
should provide for a statutory Code of Practice to provide practical guidance on the search 
warrant process. Mirroring the approach to breaches of the Act, a breach of the Code of 
Practice will not, of itself, render evidence obtained inadmissible.   
H Recommendations on Bench Warrants and Committal Warrants for Unpaid Fines 
23. Chapter 7 of the Report contains the Commission’s conclusions and recommendations on 
bench warrants and committal warrants for unpaid court fines.   
24. A bench warrant is an arrest warrant that is issued when an individual who is required to 
appear in court fails to do so. At any given time, there are between 20,000 to 30,000 
unexecuted bench warrants in Ireland.9 The high figures reflect an accumulation of 
warrants over the years. Efforts are being made to reduce the number of unexecuted 
bench warrants, such as the management of bench warrant execution by a Garda 
Inspector in each Garda Division, the establishment of a working group to address 
difficulties in the process and the devotion of certain sittings of the District Court to 
cancelling outstanding bench warrants that are impossible to execute or where their 
execution is unlikely.   
25. Many of the issues surrounding bench warrants are of a procedural or operational nature. 
The Garda Inspectorate’s 2014 Report on Crime Investigation recommends the 
introduction of a standard operating procedure for the management of warrants and the 
convening of a multi-agency working group to examine and consider changes to the 
processing of warrants.10 The implementation of the recommendations of the Garda 
Inspectorate Report should overcome many of the operational issues surrounding the 
bench warrant process.   
26. A committal warrant is the mechanism used to imprison an individual who has been 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment (including a default period of imprisonment) or 
remanded in custody. One circumstance in which a committal warrant is issued is where a 
court imposes a fine on an individual which remains unpaid by the due date (often referred 
to as a ‘penal warrant’). A large number of committal warrants for unpaid court fines are 
issued and remain unexecuted. 
27. The Fines (Payment and Recovery) Act 2014, when commenced, will bring into force 
measures that should assist in reducing the number of committal warrants issued. Under 
the 2014 Act, a court will be able to consider alternative methods of enforcing fines to 
issuing committal warrants. These include the option of paying fines by instalments and 
the making of a recovery order, an attachment order or community service order.  
28. The majority of cases that are dealt with in the District Court are prosecutions under the 
Road Traffic Acts.11 Many of these cases can be dealt with under the Fixed Charge Notice 
                                               
9
  Garda Inspectorate, Report on Crime Investigation (2014), part 10 at 19.   
10
  Garda Inspectorate, Report on Crime Investigation (2014), part 10 at 29. 
11
  The Courts Service Annual Report 2012 states that in 2012 almost 60% of summary cases dealt with in the 
District Court related to road traffic offences. 
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System without having to proceed to prosecution in the District Court.12 The high volume 
of road traffic cases means that a significant proportion of persons imprisoned for failure 
to pay court fines have been convicted of road traffic offences. 
29. Reform of the Fixed Charge Notice system is necessary to reduce the number of 
committal warrants issued for road traffic offences by encouraging and facilitating the 
payment of Fixed Charge Notices before such cases reach the District Court.13 Although 
the measures that will be introduced by the Fines (Payment and Recovery) Act 2014 
should improve the collection rate of court fines, additional methods of enforcement 
particular to road traffic cases would also be of benefit.   
30. In this respect the Report recommends that section 44 of the Road Traffic Act 2010 
should be brought into force. This provides for proceedings to be discontinued where an 
individual pays a specified fixed charge amount no later than 7 days before the date that 
the charge is listed for hearing. As many persons attempt to pay the fixed charge notice 
upon receipt of a court summons but are not currently permitted to do so, the 
commencement of section 44 of the 2010 Act would assist in reducing the number of 
committal warrants issued for failure to pay fines for road traffic offences. 
31. The Report also concludes that additional methods of addressing non-payment of court 
fines that are particular to road traffic offences should be implemented, a number of which 
have been identified in other reviews of this area. For example, as a means of 
encouraging payment of fines, the Report agrees with the view expressed elsewhere that 
legislation should be introduced to provide that, where a court imposes a fine on a person 
who has been convicted of an offence under the Road Traffic Acts and the person does 
not pay the fine by the due date, the court may direct that motor tax applications and 
changes in vehicle ownership should not be processed in respect of a vehicle that is 
registered in the name of the person against whom the fine was imposed. 
32. There is no procedure in place permitting persons summoned to appear in court who wish 
to plead guilty to respond to a summons by post without having to attend court. Some 
individuals fail to appear due to circumstances such as family or work commitments or 
lack of transport. The Report recommends that legislation should provide for a postal 
response system to summonses in respect of summary only offences. Such a procedure 
would allow such persons to plead guilty to the offence without having to appear in court 
and the court could proceed with the case instead of issuing a bench warrant. 
33. A great number of summonses are delivered by ordinary post, also referred to as 
“letterbox delivery.” The lack of personal engagement associated with letterbox delivery 
can result in an accused person failing to receive a summons, and therefore being 
unaware that they are required to attend court. If the prosecutor and Courts Service are 
not able to state that the accused received the summons, the Court usually adjourns the 
case; alternatively it may issue a bench warrant. Given the uncertainty associated with 
letterbox delivery, the Commission considered whether all summonses should be served 
by personal service or registered post. Consultees referred, however, to the practical 
difficulties with requiring personal service or registered post in every case. Therefore 
although summonses should, where possible, be served by these methods, the Report 
concludes that letterbox delivery should remain as an method of serving summonses. 
34. The Report also recommends that, where a person is granted bail, whether at a Garda 
station or by a court, the relevant authority should be required to take all reasonable steps 
                                               
12
  The Courts Service Annual Report 2012 shows that of the 147,371 defendants who had orders made against 
them for road traffic offences, 58,416 were prosecuted for penalty point offences and most of these would 
have originated in a fixed charge notice. 
13
  For a full discussion of these issues, see Garda Inspectorate Report on The Fixed Charge Processing 
System: A 21
st
 Century Strategy (2014).   
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to ensure that he or she understands that a condition of bail is the obligation to appear 
before a court at a later date. The individual should be provided with a document at that 
time setting out, in simple language, his or her requirement to attend at a court sitting, as 
well as the time and date upon which he or she is required to appear. 
35. The 2014 Report of the Garda Síochána Inspectorate on Crime Investigation noted that 
many warrants are issued because An Garda Síochána or other agencies have not fully 
verified the identity of the individual involved. This can lead to warrants being issued for 
the wrong person or a person who does not exist. That 2014 Report recommended the 
implementation of a Garda Síochána Standard Operating Procedure for identity 
verification. The Commission supports that recommendation. 
36. Appendix A contains a list of over 300 search warrant legislative provisions. 
37. Appendix B contains a list of legislative powers of entry and search that do not require 
search warrants. 
38. Appendix C contains a draft Criminal Justice (Search Warrants) Bill to give effect to the 
Commission’s recommendations concerning search warrants.   
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CHAPTER 1 HISTORY OF SEARCH WARRANTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS 
A Historical Development of Search Warrants 
(1) The development of search warrants in England and the United States  
1.01 It is thought that the concept of procedural searches travelled with Romans to Britain 
during the Roman invasion of 43 AD.1 Early medieval English common law accepted that, 
while there was no general authority to issue warrants to search homes because of the 
general common law protection of the dwelling, it was permissible to do so to search for 
stolen goods.2 This common law exception reflected the position under the Roman code 
of law, the Twelve Tables, concerning searches under the Roman law of theft (furtum) 
that, in the prosecution of “private” offences, a person who suspected that his or her 
stolen goods were on the premises of another was permitted to enter that place to carry 
out a search.3 In addition to the position at common law, legislation providing for search 
warrants in England was first enacted in the early part of the 14th century. The search 
powers in these early statutes were quite broad in nature and at that time were referred to 
as “writs” rather than warrants.4 Writs were general in form, containing little specification 
or restriction as to what, where or who could be searched and required little supporting 
evidence to be submitted by the applicant.5  
1.02 The general search warrant that existed in Britain at this time was exported to the United 
States, then under British rule. Writs were initially provided for by legislation governing 
customs in the United States and afforded customs officials a “blanket authority” to search 
any location where they suspected that they would find smuggled goods and to examine 
any package or container which they saw fit.6  
1.03 In addition to being unspecific as to the persons or places that could be searched under 
their authority, or the items that could be seized, writs were also general as to the length 
of time for which they were in operation. Once issued, writs remained “as continuing 
                                               
1
  Borkowski and du Pleiss Textbook on Roman Law 3
rd
 ed (Oxford University Press 2005) at 335.  For a more 
detailed discussion on the procedure for carrying out searches in Ancient Rome, see the Consultation Paper 
on Search Warrants and Bench Warrants (LRC CP 58-2009) at paragraphs 1.02-1.05. 
2
  See Sir Matthew Hale History of the Pleas of the Crown  Volume II at 149, and the comments of Lord Halifax 
in Entick v Carrington (1765) 2 Wils 275, 291 (discussed generally below at paragraphs 1.05 to 1.06).  Coke’s 
Institutes of the Law of England, Volume IV, at 176, did not accept that the common law allowed even this 
exception for stolen goods and considered that search warrants were void at common law. This appears to be 
a minority view.  
3
  Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law (Oxford University Press 1962) at 212. 
4
  Writs took their name from the fact that they commanded all of the king’s representatives and subjects to aid 
their holders in executing them. See Reynard, “Freedom from Unreasonable Search and Seizure – A Second 
Class Constitutional Right?” (1950) 25 Indiana Law Journal 259 at 271. See also Polyviou, Search and 
Seizure: Constitutional and Common Law (Duckworth 1982) at 12.  
5
  Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (Johns 
Hopkins Press 1937) at 26. 
6
  Polyviou Search and Seizure: Constitutional and Common Law (Duckworth 1982) at 10.   
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licences” until 6 months after the death of the monarch under whose reign they were 
issued.  
(2) Criticisms of general search warrants in the 17th century 
1.04 During the 17th century, a number of the authoritative chroniclers of English law expressed 
concern over the broad search powers which could be authorised by general search 
warrants.7 Similar dissatisfaction with the general warrant system emerged at the same 
time in the United States.8 In his leading work on English law, History of the Pleas of the 
Crown, Sir Matthew Hale recommended that certain requirements should be met when 
search warrants were issued and executed. These included requirements such as: 
probable cause to suspect that stolen items were in a certain place; making an oath 
before a justice when seeking a search warrant; limiting search warrants to specified 
places; directing warrants only to constables and other public officers, rather than to 
private persons; and returning of seized goods and executed warrants to a justice.9 These 
requirements heralded the creation of the modern system of search warrants, complete 
with procedural safeguards.   
(3) The end for general search warrants under English common law: Entick v 
Carrington (1765) 
1.05 A fundamental change came about in England in 1765 in Entick v Carrington.10 Entick had 
published a leaflet, “Monitor or British Freeholder”, which the authorities deemed to be 
seditious and to contain “gross and scandalous reflections” upon the government. He took 
an action for trespass following the execution of a search warrant in his home under the 
licensing statutes. Due to the general nature of the warrant the executing officials 
searched and examined all the rooms in his home, as well as private papers and 
materials.  
1.06 Delivering judgment in the case, Lord Camden CJ concluded that general warrants were 
not provided for in English law. He stated that the Court could “safely say that there is no 
law in this country to justify the defendants in what they [had] done; if there was, it would 
destroy all the comforts of society”.11 As Lord Camden CJ explained, the common law 
“holds the property of every man so sacred that no man can set foot upon his neighbour’s 
close without his leave. If he does, he is a trespasser... If he will tread upon his 
neighbour’s ground, he must justify it by law.”12 The Court added that where a warrant was 
to be granted for the search for stolen goods, the informer (applicant) and the justice 
involved should abide by certain safeguards and “proceed with great caution.”13 The 
procedure recommended by Lord Camden CJ, which reflected the views of Sir Matthew 
Hale, discussed above, was that there should be an oath sworn that a person has had his 
goods stolen and there should be a strong reason to believe that the goods are concealed 
in a particular place. Thus, the Court in Entick v Carrington rejected the concept of general 
warrants, but accepted the principle of search warrants subject to procedural safeguards.  
                                               
7
  See Coke Institutes of the Law of England, Volume IV, at 176 where Coke expressed the opinion that the 
broad writs were contrary to common law. 
8
  See generally Reynard “Freedom from Unreasonable Search and Seizure – A Second Class Constitutional 
Right?” (1950) 25 Indiana Law Journal 259, at 271 – 272; Polyviou Search and Seizure: Constitutional and 
Common Law (Duckworth 1982) at 10-11. 
9
  Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown, at 149-152. 
10
  (1765) 2 Wils 275, 19 State Tr 1029; [1558-1774] All ER Rep 41. 
11
  Ibid. 
12
  Ibid. 
13
  Ibid. 
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(4) United States Constitution: Fourth Amendment ban on unreasonable search and 
seizures 
1.07 The decision in Entick v Carrington also resolved the issue of the use of general warrants 
in the United States. In 1789, the Fourth Amendment to the US federal Constitution 
effectively codified the decision in Entick v Carrington by providing: 
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” 
1.08 The English rejection of the general warrant was also relied on as an authority to end the 
use of the writ. In 1886, in Boyd v United States14 the US Supreme Court commented that 
the ruling in Entick was “welcomed and applauded by the lovers of liberty in the colonies, 
as well as in the mother country.” Delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court, Bradley 
J added that Entick was “regarded as one of the permanent monuments of the British 
Constitution.”15 
(5) Evolution of search warrants in English and Irish law to the 20th century 
1.09 By the 19th century, the search warrant system based on procedural safeguards had 
become established in both England and the United States. In addition, an increasing 
number of Acts were enacted in the 19th century providing for specific search warrant 
powers. Further Acts were enacted in the 20th century which contained specific provisions 
governing search warrants.  
1.10 The approach adopted in Ireland reflected these developments.  In discussing the 
rejection of general warrants in 1842, Hayes noted the acceptance that “[a] general 
warrant to search all suspected places is decidedly illegal.”16  Similarly, a number of 
procedural rules consistent with those advocated by Sir Matthew Hale and implemented in 
Entick v Carrington17 had been applied in Irish law in the 19th century.  For example, the 
law in Ireland required that a justice receive sworn information of suspicion during the 
making an application for a warrant,18 that the place intended to be searched “be stated 
with convenient certainty”,19 that no search could be made beyond the premises specified 
in the warrant,20 and that in executing a warrant of search and seizure the officer(s) 
“should strictly obey its directions.”21  Further rules were also set out concerning issues 
such as the time at which the warrant should be executed, the use of force, the person to 
whom the warrant should be addressed and the procedure to be carried out once 
execution was completed.22  The approach that developed in 19th century Ireland formed 
                                               
14
  116 US 616 (1886). 
15
  116 US 616, at 626 (1886). 
16
  Hayes A Digest of the Criminal Statute Law in Ireland, Volume II (Hodges and Smith 1842) at 788.  
17
  (1765) 2 Wils 275, 19 State Tr 1029.  
18
  Thus, “a mere surmise without oath will not suffice”: Hayes A Digest of the Criminal Statute Law in Ireland, 
Volume II (Hodges and Smith 1842) at 788. See also Humphreys The Justice of the Peace for Ireland 
(Hodges, Figgis and Co Ltd 1897) at 759; Supple The Irish Justice of the Peace (William McGee Publishing 
1899) at 559; O’Connor The Irish Justice of the Peace (E Ponsonby Ltd 1911) at 144. 
19
  Hayes A Digest of the Criminal Statute Law in Ireland, Volume II (Hodges and Smith 1842) at 788. 
20
  O’Connor The Irish Justice of the Peace (E Ponsonby Ltd 1911) at 145.  
21
  Hayes A Digest of the Criminal Statute Law in Ireland, Volume II (Hodges and Smith 1842) at 789. See also 
O’Connor The Irish Justice of the Peace (E Ponsonby Ltd 1911) at 145. 
22
  See generally: Hayes A Digest of the Criminal Statute Law in Ireland, Volume II (Hodges and Smith 1842) at 
788-791; O’Connor The Irish Justice of the Peace (E Ponsonby Ltd 1911) at 144-146.  
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the basis of the law as it stood on the foundation of the State in 1922.  Since then, over 
100 Acts and almost 200 statutory Regulations conferring powers of search and seizure 
pursuant to warrant have been enacted (a thematic list of which is contained in Appendix 
A).  The content of these statutory powers has, broadly, followed the procedural 
requirements developed at common law. In addition, such legislative powers must now 
also be considered in light of the relevant fundamental rights in the Constitution of Ireland 
and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).   
B The Constitution and International Human Rights Standards Applicable to Search 
Warrants  
1.11 The 18th century decision Entick v Carrington emphasised the importance at common law 
of the privacy of the dwelling.  This principle is reinforced by the constitutional protection 
of the dwelling under Article 40 of the Constitution and the related constitutional right to 
privacy.  Moreover, the right to respect for private life is also protected under Article 8 of 
the ECHR.   
1.12 The use of a search warrant involves an interference with the right to privacy, be it in the 
context of a dwelling, workplace, vehicle, documents, or otherwise. The right to privacy is 
not, however, absolute.  While it exists as a safeguard which may be relied upon to 
prevent or challenge an undue interference with one’s privacy, it does not necessarily 
prevent all interferences.23    
(1) Protection of privacy 
1.13 Although there is no express reference to a general right to personal privacy in the Irish 
Constitution, the courts have recognised it as one of the unenumerated personal rights 
under Article 40.3 of the Constitution.  In Kennedy v Ireland,24 the High Court held that the 
“nature of the right to privacy must be such as to ensure the dignity and freedom of an 
individual in the type of society envisaged by the Constitution, namely a sovereign, 
independent and democratic society.”25  The High Court also held that the right was not 
absolute in nature and that “its exercise may be restricted by the constitutional rights of 
others, by the requirements of the common good and is subject to the requirements of 
public order and morality.”26   
1.14 This general approach also reflects the specific recognition of privacy in the ECHR.  
Article 8 of the ECHR expressly recognises the right to respect for private and family life.27  
Although Article 8.1 is broad in scope, and relates to a person’s privacy, family life, home 
and correspondence, Article 8.2 qualifies it by providing that the rights afforded by Article 
8 are not absolute.  It lists the interests and requirements which may justify an 
interference with the right, provided that the interference is “in accordance with law” and 
“necessary” to protect the interest(s) concerned.28   
                                               
23
  Kennedy v Ireland [1987] IR 587. 
24
  [1987] IR 587. 
25
  Ibid at 593. 
26
  Ibid at 592. This general approach has been applied in subsequent case law: see Hogan and Whyte (eds) 
Kelly: The Irish Constitution 4th ed (LexisNexis, 2003), at paragraphs 7.3.115-7.3.129. 
27
  Velu has commented that Article 8 was “to a great extent inspired by” Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, which was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948. Velu, “The 
European Convention on Human Rights and the right to respect for private life, home and communications” in 
Robertson (ed) Privacy and Human Rights (Manchester University Press 1973) at 14.  
28
  In Olsson v Sweden (No.1) 10465/83 [1988] ECHR 2 the European Court of Human Rights identified the 
interests and requirements flowing from the phrases “in accordance with law” and “necessary in a democratic 
society”.   
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1.15 As the right to privacy is well established in Ireland, both in terms of the Constitution and 
under the ECHR, the State is obliged to respect this right in exercising its powers and 
functions.  The right, however, is limited, and the State is permitted to restrict the privacy 
of a person in certain circumstances.  
1.16 Search warrants are relied upon for purposes such as the detection or prevention of 
crime, obtaining evidence which can ground a prosecution, or to ensure compliance with 
legal requirements.  These purposes are generally considered to be in the interests of the 
State and the common good.  Therefore, while the use of a search warrant may interfere 
with a person’s right to privacy, in some circumstances the intrusion may be justified.  The 
essential requirement is that the interference is necessary and does not go beyond what 
is justified and permissible.  When these constraints are not complied with, however, or 
when a search warrant is itself invalid, the person whose premises are subjected to the 
search may establish that his or her constitutional and/or ECHR right to privacy has been 
breached by the State.  This approach has influenced the detailed content of the statutory 
provisions concerning search warrants discussed in Chapters 2 to 6, below.  
(2) Protection of the dwelling 
1.17 Long before the decision in Entick v Carrington,29 the common law recognised that a 
man’s home was his castle and that there should be no undue interference with it.30  
Article 40.5 of the Constitution of Ireland expressly enshrines this traditional protection of 
the dwelling31 as one of the fundamental rights of citizens.  Article 40.5 states:  
“The dwelling of every citizen is inviolable and shall not be forcibly entered save in 
accordance with the law.”   
1.18 In The People (DPP) v Barnes32 the Court of Criminal Appeal held that Article 40.5: 
“is a modern formulation of a principle deeply felt throughout historical time and in 
every area to which the common law has penetrated. This is that a person’s 
dwellinghouse is far more than bricks and mortar; it is the home of a person and his or 
her family, dependents or guests (if any) and is entitled to a very high degree of 
protection at law for this reason.”33  
(a) Requirement to be in occupation of the dwelling 
1.19 In The People (Attorney General) v O’Brien34  the Supreme Court discussed the 
requirement that a person be in occupation of a premises to benefit from the constitutional 
right and what class of occupants benefit from it.  The Court observed that the persons 
affected by the search warrant in that case were members of a family living in the family 
home, with each of them having their own separate bedrooms.  The Court concluded that 
each of them would have a constitutional right to the inviolability of the dwelling as a 
whole.35   
                                               
29
  (1765) 2 Wils 275, 19 State Tr 1029; [1558-1774] All ER Rep 41. 
30
  Seymane’s Case (1604) 5 Co. Rep 91a; 77. 
31
  For discussions of what constitutes a “dwelling” see The People (Attorney General) v O’Brien [1965] IR 142 at 
169; The People (DPP) v Corrigan [1986] IR 290 at 296; The People (DPP) v Forbes [1994] 2 IR 542. 
32
  [2006] IECCA 165, [2007] 3 IR 130. 
33
  [2006] IECCA 165, [2007] 3 IR 130, paragraph 42. 
34
  [1965] IR 142.  See also The People (DPP) v Lawless (1984) 3 Frewen 30; The People (DPP) v Delaney 
[2003] 1 IR 363. 
35
  [1965] IR at 169.   
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1.20 Occupation of a dwelling must also be personal in nature, so that the protection does not 
extend to commercial premises. Thus, in The People (DPP) v McMahon36 members of An 
Garda Síochána entered a licensed premises to carry out a search.  The Supreme Court 
observed that the area entered was “the public portion of a licensed premises which is 
open for trade”, and therefore the constitutional protection of Article 40.5 did not apply.37  
(b) Scope of the protection of dwelling 
1.21 It is clear from Article 40.5 itself that the protection it offers to the dwelling is not absolute; 
forcible entry is prohibited “save in accordance with the law.” The Court of Criminal Appeal 
in The People (Attorney General) v Hogan38 held that the guarantee is: 
“not against forcible entry only. The meaning of the Article is that the dwelling of every 
citizen is inviolable except to the extent that entry is permitted by law which may 
permit forcible entry.”39  
1.22 The High Court in Ryan v O’Callaghan40 considered what was meant by the phrase “save 
in accordance with law”. It followed the explanation provided by Henchy J in the Supreme 
Court in King v Attorney General41 that the phrase means “without stooping to methods 
which ignore the fundamental norms of the legal order postulated by the Constitution.”42 
1.23 Where a search is to be carried out in a dwelling, a balancing of rights and interests is 
required. On the one hand is the person’s constitutional right to the inviolability of the 
dwelling.  The importance of upholding this constitutional right was clearly noted by the 
Supreme Court in The People (Attorney General) v O’Brien.43 Walsh J observed that “[t]he 
vindication and the protection of constitutional rights is a fundamental matter for all courts 
established under the Constitution... [and they] must recognise the paramount position of 
constitutional rights.”44 On the other hand is the interest of the State to prevent, detect and 
prosecute criminal offences, or to ensure adherence to the law.   
1.24 Although Article 40.5 of the Constitution protects the inviolability of the dwelling, this 
protection is not absolute.  There may be occasions where it is justifiable to set this right 
aside.  The courts have made it equally clear, however, that the constitutional right under 
Article 40.5 should not be set aside easily.  This must be done in accordance with law so 
that the constitutional right is not offended and, furthermore, the invasion of the right must 
not go beyond what is necessary.  
(3) Damache v Director of Public Prosecutions  
1.25 In Damache v Director of Public Prosecutions,45 the Supreme Court held that section 
29(1) of the Offences Against the State Act 1939, as inserted by section 5 of the Criminal 
                                               
36
  [1986] IR 393.  
37
  Ibid at 398.  
38
  (1972) 1 Frewen 360.  
39  This aspect of Article 40.5 was also considered by the Supreme Court in The People (Attorney General) v 
O’Brien [1965] IR 142, at 169. Walsh J expressed the view that the reference to forcible entry “is an intimation 
that forcible entry may be permitted by law but that in any event the dwelling of every citizen is inviolable save 
where entry is permitted by law and that, if necessary, such law may permit forcible entry.” 
40
  High Court 22 July 1987. 
41
  [1981] IR 233. 
42
  Ibid, at 5. 
43
  [1965] IR 142.  
44
  Ibid at 170. 
45
  [2011] IEHC 197, [2012] IESC 11; [2012] 2 IR 266. 
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Law Act 1976, was unconstitutional.  The decision in Damache was based primarily on the 
ground that section 29(1) of the 1939 Act, as amended, permitted a member of An Garda 
Síochána to issue a search warrant in circumstances which were not urgent where that 
member was directly involved in the criminal investigation in respect of which the search 
warrant was issued.  The decision reinforced the widely-held view (discussed further in 
Chapter 4 of this Report) that a search warrant may only be issued by an authority that is 
independent of the investigation to which the search warrant relates. 
(i) Circumstances in Damache  
1.26 In 2009, An Garda Síochána commenced an investigation into an alleged conspiracy to 
murder a Swedish cartoonist Lars Vilks, who had depicted the prophet Mohammad with 
the body of a dog.  The Gardaí suspected that the applicant was involved in this alleged 
conspiracy and that he had sent threatening messages to the United States.  As a result 
of intelligence received, the detective in charge of the investigation issued a search 
warrant to a detective sergeant authorising him to search the applicant’s home under 
section 29(1) of the Offences Against the State Act 1939, as inserted by section 5 of the 
Criminal Law Act 1976.  During the course of the search, Gardaí seized a number of items 
from the applicant’s home, including a mobile phone.  The applicant was later charged 
with sending a menacing message by telephone under section 13 of the Post Office 
(Amendment) Act 1951 (as amended by the Communications Regulation (Amendment) 
Act 2007). 
1.27 The applicant brought judicial review proceedings challenging the constitutionality of 
section 29(1) of the 1939 Act, as amended.  His challenge was rejected by the High Court 
but, on appeal, the Supreme Court declared section 29(1) unconstitutional. 
(ii) Legislative Context of Damache 
1.28 Section 29 of the Offences Against the State Act 1939, as substituted by section 5 of the 
Criminal Law Act 1976, provided:  
“Where a member of the Garda Síochána not below the rank of superintendent is 
satisfied that there is reasonable ground for believing that documentary evidence of or 
relating to the commission of an offence under this Act or the Criminal Law Act, 1976, 
or an offence which is for the time being a scheduled offence for the purposes of Part 
V of this Act, or evidence relating to the commission or intended commission of 
treason, is to be found in any building or part of a building or in any vehicle, vessel, 
aircraft or hovercraft or in any other place whatsoever, he may issue to a member of 
the Garda Síochána not below the rank of sergeant a search warrant under this 
section in relation to such place.”46 
1.29 As originally enacted, and as amended by the 1976 Act, section 29(1) of the 1939 Act 
authorised a member of An Garda Síochána to issue a search warrant to another member 
of An Garda Síochána.  Prior to its amendment by the 1976 Act, section 29(1) of the 1939 
Act empowered a member of An Garda Síochána not below the rank of chief 
superintendent to issue a search warrant to a member not below the rank of Inspector.  
The key change effected by the 1976 Act was to reduce both the rank of the issuing 
member and of the member to whom such a warrant might be issued.  
1.30 The applicant applied for judicial review seeking a declaration that section 29(1) of the 
1939 Act, as inserted by section 5 of the 1976 Act, was unconstitutional on the grounds 
that it authorised a search of the his  home on foot of a search warrant which was not 
issued by an independent person. 
  
                                               
46
  Emphasis added. 
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(iii) Decision of the Supreme Court  
1.31 In support of its decision that section 29(1) of the 1939 Act as amended was 
unconstitutional, the Supreme Court referred to statements in previous Irish decisions that 
a search warrant should be issued by an independent person.  The Court referred to the 
High Court decision in Ryan v O’Callaghan,47 where Barr J considered the constitutionality 
of section 42(1) of the Larceny Act 1916 (“the 1916 Act”).  That provision authorised a 
peace commissioner to issue a warrant in certain circumstances.  Barr J was of the view 
that the requirement under section 42(1) of the 1916 Act that the investigating police 
officer applying for a warrant must “satisfy a peace commissioner who is an independent 
person unconnected with criminal investigation”48 was an important procedural element for 
the protection of the public.    
1.32 The Supreme Court also referred to relevant case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR).  In Camezind v Switzerland,49 the ECtHR rejected the argument that a 
search of the applicant’s home carried out by officials from the Swiss Post and 
Telecommunications Authority violated his right to private life under Article 8 of the ECHR.  
The ECtHR noted that under the relevant Swiss legislation a search could, subject to 
exceptions, only be effected under a written warrant issued by a limited number of 
designated senior public servants and carried out by officials specially trained for the 
purpose.50 The ECtHR held that these citizens “each have an obligation to stand down if 
circumstances exist which could affect their impartiality.”51  The ECtHR concluded: 
“Having regard to the safeguards provided by Swiss legislation and especially to 
the limited scope of the search, the Court accepts that the interference with the 
applicant’s right to respect for his home can be considered to have been 
proportionate to the aim pursued and thus ‘necessary in a democratic society’ 
within the meaning of Article 8. Consequently, there has not been a violation of 
that provision.”52 
1.33 The Supreme Court in Damache also cited53 the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada 
in Hunter v Southam Inc.54  In Hunter, the Court held that a search executed under a 
warrant issued by members of the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission infringed 
section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which protects “the right to be 
secure against unreasonable search and seizure.”  The Court was of the view that “for the 
authorization procedure to be meaningful, it is necessary for the person authorizing the 
search to be able to assess the conflicting interests of the state and the individual in an 
entirely neutral and impartial manner.”55  
1.34 The Supreme Court of Canada considered that, while the person considering the prior 
authorisation need not be a judge, “he must nevertheless, at a minimum, be capable of 
acting judicially” and “must not be someone charged with investigative or prosecutorial 
functions under the relevant statutory scheme.”56  It held that a member of the Restrictive 
                                               
47
  High Court 22 July 1987. 
48
  Ibid at 5 
49
  (1999) 28 EHRR 458. 
50
  Ibid at paragraph 46. 
51
  Ibid. 
52
  Ibid at paragraph 44. 
53
  [2012] IESC 11, [2012] 2 IR 266 at paragraph 50. 
54
  [1984] 2 SCR 145. 
55
  Ibid at 146. 
56
  Ibid. 
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Trade Practices Commission “simply [could] not be the impartial arbiter necessary to grant 
an effective authorisation.”57 
1.35 In Damache, the Supreme Court reiterated that the issuing of a search warrant is an 
administrative act and does not constitute the administration of justice.58  Thus a search 
warrant need not be issued by a judge; it is however an action that must be exercised 
judicially.  The Court quoted with approval the following view of Keane J in Simple Imports 
Ltd v Revenue Commisisoners:59 
“The [judge of the District Court] is no doubt performing a purely ministerial act in 
issuing the warrant. He or she does not purport to adjudicate on any lis in issuing the 
warrant. He or she would clearly be entitled to rely on material, such as hearsay, 
which would not be admissible in legal proceedings.”60 
1.36 The Court noted in the Damache case that the place for which the search warrant was 
issued, and the place searched, was the applicant’s home. 61  It pointed out that the 
dwelling is regarded as a place of importance which is protected under Article 40.5 of the 
Constitution, so that “at the core of this case is to be found the principle of the 
constitutional protection of the home.”62 The Court expressly approved the view of Henchy 
J in King v Attorney General,63 when striking down as unconstitutional an offence created 
by section 4 of the Vagrancy Act 1824, for reasons including: “that it violates the 
guarantee in Article 40.4.1º that no citizen shall be deprived of personal liberty save in 
accordance with law – which means without stooping to methods which ignore the 
fundamental norms of the legal order postulated by the Constitution.”  The Supreme Court 
set out the following principles applicable to the search warrant process: 
“The procedure for obtaining a search warrant should adhere to fundamental 
principles encapsulating an independent decision maker, in a process which may be 
reviewed. The process should achieve the proportionate balance between the 
requirements of the common good and the protection of an individual’s rights. To 
these fundamental principles as to the process there may be exceptions, for example 
when there is an urgent matter.” 64 
1.37 It applied the proportionality principle and approved the following analysis of Costello J in 
Heaney v Ireland: 
“The objective of the impugned provision must be of sufficient importance to warrant 
over-riding a constitutionally protected right. It must relate to concerns pressing and 
substantial in a free and democratic society. The means chosen must pass a 
proportionality test. They must: 
(i) be rationally connected to the objective and not be arbitrary, unfair or based on 
irrational considerations; 
(ii) impair the right as little as possible; 
                                               
57
  Ibid at 164. 
58
  [2012] IESC 11 at paragraph 34. 
59
  [2000] 2 IR 243.  
60
  Ibid at 251. 
61
  [2012] IESC 11 at paragraph 39. 
62
  Ibid. 
63
  [1981] IR 233, 257. 
64
  [2012] IESC 11 at paragraph 47. 
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    (iii) be such that their effects on rights are proportionate to the objective.” 65 
1.38 The Supreme Court also cited with approval a passage from the 2006 Report of the 
Tribunal of Inquiry into Certain Gardaí in the Donegal Division (the Morris Tribunal Report) 
concerning the proportionality of section 29(1) of the 1939 Act.  The Morris Tribunal 
Report stated that “the power to issue a warrant should be vested in a judge”66 and that 
with modern technology “there is no reason why a judge cannot be easily contacted by 
telephone, facsimile or e-mail or personally for the purpose of making an application to 
him or her for a search warrant.”67  It noted that a decision to issue a search warrant 
involved striking a balance between the interests of An Garda Síochána in the 
investigation of the criminal offence and the constitutional or legal rights of the person 
whose premises are the subject of the search warrant.  Thus, it stated that there are “very 
limited occasions upon which time would be so pressing as to make it impossible to follow 
such a procedure.”68  The Morris Tribunal Report recommended that urgent consideration 
be given to vesting the power to issue search warrants under section 29 of the 1939 Act to 
judges of the District Court or Circuit Court.  
(iv) Conclusions of the Supreme Court  
1.39 Two circumstances were “at the kernel”69 of the Supreme Court’s decision in Damache to 
strike down section 29(1) of the 1939 Act, as amended.  The first was that “the warrant 
was issued by a member of the Garda Síochána investigating team which was 
investigating the matters.”70  The Court was of the view that the person authorising the 
warrant was not independent and held that “[i]n the circumstances of this case a person 
issuing the search warrant should be independent of the Garda Síochána, to provide 
effective independence.”71 
1.40 The second relevant circumstance was “that the place for which the search warrant was 
issued, and which was searched, was the appellant’s dwelling house”72 and was therefore 
expressly protected under Article 40.5 of the Constitution.  The Court noted that “[n]o 
issue of urgency arose in this case, and the Court has not considered or addressed 
situations of urgency.”73  It stated that, although it was not directly relevant to the outcome 
in the case, “it is best practice to keep a record of the basis upon which a search warrant 
is granted.”74  The Court concluded by declaring that section 29(1) of the Offences against 
the State Act 1939, as inserted by section 5 of the Criminal Law Act 1976, was repugnant 
to the Constitution as it permitted a search of the applicant’s home on foot of a warrant 
that was not issued by an independent person.75 
                                               
65
  [1994] 3 IR 593 at 607. 
66
  Fifth Report of the Morris Tribunal Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry into Certain Gardaí in the Donegal Division 
(Government Publications 2006) paragraphs 623-624, quoted in Damache v Director of Public Prosecutions 
[2012] IESC 11 at paragraph 53. 
67
  Ibid. 
68
  Ibid. 
69
  [2011] IESC 11 at paragraph 56. 
70
  [2011] IESC 11 at  paragraph 54. 
71
  Ibid. 
72
  Ibid at paragraph 55. 
73
  Ibid at paragraph 57. 
74
  Ibid at paragraph 58. 
75
  Ibid at paragraph 59. The courts have subsequently considered the effect of the decision of the Supreme 
Court in Damache on other cases where evidence was gathered pursuant to a search warrant issued under 
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(4) Legislative response to the Damache case 
1.41 The legislative response to the Supreme Court decision in Damache was the enactment 
of the Criminal Justice (Search Warrants) Act 2012 (“the 2012 Act”), which inserted a new 
section 29 into the 1939 Act.  The amended section 29 contains the following key 
elements: 
i. It identifies the offences to which section 29 applies.  These are: an offence under the 
1939 Act or the Criminal Law Act 1976; a scheduled offence for the purposes of Part V 
of the 1939 Act (that is, offences that may be tried before the Special Criminal Court), 
treason and the related inchoate offences of attempting, conspiring or inciting. 76 
ii. It provides that a judge of the District Court may issue a warrant for the search of a 
place. In order to do so the judge must be satisfied by information on oath of a member 
of An Garda Síochána of the rank of sergeant (or above) that there are reasonable 
grounds for suspecting that evidence of or relating to the commission of an offence to 
which the section applies is to be found in that place.77 
iii. It empowers a member of An Garda Síochána of the rank of superintendent (or above) 
to issue a search warrant under the section to a member of An Garda Síochána of the 
rank of sergeant (or above).78 
iv. It provides that a superintendent may only issue a warrant under this section if: (i) he or 
she is satisfied that the warrant is necessary for the proper investigation of an offence to 
which the section applies and (ii) he or she is satisfied that circumstances of urgency 
giving rise to the need for the immediate issue of the warrant would render it 
impracticable to apply to a judge of the District Court.79 
v. It adds a further qualification to the power of a superintendent to issue a warrant under 
this section: the issuing officer must be independent of the investigation concerned.80  
‘‘Independent of’’ is defined as not being in charge or involved in the investigation 
concerned. 
vi. It provides for the information to be set out in the warrant and the actions that may be 
carried out pursuant to the warrant. The actions are those of entry, search (of both the 
place and any person found there), and seizure of anything found at the place or in the 
possession of a person present at the place. The seizure power relates to items that the 
member of An Garda Síochána (or, where relevant, member of the Defence Forces) 
reasonably believes to be evidence of, or, related to the commission of an offence to 
which the section applies. The right to enter is subject to the obligation to produce the 
warrant or a copy of it, if requested. The entry may be achieved by use of reasonable 
force, if necessary. A warrant issued by a judge of the District Court permits multiple 
entries within 1 week of the date of issue of the warrant.81 
                                                                                                                                                       
section 29(1) of the Offences Against the State Act 1939. See The People (DPP) v Cunningham [2012] IECCA 
64; The People (DPP) v Kavanagh [2012] IECCA 65; The People (DPP) v O’Brien [2012] IECCA 68; The 
People (DPP) v Bolger [2013] IECCA 6. 
76
  Section 29(1) of the 1939 Act, as inserted by the 2012 Act. 
77
  Section 29(2). 
78
  Section 29(3). 
79
  Section 29(4). 
80
  Section 29(5). 
81
  Section 29(6). 
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vii. It specifies a maximum duration of 48 hours for warrants issued by a Garda 
superintendent from the time of the issue of such a warrant.82 
viii. It provides that a member of An Garda Síochána (or, where relevant, the Defence 
Forces) acting under the authority of a warrant under the section may require any person 
present at the place where the search is being carried out to give to the member his or 
her name and address. It provides an arrest power in the event that any person: 
obstructs or attempts to obstruct a member in the carrying out of his or her duties, fails to 
give a member his or her name and address, or gives a false or misleading name or 
address.83 
ix. It provides that a person commits an offence where he or she obstructs or attempts to 
obstruct a member acting under the authority of a warrant, fails to comply with a 
requirement to provide their name and address when requested, or who gives a false or 
misleading name or address. The maximum penalties on conviction are a class A fine 
(currently, in accordance with the Fines Act 2010, a fine not exceeding €5,000) or 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or both.84 
x. It provides that the power to issue a warrant under this section is without prejudice to 
any other power conferred by statute to issue a warrant for the search of any place or 
person.85 
xi. It requires that a member of An Garda Síochána of the rank of superintendent (or above) 
who issues a warrant under this section must record the grounds on which he or she 
issued the warrant, either at the time, or, as soon as reasonably practicable after issuing 
the warrant.86 
1.42 The 2012 Act also amended section 26 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, which authorises 
a Garda Superintendent to issue a search warrant.  Section 26(1) of the 1977 Act, as 
amended by section 8 of the Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act 1996 already provided 
that a Garda not below the rank of Superintendent could only issue a search warrant 
under that provision if he or she was satisfied that the urgency of the situation meant that 
it was impracticable to apply to a District Court judge or Peace Commissioner, and that 
such a warrant would cease to have effect 24 hours after it was issued.   
1.43 Section 3 of the 2012 Act inserted two additional safeguards into section 8 of the 1996 
Act: 
i. Section 8(2A) of the 1996 Act provides that only a Garda superintendent who is 
independent of the investigation concerned may issue a warrant under section 26 of the 
1977 Act.  ‘‘Independent of’’ is defined as not being in charge of, or involved in the 
investigation concerned.  
ii. Section 8(2B) of the 1996 Act, inserted by the 2012 Act, requires a Garda 
superintendent who issues a warrant under section 26 of the 1977 Act to record the 
grounds on which he or she issued the warrant, either at the time, or as soon as 
reasonably practicable after issuing the warrant.  
1.44 The 2012 Act addresses the principal matter dealt with by the Supreme Court in the 
Damache case by ensuring that decisions authorising the search of any place, including a 
dwelling, are taken by persons who are independent of the investigation.  Section 29(1) of 
the 1939 Act, as amended by the 2012 Act, now provides that a warrant should be issued 
                                               
82
  Section 29(7). 
83
  Section 29(8). 
84
  Section 29(9). 
85
  Section 29(10). 
86
  Section 29(11).  
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by a judge of the District Court.  However, it also provides that, in urgent circumstances, a 
member of An Garda Síochána not connected with the investigation may issue such a 
warrant.  The amended powers in the 1939 Act are without prejudice to other statutory 
search warrant powers.  These include section 10 of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1997, as amended by section 6 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006), which 
allows a member of An Garda Síochána to apply to a judge of the District Court for a 
search warrant in relation to any arrestable offence, that is, an offence attracting a 
sentence of 5 years or more on conviction.  
(5) Conclusions on constitutional and ECHR standards applicable to search warrants 
1.45 Having regard to both the Supreme Court decision in Damache and the review above of 
the domestic and international case law concerning the right to privacy and the protection 
of the dwelling, the Commission considers that the following principles should inform its 
proposals for reform in the succeeding Chapters of this Report: 
1. The law on search warrants must respect the right to privacy and property in Article 
40.3 of the Constitution and the protection of the dwelling under Article 40.5, and the 
right to respect for private life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. 
2. The law on search warrants may encroach on these rights, but only to the extent 
necessary in a democratic state and only in a proportionate manner. 
3. Search warrants authorising the search of a dwelling where a person resides should 
be subject to additional scrutiny to ensure that they comply with constitutional 
requirements. 
4. The person authorising the search should be in a position to assess the conflicting 
interests of the State and the person to whom the search warrant is addressed in an 
impartial manner.  Thus, the person authorising the search should be independent of the 
investigation requiring the search warrant and must act judicially.  
5. Although the issuing of a search warrant does not involve the administration of justice 
and does not, therefore, have to be issued by a court, it is in general preferable that a 
search warrant be issued by a court. 
6. There should be reasonable grounds established that an offence has been committed 
and that there may be evidence to be found at the place of the search. 




CHAPTER 2 A GENERALLY APPLICABLE SEARCH WARRANTS ACT 
A A Generally Applicable Search Warrants Act  
(1) Relationship between law on search warrants and general law on entry, search and 
seizure, including powers of entry and search without warrant   
2.01 This Report focuses on the law concerning search warrants (and, in Chapter 7, on bench 
and committal warrants). It does not deal directly with the powers of An Garda Síochána – 
and increasingly those of virtually all regulatory bodies – of entry, search and seizure that 
apply without the need to obtain a search warrant; or with their (more limited) powers of 
stop and search without the need for a search warrant.  While these “warrantless powers” 
fall outside the scope of this Report, it is nonetheless important to discuss them because 
the law on search warrants forms part of the general law on entry, search and seizure.  It 
would therefore not be possible to complete a review the law on search warrants without 
acknowledging these warrantless powers. The Commission therefore discusses 
immediately below these related powers before proceeding to discuss the law on search 
warrants. 
(a) Limited common law powers to enter private property, including without a warrant  
2.02 At common law, members of An Garda Síochána do not have any general authority to 
enter onto or remain on private property for the purpose of investigating a criminal 
offence.1  A Garda may, however, enter private property without a warrant with the 
consent of the owner or occupier. This consent may be implied but the implication of 
consent is rebuttable.  However, given the express constitutional protection of the dwelling 
in Article 40.5 of the Constitution, discussed in Chapter 1, consent to enter a dwelling will 
not readily be implied.2  
2.03 A Garda may also enter private property without a search warrant in other limited 
circumstances, such as to terminate an actual affray, to prevent an occupant from causing 
serious injury to another person on the premises or to prevent the destruction of 
evidence.3 
(b) Statutory powers to enter and search without warrant 
2.04 A large number of statutory powers exist which authorise An Garda Síochána – and 
officers of various regulatory authorities, such as the Competition and Consumer 
Protection Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Food Safety Authority 
of Ireland and the Health and Safety Authority – to enter, search and inspect premises 
without a warrant.  The Commission does not propose to list all of these powers here, but 
their wide scope may be seen from the examples set out in Appendix B to this Report.   
2.05 Warrantless powers of entry are provided for in legislation governing a wide range of 
areas such as animal health and welfare,4 broadcasting,5 child protection6 company law 
                                               
1
  Walsh Criminal Procedure (Thomson Round Hall 2002) at paragraph 8-03. 
2
  Ibid at paragraph 8-03. 
3
  Ibid at paragraph 8-04. 
4
  Section 38 of the Animal Health and Welfare Act 2013; section 16(1)(d) of the Control of Dogs Act 1986, as 
substituted by section 7 of the Control of Dogs (Amendment) Act 1992; section 34 of the Control of Horses Act 
1996; section 19 of the Dog Breeding Establishments Act 2010; section 18 of the Welfare of Greyhounds Act 
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enforcement,7 competition law,8 customs and excise,9 and safety and health at work.10  For 
example, section 50(4)(b) of the Broadcasting Act 2009 allows a Broadcasting Authority of 
Ireland investigator to enter the premises of a broadcasting contractor to conduct 
inspections and examine broadcasting equipment.  Section 23T of the Child Care Act 
1991, as inserted by section 16 of the Children Act 2001, empowers an authorised officer 
of the Child and Family Agency to enter any premises (including a private dwelling) in 
which a child who is the subject of a private foster care arrangement resides.  Sections 36 
and 37 of the Competition and Consumer Protection Act 2014 authorise officers of the 
Competition and Consumer Protection Commission to enter premises for the purposes of 
inspecting compliance with the Competition Act 2002 and the Consumer Protection Act 
2007. Section 12 of the Criminal Justice (Psychoactive Substances) Act 2010 authorises a 
member of An Garda Síochána to enter without warrant any place other than a dwelling 
where he or she believes activity in relation to the sale, importation or advertisement of 
psychoactive substances and carry out examinations, take samples and seize items of 
evidence. Under section 64(1) of the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005 an 
inspector of the Health and Safety Authority has the power to enter any place which he or 
she has reasonable grounds for believing is a place of work and conduct searches, 
examinations and inspections to assess compliance with the relevant statutory provisions 
concerning safety and health at work.       
2.06 The majority of these Acts provide that the powers to enter and search without a warrant 
may not be exercised in respect of a private dwelling (the provisions of the Child Care Act 
1991, above, being a notable exception). Some Acts also provide that, even in the case of 
commercial premises, a regulatory authority may apply to the District Court for a search 
warrant. It is common for such legislative provisions to provide that the officer may be 
accompanied by a member of An Garda Síochána; this may be used if it is anticipated 
that entry and inspection might be resisted. In both respects, these statutory powers are 
linked to, and overlap with, the law on search warrants.  
  
                                                                                                                                                       
2011. Comparable powers are contained in Regulations that implement EU Directives: see, for example, 
Regulation 31 of the European Communities (Welfare of Farmed Animals) Regulations 2010 (SI No.311 of 
2010). 
5
  Section 50(4) of the Broadcasting Act 2009.  
6
  Section 23T of the Child Care Act 1991, as inserted by section 16 of the Children Act 2001; section 58J of the 
Child Care Act 1991, as inserted by section 92 of the Child and Family Agency Act 2013; section 254 of the 
Children Act 2001, as amended by section 75 and schedule 7, part 11, item 19 of the Health Act 2004 (Garda 
power of arrest without warrant; and section 354(5) allows search also); sections 10(2)(e) and 13(3)(a)(i) of 
the Education Act 1998. 
7
  Section 787 and 788 of the Companies Act 2014, which replaced section 20 of the Companies Act 1990, as 
amended by section 30 of the Company Law Enforcement Act 2001 and section 5 of the Companies 
(Amendment) Act 2009. 
8
  Sections 36 and 37 of the Competition and Consumer Protection Act 2014. 
9
  Sections 25 to 35 of the Customs Act 2015. These provisions (not commenced at the time of writing) will 
replace powers set out in a wide range of pre-2015 provisions. Customs and excise: section 205 of the 
Customs Consolidation Act 1876, as amended by section 19 of the Finance Act 1936; section 5 of the 
Customs and Excise (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1988 (restricted to customs by schedule 3 of the Finance 
Act 2001); Excise: section 136 of the Finance Act 2001, as amended by section 87 of the Finance Act 2002, 
section 90 of the Finance Act 2003, section 9 of the Finance Act 2005 and section 73 of the Finance Act 2012. 
10
  Section 64(1) of the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005. 
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(c) Power of arrest without warrant in the Criminal Law Act 1997: arrestable offences  
2.07 The Criminal Law Act 1997 contains a power of arrest without warrant in respect of an 
arrestable offence, that is, an offence that carries, on conviction, a sentence of 
imprisonment of 5 years or more.11  
2.08 The power of arrest without warrant in respect of “arrestable offences” is a key feature of 
the 1997 Act.  Section 4(1) of the 1997 Act provides for a citizen’s arrest, namely that any 
person may arrest without warrant anyone who is, or whom he or she, with reasonable 
cause, suspects to be in the act of committing an arrestable offence.  As well as applying 
only where an arrestable offence is being committed, this power is further limited by 
section 4(4), which provides that the power may only be exercised where the person 
effecting the arrest suspects, with reasonable cause, that the person to be arrested by him 
or her would otherwise attempt to avoid, or is avoiding, arrest by a member of An Garda 
Síochána.  
2.09 A more wide-ranging power of arrest without warrant is conferred on members of An 
Garda Síochána by section 4(3) of the 1997 Act, which provides that, where, with 
reasonable cause, a Garda suspects that an arrestable offence has been or is being 
committed, he or she may arrest without warrant anyone whom he or she, with reasonable 
cause, suspects to be guilty of the offence. 
(d) Powers of entry and search for purpose of arrest in the Criminal Law Act 1997: with 
and without warrant 
2.10 Sections 5 and 6 of the Criminal Law Act 1997 concern the powers of An Garda Síochána 
operating under a warrant.  Section 5 of the 1997 Act provides that a warrant for the arrest 
of a person or an order of committal (which are discussed in Chapter 7 of this Report) may 
be executed by a member of An Garda Síochána notwithstanding that it is not in the 
possession of the Garda at the time.  In addition it provides that the warrant or order must 
be shown to the person in question as soon as practicable.  Section 6(1) of the 1997 Act 
provides that, for the purpose of arresting a person on foot of an arrest warrant or a 
committal order, a member of An Garda Síochána may enter (by use of reasonable force 
if necessary) and search any premises (including a dwelling) where the person is or where 
the member, with reasonable cause, suspects that person to be. Such a warrant or order 
may be executed in accordance with section 5 of the 1997 Act. 
2.11 Section 6(2) of the 1997 Act provides that, for the purpose of arresting a person without a 
warrant for an arrestable offence, a member of An Garda Síochána may enter (if need be, 
by use of reasonable force) and search any premises (including a dwelling) where that 
person is or where the member, with reasonable cause, suspects that person to be.  It 
also provides that, where the premises is a dwelling the member shall not, unless acting 
with the consent of an occupier of the dwelling or other person who appears to the 
member to be in charge of the dwelling, enter that dwelling unless: (a) he or she or 
another such member has observed the person within or entering the dwelling, or (b) he 
or she, with reasonable cause, suspects that before a warrant of arrest could be obtained 
the person will either abscond for the purpose of avoiding justice or will obstruct the 
course of justice, or (c) he or she, with reasonable cause, suspects that before a warrant 
of arrest could be obtained the person would commit an arrestable offence, or (d) the 
person ordinarily resides at that dwelling. 
2.12 Section 6(3) of the 1997 Act provides that, without prejudice to any express amendment 
or repeal made by the 1997 Act, section 6 “shall not affect the operation of any enactment 
or rule of law relating to powers of search or powers of arrest.” 
  
                                               
11
  Section 2 of the Criminal Law Act 1997. 
 26 
(e) Stop and search powers 
2.13 An Garda Síochána do not have any general common law power to stop and search 
persons who are not under arrest.12  As Walsh notes, by contrast the US Supreme Court 
held in Terry v Ohio13 that a police officer could lawfully stop and search a person where 
he or she had reasonable grounds to suspect, as in that case, that the person might be 
armed and about to commit a robbery.14  
2.14 Nonetheless, considerable stop and search powers have been conferred by legislation on 
An Garda Síochána.  These include a wide power to stop and search a vehicle under 
section 8 of the Criminal Law Act 1976, as amended, where a member of An Garda 
Síochána with reasonable cause suspects that a specified list of offences is being, or is 
about to be, committed.15  Section 30 of the Offences against the State Act 1939 
empowers a member of An Garda Síochána to “stop and interrogate” a person that he or 
she suspects has committed, or is about to commit, an offence under the 1939 Act or any 
scheduled offence under the 1939 Act. 
2.15 The Road Traffic Acts 1961 to 2014 also confer considerable Garda powers of stop and 
search in connection with the enforcement of these Acts.  In particular, these include 
provision for mandatory roadside breath testing of drivers related to drink and drug driving 
offences.16 
2.16 In addition, and mirroring the statutory powers to search commercial premises without a 
warrant discussed above, a large number of statutory powers exist which authorise 
members of An Garda Síochána and officers of various regulatory authorities to stop and 
search persons.17 For example, legislative powers of stop and search exist in connection 
                                               
12
  Walsh Criminal Procedure (Thomson Round Hall 2002) at paragraph 7-13. 
13
  392 US 1 (1968). 
14
  Walsh Criminal Procedure (Thomson Round Hall 2002) at paragraph 8-03. 
15
  Section 8 of the Criminal Law Act 1976, as amended most recently by section 6 of the Illegal Immigrants 
(Trafficking) Act 2000, applies to: (a) an offence under the Offences against the State Act 1939 or any 
scheduled offence under Part 5 of the 1939 Act; (b) an offence under section 2 or 3 of the Criminal Law 
(Jurisdiction) Act 1976; (c) murder, manslaughter or an offence under section 18 of the Offences against the 
Person Act 1861 (since repealed by section 31 and the Schedule to the Non-Fatal Offences Against the 
Person Act 1997); (d) an offence under section 23, 23A or 23B of the Larceny Act 1916 (since replaced by the 
Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001); (e) an offence of malicious damage to property 
involving the use of fire or of any explosive substance (within the meaning of section 7(1)(e) of the Criminal 
Law Act 1976); (f) an offence under the Firearms Acts 1925 to 2006; (g) escape from lawful custody; (h) an 
offence under section 11 of the Air Navigation and Transport Act 1973, or under section 10 of the Criminal 
Law (Jurisdiction) Act 1976; (i) any offence under the Criminal Law Act 1976 itself; (j) an offence under section 
12(1) of the Firearms and Offensive Weapons Act 1990; (k) an offence under section 112(2) of the Road 
Traffic Act 1961 (substituted by section 3(7) of the Road Traffic (Amendment) Act 1984 and subsequently 
amended by section 18 and Table, Part 1 reference numbers 21 and 22 of the Road Traffic Act 2006); and (l) 
an offence under section 2 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000. 
16
  See generally Pierse Road Traffic Law: The 1961-2011 Road Traffic Acts: Annotated Legislation (Bloomsbury 
Professional 2012). 
17
  See Walsh Criminal Procedure (Thomson Round Hall 2002), at paragraph 7-21, for the position in 2002. 
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with animal health and welfare,18 customs and excise (including illicit alcohol distillation),19 
drugs,20 explosives21 and wildlife protection.22  
(2) Over 300 existing search warrant provisions 
2.17 A large number of statutory provisions on search warrants currently exist in Ireland.  
Appendix A to this Report contains a list of 300 separate legislative provisions (143 Acts 
and 159 Statutory Instruments) that, as of 2015, confer powers to issue search warrants. 
As the Commission noted in the Consultation Paper, while the majority of these statutory 
provisions share common features, notably that the application for a search warrant is 
usually made on oath to a judge of the District Court, they also contain differences 
relevant to their own statutory context.23 Walsh has commented:  
“[T]he current statutory powers to issue search warrants constitute an unwieldy 
collection of disparate provisions which have been developed in a piecemeal fashion 
over the past two centuries. Each authorises the issue of a search warrant only when 
its own peculiar requirements have been satisfied.” 24  
2.18 The Commission agrees with this criticism and accepts that, since many of the existing 
statutory provisions on search warrants overlap with each other and contain sometimes 
small but significant differences, there is a need for overarching reform.  
2.19 The common law power to issue search warrants was limited to searches for stolen 
goods.25 This power was placed on a statutory footing in section 103 of the Larceny Act 
1861.26  Since then, the list of statutory provisions that authorise the issuing and execution 
of search warrants has grown enormously and has a wide scope, as the list of over 300 
provisions in Appendix A of this Report clearly indicates.  
2.20 Areas in which current legislation provides powers of entry and search on foot of a search 
warrant include: all arrestable offences,27 animal health and welfare,28 broadcasting,29 child 
                                               
18
  Section 40 of the Animal Health and Welfare Act 2013. 
19
  Sections 25 to 35 of the Customs Act 2015. These provisions (not commenced at the time of writing) will 
replace powers set out in a wide range of pre-2015 provisions. 
20
  Section 23 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 as amended by section 12 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1984. 
21
  Section 73 of the Explosives Act 1875, as amended (licensed civil use of explosives), and section 8(1) of the 
Explosive Substances Act 1883, as amended (criminal offences concerning explosives).  
22
  Section 72 of the Wildlife Act 1976 as amended. 
23
  Consultation Paper on Search Warrants and Bench Warrants (LRC CP 58-2009) at paragraph 2.02.  
24
  Walsh Criminal Procedure (Thomson Round Hall 2002) at paragraph 8-09. 
25 
 Consultation Paper on Search Warrants and Bench Warrants (LRC CP 58-2009) at paragraph 1.04. 
26
  This was replaced, in turn, by section 42 of the Larceny Act 1916 and section 48 of the Criminal Justice (Theft 
and Fraud) Offences Act 2001, subsequently amended by section 192 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006. See 
Ryan and Magee The Irish Criminal Process (Mercier 1983) at 147-148; McCutcheon The Larceny Act 1916 
(Round Hall Press 1988) at 129-30; and Walsh Criminal Procedure (Thomson Round Hall 2002) at paragraph 
8-10.  
27
  Section 10 of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1997 as enacted was confined to a specified 
list of offences against the person, notably murder and sexual offences.  Section 10 of the 1997 Act, as 
inserted by section 6 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006, now applies to all arrestable offences, that is, offences 
for which on conviction a penalty of 5 years imprisonment or more applies. As a result, section 10 of the 1997 
Act now overlaps with a number of offences dealt with in the other Acts discussed in the footnotes immediately 
following below and in the more extensive list in Appendix A.  
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protection,30 company law enforcement,31 competition law,32 customs and excise,33 drugs 
(including drug trafficking),34 immigration35 and safety and health at work.36   
2.21 These statutory powers invariably form a small element of the Acts or Statutory 
Instruments in which they appear. In the Consultation Paper, the Commission noted that a 
number of other jurisdictions had enacted generally applicable legislation on search 
warrants. Such a general Search Warrants Act sets out, in a single piece of legislation 
(which sometimes comprises part of a legislative code on criminal procedure),37 common 
provisions relating to each element of the search warrant process (including application, 
issuing and execution) and also relevant procedural safeguards.  
(3) Search Warrant Acts in other jurisdictions  
2.22 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission discussed the generally applicable legislative 
provisions on search warrants operating in Australia (the Australian Commonwealth,38 
New South Wales,39 Tasmania40 and Western Australia41), Canada,42 England and Wales43 
                                                                                                                                                       
28
  Section 38 of the Animal Health and Welfare Act 2013; section 16(1) of the Control of Dogs Act 1986, as 
substituted by section 7 of the Control of Dogs (Amendment) Act 1992; section 34 of the Control of Horses Act 
1996; section 19 of the Dog Breeding Establishments Act 2010; section 18 of the Welfare of Greyhounds Act 
2011. Comparable powers are contained in Regulations that implement EU Directives: see, for example, 
Regulation 31 of the European Communities (Welfare of Farmed Animals) Regulations 2010 (SI No.311 of 
2010). 
29
  Section 50(4) of the Broadcasting Act 2009.  
30
  Section 23T of the Child Care Act 1991, as inserted by section 16 of the Children Act 2001. 
31
  Section 787 and 788 of the Companies Act 2014, which replaced section 20 of the Companies Act 1990, as 
amended by section 30 of the Company Law Enforcement Act 2001 and section 5 of the Companies 
(Amendment) Act 2009. 
32
  Sections 36 and 37 of the Competition and Consumer Protection Act 2014. 
33
  Sections 25 to 35 of the Customs Act 2015. These provisions (not commenced at the time of writing) will 
replace powers set out in a wide range of pre-2015 provisions. Customs and excise: section 205 of the 
Customs Consolidation Act 1876, as amended by section 19 of the Finance Act 1936; section 5 of the 
Customs and Excise (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1988 (restricted to customs by schedule 3 of the Finance 
Act 2001); Excise: section 136 of the Finance Act 2001, as amended by section 87 of the Finance Act 2002, 
section 90 of the Finance Act 2003, section 9 of the Finance Act 2005 and section 73 of the Finance Act 2012. 
34
  Section 26 of the Misuse of Dugs Act 1977, as amended by section 13 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1984 and  
section 8 the Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act 1996; section 55 of the Criminal Justice Act 1994, as 
amended by section 35 of the Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005 and section 15 of the Criminal 
Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1997; section 8 of the Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act 1996, as 
amended by section 3 of the Criminal Justice (Search Warrants) Act 2012. These provisions supplement the 
powers to search persons and vehicles (not premises) in section 23 of the 1977 Act (as amended), which do 
not require a warrant from the District Court. 
35
  Section 7 of the Aliens Act 1935, as substituted by section 4 of the Immigration Act 2003; section 1 of the 
Immigration Act 2004. 
36
  Section 64(1) of the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005. 
37
  In the common law jurisdictions that have enacted statutory codes of criminal law and procedure, such as 
Australia and New Zealand, the relevant Search Warrant Acts form part of those general legislative codes.  
38
  Crimes Act 1914, as amended.  
39
  Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002.  
40
  Search Warrants Act 1997.  
41
  Criminal Investigation Act 2006.  
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and New Zealand.44  The Commission identified the following core provisions in almost all 
of these Acts:45 
 the application procedure;  
 the process for issuing search warrants;  
 the authority conferred by search warrants;  
 the validity period of an issued warrant;  
 execution of warrants;  
 the use of force during execution;  
 the use of equipment during a search;  
 the attendance of assistants at a search warrant execution;  
 obstruction of searches;  
 seizing and retaining material found during the course of a search;  
 rights of occupiers;  
 giving copies of search warrants or inventories of items seized to occupiers; and  
 procedures regarding privileged materials. 
2.23 The legislation in those jurisdictions also prescribe the threshold of offence to which they 
apply, with many providing that a warrant may be applied for, issued and executed either: 
(a) where it is believed that evidence may be found relating to a specific category of 
criminal offence, such as an arrestable offence or an indictable offence (or, in some 
instances, any offence); or (b) that an item intended for use in the commission of an 
offence may be found. It is clear that the scope of these Acts is usually broad, and 
therefore they can be relied upon generally in cases where a search warrant is required. 
In some jurisdictions, a generally applicable Search Warrants Act operates alongside 
existing specific statutory powers concerning search warrants, such as in the field of child 
protection, corporate enforcement and in other contexts where state regulatory bodies are 
also given extensive related inspection powers, including warrantless powers of entry, 
search and seizure.  
2.24 The specific forms of search warrant documents are sometimes set out in these Acts but 
are more often set out in separate Regulations. Part 6 of the England and Wales Criminal 
Procedure Rules 2013 contain search warrant application forms with guidance notes on 
completing the forms in respect of the search warrant powers in the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984, as amended. A Schedule to Canada’s Criminal Code 1985 contains 
an application form, a standard search warrant form and report forms relating to property 
seized. In New South Wales the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) 
Regulation 2005 contains the forms required in respect of the Law Enforcement (Powers 
and Responsibilities) Act 2002. These include a search warrant application form, an 
issuing officer’s record of application form (to record his or her receipt of the application), 
a standard search warrant form and an occupier’s notice form. In Western Australia the 
Criminal Investigation Act 2006 is supplemented by the Crimes (Search Warrant) 
Regulations 2004, which contain the search warrant form to be used when a warrant is 
                                                                                                                                                       
42
  Canadian Criminal Code 1985.  
43
  Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.  
44
  Search and Surveillance Act 2012 (discussed in the Consultation Paper as the Search and Surveillance Bill 
2009).  
45
  Consultation Paper on Search Warrants and Bench Warrants (LRC CP 58-2009) at paragraphs 2.06–2.17. 
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issued under the 2006 Act. In Victoria the Crimes (Search Warrant) Regulations 2004 
provide the search warrant form to be used where a warrant is issued under the Crimes 
Act 1958, as amended.       
(4) Conclusion on the enactment of a generally applicable Search Warrants Act  
2.25 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission identified a number of significant advantages 
of a generally applicable Search Warrants Act, and the disadvantages of the current 
position in this jurisdiction which has led to the creation of over 300 statutory search 
warrant provisions. The Commission therefore provisionally recommended the enactment 
of a single generally applicable Search Warrants Act.46 The submissions received by the 
Commission since the publication of the Consultation Paper supported this analysis. For 
the purposes of this Report, it is worth reiterating these arguments. 
2.26 Firstly, the enactment of a generally applicable Search Warrants Act would mean that 
those concerned with applying for, issuing and executing search warrants would have a 
single set of consistent and standard criteria for each stage of the process, by contrast 
with the varying standards that are a feature of the 300 existing legislative provisions. This 
result would also be consistent with one of the general purposes of law reform, to 
consolidate and simplify the law. Secondly, it would have the consequential advantage 
that those involved in the process would no longer be required to determine, as is the 
position at present, which specific statutory power to apply for a specific search, or to 
consider any specific case law that may have arisen from that provision. Thirdly, it would 
no longer be necessary to insert into every relevant Act or Statutory Instrument a new 
search warrant power: a reference to the general Search Warrants Act would be sufficient 
(subject only to the need for specific additional powers in certain regulatory contexts). This 
would therefore avoid inefficient, time consuming, and wasteful use of resources in 
preparing legislation, as well as reducing its length. For these reasons, the Commission 
confirms the view in favour of the enactment of a generally applicable Search Warrants 
Act.   
2.27 The Commission recommends the enactment of a generally applicable Search 
Warrants Act. 
B Scope of offences to which the Act should apply 
2.28 The Commission is of the view that the proposed generally applicable Search Warrants 
Act should define the scope of offences to which it applies. Other jurisdictions with 
generally applicable Search Warrant Acts specify the scope of the power to issue search 
warrants.47 
2.29 The execution of a search warrant involves an interference with certain rights and it is 
important that any such interference be appropriate and proportionate. Therefore, the 
applicable constitutional and ECHR rights standards determine what the statutory 
threshold for issuing a search warrant should be. The constitutional rights of the owner or 
occupier of the premises which are the subject of a search must be weighed against the 
interest of the State to prevent, detect and prosecute offences and ensure adherence to 
the law. 
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  Consultation Paper on Search Warrants and Bench Warrants (LRC CP 58-2009) at paragraph 2.23. 
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  See section 8 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, as amended by the Serious Organised Crime 
and Police Act 2005 (England and Wales), section 3E of the Crimes Act 1914 (Commonwealth of Australia), 
section 5 of the Search Warrants Act 1997 (Tasmania), section 47 and section 46A of the Law Enforcement 
(Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (New South Wales), section 6 of the Search and Surveillance Act 
2012 (New Zealand) and section 487(1) of the Criminal Code 1985 (Canada). 
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2.30 In the Issues Paper, the Commission sought views of interested parties as to which of the 
following three approaches, or what other approach, should be adopted when specifying 
what the scope of the proposed generally applicable Search Warrants Act should be, 
having regard to the relevant constitutional and ECHR rights. 
(1) Option 1: Search Warrants Act could apply to arrestable offences 
2.31 The Commission has been advised that one of the most commonly-used provisions 
concerning a search warrant is section 10 of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1997, as amended.48 This provides that a judge of the District Court may 
issue a search warrant where satisfied by information on oath that evidence of, or relating 
to, the commission of an arrestable offence is to be found at any place. As discussed 
earlier, an arrestable offence is an offence that carries a sentence of imprisonment of 5 
years or more.49 In the Issues Paper, the Commission suggested that a Search Warrants 
Act could provide for the issuing of search warrants where the judge is satisfied that 
evidence of or relating to an arrestable offence is to be found at any place. This would 
largely replicate the scope of section 10 of the 1997 Act. The Commission noted that there 
is other legislation which provides for the issuing of search warrants even where the 
offences carry a maximum sentence of less than 5 years’ imprisonment on conviction (that 
is, are not arrestable offences). For this reason, the Issues Paper suggested that the 
proposed Search Warrants Act could be applied without prejudice to search warrant 
powers in respect of non-arrestable offences contained in other legislation, thereby 
leaving them in force. 
(2) Option 2: Search Warrants Act could apply to all criminal offences  
2.32 A second option suggested in the Issues Paper was the application of the proposed 
Search Warrants Act to all criminal offences. Such an approach would result in the 
application of the proposed Act to both summary and indictable offences. A number of 
other jurisdictions include all criminal offences within the scope of their generally 
applicable Search Warrant Acts. For example, section 3E of the Australian 
Commonwealth Crimes Act 1914, as amended, provides that a search warrant may be 
issued for the search of any evidential material which may be at a premises. The Act 
defines “evidential material”‘ as “a thing relevant to an indictable offence or a thing 
relevant to a summary offence, including such a thing in electronic form.”50 
(3) Option 3: Search Warrants Act could apply to indictable offences 
2.33 A third option suggested in the Issues Paper was that the proposed Search Warrants Act 
could apply in relation to the issuing of warrants to search for material relating to indictable 
offences, including indictable offences which may be tried summarily (“also known as 
“hybrid” or “either way” offences).  Such an approach would be broader than that in 
section 10 of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1997 but narrower than 
defining the scope to include all criminal offences.  An example of such an approach is 
section 8 of the England and Wales Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, as amended, 
which provides for the issuing of search warrants in relation to indictable offences.  
(4) Discussion 
(a) Threshold of offence 
2.34 The advantage of defining the scope of a Search Warrants Act to include all criminal 
offences is that it would result in a single piece of primary legislation that could be used in 
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  Section 10 of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1997, as amended by section 6 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 2006. 
49
  Section 2 of the Criminal Law Act 1997, as amended by section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006. 
50
  Section 3C of the Crimes Act 1914.  See also section 5 of Search Warrants Act 1997 (Tasmania) and section 
487(1) of the Criminal Code (Canada). 
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respect of any criminal offence, whether it is a summary offence or an indictable offence 
(or a "hybrid offence" that can be tried either summarily or on indictment). This would 
promote standardisation and uniformity in search warrant law, and be one method of 
overcoming the current unsatisfactory position of having 143 Acts and 159 Statutory 
Instruments containing search warrant provisions.   
2.35 Feedback noted that defining the scope of a Search Warrants Act to cover all criminal 
offences would be useful to persons and organisations who engage with legislation 
governing search and seizure, as all of the relevant law would be located in one Act. 
However, other submissions asserted that the inclusion of all criminal offences in the 
scope of a Search Warrants Act would be a disproportionate interference with 
constitutional rights as it could result in the existence of a power to issue search warrants 
to enter and search private dwellings in respect of offences considered to be minor and 
therefore summary only, such as assault under section 2 of the Non Fatal Offences 
Against the Person Act 1997. It was also submitted that it is unnecessary to have a search 
warrant power in respect of every offence. For example, it would never be necessary to 
obtain a search warrant for the investigation of intoxication in a public place under section 
4 of the Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act 1994.   
2.36 A number of submissions agreed that defining the scope of a Search Warrants Act to 
include arrestable offences would not involve any fundamental change in the existing law, 
as the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provision) Act 1997 already allows a search 
warrant to be issued for arrestable offences. In addition, defining the scope of a Search 
Warrants Act to include arrestable offences only would not encompass a large number of 
Acts and Statutory Instruments that contain search warrant provisions for indictable 
offences that fall short of being arrestable offences. These include many offences that are 
included in legislation that have established regulatory bodies, such as the Safety, Health 
and Welfare at Work Act 2005, and other legislation of public importance such as the 
Commissions of Investigation Act 2004.   
2.37 A high proportion of persons who responded to the Issues Paper submitted that a Search 
Warrants Act should apply to all indictable offences.  One advantage of defining the scope 
of a Search Warrant Act to include indictable offences is that it would cover a wider range 
of offences than under section 10 of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
1997.  
2.38 A number of respondents were of the view that defining the scope of the Act to include 
indictable offences, without prejudice to provisions under which search warrants authorise 
Gardaí and other officials to enter and search premises in respect of summary offences 
(that is, offences which cannot lead to a prosecution on indictment), would constitute 
meaningful reform and proportionate extension of powers of search.  Such an approach, it 
was suggested, would strike an appropriate balance between the interests of society in 
the detection and investigation of crime and the rights of citizens to privacy and 
inviolability of the dwelling.  Feedback also suggested that a general threshold of 
indictable offences is one that is easily identifiable.   
2.39 In light of feedback received on the Issues Paper and the fundamental rights principles 
which inform the recommendations in this Report, the Commission is of the view that a 
Search Warrants Act should apply to indictable offences and to those summary offences 
for which existing legislation provides for search warrant powers (subject to the 
recommendation in paragraph 2.54, below). Such an approach would, in general, limit the 
circumstances in which a warrant could be issued to offences which are considered to be 
sufficiently serious to merit being indictable, but would also include those summary 
offences that, on a case-by-case basis, have been designated as requiring search warrant 
powers.  There would, therefore, be an appropriate balance between the social interest in 
the investigation of crime by affording authorities sufficient powers of search and seizure, 
and the interest in ensuring respect for the relevant constitutional and ECHR rights 
discussed in Chapter 1, above. 
 33 
2.40 The Commission recommends that the proposed Search Warrants Act should apply 
to all indictable offences and (in accordance with the recommendation in paragraph 
2.55) to those summary offences for which existing legislation provides for search 
warrant powers. 
(b) Consequences of Search Warrants Act for existing search warrant provisions 
applicable to indictable offences 
2.41 Appendix A to this Report contains a list of legislative powers that authorise the issuing of 
a search warrant for offences or circumstances set out in each individual provision. Most 
of these apply to indictable offences, but as discussed below a number of them apply to 
summary offences and some of the search powers apply where regulatory authorities are 
engaged in "routine" inspections that may not lead to any criminal prosecution.  
2.42 As noted above, section 10 of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1997 
provides that a search warrant may be issued in respect of any arrestable offence, that is, 
an offence punishable by imprisonment of at least 5 years on conviction. Similarly, section 
48 of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001 provides for a search 
warrant power in respect of any arrestable offence to which the 2001 Act, which is clearly 
no longer necessary in view of the general scope of section 10 of the 1997 Act. By way of 
example of the legislative provisions that authorise the issuing of search warrants for 
indictable offences, section 26 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, as amended, provides 
that a search warrant may be issued where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting 
that the following types of indictable offences are being committed, not all of which are 
arrestable offences: 
(a) a person is in possession in contravention of the 1977 Act on any premises [or 
other land] of a controlled drug, a forged prescription or a duly issued prescription which 
has been wrongfully altered and that such drug is on a particular premises or land; or 
(b) opium poppy, a plant of the genus Cannabis or a plant of the genus Erythroxylon 
is being cultivated contrary to section 17 of the 1977 Act on any premises or land; or 
(c) a document directly or indirectly relating to, or connected with, a transaction or 
dealing which was, or an intended transaction or dealing which would if carried out be, 
an offence under the 1977 Act, or in the case of a transaction or dealing carried out or 
intended to be carried out in a place outside the State, an offence against a provision of 
a corresponding law is in the possession of a person on the premises. 
2.43 Those involved in seeking search warrants may choose to apply for search warrants 
under specific provisions such as section 26 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 rather than 
under the widely applicable section 10 of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Act 1997, as amended. If the proposed Search Warrants Act was enacted, separate 
statutory provisions providing for the issuing of search warrants for indictable offences 
would no longer be necessary.  
2.44 The removal of existing search warrant provisions applicable to indictable offences could 
be achieved by either a textual amendment or a blanket non-textual amendment.  A 
blanket non-textual amendment would involve, for example, the inclusion of a provision in 
the generally applicable Search Warrants Act stating that each time a provision authorises 
the issuing of a search warrant for the investigation of an indictable offence, it shall be 
construed as providing for the issuing of a search warrant under the generally applicable 
Act.  There is a general drafting policy against the use of non-textual amendments, other 
than in exceptional circumstances.51  However, blanket non-textual amendments are 
frequently used to clarify or change the way a particular provision, term or phrase should 
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be read across a range of Acts or Statutory Instruments or across the whole Statute book.  
For example, section 9(2) of the Local Government and Reform Act 2014 states that a 
reference, however expressed, in any enactment to a county council or a city council 
shall, if the context permits, be read as a reference to a county council, a city council or a 
city and county council. 
2.45 A textual amendment is a specific insertion, substitution or deletion of words, paragraphs, 
sections or subsections from a piece of legislation and is the preferable method to use.  In 
respect of search warrant provisions applicable to indictable offences, the list of legislation 
in Appendix A consists primarily of search warrant provisions that apply to indictable 
offences, but also contains some that apply to summary offences. For this reason, it would 
be necessary to engage in a careful exercise to identify for repeal only those provisions 
that clearly apply to indictable offences. The Commission has included in the draft Bill in 
Appendix C a Schedule that contains a number of provisions, such as section 10 of the 
Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1997, that are clearly suitable for repeal. 
Further analysis of the list of legislation would be required in the preparation of a final Bill. 
As discussed below, where a piece of legislation in Appendix A also provides for search 
warrants in respect of summary offences, this would need to be retained and located in a 
separate Schedule to the Bill; and the Commission also includes in the draft Bill a sample 
of such provisions that should be retained. 
2.46 The need to engage in careful analysis of the existing legislation is illustrated by section 
13 of the Criminal Damage Act 1991, which provides: 
“If a judge of the District Court is satisfied by information on oath of a member of the 
Garda Síochána that there is reasonable cause to believe that any person has in his 
custody or under his control or on his premises any thing and that it has been used, or 
is intended for use, without lawful excuse — 
(a) to damage property belonging to another, 
(b) to damage any property in a way likely to endanger the life of another or with intent 
to defraud, or 
(c) to access, or with intent to access, data, 
the judge may issue a search warrant...” 
2.47 Under the 1991 Act, to establish whether this provision applies to indictable offences or 
summary offences, it is necessary to refer to sections 2 and 5 of the 1991 Act, which 
provide for the offences of damaging property and unauthorised accessing of data and the 
associated penalties.  This shows that section 13 of the 1991 Act applies to: (a) the 
indictable offences of damaging property belonging to another and damaging property in a 
way likely to endanger the life of another or with intent to defraud; and (b) the summary 
offence of unauthorised accessing of data.  In many provisions, a number of steps are 
therefore involved in identifying whether the power to issue a search warrant applies to an 
indictable or summary offence. 
2.48 The Commission is of the view that the removal of provisions authorising the issuing of 
search warrants for indictable offences should be achieved by repealing each of these 
provisions by way of textual amendment and not by a non-textual blanket amendment.  
The use of non-textual amendment would create difficulties, as it would require the person 
engaging with a search warrant provision to interpret the provision to see whether it 
should be construed under the terms of the generally applicable Search Warrants Act.  
The optimal approach is for the Search Warrants Act to include a Schedule of legislative 
provisions applicable to indictable offences that would be repealed on the enactment of 
the Act.  Such an approach would better facilitate codification and standardisation of the 
law relating to search warrants. 
2.49 If the Commission’s recommendation for the enactment of a generally applicable Search 
Warrants Act was implemented, any new legislation that provides for search warrants 
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would be able to provide simply that the Search Warrants Act applies to that new 
legislation. In order to ensure that the Search Warrants Act remains a comprehensive 
statutory code on search warrants that contains a complete list of the legislation to which it 
applies into the future, the new legislation should also provide that it is contained in a 
Schedule to the Search Warrants Act for this purpose.   
2.50 The Commission recommends that existing legislative provisions which authorise 
search warrants to be issued for the investigation of specific indictable offences 
should be repealed. 
2.51 The Commission recommends that the repeal of these legislative provisions should 
be achieved by way of textual amendment and not a blanket non-textual 
amendment. 
2.52 The Commission recommends that, in the future, where new legislation is enacted 
or made that provides for search warrants, the legislation should provide that the 
generally applicable Search Warrants Act should apply to that legislation and that 
the new legislation should also expressly amend a Schedule to the Search 
Warrants Act to include a reference to the new legislation. 
(c) Consequences of Search Warrants Act for existing search warrant provisions 
applicable to summary offences 
2.53 In the Issues Paper, the Commission noted that if a Search Warrants Act applies to 
arrestable or indictable offences, it might be necessary to provide that it is without 
prejudice to provisions under which search warrants authorise Gardaí and other officials 
to enter and search premises in respect of summary offences, that is, offences which 
cannot lead to a prosecution on indictment. A number of the provisions listed in Appendix 
A to this Report fall into this category. For example, section 7 of the Aliens Act 1935, as 
amended by section 4 of the Immigration Act 2003, allows a judge of the District Court to 
issue a warrant if satisfied that evidence of or relating to a summary offence under 
sections 3, 4, 5 or 8 of the Immigration Act 1999 is to be found at a specified place.52 More 
generally, section 3 of the European Communities Act 1972 empowers Ministers to make 
Regulations for the purposes of implementing EU law. Prior to the enactment of the 
European Communities Act 2007, the 1972 Act prohibited the creation of indictable 
offences by way of section 3 Regulations.  A large number of pre-2007 Regulations made 
under section 3 of the 1972 Act contain search warrant powers and they therefore apply to 
summary offences only.  For example, Regulation 7 of the European Communities (Trade 
in Animals and Animal Products) Regulations 1994 empowers a judge to issue a search 
warrant in relation to evidence of an offence under the Regulations, all of which are 
summary criminal offences.53 
2.54 It is important to note, however, that provision for a search warrant power is not included 
in every piece of legislation that has created a summary criminal offence. It is therefore 
clear that this is done on a selective, case-by-case, basis. Because of this selective 
approach, the Commission has concluded that it should not therefore make any 
recommendation concerning the repeal of these existing provisions, even though it could 
be said that they constitute an exception to the general recommendation made above that 
the proposed Search Warrants Act should apply to indictable offences. To ensure a 
consistency of approach to search warrants, however, the Commission recommends that 
the generally applicable Search Warrants Act should also apply to those existing search 
warrant provisions that refer to summary only offences, and that these should be listed in 
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a Schedule to the proposed Search Warrants Act. The benefit of this approach is that a 
person involved with a search warrant process would be subject to one Act, whether 
dealing with indictable offences or with the specific summary offences to which a search 
warrant power applies. 
2.55 The Commission recommends that the Search Warrants Act should apply to 
existing search warrant provisions that apply to summary offences, and that these 
provisions should be listed in a Schedule to the Act. 
(d) Provisions authorising entry and search or inspection where suspicion or belief 
that evidence of or relating to an offence is not a requirement for issuing a warrant 
(regulatory entry and inspection powers) 
2.56 The application of a Search Warrants Act to indictable offences would allow for the repeal 
of existing provisions authorising search warrants for the investigation of specific 
indictable offences. However, the repeal of separate statutory provisions applicable to 
indictable offences would still leave a considerable number of legislative provisions 
authorising the issuing of a search warrants in a regulatory setting, where the use of a 
search warrant is not necessarily linked to the investigation of an offence.  
2.57 Many of the statutory provisions in Appendix A fall into this category. Typically, they 
authorise the issuing of a search warrant where a specified officer or inspector believes 
that either (a) evidence of an offence (whether indictable and/or summary only) is at a 
location or that a statutory provision has been contravened and/or (b) that other 
circumstances exist, for example, that a certain activity is being carried out or that certain 
material is on the premises. For example, section 40 of the Communications Regulation 
Act 2002 provides for the issuing of a search warrant where “there are reasonable 
grounds for suspecting that information required by an authorised officer for the purpose 
of the Commission [for Communications Regulation] exercising its functions under the 
Act” is to be found at a location.  
2.58 In the same vein, section 64(7) of the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005 
provides that a judge of the District Court may issue a search warrant to an inspector of 
the Health and Safety Authority if the Court is satisfied on the sworn information of an 
inspector that there are reasonable grounds for believing that: (a) there are any articles or 
substances being used in a place of work or any records (including documents stored in a 
non-legible form) or information, relating to a place of work, that the inspector requires to 
inspect for the purposes of the relevant statutory provisions, held in, at or on any place or 
any part of any place, or (b) there is, or such an inspection is likely to disclose, evidence 
of a contravention of the relevant statutory provisions.  
2.59 Similarly, section 45(1) of the Animal Health and Welfare Act 2013 provides that a judge 
of the District Court may issue a search warrant where he or she is satisfied by 
information on oath of an authorised officer that there are reasonable grounds for 
believing that: 
(a) evidence of or relating to the commission or intended commission of an offence 
under this Act relating to an animal, animal product or animal feed is to be found 
on land or premises,  
(b) there is or was an animal, animal product, animal feed, machinery, equipment or 
other thing made, used or adapted for use (including manufacture and transport) 
in connection with an animal, animal product or animal feed on land or premises, 
(c) a record related to a thing to which paragraph (a) or (b) refers is or may be on the 
land or premises. 
2.60 Section 45(2) of the 2013 Act provides that a search warrant issued under the section 
authorises a named officer, accompanied by such other authorised officers as necessary, 
to enter the place named in the warrant and exercise any of the functions conferred on the 
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officer under the 2013 Act. These functions are set out in section 38 of the 2013 Act and 
are specific to animal health and welfare.   
2.61 Section 38(5) prohibits an authorised officer from entering a private dwelling without the 
consent of the occupier unless he or she has obtained a search warrant under section 45. 
Sections 38 and 45 of the Animal Welfare Act 2013 are typical examples of the types of 
search warrant provisions which operate in regulatory settings.  
2.62 The proposed Search Warrants Act would apply to an application for a search warrant for 
the investigation of an offence under the 2013 Act and similar Acts, such as the 
Communications Regulation Act 2002 or the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 
2005. Thus, if an authorised officer under the Animal Health and Welfare Act 2013 had 
reasonable grounds to suspect that evidence of the commission of an indictable offence 
under the 2013 Act is to be found at a premises, the application for a search warrant 
would be brought under the proposed Search Warrants Act. However, it would be 
necessary to retain paragraphs (b) and (c) of section 45 of the 2013 Act, otherwise no 
warrant could issue on foot of those grounds which relate to the regulation of activities 
concerning animal health and welfare rather than the narrower issue of the investigation of 
an offence under the 2013 Act.   
2.63 A less common example of a statutory search power is contained in section 29 of the 
Commissions of Investigation Act 2004, which  provides that a judge of the District Court 
may issue a warrant authorising a named person to enter any premises, including a 
private dwelling, if satisfied that there are any documents or information in any form 
relating to a matter within a commission of investigation’s terms of reference and required 
by a commission for the purposes of its investigation. 
2.64 A number of submissions in response to the Issues Paper noted the need for a Search 
Warrants Act to take regulatory search warrant powers into account, and those less 
common examples such as found in the Commissions of Investigation Act 2004.  It was 
suggested that the proposed legislation would need to preserve these powers by either 
including them in the generally applicable Search Warrants Act or be expressed to be 
without prejudice to them.   
2.65 One possible approach would be to provide that the Search Warrants Act is without 
prejudice to provisions authorising entry and search or inspection where there is no 
prerequisite of suspicion or belief that evidence relating to an offence is at a location.  
However, this would leave a considerable number of such legislative provisions in place 
and would not alleviate the difficulty of having a large number of disparate search warrant 
provisions. 
2.66 An alternative option would be to apply the key elements of the recommended Search 
Warrants Act to existing legislation authorising the issuing of a search warrant in 
regulatory settings.  This would leave the functions which may be exercised by authorised 
officers pursuant to search warrants intact, but would apply the suite of powers and 
obligations in the generally applicable Search Warrants Act to them. In this respect, the 
main elements that the Commission recommends should be included in the Search 
Warrants Act would apply to search warrants that are connected with regulatory 
supervision and oversight, such as the use of a standard application form, the time or 
times at which the search is to be carried out, the use of reasonable force and the 
obligation to provide the owner or occupier with a copy of the search warrant.   
2.67 The New Zealand Search and Surveillance Act 2012 is an example of an approach that 
applies the key elements of a generally applicable Search and Surveillance Act to a list of 
enactments that contain powers to issue search warrants in particular settings.  Section 6 
of the 2012 Act allows for the issuing of a search warrant to a constable who suspects that 
an offence has been, is being or will be committed or evidential material is at a location.  
In addition, section 89(2) of the 2012 Act provides that Part 4 of the Act:  
“also applies in respect of powers conferred by: 
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(a) the enactments listed in column 2 of the Schedule, to the extent identified in 
column 4 of the Schedule: 
(b) any other enactment, to the extent that the other enactment expressly applies any 
provisions of this Part.” 
2.68 Part 4 of the 2012 Act outlines the elements of the search warrant process, such as the 
mode of application, requirement that documents be retained and time during which a 
search warrant can be executed.  The Schedule specifies: (a) the Act to which Part 4 
applies; (b) the specific section; and (c) a brief description of the power contained in that 
section.  It also specifies which provisions of Part 4 apply in the case of each enactment.  
Therefore, the elements of the search warrant process apply in whole or in part to the list 
of powers in enactments outlined in the schedule.  Each of the individual Acts specified in 
the Schedule contains a provision stating that some or all of the provisions of Part 4 of the 
Search and Surveillance Act 2012 apply.  Section 89(3) of the 2012 Act provides that, 
where there is inconsistency between the Schedule and any other enactments, the other 
enactment prevails. 
2.69 The New Zealand Search and Surveillance Act 2012 is broader than the Search Warrants 
Act proposed in this Report, as it deals with all aspects of the law of search, seizure and 
surveillance.  However, the application of the New Zealand Act to a scheduled list of 
regulatory powers provides a useful example of an approach which could be used to 
incorporate such powers into a single Act in this jurisdiction.  This would promote 
uniformity and standardisation by ensuring that persons engage with the generally 
applicable Search Warrants Act as far as possible.  It would mean that each time the 
Oireachtas enacts a piece of legislation that confers functions on certain officers who may 
require a search warrant to exercise those functions, it could refer to the generally 
applicable Search Warrants Act and provide that specified elements of it applies to the 
new legislation, which would also be added to the relevant Schedule in the Search 
Warrants Act. Apart from this, it would not be necessary to enact a new specific search 
warrant provision. 
2.70 The Commission therefore envisages that the enactment of the proposed Search 
Warrants Act would, in general, remove the need for the Oireachtas to supplement its 
provisions or to enact separate search warrant provisions. It may, however, be necessary 
to provide for some exceptions to the generality of the Search Warrants Act. For example, 
section 787(9) of the Companies Act 201454 provides for a validity period of 30 days for 
search warrants issued under its terms, which is longer than the standard 7 days period 
which the Commission has recommended should be included in the generally applicable 
Act.55 This longer validity period, and related additional powers in the 2014 Act, reflect 
issues that may only arise in the context of a search of commercial premises related to 
suspected complex financial fraud or other corporate offences. The Commission has 
therefore concluded that it is necessary to provide that the generally applicable Search 
Warrants Act is without prejudice to such specific provisions.  
  
                                               
54
  Section 787(9) replaced section 20 of the Companies Act 1990, as amended by section 30 of the Company 
Law Enforcement Act 2001 and section 5 of the Companies (Amendment) Act 2009, which provided for a 
validity period of one month.  
55
  See Chapter 5, below. 
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2.71 The Commission recommends that the Search Warrants Act (other than provisions 
relating to the use in any subsequent criminal proceedings of material seized 
during a search) should apply to a scheduled list of Acts and Statutory Instruments 
which authorise the issuing of a search warrant where suspicion or belief that 
evidence relating to an offence is not a requirement or not the only requirement for 
the issuing of a warrant (in particular, Acts and Statutory Instruments that authorise 
the issuing of search warrants to regulatory authorities for purposes of regulatory 
supervision and inspection). 
2.72 The Commission recommends that the key elements of the Search Warrants Act 
should be supplemented by elements in other legislation only where there is a 
particular need to do so, such as the need for a longer validity period in the 
Companies Act 2014.56 
(e) Consequences of generally applicable Act for powers to enter property without 
warrant 
2.73 In Part A of this Chapter, the Commission referred to a number of powers of entry and 
search which do not involve search warrants, but form part of the general law of entry, 
search and seizure.  These include: 
i) limited circumstances at common law which authorise Gardaí to enter private 
property, such as to terminate an actual affray or prevent injury being caused to 
another occupant; 
ii) powers of entry and search for the purpose of arrest with and without warrant in 
section 6 of the Criminal Law Act 1997; and 
iii) statutory powers of entry and search without warrant, such as the examples in 
Appendix B to this Report. 
2.74 The Commission does not propose that the generally applicable Search Warrants Act 
should alter or affect these powers which provide for entry onto property without a warrant 
and the Act should therefore be without prejudice to these powers. 
2.75 The Commission recommends that the Search Warrants Act should not should not 
alter or affect any common law rule or statutory provision that authorises a person 
to enter property without a search warrant. 
(f) Transitional arrangements 
2.76 The enactment of a generally applicable Act would involve the repeal or amendment of 
existing legislation concerning search warrants.  It is therefore necessary to consider how 
the proposed Act should provide for the transition from current search warrant law.  
Search warrants issued under a legislative provision prior to the commencement of a new 
Search Warrants Act should not be open to challenge due to the repeal or amendment of 
existing search warrant provisions.  Proceedings pending at the time of the repeal should 
not be affected by the introduction of the new legislation. 
2.77 It is common for legislation containing provisions which substantively amend or repeal 
other enactments to contain transitional or saving provisions, which “regulate the coming 
into operation of those enactments and modify their effect during the period of 
transition.”57  Dodd notes that it “is not uncommon for the legislature to omit transitional 
provisions or to provide incomplete transitional provisions”, which often results in 
“avoidable difficulty for the interpreter” of the legislation.58  Transitional provisions are a 
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  Section 787(9) of the Companies Act 2014. 
57
  Bennion, Bennion on Statutory Interpretation 6
th
 ed (LexisNexis 2013) at 289. See also Hunt, The Irish Statute 
Book: a Guide to Irish Legislation (First Law 2007); Dodd, Statutory Interpretation in Ireland (Tottel 2008). 
58
  Dodd, Statutory Interpretation in Ireland (Tottel 2008) at 97. 
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way of allowing for the continued application of legislative provisions despite their repeal.  
They may either supplement or replace the transitional provisions in the Interpretation Act 
2005.59  A saving provision is the term used to describe a provision which “narrow[s] the 
effect of the enactment to which it refers so as to preserve some existing legal rule or right 
from its operation.”60  For example, section 3(3) of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud 
Offences) Act 2001 provides that the abolition of common law offences in the Act shall not 
affect proceedings for any such offence prior to their abolition. 
2.78 Where an Act does not include transitional provisions, a court may infer such transitional 
arrangements it considers the legislature to have had in mind.61  However, the power of a 
court to infer transitional provisions is limited and there must be an indication in the 
legislation that the legislature intended to provide for transitional arrangements. 
2.79 The problems that can arise from failing to include transitional measures in legislation are 
demonstrated by the decision of Grealis v Director of Public Prosecutions.62  The Supreme 
Court considered the absence of transitional provisions in the Non-Fatal Offences Against 
the Person Act 1997.  The 1997 Act abolished a number of offences, including the 
common law offences of assault and battery.  However, it did not contain transitional 
provisions for offences alleged to have been committed but not yet prosecuted prior to the 
coming into force of the 1997 Act.  The Interpretation Act 1937 included such transitional 
provisions in respect of statutory offences, but contained no saving provisions for common 
law offences.  The Interpretation (Amendment) Act 1997 contained transitional provisions 
which aimed to address the lacuna regarding common law offences which were alleged to 
have been committed prior to their repeal.  Section 1(4) of the Interpretation (Amendment) 
Act 1997 provided that the Act would be “subject to such limitations as are necessary” to 
ensure that it did not “conflict with the constitutional rights of any person.”   
2.80 The first applicant was charged with common law assault on foot of two summonses and 
assault causing actual bodily harm contrary to section 47 of the Offences Against the 
Person Act 1861.  The Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997 was in force on 
the date of the issuing of the summonses, but had not been in force on the date of the 
alleged offences.  The Interpretation (Amendment) Act 1997 came into force after the 
proceedings were instituted.   
2.81 The Supreme Court granted orders of prohibition and held that the Non-Fatal Offences 
Against the Person Act 1997 was clear and unambiguous and provided for the abolition of 
the common law offence of assault and battery.  Where a common law offence was 
repealed by statute, it ceased and no prosecution in respect of the repealed common law 
offence could proceed after the coming into effect of the repealing enactment.  In respect 
of a submission by the Director of Public Prosecutions that the Court should draw 
reasonable inferences as to the intention of legislature to provide for transitional 
arrangements, the Court stated that it is inappropriate to “seek or make a determination 
that if the Oireachtas had thought about it they would have introduced transitional 
provisions providing for the time of transition as the functions of the three organs of 
government are separate and one should not interfere with another”.63  The Supreme 
Court was unwilling to infer transitional provisions.  The Court held that in order for the 
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  Ibid. 
60
  Bennion, Bennion on Statutory Interpretation 6
th
 ed (LexisNexis 2013) at 676. 
61
  See Minister for Education and Science v Information Commissioner, High Court, 31 July 2001, where the 
High Court stated that even if the legislative provision at issue did not include transitional provisions expressly, 
the Court “is required to draw such inferences as to the intended transitional arrangements as, in light of the 
interpretative criteria, it considers the Oireachtas to have intended.” 
62
  [2001] IESC 50; [2001] 3 IR 144. 
63
  [2001] IESC 50; [2001] 3 IR 144 at 178. 
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Interpretation (Amendment) Act 1997 to be constitutional, it must be interpreted as having 
prospective effect.  Therefore, it did not apply to prosecutions for repealed common law 
offences initiated prior to its commencement. 
2.82 Section 27 of the Interpretation Act 2005 specifically addresses the effect of the repeal of 
an enactment by stating that the repeal does not: “(a) revive anything in force or not 
existing immediately before the repeal, (b) affect the previous operation of the enactment 
or anything duly done or suffered under the enactment, (c) affect any right, privilege, 
obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the enactment, (d) affect any 
penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence against or 
contravention of the enactment which was committed before the repeal, or (e) prejudice or 
affect any legal proceedings (civil or criminal) pending at the time of the repeal in respect 
of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, offence or contravention.”   
2.83 Section 27 of the 2005 Act may ensure that the repeal of any enactments by the generally 
applicable Search Warrants Act does not affect search warrants issued under those Acts 
or prejudice any proceedings pending at the time of the repeal.  However, the 
Commission notes that it is common for legislation to contain transitional or saving 
provisions to deal with specific situations.  An example of a saver in the context of search 
warrants can be found in the Criminal Justice Act 2006.  Section 6 of the 2006 Act 
substituted section 10 of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1997 
(discussed in detail below), thus extending the power to issue a search warrant for 
specified offences to all arrestable offences.  Section 6(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2006 
provides that it does not affect the validity of a warrant issued under section 10 of the 
1997 Act before the commencement of section 6 of the 2006 Act, and that such a warrant 
shall continue in force in accordance with its terms.  The Commission is of the view that a 
similar provision should be included in the proposed Search Warrants Act to safeguard 
the validity of search warrants issued under legislative provisions repealed or significantly 
altered by its introduction, and to ensure that proceedings issued under repealed 
enactments are not affected. 
2.84 The Commission recommends that the proposed Search Warrants Act should 
contain transitional provisions to safeguard the validity of search warrants issued 
under any prior legislative provisions. 
C Main elements of a generally applicable Search Warrants Act 
(1) Section 10 of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1997: origins and 
subsequent amendments  
2.85 The Commission has concluded that, in order to consider the main elements that should 
be included in the proposed Search Warrants Act, it would be suitable to examine the 
main elements of the search warrants power in section 10 of the Criminal Justice 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1997, as substituted by section 6 of the Criminal Justice 
Act 2006.  Section 10 of the 1997 Act is not confined to a specific category of offences, 
such as drugs offences, and applies to all arrestable offences. It is therefore suitable for 
this purpose, including in light of its origins, significant subsequent amendment and its 
detailed provisions.  
2.86 The origins of section 10 of the 1997 Act can be traced to the 1960s, when it was 
recognised that no authority existed to search premises and seize evidence in connection 
with serious crimes such as murder and rape.  This gap was to be filled by section 15 of 
the Criminal Justice Bill 1967, which proposed to provide authority to issue search 
warrants in respect of indictable offences involving death or grievous bodily harm and/or 
rape.  
2.87 The Criminal Justice Bill 1967 was a major legislative proposal that (had it been enacted) 
would have abolished the distinction between felonies and misdemeanours, whilst also 
introducing significant changes to powers of arrest, updating the law of evidence and 
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abolishing suicide as a crime. In this respect, it would have produced significant and, 
largely, uncontroversial reforms.64 But the 1967 Bill also contained many controversial 
provisions, including extensive Garda powers to control public meetings.65 As a result,  the 
debates on the 1967 Bill in Dáil Éireann were protracted. The Committee Stage debate in 
the Dáil had not been completed when the 1969 General Election was called, and the Bill 
therefore lapsed.66 Due to many of the controversial aspects, the 1967 Bill was never re-
introduced as a single legislative proposal, although a number of provisions have since 
been enacted.67 The relevance to this Report was the proposal in section 15 of the 1967 
Bill concerning search warrants, which was ultimately enacted with some textual changes 
as section 10 of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1997.  
2.88 Reflecting its roots in the 1967 Bill, section 10 of the 1997 Act, as originally enacted, was 
limited in scope to authorising searches and seizure of evidence in connection with a 
defined list of serious offences: (a) an indictable offence involving the death of or serious 
bodily injury to any person, (b) an offence of false imprisonment, (c) an offence of rape, or 
(d) an offence under an enactment set out in the First Schedule to the 1997 Act.  The First 
Schedule to the 1997 Act listed the following provisions, all of which involved sexual 
offences: section 1 of the Punishment of Incest Act 1908; sections 1 and 2 of the Criminal 
Law Amendment Act 1935; sections 3 and 4 of the Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act 
1990; and sections 3 and 5 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1993. 
2.89 Shortly after the 1997 Act was enacted, the Report of the Steering Group on the Efficiency 
and Effectiveness of the Garda Síochána (the Garda SMI Report)68 recommended, among 
other matters, that section 10 of the 1997 Act be extended to any “serious offences.” The 
Garda SMI Report defined “serious offences” as (a) arrestable offences, that is, offences 
carrying, on conviction, a sentence of 5 years’ imprisonment; and (b) other serious 
offences which, although not arrestable offences “are of such gravity as to warrant 
consideration for inclusion, in particular serious offences against the person or property 
which do not at present attract a sentence of five years’ imprisonment or more.”69  
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  It was acknowledged during the Oireachtas debates on the 1967 Bill that many of its provisions derived from 
the recommendations of the English Criminal Law Revision Committee, notably, its Second Report: Suicide 
(Cmnd 1187) (1960), Seventh Report: Felonies and Misdemeanours (Cmnd 2659) (1966) and Ninth Report: 
Evidence: Written Statements, Formal Admissions, Notice of Alibi (1966). 
65
  See O’Hanlon “The Criminal Justice Bill 1967” (1968) 3 Irish Jurist (n) 101 at 103,104. 
66
  There were 4 days of debate on the Second Stage of the 1967 Bill in Dáil Éireann (4, 12, 13 and 18 February 
1969) and 5 days of debate on the Committee Stage of the 1967 Bill in Dáil Éireann (22, 23, 29 and 30 April 
1969, and 7 May 1969). The Committee Stage debates had not completed discussion of section 12 of the 
1967 Bill (which concerned the proposed Garda powers of arrest without warrant, and were regarded as 
closely connected to the proposed powers concerning public meetings) when the 1969 General Election was 
called. The 1967 Bill, as initiated, contained 62 sections in total. 
67
  By way of examples: the Criminal Law (Suicide) Act 1993 provided that suicide ceased to be a crime 
(proposed in section 51 of the 1967 Bill); the Criminal Evidence Act 1992 reformed the law of evidence 
concerning proof by written and formal statements (proposed in sections 24 and 25 of the 1967 Bill); and the 
Criminal Law Act 1997 abolished the distinction between felonies and misdemeanours and also introduced the 
concept of arrestable offence (proposed in sections 5 to 11 of the 1967 Bill).  
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  Report of the Steering Group on the Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Garda Síochána (Department of 
Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Government Publications 1997). The Report is also referred to as the 
Garda SMI Report, because it was one of a series of similar Reports published at that time which formed part 
of a government-wide Strategic Management Initiative (SMI) aimed at improving the efficiency and 
effectiveness of Government Departments and State bodies.  
69
  Ibid at 18. 
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2.90 The Garda SMI Report was followed by the 1998 Report of the Expert Group to Consider 
Changes in the Criminal Law Recommended in the Garda SMI Report (the Leahy Group 
Report).70 The Leahy Group Report accepted the proposal in the Garda SMI Report to 
extend section 10 of the 1997 Act to all arrestable offences. The Report also noted the 
opinion in the Garda SMI Report that some offences which were at that time not 
punishable by 5 years’ imprisonment should be considered for inclusion in any reforms 
under consideration.  The Leahy Group Report considered that an individual assessment 
of the adequacy of sentences for particular offences was beyond its remit however, and 
as a result, its recommendation was confined to the extension of section 10 of the 1997 
Act to arrestable offences.71 
2.91 The recommendation of the Leahy Group Report was enacted by the Oireachtas as 
section 6 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006, which replaced the original text of section 10 of 
the 1997 Act in its entirety, substituting it with an entirely new section. This had the effect 
of extending its scope to all arrestable offences.  
2.92 The Commission will proceed to discuss the key elements of section 10 of the 1997 Act, 
as amended, because it contains the type of key procedural elements in virtually all other 
statutory provisions in this area, including the process for applying for, issuing and 
executing a search warrant.  Section 10 of the 1997 Act is also worthy of analysis 
because it does not contain what, in the view of the Commission, are comprehensive 
provisions, to ensure compliance with the constitutional and international human rights 
standards discussed in Chapter 1.  In this respect, while section 10 of the 1997 Act 
contains important elements that would be included in a generally applicable Search 
Warrants Act, its limitations also suggest what additional provisions should be included in 
such an Act. 
2.93 Section 10 of the 1997 Act, as substituted in its entirety by section 6 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 2006, provides: 
“(1) If a judge of the District Court is satisfied by information on oath of a member [of An 
Garda Síochána] not below the rank of sergeant that there are reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that evidence of, or relating to, the commission of an arrestable offence is 
to be found in any place, the judge may issue a warrant for the search of that place 
and any persons found at that place.  
(2) A search warrant under this section shall be expressed, and shall operate, to 
authorise a named member, accompanied by such other members or persons or both 
as the member thinks necessary—  
(a) to enter, at any time or times within one week of the date of issue of the 
warrant, on production if so requested of the warrant, and if necessary by the 
use of reasonable force, the place named in the warrant, 
(b) to search it and any persons found at that place, and 
(c) to seize anything found at that place, or anything found in the possession of a 
person present at that place at the time of the search, that that member 
reasonably believes to be evidence of, or relating to, the commission of an 
arrestable offence. 
(3) A member acting under the authority of a search warrant under this section may—  
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  The full title is Report of the Expert Group Appointed to Consider Changes in the Criminal Law Which Were 
Recommended in the Garda SMI Report (Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Government 
Publications 1998). The Expert Group was chaired by (the late) Eamon Leahy SC, and is also often referred to 
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  Ibid at 3 (arrestable offence) and 9-13 (Recommendation 2). 
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(a) require any person present at the place where the search is being carried out to 
give to the member his or her name and address, and 
(b) arrest without warrant any person who— 
(i) obstructs or attempts to obstruct the member in the carrying out of his or 
her duties, 
(ii) fails to comply with a requirement under paragraph (a), or 
(iii) gives a name or address which the member has reasonable cause for 
believing is false or misleading.  
(4) A person who obstructs or attempts to obstruct a member acting under the authority 
of a search warrant under this section, who fails to comply with a requirement under 
subsection (3)(a) or who gives a false or misleading name or address to a member 
shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on summary conviction to a [Class B 
fine]72 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or both.  
(5) The power to issue a warrant under this section is without prejudice to any other 
power conferred by statute to issue a warrant for the search of any place or person.  
(6) In this section—  
‘arrestable offence’ has the meaning it has in section 2 (as amended by section 8 of 
the Criminal Justice Act 2006) of the Criminal Law Act 1997; 
‘place’ means a physical location and includes— 
(a) a dwelling, residence, building or abode, 
(b) a vehicle, whether mechanically propelled or not, 
(c) a vessel, whether sea-going or not, 
(d) an aircraft, whether capable of operation or not, and 
(e) a hovercraft.” 
(2) Main elements of section 10 of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
1997, as amended  
2.94 Section 10 contains the following elements concerning the application for, the issuing of 
and executing of a search warrant: 
1. Applying for the search warrant: (a) the applicant must be a member of An Garda 
Síochána not below the rank of sergeant; (b) the basis for the application must be 
reasonable grounds for suspecting; and (c) the application must be based on 
information on oath.  
2. Issuing the search warrant: (a) the issuing authority is a judge of the District Court; 
(b) the offences to which it applies are arrestable offences; and (c) the scope of the 
search is limited by reference to named places and any persons found at those 
places.  
3. Executing the search warrant: (a) those authorised to execute the search are a 
named member of An Garda Síochána, accompanied by such other members or 
persons or both as the member thinks necessary; (b) entry is permitted at any time or 
times; (c) the warrant is valid for one week from date of issue; (d) the scope of power 
to seize material includes material found at the place, or found in the possession of a 
person present at that place, that the member reasonably believes to be evidence of, 
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  Section 10 of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1997, as inserted by section 6 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 2006, refers to “a fine not exceeding €3,000.” The effect of section 5 of the Fines Act 
2010 is to convert this to a Class B fine, currently a fine not exceeding €4,000 (see section 3 of the 2010 Act).  
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or relating to, the commission of an arrestable offence; (e) the scope of power of the 
executing officer to deal with persons present includes: (i) requiring any person 
present to give his or her name and address; (ii) arresting any person who obstructs 
or attempts to obstruct the member in the carrying out of his or her duties; (iii) 
arresting any person who fails to give his or her name and address; and (iv) arresting 
any person who gives a name or address which the member has reasonable cause 
for believing is false or misleading; and (f) there are offences for obstructing or 
attempting to obstruct the execution of the search warrant.  
2.95 The generally applicable Search Warrants Act should contain at the very least the three 
main elements outlined above.  Such elements should be subject to scrutiny to ensure 
that they comply with the constitutional and international human rights principles 
discussed in Chapter 1.  In addition, they should be supplemented with any additional 
provisions that are required by such principles.  
2.96 Building on the useful elements of section 10 of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1997, the Commission in the following chapters considers the key 
elements that should be contained in a generally applicable Search Warrants Act, notably 
those dealing with applying for, issuing and executing a search warrant. 
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3  
CHAPTER 3 APPLICATION FOR SEARCH WARRANTS 
A Reference to the Applicant  
3.01 Currently, each legislative provision specifies the person or persons who have the 
authority to apply for a search warrant under its terms.  Generally, a search warrant will be 
applied for by a member of An Garda Síochána; however this varies depending on the 
type of investigation concerned.  While some Acts permit a Garda of any rank to apply for 
a search warrant, others specify that the Garda applicant must be of a specified minimum 
rank.1  Certain provisions enable persons who are not members of An Garda Síochána, 
but who hold a particular office, to apply for a search warrant.  For example, the Aviation 
Regulation Act 2001 provides that an “authorised officer” may apply.2  Section 787 of the 
Companies Act 20143 refers to a “designated officer” as a suitable applicant.  Both the 
Adventure Activities Standards Authority Act 2001 and the Railway Safety Act 20055 state 
that a person appointed as an “inspector” under their provisions can make an application.  
The Sea-Fisheries and Maritime Jurisdictions Act 2006 authorises “sea-fisheries 
protection officers” to apply.6          
3.02 In light of the Commission’s recommendation that a single Search Warrants Act should be 
implemented in Ireland, the Commission is of the view that it would be necessary for such 
an Act to contain a generic term referencing those that may apply for a search warrant.  
Thus, the Commission recommends that the term “applicant” should be used.  The term 
“applicant” should be interpreted as either: (a) a member of An Garda Síochána not below 
the rank of sergeant; or (b) a person who is authorised to apply for a search warrant under 
an enactment specified in the schedule of enactments which contains provisions 
authorising persons who hold a particular office to apply for a search warrant. 
3.03 The Commission recommends that the proposed Search Warrants Act should use 
the term “applicant” to refer to the person applying for a search warrant.           
B The Evidential Threshold to be Met by Applicants 
3.04 Applications for search warrants generally involve the applicant appearing personally 
before the issuing authority (usually a judge of the District Court) and making an ex parte 
application in the chambers of a judge of the District Court.  Most legislative provisions 
which provide for the issuing of a search warrant require the applicant to satisfy two 
                                               
1
  See for example section 9 of the Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act 1989; section 25 of the Video 
Recordings Act 1989; section 10 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1993; section 10 of the Criminal 
Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1997 (as amended); and section 15 of the Immigration Act 2004.  All of 
the above require that a Garda member not below the rank of sergeant apply. 
2
  Section 43 of the Aviation Regulation Act 2001.  
3
  Section 787 of the 2014 Act replaced section 20 of the Companies Act 1990, as amended by section 30 of the 
Company Law Enforcement Act. 
4
  Section 37 of the Adventure Activities Standards Authority Act 2001.   
5
  Section 73 of the Railway Safety Act 2005.  
6
  Section 17 of the Sea-Fisheries and Maritime Jurisdiction Act 2006, as amended by section 44 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 2007.  
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procedural requirements.  The first is that he or she holds an opinion.  In cases where the 
applicant is a member of An Garda Síochána, he or she must usually state that he or she 
holds the opinion that evidence of, or relating to, a particular offence may be found at a 
certain location.  In cases where the applicant is an authorised officer exercising his or her 
powers in a regulatory setting, the applicant must usually state that he or she is of the 
opinion that: 1. evidence of, or relating to, a particular offence is at a location or an 
enactment has been contravened; and/or 2. other circumstances exist, such as the 
presence of certain material or the carrying out of particular activity at a location. 
3.05 Secondly, the applicant must usually affirm the opinion under a suitable form of oath.7   
3.06 Currently, the specific requirements of the application procedure are set out in the terms 
of the particular legislative provision under which the applicant is applying for a search 
warrant.  In the Consultation Paper, the Commission observed that variations as to the 
precise requirements in respect of the opinion of the applicant and the manner in which it 
is affirmed can be found throughout Irish legislative provisions.8 
(1) Reasonableness of the applicant’s suspicion  
3.07 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission noted that some provisions require the 
applicant to have “reasonable grounds for suspecting” that evidence relating to an offence 
is to be found at a specified location, while other provisions set the requirement at 
“reasonable grounds for believing” that evidence is to be found.9  The Criminal Damage 
Act 1991 refers to a “reasonable cause to believe”.10   
3.08 The Commission has been informed that many search warrant applications are made 
under section 10 of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1997, as 
amended by section 6 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006, which provides:  
“If a judge of the District Court is satisfied by information on oath of a member not 
below the rank of sergeant that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that 
evidence of, or relating to, the commission of an arrestable offence is to be found in 
any place, the judge may issue a warrant for the search of that place and any persons 
found at that place.” 
3.09 Beyond the requirement for reasonableness, there is a lack of uniformity in Irish provisions 
as to the standard of the applicant’s opinion.  Legislation varies as to whether the 
applicant holds a suspicion or belief regarding the presence of evidence.   
3.10 The element of reasonableness, however, is common to all search warrant provisions.  
This imposes an objective test as to the opinion of the applicant. Thus, the opinion of the 
applicant must not be subjective, rather it should be the opinion that a reasonable person 
with the same experience and level of understanding as the applicant would hold on the 
basis of the facts.  The Commission has looked to other jurisdictions in respect of the 
standard of opinion required in similar search warrant applications.  The standard of 
“reasonable grounds for suspecting” is found in the Australian Commonwealth, under 
section 3E of the Crimes Act 1914, as amended, and in Tasmania under section 5 of the 
Search Warrants Act 1997.  Jurisdictions where the law requires “reasonable grounds for 
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  A small number of provisions do not contain a requirement for the application to be accompanied by a formal 
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  Consultation Paper on Search Warrants and Bench Warrants (LRC CP 58-2009) at paragraph 3.06.  
9
  Examples of the phrasing “reasonable grounds for suspecting” can be found in the Criminal Assets Bureau Act 
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believing” include England and Wales under section 8 of the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984; New South Wales, under section 47 of the Law Enforcement (Powers and 
Responsibilities) Act 2002; Victoria, under section 341 of the Crimes Act 1958; and 
Canada, under section 117.04 of the Criminal Code.  Unlike in Ireland, a single standard 
is found in each of these jurisdictions.  
3.11 The Commission is of the view that the proposed Search Warrants Act should provide for 
a single standard as to the opinion of an applicant. The Commission notes that this would 
not only lead to greater consistency but it would also enable applicants to be certain as to 
the standard of opinion they are required to have when making an application.  Greater 
consistency and certainty as to this requirement may also help to avoid errors being made 
at this stage of the process.  For example, if an applicant were to establish that he or she 
has a reasonable suspicion, when in fact the provision under which the application is 
made requires him or her to have a reasonable belief, a search warrant issued on the 
basis of that application may be subject to challenge.  
3.12 The Commission recommends that a single, standard requirement should be used 
to describe the opinion required by the search warrant applicant. 
(a) Suspicion v Belief 
3.13 The Commission has considered whether or not there is a substantial difference between 
the standards of suspicion and belief, and consequently whether one should be favoured 
over the other for the purpose of establishing a single standard.  O’Malley has considered 
the “conceptual distinction” between the two with regard to search warrant applications.11  
He details the dictionary meanings of both words, which he outlines is “in keeping with the 
interpretive principle that words in a statute be given their plain meaning, unless the 
context otherwise requires.”12  On this basis belief is defined as a: 
“mental acceptance of a proposition, statement or fact, as true, on the ground of 
authority, or evidence; assent of the mind to a statement, or to the truth of a fact 
beyond observation, on the testimony of another, to the fact or truth on the 
evidence.”13  
3.14 By contrast, he notes that suspicion is defined, among other things, as “apprehension of 
guilt or fault on slight grounds or without clear evidence.”14  Thus, O’Malley explains that a 
suspicion does not require clear proof, evidence or knowledge, whereas a belief is 
grounded by authority or evidence.  O’Malley refers to a case of the ECtHR, Fox v United 
Kingdom15, as one of the more commonly quoted authorities which examines the definition 
of “reasonable suspicion” in the context of Article 5 of the ECHR (right to liberty and 
security).  Here, the Court observed that “having a reasonable suspicion presupposes the 
existence of facts or information which would satisfy an objective observer” that an 
offence had been committed.16  O’Malley concludes that there is an accepted distinction 
between suspicion and belief “to the extent that belief imports a greater degree of 
certainty.”17  The New Zealand Law Commission in its Report on Search and Surveillance 
Powers18 also focused on certainty and likelihood when distinguishing between belief and 
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  See generally O’Malley The Criminal Process (Round Hall 2009) at 361.  
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  (1991) 13 EHRR 157.  
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  Ibid at paragraph 32.  
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  O’Malley The Criminal Process (Round Hall 2009) at 362.  
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  New Zealand Law Commission Report on Search and Surveillance Powers (NZLC R97-2007).   
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suspicion.  The Commission expressed the view that “belief requires something akin to a 
high or substantial likelihood, while suspicion may require no more than medium or 
moderate likelihood.”19   
(b) Reasonable suspicion and search warrant applications  
3.15 These interpretations of the terms suggest that belief is more objective and concrete in 
nature and that suspicion may be more subjective and vague.  However, suspicion is quite 
often sufficient to ground the commencement of a criminal investigation; for example 
Gardaí may arrest and question a person on suspicion that he or she has committed an 
offence.20  It would, therefore, be consistent to provide that reasonable suspicion of an 
applicant is sufficient to ground a search warrant application.  Furthermore, it is notable 
that the search warrant process forms part of the investigation and the application for or 
execution of a search warrant is by no means indicative of unlawful conduct on the part of 
the person to whom the warrant is directed.  If these interpretations, that suspicion is 
concerned with apprehension and belief is concerned with acceptance of something as 
the truth, are accurate it would seem unnecessary to require the applicant to believe that 
evidence may be found.  A requirement of suspicion should therefore be sufficient to 
ground a search warrant application.  
3.16 Moreover, suspicion may be broader in that it may involve and enable consideration of an 
extensive range of issues.  To this end, the discussion of the concept of suspicion by the 
High Court (Charleton J) in Director of Public Prosecutions (Walsh) v Cash21 is instructive.  
The Court observed that a reasonable suspicion in law is not required “to be based on the 
kind of evidence that would be admissible under the rules of evidence during the hearing 
of a criminal trial.”22  The Court outlined that unlike prima facie evidence23, which must 
consist of admissible evidence relevant to a case, suspicion could take account of matters 
that could not be admitted in evidence at all, or matters which although admissible could 
not form part of the prima facie case.  Therefore, a reasonable suspicion could be based, 
for example, on hearsay evidence or could be inferred from discovering that an alibi put 
forward by an accused is in fact false.  The comments of Charleton J in the High Court in 
Cash regarding the essence of a “reasonable suspicion” were quoted with approval by the 
Supreme Court.24   
3.17  Archbold discusses the phrase “reasonable grounds for suspicion” in the context of the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the codes of practice which supplement the 
1984 Act.25  He comments that, while an arresting officer must have a genuine suspicion 
that the person being arrested is guilty of an offence, there must be reasonable grounds 
for forming such a suspicion.  This outlines the dual nature of such a test, in that it is partly 
subjective and partly objective.  Archbold also notes that the reasonable grounds for 
forming a suspicion could arise from information received from another.  This can be the 
case even if such information subsequently proves to be false, “provided that a 
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  Ibid at 57.  
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  See for example O’Malley The Criminal Process (Round Hall 2009) at 287 and 292-294; Walsh Criminal 
Procedure (Thomson Round Hall 2002) at 149-150.   
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  [2007] IEHC 108, [2008] 1 ILRM 443.  
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  [2007] IEHC 108 at paragraph 12. 
23
  See Garner (ed) Black’s Law Dictionary (7
th
 ed, West Group 1999) at 578 which defines “prima facie 
evidence” as “[e]vidence that will establish a fact or sustain a judgment unless contradictory evidence is 
produced.” 
24
  [2010] IESC 1, [2010] 1 IR 609 at paragraphs 73 – 75. 
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  Richardson (ed) Archbold Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice 2010 (Sweet and Maxwell 2013). 
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reasonable person, having regard to all the circumstances, would regard them as 
reasonable grounds for suspicion.”26  
3.18 Regarding search warrants which are relied upon for purposes of investigation, it would be 
appropriate that officers could take account of a broad range of factors, even though they 
may not be admissible at trial stage.  This approach would be consistent with the decision 
of the Supreme Court in Director of Public Prosecutions v Cash 27 where the Court held 
that the accused had failed to establish that there was an onus on the prosecution to 
prove the lawful provenance of material relied upon by a member of An Garda Síochána 
or that such material was obtained without breaching fundamental constitutional rights to 
form reasonable cause justifying an arrest.  The Court noted that the lawfulness of an 
arrest and the admissibility of evidence at trial are “different matters which will normally be 
considered in distinct contexts.”28 
3.19 The British Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 Code of Practice A also discusses the 
concept of reasonable suspicion and offers guidelines as to its scope.29  Code A is 
concerned with police powers to stop and search rather than with search warrants 
specifically. However, the interpretation of reasonable suspicion should nonetheless be 
applicable regardless of the search context.  The Code states that “reasonable grounds 
for suspicion depend on the circumstances in each case.  There must be an objective 
basis for that suspicion based on facts, information, and/or intelligence which are relevant 
to the likelihood of finding” a particular thing.30  The Code further specifies that reasonable 
suspicion can never be supported on the basis of personal factors, nor can it be based on 
“generalisations or stereotypical images of certain groups or categories of people as more 
likely to be involved in criminal activity.”31  The Code notes that reasonable suspicion can 
sometimes arise on the basis of the behaviour of a person without specific information or 
intelligence; for example, where a person is observed attempting to conceal something 
whilst walking along a public street.  Overall, the Code acknowledges that suspicion can 
arise in a variety of circumstances and may be the result of information provided by a third 
party.  Nonetheless the Code clearly sets out the requirement that the suspicion is in fact 
objective and based on accurate and current intelligence or information.32 
3.20 As section 10 of the section 10 of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
1997, as amended by section 6 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006, is one of the main 
provisions under which search warrant applications are made, it is notable that its terms 
refer to “reasonable grounds for suspecting” and not to “belief”.  Reliance on the term 
suspicion as the standard requirement for search warrant applicants would therefore also 
be in line with this commonly used procedure and the Commission has concluded that this 
phrase should be used in the proposed Search Warrants Act.  
3.21 The Commission recommends that “reasonable grounds for suspicion” should be 
the standard requirement in respect of an application for a search warrant.   
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  Ibid at 1625.   
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  [2010] IESC 1, [2010] 1 IR 609. 
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  [2010] 1 IR 609 at paragraph 75? 
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     See generally Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 Code A: Code of Practice for the Exercise by Police 
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 ed (Sweet and Maxwell 2005) at 585.   
31
  Ibid.   
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  Ibid.   
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(2) Affirmation of the applicant’s opinion  
3.22 The second element of the search warrant application procedure to be satisfied by an 
applicant is that he or she must formally affirm his or her submitted opinion.  In the 
Consultation Paper the Commission observed that varying specifications can be found in 
Irish search warrant provisions as to the manner in which the opinion is affirmed.33  Some 
Acts require the applicant to provide “information on oath” when making the application,34 
while other Acts state that the applicant should provide “sworn information”.35  
3.23 A limited number of Acts, however, contain no requirement for the applicant to formally 
affirm the information upon which the search warrant application is based.  Within this 
category, two sub-categories can be identified.  The first sub-category is comprised of 
Acts which enable members of An Garda Síochána of a certain minimum rank to issue a 
search warrant rather than applying to the District Court.  These Acts include section 29(3) 
of the Offences Against the State Act 1939, as amended,36 the Official Secrets Act 1963,37 
the Criminal Assets Bureau Act 1996, as amended,38 and the Prevention of Corruption 
(Amendment) Act 2001.39  None of these provisions require the member of An Garda 
Síochána seeking the search warrant to swear an information or to take an oath.   
3.24 The second sub-category includes Acts under which an application must be made to a 
judge of the District Court, but where there is no requirement within the provision for the 
applicant to provide sworn information or to take an oath.  These provisions are contained 
within the Official Secrets Act 1963,40 the Criminal Justice Act 199441 and the Sexual 
Offences (Jurisdiction) Act 1996.42  The latter two Acts in this category are concerned with 
offences of an extra-territorial nature.  
3.25 The Commission is of the view that a single standard phrase should be used in Irish 
legislation in respect of the wording contained in search warrant provisions regarding 
affirmation of the applicant’s opinion.  The Commission acknowledges that there may be 
little practical difference between providing sworn information and providing information on 
oath.  Essentially, the effect of either of these approaches amounts to the same thing – 
the applicant formally affirming his or her opinion.43  Nonetheless, the Commission 
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  Consultation Paper on Search Warrants and Bench Warrants (LRC CP 58-2009) at paragraph 3.21.    
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recommends that for the sake of consistency and clarity a standard term should be 
employed. 
3.26 The Commission is of the view that the term “information on oath and in writing” should be 
implemented as the standard requirement.  It is notable that search warrant provisions in 
a number of other jurisdictions rely solely on the phrase “information on oath”: for example 
the Criminal Code44 in Canada; the Crimes Act 1914, as amended,45 in the Australian 
Commonwealth; the Search Warrants Act 199746 in Tasmania; and the Criminal 
Investigation Act 200647 in Western Australia. In England and Wales the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 does not specify that an applicant must provide information 
on oath when he or she makes an application. However, the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984 provides that the applicant “shall answer on oath any question that the justice of 
the peace or judge hearing the application asks him.”48     
3.27 The term “provide information on oath”, as opposed to swearing information, can be found 
in a number of bench warrant provisions in Ireland.  Order 21, Rules 1(5) and 1(6) of the 
District Court Rules 1997, which relate to the issuing of a bench warrant for a witness in 
criminal proceedings, require information on oath to be provided to the issuing judge.  
Where an accused is believed to be evading service of a summons or is believed to be 
about to abscond or has absconded, an application may be made to the District Court for 
a bench warrant to arrest the person.  The request for this must be made by use of a 
Form 22.1, as contained in Schedule B of the District Court Rules 1997, and the applicant 
must provide information on oath.  Relying on “information on oath” as the standard term 
would therefore coincide the search warrant application requirement with the wording 
contained in bench warrant provisions.  
3.28 Furthermore, evidence given at trial is generally given under oath.49  As search warrants 
are concerned with obtaining evidence, it would be consistent with the process for giving 
evidence before a court under oath to require a search warrant applicant to provide 
information in the same manner.   
3.29 The Commission is of the view that the recommended Search Warrants Act should 
expressly provide that the information grounding a search warrant application must be in 
writing.  Section 10 of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1997, as 
amended by section 6 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006, requires an application for a 
search warrant under that provision to be by “information on oath”.  Order 34, rule 17 of 
the District Court Rules provides that such an application must be by “information on oath 
and in writing.”  In The People (DPP) v Jakubowski50  the Court of Criminal Appeal held 
that the term “information on oath” in section 10 of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1997 does not mean that a written information is required.51  In 
Jakubowski the appellant challenged the validity of a search warrant issued under section 
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10 of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1997, as amended.  The search 
warrant stated on its face that it had been issued by the judge who was satisfied “as a 
result of hearing evidence on oath” that there were sufficient grounds for doing so.  The 
term “evidence on oath” was the requirement originally specified in section 10 of the 1997 
Act.  However, when section 10 of the 1997 Act was substituted by the 2006 Act the 
wording changed to “information on oath”.  Although the Garda who applied for the search 
warrant had in fact provided a written information form, this was not recorded on the 
search warrant.  The appellant submitted the change from “evidence on oath” to 
“information on oath” tightened the requirements by requiring the basis upon which a 
search warrant was issued to be in a permanent form which would be available should 
there be any dispute regarding the grounds on which the warrant was issued.52   He also 
argued that even if the 1997 Act did not require information in writing, Order 34, rule 17 of 
the District Court (Search Warrant) Rules 2008,53 which uses the term “information on 
oath and in writing”, creates such an obligation.   
3.30 The Court of Criminal appeal held that, under Simple Imports Ltd v Revenue 
Commissioners & Ors, 54 if the warrant stated that it was issued on a basis that was not 
justified by the statute creating the power, the invalidity of the search warrant could not be 
cured by evidence that there was in fact before the issuing authority evidence which 
entitled it to issue the warrant.55  A warrant must show jurisdiction on its face to be valid.  
In considering what is required by section 10 of the 1997 Act when it refers to “information 
on oath”, the Court stated that in ordinary terms, information “simply means some 
material, knowledge or news which is communicated” and may be given “orally, in writing, 
electronically or possibly by gesture.”56  The Court was of the view that “whatever the logic 
and good sense of providing that material upon which a warrant is based should be 
recorded in permanent form, it seems unlikely that the 2006 Act in general, or section 6 in 
particular, was intended to make more restrictive the requirements for obtaining a valid 
warrant.”57  The Court concluded that there is nothing in the structure or terms of the Act 
to suggest that information was intended only to mean a written document.58 
3.31 The Court accepted that the warrant was inconsistent with the relevant District Court Rule 
and the form prescribed under the Rule.59  However, applying the case of The State (O’ 
Flaherty) v Floinn,60 the Court held that the jurisdiction to issue a search warrant was 
derived from primary legislation which also set the limits of such jurisdiction.61  Order 12 
Rule 23 of the District Court Rules 199762 and section 12 of the Interpretation Act 2005  
provide that a departure from a form in the Schedule to the Rules or a deviation from a 
form in an enactment does not automatically invalidate the proceedings.  Thus, the Court 
held that the search warrant was not invalid. 
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3.32 The Commission is aware that, in practice, persons applying for search warrants lay a 
written information form before the issuing authority.  Requiring the information grounding 
a search warrant application to be in writing ensures that there is a written record of the 
information on which the application is based which is useful if an issue regarding the 
grounds for the application arises during proceedings.  In addition, it requires the applicant 
to carefully consider the grounds upon which he or she is basing the application.  It also 
gives the issuing authority an opportunity to scrutinise the written form and satisfy himself 
or herself that there is an adequate basis for issuing the warrant.  In Damache v Director 
of Public Prosecutions,63 the Supreme Court pointed out that “it is best practice to keep a 
record of the basis upon which a search warrant is granted.”64 
3.33 The Oireachtas debates on the Criminal Justice Bill 2004, enacted as the Criminal Justice 
Act 2006, which changed the terminology in section 10 of the Criminal Justice 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1997 from “evidence on oath” to “information on oath”, 
indicates that the intention of the legislature was to clarify that the traditional practice of 
swearing an information in writing applies.  When introducing the 2004 Bill the Minster for 
Justice, Equality and Law Reform stated (as Gaeilge) that “information on oath” was the 
formula traditionally used in search warrant provisions and operates so that the officer of 
An Garda Síochána swears an affidavit, upon which he or she may be questioned by the 
judge.65  He stated that the formula was changed to “the hearing of evidence on oath” in 
section 10 of the 1997 Act.66  However, the new formula created some uncertainty 
regarding the practice and procedure that should be followed when making a search 
warrant application.67  To avoid uncertainty, the legislature returned to the tried and tested 
formula, “information on oath”.   
3.34 The Commission recommends below in this Chapter (paragraph 3.88) that as a general 
rule a person applying for a search warrant should be required to appear personally 
before the issuing authority to affirm his or her opinion under oath.  However, legislation 
should permit the requirement for the applicant to appear personally before the issuing 
authority to be dispensed with in urgent situations.  The requirement to provide 
information in writing should not be insisted upon in such situations, but the applicant 
should be required to file a written record of the application within a certain timeframe 
following the issuing of the search warrant. 
3.35 As noted, a small number of provisions do not include any requirement for the applicant to 
affirm his or her opinion, whether on oath or by swearing the information. There is no 
rationale included within these provisions as to why there is no such requirement.  The 
Commission is of the view that it would be appropriate for search warrant applications and 
subsequently issued search warrants to generally be based on information which has 
been formally sworn or provided on oath.  Affirming the applicant’s opinion is an important 
means of safeguarding fundamental rights because it encourages the applicant to 
appreciate the gravity of the interference with constitutional and other rights as he or she 
could be charged with perjury if the evidence given on oath is untrue.68   
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3.36 The Commission recommends that “information on oath and in writing” should be 
the standard requirement for an applicant to affirm his or her opinion. 
C Anticipatory Search Warrants 
3.37 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission invited submissions on whether the 
recommended generally applicable Search Warrants Act should provide for the issuing of 
a search warrant on the basis of a belief that evidence will or is likely to be found at a 
place at some time in the near future.69  In Ireland, legislative provisions allow for the 
issuing of a search warrant where there are reasonable grounds to suspect or believe that 
evidence of or relating to the commission of an offence is to be found at a named location. 
3.38 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission noted that legislation in a number of other 
jurisdictions provides for anticipatory search warrants.  For example, in Australia, the 
Commonwealth Crimes Act 1914, as amended, allows an applicant to apply for a search 
warrant where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that “there is, or there will be 
within the next 72 hours, any evidential material at the premises.”70  In the United States, 
rule 41(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure  permits anticipatory warrants.  
The constitutional validity of anticipatory search warrants was upheld by the Supreme 
Court in United States v Grubb.71  In Grubb, the applicant claimed that the issuing of a 
search warrant on the basis of an affidavit that police had organised the controlled 
delivery of a package to his home violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution which provides that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause.  The 
Supreme Court stated that, as the issuing of all search warrants depends on evidence 
being found when the search is conducted, all search warrants are in a sense anticipatory, 
and therefore anticipatory warrants are “no different in principle from ordinary warrants.”72  
The Supreme Court held that three elements must be present in an application for an 
anticipatory search warrant: 
(i) that it is now probable, 
(ii) that contraband, evidence of a crime, or a fugitive will be on the described 
premises, 
(ii) when the warrant is executed. 
3.39 The Court stated that two requirements must be satisfied.  The first is that if the triggering 
condition occurs, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence will be found at a 
particular location.  Secondly, there must be probable cause to believe that the triggering 
condition will in fact occur.   
3.40 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission suggested that, if provision were made for 
anticipatory warrants, a corresponding set of procedural rules and safeguards would be 
required, such as a time limit as to the anticipation and validity of such a warrant.  
Otherwise, there is a danger that law enforcement officials could engage in a “fishing 
expedition” by applying for an anticipatory warrant and keeping it on file until the expected 
circumstances occur.  The Commission also suggested additional safeguards such as 
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confining the authority who could issue such warrants to a judge of the District Court and 
implementing a high standard of information required to support the application. 
3.41 The Commission received feedback highlighting some advantages that anticipatory 
search warrants would have during investigations.  It was suggested that such a 
procedure would be of assistance where, for example, Gardaí are aware that controlled 
drugs are going to be on a premises at a particular time.  Gardaí could obtain a search 
warrant prior to the drugs being on the premises.  Currently, in such a situation Gardaí 
must wait until the drugs are actually located on the premises before an application for a 
search warrant can be made.  The New Zealand Law Commission recommended the 
introduction of anticipatory warrants in its report on Search and Surveillance Powers;73 but 
its recommendation was not incorporated into the subsequently enacted Search and 
Surveillance Act 2012.   
3.42 The main reason for the New Zealand Commission’s recommendation was the view that it 
would result in greater time efficiency and would assist in avoiding the delay of waiting to 
confirm the existence of an object at a location before applying for a search warrant.74  
This would be of benefit where there is a risk of evidence being destroyed or moved to 
another location, or where the material in question is intangible, such as emails or text 
messages, which are easily destroyed or altered.75   
3.43 Notwithstanding the potential advantages that anticipatory search warrants may have in 
the investigation of offences, such warrants may confer an overly expansive discretion on 
law enforcement officials.  Arguably, where the location of material at a premises is 
dependent upon the occurrence of some future event, such as delivery of drugs to the 
premises, any grounds put forward in a search warrant application would be too remote to 
satisfy a threshold for granting the search warrant application.  Even where the validity of 
an anticipatory warrant were triggered by a future event, so that the warrant could not be 
executed until, for example, a consignment of controlled drugs was delivered to a location, 
the power to decide if and when the triggering event has occurred would be vested in law 
enforcement officials.   
3.44 The Commission has recommended the introduction of a limited electronic search warrant 
application and issuing process, whereby the requirement for the applicant to appear 
personally before the issuing authority could be dispensed with in urgent circumstances.  
In such circumstances, an application to the High Court could be made and a search 
warrant issued and transmitted quickly, thereby reducing the risk of any material being 
moved to another location or destroyed before a premises could be searched. 
3.45 The Commission is of the view that the present position which requires the applicant to 
have a reasonable suspicion or belief that evidence is at a place should remain. 
3.46 Having considered feedback received, the position in other jurisdictions and the potential 
advantages and disadvantages of anticipatory warrants, the Commission is also therefore 
of the view that the proposed Search Warrants Act should not provide for anticipatory 
search warrants.   
3.47 The Commission recommends that the proposed Search Warrants Act should 
retain the current requirement that a search warrant may be issued where material 
in respect of an offence is to be found at a specified location, and that the 
recommended Search Warrants Act should not therefore provide for anticipatory 
warrants. 
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D Requests for Additional Information  
3.48 In Ireland, search warrant provisions do not contain any express stipulation that an issuing 
authority must request further information from the applicant in addition to that included in 
the application itself.  On the other hand, there is no express stipulation prohibiting a 
request for further information from an applicant.  In The People (DPP) v Kenny,76 the 
Supreme Court inferred that the issuing authority concerned did have the power the make 
further enquiries.  The Court went further, however, and suggested that issuing authorities 
had a duty to do so in order to satisfy themselves that there were grounds to issue a 
search warrant.77  In Hanahoe v Hussey,78 the High Court observed that the issuing 
District Court judge did not rely solely on the information submitted to her in the 
application.  Rather, she independently “probed and put questions to the Gardaí” for the 
purpose of gaining additional information, so that she could make a fully informed decision 
on the matter.79  Therefore, the power and duty of the issuing authority to request further 
information is a corollary of the condition that the applicant must satisfy the issuing 
authority of the need for a search warrant.  In turn, the issuing authority must be satisfied 
that a search warrant is necessary and should be issued.    
3.49 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission referred to legislation in other jurisdictions 
which includes express provisions regarding requests for additional information.  In 
England and Wales, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 provides that an applicant 
“shall answer on oath any question that the justice of the peace or judge hearing the 
application asks him.”80  The New South Wales Law Enforcement (Powers and 
Responsibilities) Act 2002 states that the applicant “must provide (either orally or in 
writing) such further information as the eligible issuing officer requires concerning the 
grounds on which the warrant is being sought.”81  In Victoria, the Confiscation Act 1997 
states that a search warrant must not be issued unless the applicant has given the 
magistrate or judge “any further information that he or she requires concerning the 
grounds on which the warrant is being sought.”82  Similarly, in Queensland the Crime and 
Misconduct Act 2001 provides that the magistrate or judge may refuse to consider an 
application until the applicant gives “all the information the issuer requires about the 
application in the way the issuer requires.”83    
3.50 Expressly setting out a power to request further information within legislation may have 
certain advantages.  It would provide a clear legislative recognition of the power and 
practice of issuing authorities to seek further details so applications are sufficiently 
informative.  Secondly, such a provision would assist an applicant in being fully prepared 
by ensuring that they provide as much relevant information as possible when making an 
application.  Greater preparation on the part of the applicant may in turn result in a more 
efficient and timely application process.  This would be particularly beneficial where an 
applicant does not have a great deal of experience in making such applications.  Thirdly, 
this type of legislative provision may also serve to remind issuing authorities of the duty to 
request further information where the information initially provided by the applicant is not 
sufficient to justify issuing a warrant.  
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3.51 The Commission recommends that the power of issuing authorities to request further 
information of an applicant should be acknowledged in legislation. However, the 
Commission does not recommend that such requests should be obligatory in every case.  
Thus, the legislation should not create a positive obligation, as to do so may provide a 
basis on which to challenge the validity of a search warrant in cases where additional 
information was not requested.  Rather, it would be a matter for the issuing authority in 
each case to determine whether additional information is required to ground the 
application.  The Commission is of the view that it would be appropriate to incorporate 
such a provision in the Search Warrants Act recommended in this Report.         
3.52 The Commission recommends that the power of an authority considering whether 
to issue a search warrant to request further information from an applicant should 
be placed on a statutory footing in the Search Warrants Act. Such a provision 
should not create a positive obligation but should simply acknowledge the power to 
request additional information where it is necessary and appropriate to do so. 
E Form of Search Warrant Applications  
3.53 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission noted that although the majority of search 
warrant provisions do not specify the manner in which applications should be presented,84 
legislation  generally refers to corresponding “information forms” which are to be 
completed by the applicant and submitted to the issuing authority.85  In practice, therefore, 
search warrant applications are typically presented in writing.  The Commission has 
recommended at paragraph 3.366 that a generally applicable Search Warrants Act should 
require a person applying for a search warrant to affirm his or her opinion “on oath and in 
writing”.   
3.54 A number of these information forms are contained in the District Court Rules 1997,86 for 
example, in relation to the Gaming and Lotteries Act 1956,87 the Control of Dogs Act 
1986,88 the Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act 1989,89 the Video Recordings Act 
1989,90 the Firearms and Offensive Weapons Act 1990,91 the Criminal Damage Act 199192 
and the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1993.93  The District Court (Search Warrant 
Rules) 2008 amended the District Court Rules 1997 by substituting new information forms 
in respect of the Criminal Assets Bureau Act 1996,94 the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1997,95 the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud) Act 200196 and the 
Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act 2001. 97    
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3.55 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission expressed the view that having a large 
number of information forms, from which the relevant form must be selected and 
completed by the applicant, is inefficient.98  The Commission also noted that the 
legislature’s task of amending existing provisions so as to incorporate new information 
forms corresponding with each new search warrant provision is inefficient and time-
consuming.99  The Commission therefore examined the possibility of implementing a 
single information form to be used when applying for search warrants.  In this regard, the 
Commission examined the approach in other jurisdictions where standard search warrant 
forms are issued when applying for search warrants.100  For example, in England and 
Wales, the search warrant provisions under sections 8, 15 and 16 of the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 are supplemented by the Criminal Procedure Rules 2014.101  
The Criminal Practice Directions102 set out the forms to be used in connection with the 
parts of the 2014 Rules which relate to search warrant applications.  Rule 6.30 sets out 
detailed requirements about what must be included in such forms.  The 2014 Rules are 
accompanied by guidance notes on completing the forms.  
(1) Format of “information for search warrant” forms in Ireland   
3.56 With regard to the current approach in Ireland it has been noted that, generally, each 
search warrant provision has a corresponding ‘information for search warrant’ form which 
is completed by the applicant and submitted to the issuing authority.  The typical format of 
such forms is as follows:  
(a) the name and section of the legislative provision under which the application is made is 
printed on the document;  
(b) the applicant is required to complete the name of the District Court area and district 
number where the application is being made; 
(c) the applicant must state his or her name on the form;  
(d) a statement as to the status of the applicant, for example, whether he or she is a 
member of An Garda Síochána, a member of An Garda Síochána of a certain rank, or 
an officer of another authority entitled to make an application;  
(e) a statement that the informant has reasonable grounds for suspecting or believing that 
certain material, which may include evidence of or relating to an offence or other 
material relevant to the enactment containing the provision, is likely to be found at a 
location named by the applicant; 
(f) the applicant must specify the address of the location concerned;  
(g) the applicant must set out the basis for the grounds of the suspicion or belief; 
(h) a statement that a search warrant is being sought on the basis of the information form;  
(i) the signature of the informant or applicant; 
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(j) the signature of the potential issuing authority to whom it has been presented and the 
date upon which the information was presented and sworn. 
(2) Implementing a standard search warrant application form   
3.57 The major benefit of having a standard information form in place of the array of forms 
which currently exist in Ireland is that it would lead to greater efficiency in respect of the 
search warrant application procedure.  An applicant would no longer need to obtain the 
particular information form corresponding to the relevant search warrant provision, but 
would simply need to complete a standard form with the necessary details. Furthermore, 
the legislature would no longer need to draft a new information form corresponding to 
each new search warrant provision as the standard form would be used for applications 
made under any and all provisions.  
3.58 A standard form would not deviate greatly in substance from the information forms which 
are currently relied upon.  Many of the features noted above would remain the same, 
including: 
 a section of the form where the applicant specifies the relevant District Court area and 
district number; 
 a section where the applicant states his or her name, office and position;  
 a section where the applicant identifies the location to be searched;  
 a requirement to state the information upon which the application is based, and 
 a section for the signatures of the applicant and the authority who accepts the 
application.  
3.59 Many information for search warrant forms contain a printed statement that the informant 
has reasonable grounds for suspecting or believing that evidence of, or relating to, an 
offence is to be found.  This is not, however, a requirement for all information for search 
warrant forms and even where it is a requirement the terms of the statement may vary. 
For example, Form 34.15 is the information form associated with section 20(1) of the 
Companies Act 1990, as amended.  It contains the following statement concerning the 
belief of the officer applying for a search warrant: 
“I believe that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that there are on the 
premises at ........., in the court (area and) district aforesaid, material information within 
the meaning of the said section 20, namely 
(*books *documents of which production has been required under section *14 *15 *19 of 
the above-mentioned Act on the .... day of .......... 20.... and which have not been 
produced in compliance with that requirement) 
(*books *documents *other things which I have reasonable grounds for believing may 
provide evidence of or relating to the commission of an offence under the Companies 
Acts). 
The basis for my so believing is as follows...” 103 
 Therefore, the officer’s stated belief does not always relate to a suspected offence. 
3.60 The Commission has already discussed the variations within Irish search warrant 
provisions dealing with the opinion of the applicant.  The Commission has recommended 
that a single term (“reasonable grounds for suspecting”), outlining the opinion required of 
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an applicant, should be used in legislation.  This standardisation would be equally 
appropriate for search warrant application forms.  Where an applicant is applying for a 
search warrant based on reasonable grounds for suspecting that evidence of or relating to 
an indictable offence is at a location, a statement to that effect should be included on the 
form.  Currently, information for search warrant forms vary depending on the search 
warrant provision to which they relate and the title of the legislative provision under which 
the application is being made is printed at the top of each form.  By contrast, the proposed 
standard information form would simply include a section whereby the applicant would, 
himself or herself, state the suspected offence with which the investigation, and 
consequently the search warrant application, is concerned. 
3.61 Where the person applying for a search warrant does not suspect that evidence of or 
relating to an offence is at a place, but is applying pursuant to a power in an enactment in 
the schedule, the standard of belief should still be “reasonable grounds for suspecting”.  
However, the information form should state that the applicant has reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that a search warrant is necessary to facilitate a person in carrying out his or 
her powers or functions under one of the enactments specified in the schedule of Acts and 
Statutory Instruments which authorise the issuing of a search warrant where suspicion or 
belief that evidence relating to an offence is at a location is not a requirement or the only 
requirement for the issuing of a warrant.  The information form should then leave room for 
the applicant to describe the basis for this suspicion. 
3.62 Overall, a standard form would be more open and, in practice, would require the applicant 
to complete a greater portion of the form rather than these details being printed on the 
particular corresponding form, as is currently the case.  
3.63 The Commission recommends that the proposed Search Warrants Act should 
provide for a standard search warrant information form to be used when applying 
for a search warrant, which should replace the array of “information for search 
warrant” forms that currently exist. 
F An Electronic Search Warrant Application Process 
3.64 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission examined the issue of whether a Search 
Warrants Act should provide for electronic procedures for applying for and issuing search 
warrants, and discussed legislation providing for electronic processes in other 
jurisdictions.104  Irish legislation does not provide for the use of information and 
communication technology (ICT) in the search warrant application process.  The 
Commission also published an Issues Paper on Search Warrants in which it sought the 
views of interested parties in respect of electronic search warrant procedures.105 
(1) Electronic filing of search warrant forms 
3.65 In the Issues Paper, the Commission discussed the option of introducing a system under 
which all search warrant information forms could be filed electronically.  This approach 
would involve the applicant saving an “information for search warrant” form to a database.  
Such a system would mean that there would be a record of every search warrant 
information form stored electronically.  An e-filing system would be a natural development 
of the current practice of An Garda Síochána, which involves the completion of the 
information form on the Garda Síochána PULSE database before printing the form and 
bringing it to the issuing authority to make the search warrant application.   A record of the 
warrant application is retained on PULSE.  If a search warrant is issued, the Garda notes 
this on the relevant PULSE file.  The Commission understands that this electronic 
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database is accessible only to members of An Garda Síochána.  In the Issues paper, the 
Commission suggested that this practice of having an electronic database could also be 
open to other bodies that apply for search warrants such as the Office of the Director of 
Corporate Enforcement or the Revenue Commissioners, and all of these electronic 
databases could be combined to form a central repository.106 
3.66 A significant majority of the submissions which the Commission received in response to 
this aspect of the Issues Paper favoured the introduction of a system whereby it would be 
possible to file search warrant information forms electronically.  Feedback suggested that 
the filing and automatic recording of search warrant information forms in a central 
repository would be a useful development, as information forming the basis of a search 
warrant application could be accessed without delay if an issue arose in respect of the 
search warrant application during proceedings.  It was also suggested to the Commission 
that an e-filing system would allow for greater flexibility than the current system as 
information forms could be filed at any time.  Submissions also agreed with the 
observation in the Issues Paper that an e-filing system would complement current 
developments in the Courts Service in relation to the use of ICT and would be consistent 
with eGovernment strategy in Ireland.107  The Commission’s 2010 Report on Consolidation 
and Reform of the Courts Acts108 includes a provision in the draft Courts (Consolidation 
and Reform) Bill appended to that Report to the effect that “[r]ules of court shall, where 
practicable and appropriate, support the efficient use of information and communications 
technology in the conduct of proceedings before the Courts.”109  Electronic procedures 
have been introduced in small claims civil proceedings, in personal insolvency 
proceedings and in the High Court Commercial List.110 
3.67 At paragraphs 3.722 to 3.90 the Commission discusses the possibility of dispensing with 
the requirement for the individual applying for a search warrant to appear personally 
before the issuing authority in limited, exceptional circumstances.  If such a system were 
implemented, it would be useful to have all documents associated with the search warrant 
process, including the information form and the search warrant itself, readily accessible 
from one central repository. 
3.68 The Commission recommends at paragraph 3.633 that a standard search warrant 
information form should be implemented in Ireland.  The use of one standard form when 
applying for a search warrant would make an electronic filing system relatively easy to 
implement and operate as there would not be a variety of forms to choose from. 
3.69 Having regard to the positive nature of the responses to the issue of electronic filing of 
search warrant information forms and the advantages associated with such procedures, 
the Commission recommends that it should be possible to file search warrant information 
forms electronically 
                                               
106
  Ibid at paragraph 2.02. 
107
  See Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, Supporting Public Service Reform: eGovernment 2012-
2015, available at egovstrategy.gov.ie; and Courts Service ICT Strategy Statement 2011-2014, available at 
courts.ie. 
108
  Report on Consolidation and Reforms of the Courts Acts (LRC 97-2010). 
109
  Ibid at 198 (section 227 of the draft Courts (Consolidation and Reform) Bill). 
110
  See District Court (Small Claims) Rules 2009 (SI No.519 of 2009), Order 53A (small claims procedure); 
section 140 of the Personal Insolvency Act 2012, the Circuit Court Rules (Personal Insolvency) 2013 (SI 
No.317 of 2013), Order 73; the Rules of the Superior Courts (Personal Insolvency) 2013 (SI No.316 of 2013), 
Order 76A (personal insolvency); and Rules of the Superior Courts (Commercial Proceedings) (SI No.2 of 
2004), Order 63A and 63B (High Court Commercial List) . 
 64 
3.70 The development and operation of an electronic system for filing search warrants would 
be a matter for the Courts Service.  Submissions which the Commission received stressed 
the importance of having a suitable ICT infrastructure in place to ensure the efficient 
operation of an electronic search warrant filing system. In that regard, the successful 
implementation of such a system would be dependent upon sufficient resources being 
dedicated to its running and maintenance. 
3.71 The Commission recommends that the proposed Search Warrants Act should allow 
for search warrant information forms to be filed electronically. 
(2) Removing the requirement for a personal appearance by the applicant before the 
issuing authority 
3.72 As noted earlier, applications for search warrants generally involve the applicant 
appearing personally before the issuing authority (usually a judge of the District Court) 
and making the application ex parte in the chambers of a judge of the District Court by 
laying the search warrant information form before the judge and affirming his or her 
opinion on oath.  The Issues Paper sought views as to whether the current search warrant 
application process should continue to require the applicant to appear personally before 
the issuing authority formally to affirm his or her opinion.111  It asked whether, if a personal 
appearance should not generally be required, such a requirement could be dispensed with 
so that all applications could be made, or permitted to be made electronically. 
3.73 The Commission also invited views as to whether the requirement for the applicant to 
appear personally before the issuing authority could be dispensed with in limited 
circumstances as an exception to the rule.  The Issues Paper suggested that such 
circumstances could include urgent situations, or where it would be impracticable to 
appear in person before the issuing authority, or where any delay involved in applying in 
person would frustrate the effective execution of the warrant.112   
3.74 In other jurisdictions, the circumstances in which the requirement for the applicant to 
appear personally before the issuing authority may be dispensed with are limited.  For 
example, in the Commonwealth of Australia, the Crimes Act 1914, as amended, provides 
for search warrant applications by telephone, telex, fax or other electronic means in an 
urgent case or if any delay in making the application in person would frustrate the effective 
execution of the warrant.113  Electronic applications are qualified as the authority to which 
the application is being made “may require communication by voice to the extent that it is 
practicable in the circumstances.”114  The New Zealand Search and Surveillance Act 2012 
provides that an application for a search warrant must be in writing115 and may be made 
electronically.116  The New Zealand 2012 Act requires the applicant to make a personal 
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appearance or communicate orally with the issuing officer unless: (a) the issuing officer is 
satisfied that the question of whether the search warrant should be issued can properly be 
determined on the basis of any written communication by the applicant; (b) the information 
forming the basis of the search warrant application has been supplied to the issuing 
officer; and (c) the issuing officer is satisfied that there is no need to ask any questions of, 
or seek any further information from the applicant.117  The Canadian Criminal Code states 
that where a peace officer believes that an indictable offence has been committed and it 
would be “impracticable to appear personally before a justice to make an application for a 
warrant”, the peace officer may submit information on oath “by telephone or other means 
of communication” to a judge.118 
(a) Discussion 
(i) Advantages of a personal appearance 
3.75 A number of submissions which the Commission received in respect of this issue 
highlighted the importance of a personal appearance by the applicant before the issuing 
authority.  Feedback agreed with the suggestion in the Issues Paper that a personal 
appearance is more likely to make both the applicant and the issuing authority appreciate 
the gravity of using a search warrant.  One respondent with significant experience issuing 
search warrants referred to the importance of the issuing authority being able to engage 
meaningfully with the applicant so that the process is not merely a “rubber-stamping” 
exercise.  An appearance in a formal courtroom setting reminds the applicant of the 
fundamental rights which the search warrant process engages.  It therefore encourages 
him or her to provide truthful information to ensure that the grounds on which he or she is 
applying for a search warrant are sufficient.  Requiring the search warrant application to 
take place in a courtroom environment to which the applicant has to travel is likely to 
reinforce in the mind of both the issuing authority and the applicant the importance and 
implications of using a search warrant, and therefore encourage the issuing authority 
thoroughly to consider the information on which the application for the search warrant is 
based.  There may be a danger that removing the requirement for a personal appearance 
would encourage a casual approach to be taken when applying for a search warrant.  
Removing the search warrant application process from a courtroom environment might 
distance all parties from the importance and implications of using a search warrant.  The 
physical presence of the applicant and issuing authority reminds all parties of the 
solemnity of the occasion. 
3.76 Submissions also suggested that requiring the applicant to appear personally before the 
issuing authority assists in safeguarding the right to privacy and protection of the dwelling 
by allowing the issuing authority a greater opportunity to assess the merit of the 
application.  Having the applicant personally appear before him or her to satisfy the 
procedural requirements allows the issuing authority to observe the applicant’s 
demeanour at first hand thereby improving their capacity to assess the applicant’s 
veracity.  The issuing authority is able to observe what are perceived as “taken to be 
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involuntary physical signs of falsehood”119 such as tone of voice, eye movement, facial 
gestures and other body language.120 
3.77 In the Issues paper, the Commission noted comments of members of the judiciary 
suggesting that the weight that experienced observers of witnesses should attach to 
impressions they form of them in the witness box has been overestimated.  Hardiman J 
has cited with approval the following passage of Atkin LJ in Société d’Avances 
Commerciales (Sociéte Anonyme Egyptienne) v Merchants Marine Insurance Co (The 
Palitana):121 
“As I have said on previous occasions the existence of a lynx-eyed Judge who is 
capable at a glance of ascertaining whether a witness is telling the truth or not is more 
common in works of fiction than in fact on the bench, and, for my part, I think that an 
ounce of intrinsic merit or demerit in the evidence, that is to say, the value of the 
comparison of evidence with known facts, is worth pounds of demeanour.” 
3.78 However, one submission that the Commission received noted that the Supreme Court 
has commented on the benefit that a trial court has in contrast with a court of appeal in 
being able to draw inferences of fact from assessing the demeanour of a witness giving 
evidence.  In Director of Public Prosecutions v Mulvey,122 the Supreme Court cited the 
following passage of the Supreme Court in Hay v O’Grady:123 
“Inferences of fact are drawn in most trials; it is said that an appellate court is in as 
good a position as the trial judge to draw inferences of fact. (See the judgment of 
Holmes LJ in The SS “Gairloch,” Aberdeen Glenline Steamship Co v Macken [1899] 2 
IR 1, cited by O’Higgins CJ in The People (DPP) v Madden [1977] IR 336 at p.339). I 
do not accept that this is always necessarily so. It may be that the demeanour of a 
witness in giving evidence will, itself, lead to an appropriate inference which an 
appellate court would not draw. In my judgment, an appellate court should be slow to 
substitute its own inference of fact where such depends upon oral evidence or 
recollection of fact and a different inference has been drawn by the trial judge. In the 
drawing of inferences from circumstantial evidence, an appellate tribunal is in as good 
a position as the trial judge.” 
3.79 The Commission received some responses to the Issues Paper which asserted that a 
personal appearance by the applicant is so important that such a practice should not be 
dispensed with under any circumstances.  In that regard, it was suggested that the ex 
parte nature of search warrant applications necessitates a procedural safeguard of a 
personal appearance by the applicant, and therefore personal appearance is more likely 
to prevent frivolous or marginal applications given the time, effort and expense of the 
applicant having to attend at a courthouse.  Requiring a personal appearance in every 
case, it was submitted, would be the best way of maintaining the protecting the rights of 
the owner or occupier. 
(ii) Removing the requirement for a personal appearance in all circumstances 
3.80 In contrast, a number of respondents to the Issues Paper submitted that all applications 
should be made or be permitted to be made electronically.  It was suggested that a 
procedure that did not require an applicant to appear personally would save considerable 
time and resources, and may reduce the risk of investigations being compromised if 
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persons applying for search warrants were able to do so electronically while remaining at 
the location of an investigation.  This might promote speed and efficiency in the search 
warrant application process.  It was also suggested that an electronic process would be 
cost-effective as it would reduce the need to convene court sittings out of normal court 
hours, such as at the weekend, thereby reducing the need for judges, members of the 
Gardaί or other regulatory authorities and court staff to travel. 
(iii) Removing the requirement for a personal appearance only in limited circumstances 
3.81 A significant proportion of submissions relating to this issue agreed that the requirement 
for the applicant to appear personally before the issuing authority should only be 
dispensed with in certain circumstances. 
3.82 Submissions in favour of this approach suggested that search warrant applications that do 
not involve a personal appearance before the issuing authority should be an exception to 
the general rule, as there would otherwise be a danger that an issuing authority would 
satisfy themselves of the necessity for the warrant without any interaction between the 
issuing authority and the applicant.  It was suggested that the use of electronic procedures 
in all search warrant applications could result in an increase in the number of challenges 
to the admissibility of evidence obtained on foot of a search warrant.  It was also noted 
that an electronic system would not be necessary in all situations, and there would be 
greater need for such a system in a large country, such as Australia, than in Ireland. 
3.83 The submissions agreed that one benefit of such an approach is that it would facilitate the 
issuing of search warrants by judges of the District Court in circumstances of urgency.  
This issue was raised during the parliamentary debates on the Criminal Justice (Search 
Warrants) Bill 2012 (enacted as the Criminal Justice (Search Warrants) Act 2012), in 
response to which the Minister for Justice and Equality, referring to the Commission’s 
Consultation Paper, stated that the Commission’s “consideration of the extent to which 
technology could be used to apply for and issue search warrants, thereby possibly 
overcoming some of the difficulties that arise when a warrant is required immediately” was 
“of particular interest” in the context of the Bill.124  It was noted by a senator that 
developments within the area would allow the legislature to “bring... legislation up to the 
level of current technology”125 and it was suggested that if a judge could not be physically 
present to issue a search warrant, judicial interaction should be made possible through 
the use of electronic signatures.126 
3.84 Allowing for the removal of a personal appearance by the applicant in circumstances of 
urgency would decrease the need for legislation providing for members of An Garda 
Síochána of a certain minimum rank to issue search warrants in urgent circumstances 
where it is impracticable for a warrant to be issued by a judge.  The Issues Paper noted 
the existence of a small number of such legislative provisions 127  A process enabling the 
applicant to submit a search warrant application without having personally to appear 
before the issuing authority would enable members of An Garda Síochána to apply to a 
judge of the District Court for a search warrant rather than to a member of An Garda 
Síochána of a certain minimum rank.  This would ensure the independence of the issuing 
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authority, the importance of which was highlighted by the Supreme Court in Damache v 
Director of Public Prosecutions.128   
3.85 In Damache the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional section 29 of the Offences 
Against the State Act 1939, as amended by section 5 of the Criminal Law Act 1976, 
because it permitted a member of An Garda Síochána who was not independent of the 
investigation to issue a search warrant.  The Supreme Court noted that a number of other 
Acts provide for members of An Garda Síochána to issue search warrants in exceptional 
circumstances. The Court stated that “[t]he requirement of urgency is an important factor 
in determining the proportionality of legislation which may infringe a constitutionally 
protected right.”129  Courts in Ireland appear to be satisfied that warrants issued by 
members of the Gardaί satisfy the requirement that a warrant be issued by a “competent, 
detached authority exercising an independent jurisdiction”130 if the Garda is sufficiently 
independent of the investigation.  However, there is a view that the best means of 
ensuring that the issuing authority is completely independent is to have all search 
warrants issued by members of the judiciary.  The Report of the Morris Tribunal of Inquiry 
states that “the power to issue a warrant should be vested in a judge”131 and that with 
modern technology “there is no reason why a judge cannot be easily contacted by 
telephone, facsimile or e-mail or personally, for the purpose of making an application to 
him/her for a search warrant.”132  The Report notes that there are “very limited occasions 
upon which time could make it so pressing as to make it impossible to follow such a 
procedure”.133  Based on these considerations, allowing for electronic applications in 
limited circumstances would allow for the repeal of legislative powers conferring powers to 
issue search warrants on members of An Garda Síochána.  The Commission discusses 
this issue in Chapter 4. 
3.86 Other jurisdictions use ICT in the search warrant application process to vindicate 
fundamental rights.  The New Zealand Law Commission was of the view that allowing the 
requirement of making a personal appearance to be dispensed with may protect human 
rights values as it would provide “the enforcement officer with the opportunity, in cases of 
urgency, to have a search sanctioned by a neutral person, rather than executing a 
warrantless power if that is available.”134  Similarly, part of the reasoning of the United 
States Congress for the introduction of telephonic and electronic warrants was that 
difficulties in obtaining warrants were encouraging law enforcement officials to carry out 
warrantless searches.135  An American academic has commented that a process enabling 
the issuing of search warrants by telephone or other electronic means promotes greater 
compliance with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which protects 
against “unreasonable searches and seizures” and balances “the liberty and privacy 
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interests of each citizen and the safety and security needs of the public.”136  In Ireland, the 
implementation of an electronic search warrant application process in urgent 
circumstances would also protect relevant rights by providing for the issuing of all search 
warrants by a court. 
(b) Conclusion 
3.87 The Commission has considered the feedback received in response to the Issues Paper 
and the advantages and disadvantages of requiring a personal appearance on behalf of 
the applicant.  Removing the requirement for a personal appearance in favour of an 
entirely electronic application process would have the advantage of creating speed, 
efficiency and convenience in the process.  The Commission is of the view that in the 
context of search warrant applications, where fundamental rights are engaged, it is 
important for the issuing authority and the applicant to be able to engage with each other 
in the fullest possible way.  The Commission is of the view that a personal appearance by 
the applicant is the best way of ensuring that the applicant and the issuing authority 
appreciate the gravity of the situation, and that the issuing authority can assess the 
veracity of the application and examine the applicant comprehensively in relation to the 
grounds for the application.  This argument carries particular weight having regard to the 
ex parte nature of search warrant applications. 
3.88 However, the Commission is of the view that the requirement for the applicant to appear 
personally before the issuing authority could be dispensed with in limited circumstances.  
In light of fundamental rights associated with the use of a search warrant, the Commission 
is of the view that legislation should only permit search warrant applications to be made 
without a personal appearance in exceptional circumstances.  In this regard, ICT could be 
used to allow law enforcement officials or regulatory officers to apply for a warrant from 
the location of an investigation in an urgent situation, where the delay involved in applying 
in person would frustrate the effective execution of the search.  The Commission 
considers that the need to appropriately balance the right to privacy and inviolability of the 
dwelling with the public interest in the investigation and prosecution of offences requires 
the imposition of a high threshold to allow for the removal of the requirement for a 
personal appearance.  The Commission received feedback suggesting that legislation 
permitting the removal of a personal appearance in limited circumstances should not be 
too prescriptive and should allow an issuing authority to determine on a case by case 
basis whether it would be appropriate to dispense with the requirement.  However, the 
Commission is of the view that it would be appropriate for legislation to set a high 
threshold from the outset as to the standard that needs to be met. 
3.89 The implementation and functioning of a system that allows for the requirement for a 
personal appearance to be dispensed with in urgent circumstances would be dependent 
upon the appropriate technology being available.  As noted in the Issues Paper, section 
26 of the Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act 2009 provides that applications to a court for 
a search warrant “shall be heard otherwise than in public” and applications for search 
warrants are therefore generally held in chambers of judges.137 The Commission is of the 
view that any security concerns could be significantly minimised through the use of 
technological advances to maintain confidentiality in the search warrant application and 
issuing process.  In its Consultation Paper on Electronic and Documentary Evidence,138 
the Commission discusses Public Key Infrastructure, a system of cryptography which 
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ensures a high level of security in e-communications and confidentiality in the context of a 
message sent over an open network such as the internet.139 
3.90 The Commission recommends that as a general rule a person applying for a search 
warrant should be required to appear personally before a judge of the District Court 
to affirm his or her opinion under oath; but that the proposed Search Warrants Act 
should also provide that an application may be made without the applicant 
appearing personally before a judge where circumstances of urgency giving rise to 
the immediate need for a search warrant means that the delay of appearing in 
person before a judge would frustrate the effective execution of the search warrant. 
(3) Issuing authority in urgent electronic applications 
3.91 The introduction of a limited electronic search warrant application process depends on the 
availability of an issuing authority at any time of the day or night and the appropriate 
technology to hear urgent applications.  It is possible that a judge of the District Court 
assigned to a particular District may not be available.  The Commission has therefore 
considered what type of authority should have the power to hear and issue applications 
without a personal appearance by the applicant under the generally applicable Act. 
3.92 One option would be to establish a panel of judges of the District Court to hear urgent 
electronic search warrant applications.  However, the establishment of such a panel would 
need to comply with the requirement that a District Court judge exercise his or her powers 
locally in accordance with Article 34.3.4° of the Constitution.140  The same issue may arise 
if the power to hear search warrant applications without a personal appearance by the 
applicant is vested in judges of the Circuit Court, which is also a court of local and limited 
jurisdiction under Article 34. There may therefore be difficulties in establishing a panel of 
either judges of the District Court or Circuit Court to hear urgent electronic applications 
that would be compatible with Article 34.3.4°. 
3.93 The Commission is of the view that the authority best placed to consider urgent electronic 
search warrant applications is a judge of the High Court.  Under Article 34.3.1° of the 
Constitution, the High Court has “full original jurisdiction in and power to determine all 
matters and questions whether of law or fact, civil or criminal.”  There are no geographical 
limits to the exercise of the jurisdiction of the High Court. 
3.94 There is invariably a judge of the High Court on duty to hear other forms of emergency 
applications, such as habeas corpus applications pursuant to Article 40.4.2° of the 
Constitution, applications for urgent injunctions141 and emergency orders relating to 
medical procedures.142 
3.95 The electronic issuing of search warrants by the High Court in circumstances of urgency 
would be consistent with the recommendation in Chapter 4 that all search warrants should 
be issued by members of the judiciary.  Most search warrants are issued by a judge of the 
District Court.  However, the Commission notes at paragraph 4.12 that a small number of 
legislative provisions allow members of An Garda Síochána of a certain minimum rank to 
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issue a search warrant in circumstances of urgency.  A number of legislative provisions 
also allow search warrants to be issued by peace commissioners.  Such non-judicially 
issued warrants are an exception to the rule that search warrants should be issued by a 
judge of the District Court.143  One of the main advantages of a procedure allowing for a 
personal appearance to be removed is that technology could allow for greater access to 
members of the judiciary in urgent circumstances where a search warrant is required.  A 
procedure allowing for the removal of a personal appearance by the applicant would be an 
exception to the general process, which the Commission considers is the most effective 
means of allowing the issuing authority to observe the applicant in person and assess his 
or her demeanour, and encourages a sense of formality in the search warrant application 
process.  If this advantage is eroded in any way, a judge of the High Court should be the 
authority that considers the search warrant application and communicates with the 
applicant by video link or telephone.   
3.96 The Commission recommends that in the urgent circumstances allowing for the 
removal of the requirement for a personal appearance by the applicant, the issuing 
authority should be a judge of the High Court. 
(4) Affirmation of the applicant’s opinion where requirement for personal appearance 
removed 
3.97 On the assumption that the proposed Search Warrants Act permits the removal of the 
requirement for an applicant to appear before the issuing authority in urgent situations, 
consideration must be given to how the applicant would in such circumstances affirm his 
or her opinion that evidence of or relating to a particular offence may be found at a certain 
location.   
3.98 The Issues Paper noted that modern technology provides a number of mechanisms by 
which the applicant could fulfil such a requirement.144  The Commission invited 
submissions on whether a search warrant application system should facilitate the 
affirmation of the applicant’s opinion by: (i) sworn oath via telephone or video link; or (ii) 
sworn affidavit in writing (or transmitted electronically in exceptional circumstances); or (ii) 
statutory declaration in writing (or transmitted electronically in exceptional circumstances).  
If legislation provided for sworn oath via telephone or video link, the applicant could file 
the information grounding the application electronically and swear an oath over the 
telephone or by live television link.  The definition of telephone could include any means of 
communication through which the applicant’s voice can be heard, such as Skype or Face 
Time.  A second option would be for the applicant to submit an affidavit containing sworn 
evidence of the information forming the basis of his or her opinion.  The third option, 
statutory declaration, could involve the inclusion of a declaration in the search warrant 
information form that would render the applicant liable for a criminal prosecution upon 
making a false declaration. 
3.99 In the Issues Paper, the Commission noted that different procedures would need to be put 
in place depending on whether the search warrant application is in a form that produces 
writing (for example, e-mail or fax) or a form that might not produce writing (for example, 
telephone or video link).145  Other jurisdictions have put in place procedures that the 
issuing authority should follow on receipt of an electronic search warrant application.  In 
general, such procedures require the issuing judge to record the information verbatim, 
where the information received is in a form that does not produce writing, before filing a 
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certified copy with the court clerk.146  Where the information received is in a form that does 
not produce writing, the judge must certify the accuracy of the information and file it with 
the court clerk.147 
3.100 Submissions received by the Commission agreed that a process allowing for the removal 
of a personal appearance by the applicant would need to facilitate the affirmation of the 
applicant’s opinion under oath to protect the fundamental rights of the person whose 
premises is the intended subject of the search warrant.  Regarding the means of 
communication that should be used in such circumstances, the Commission recognises 
that affirmation by affidavit or statutory declaration might be the most convenient way of 
applying for a search warrant in the limited circumstances in which a personal appearance 
could be dispensed with.  If legislation were to permit an electronic search warrant in 
exceptional cases, it might seem logical to provide that in the urgent circumstances in 
which a personal appearance could be dispensed with, the whole application process 
could be conducted via electronic processing of documents, including the affirmation of 
the opinion of the applicant. 
3.101 However, many respondents to the Issues Paper expressed a preference for a method of 
communication which would allow the issuing authority to see and hear the applicant.  
Such a method of communication, it was submitted, would be the nearest alternative to a 
personal appearance by the applicant.  The Commission considers that application by 
video link or telephone would be the most effective way of affording the issuing authority 
an opportunity to assess the demeanour of the applicant, ensure the veracity of the 
application and ask the applicant any questions that the issuing authority considers 
necessary where the applicant is not physically present at the place where the issuing 
authority is located.  In that regard the Commission is of the view that a Search Warrants 
Acts should provide that where a personal appearance is dispensed with in urgent 
situations, the applicant should be required to affirm his or her opinion via telephone or 
video link.  
3.102 Regarding procedures that would need to be put in place where an applicant has applied 
for a search warrant by telephone or video link, submissions which the Commission 
received suggested that such applications should be recorded so that there is a record of 
the search warrant application.  The Commission is of the view that the creation of a 
record of the search warrant application, where the applicant has not personally appeared 
before the issuing authority, would be an important safeguard.  It would provide a record 
of the basis on which the search warrant was granted, which could be accessed if a 
dispute in respect of the issuing of the warrant arose during proceedings.  The 
Commission acknowledges that recording the affirmation of the applicant’s opinion would 
be dependent on both the applicant and the issuing authority having access to video link 
or telephone facilities.  
3.103 The Criminal Justice (Surveillance) Act 2009 provides that members of An Garda 
Síochána and the Defence Forces may approve surveillance in cases of urgency.148  The 
2009 Act requires a superior officer who approves the carrying out of the surveillance in 
such circumstances, as soon as practicable and not later than 8 hours after the 
surveillance has been approved, to prepare a written record of approval of that 
surveillance.149  The Commission is of the view that a Search Warrants Act that provides 
for the affirmation of the applicant’s opinion by video link or telephone should include a 
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similar safeguard.  In that regard, a person who has applied for a search warrant in urgent 
situations should be required to file a record of the search warrant application as soon as 
practicable and not later than 24 hours after the issuing of the search warrant.  The 
Commission is of the view that such a record could be filed electronically. 
3.104 The Commission recommends that in cases where the applicant has not appeared 
personally before a judge, he or she should be required to communicate with the 
judge of the High Court considering the application by video link or telephone to 
affirm his or her opinion under oath and answer any questions that the issuing 
authority deems necessary.  Where the applicant has affirmed his or her opinion by 
video link or telephone, the applicant should be required to file a record of the 
search warrant application with the High Court as soon as practicable thereafter 
and not later than 24 hours after the issuing of the search warrant. 
G Notice of Previous Search Warrant Applications  
3.105 Currently, Irish search warrant provisions do not specifically require an applicant to inform 
the issuing authority that an application has previously been made in respect of the same 
subject matter as the current application.  
3.106 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission outlined a number of other jurisdictions where 
the law requires search warrant applicants to inform the issuing authority of previous 
applications.150  Variations between the approaches taken in each jurisdiction can be 
identified and some legislative provisions are far broader in scope than others.  For 
example, Western Australia’s Criminal Investigations Act 2006 requires that an application 
for a search warrant must state “to the best of the applicant’s knowledge”, whether an 
application for a warrant for the same place has been made within the previous 72 hours, 
and if so, the outcome.151  This provision is narrow in scope as it is concerned with a 
limited time period in respect of previous applications.  By contrast, neither Code B of the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 in England and Wales nor the Crimes Act 1914, as 
amended, in the Australian Commonwealth set any period of limitation.  Thus, any 
previous application must be brought to the attention of the issuing authority.   
3.107 In respect of the extent of the information to be afforded by the applicant, Code B of Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 states that the applicant must establish whether the 
premises have been searched previously.  Hence the applicant will only be concerned 
with previous applications where the warrant was issued and subsequently executed.152  
Similarly, the law in Queensland requires information only where a search warrant has 
been issued.153  By contrast, the approach in the Commonwealth,154 Western Australia,155 
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and New Zealand is that the applicant must not only inform the issuing authority of 
applications, but also of their outcome.  The issuing authority will therefore be informed of 
previous applications even if they were unsuccessful.  Other, more general, points as to 
the scope of the law in certain jurisdictions are noteworthy.  For example, in New South 
Wales the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 does not include a 
general requirement as to notice of previous applications.  It limits such notice to cases 
where an application has been refused and is subsequently resubmitted. 156  The New 
Zealand Search and Surveillance Act 2012 requires the applicant to disclose details only 
of previous applications made by the agency with whom he or she is employed or 
engaged in particular.157  In Canada, the requirement for notice is limited to cases where 
the application is made electronically.158 
3.108 The Commission has considered whether it would be appropriate to implement a notice of 
previous applications provision in Ireland.  The Commission acknowledges that certain 
benefits flow from the practice of giving notice of previous applications.  For example, the 
requirement may enable the issuing authority to be more informed when determining 
whether a warrant should be issued.  It may reduce the risk of undue targeting or 
harassment of a person by applying for a number of search warrants over a short period 
of time where reasonable grounds for doing so do not exist.  In addition, it may prevent 
applications which have been rejected being resubmitted where there is no new or 
additional information to justify the subsequent application.  However, the making of 
previous applications in respect of the same person(s), place or things should not 
necessarily influence an issuing authority in the decision currently before him or her.  
Furthermore, if previous search warrants have been issued and evidential material has 
not been found, this should not be taken to mean that material is unlikely to be found in a 
subsequent search. The Commission notes that if a specific provision as to notice of 
previous applications was to be implemented, this might result in challenges to the validity 
of search warrants in cases where the applicant or issuing authority did not expressly refer 
to the notice requirement.   
3.109 On balance, the Commission is of the view that an express notice of previous applications 
provision should not be enacted because the advantages do not significantly outweigh the 
disadvantages.  The Commission does not seek to prevent such notice being requested 
or provided during a search warrant application.  However, it considers that the power of 
the issuing authority to request further information from the person making the application 
would provide sufficient scope for the issuing authority to enquire as to previous 
applications. 
3.110 The Commission recommends that where a judge wishes to be informed of 
previous search warrant applications, he or she may enquire as to this matter as 
part of his or her power to request further information of an applicant, but that the 
proposed Search Warrants Act should not include a mandatory requirement to 
inform the court of previous search warrant applications. 
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4  
CHAPTER 4 ISSUING SEARCH WARRANTS 
A Court Should be the Issuing Authority under the Search Warrants Act 
4.01 The proposed Search Warrants Act should specify who may issue a search warrant.  
Currently, each legislative provision specifies who may issue a search warrant under the 
relevant piece of legislation.  Most search warrant provisions state that a judge of the 
District Court may issue a search warrant and, in practice, the majority of warrants are 
issued by judges of the District Court.1  Some legislative provisions specify limited 
circumstances in which a member of An Garda Síochána, of a certain minimum rank, may 
issue a search warrant.  A small number of provisions enable a peace commissioner to 
issue a search warrant.2  
(1) Non-judicial search warrants 
(a) Search warrants issued by members of An Garda Síochána 
4.02 A limited number of search warrant provisions in Ireland enable members of An Garda 
Síochána of a certain minimum rank (either superintendent or chief-superintendent) to 
issue search warrants in particular circumstances.  However, warrants issued in this way 
are the exception to the rule that a search warrant must be issued by a judge.  Acts which 
provide for such powers include the Offences Against the State Act 1939,3 the Official 
Secrets Act 1963,4 the Criminal Assets Bureau Act 1996,5 the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, 
as amended,6  and the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act 2001.7    
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7
  Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act 2001.  
 76 
4.03 Under these provisions it is permissible for a search warrant to be issued by a member of 
the Gardaί where the immediate need for a search warrant means that it would be 
impracticable to apply to a judge.  Garda issued search warrants are therefore intended to 
be relied upon in circumstances where it is not possible to have the warrant issued by a 
judge.  The relevant validity periods in respect of such warrants are much shorter than if 
they were to be issued by a judge.8 These time limits further reinforce the rule that such 
warrants are only intended to be relied upon in emergency circumstances.  
4.04 In The People (DPP) v Byrne,9 the accused was convicted of an offence under section 
15A of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, as amended, in relation to drugs discovered on foot 
of a search warrant issued by a superintendent under section 8(2) of the Criminal Justice 
(Drug Trafficking) Act 1996.  The Court of Criminal Appeal referred to the decision of Ryan 
v O’Callaghan,10 which upheld the constitutionality of a peace commissioner being 
empowered to issue a search warrant.  The Court stated that Ryan: 
“stresses a particular way of supporting the constitutionality of the peace 
commissioner’s power – that he is an independent person unconnected with the 
criminal investigation as such who must himself be satisfied of the necessary matters 
by the information on oath of another person.  It is therefore clear, secondly, that the 
power of a Garda chief superintendent or superintendent to issue a warrant is by way 
of further exception and is an emergency provision, and cannot be regarded as 
anything other than an emergency provision.”11  
4.05 The Court emphasised that “there is an obligation to apply to a district judge or a peace 
commissioner before seeking a warrant elsewhere”12 and that permitting a circumstance 
of urgency to arise before applying to a superintendent was unacceptable.   
4.06 The decision of Byrne was applied in respect of surveillance approvals issued by senior 
members of the Gardaí in The People (DPP) v Idah.13  Undercover Gardaí had obtained a 
surveillance approval from a judge of the District Court under the Criminal Justice 
(Surveillance) Act 2009 to conduct surveillance from the 14 to 18 September 2010.  
However, the relevant communications concerning the applicant had not taken place over 
those dates.  A senior member of An Garda Síochána granted an approval to continue 
using the surveillance device on 19 September 2010.  The Court held that under section 
7(2) of the 2009 Act, the approval could only have been granted if the senior Garda had 
been satisfied that at least one of the circumstances of urgency provided for in the 
subsection applied.  However, as there was no note as to which of the conditions of 
urgency applied and there had been no evidence of this nature given by Gardaí at trial, 
the Court held that the surveillance approval under which the evidence had been obtained 
was invalid.  
                                               
8
  Under section 14 of Criminal Assets Bureau Act 1996, a search warrant issued by a Criminal Assets Bureau 
officer who is a member of An Garda Síochána remains valid for 24 hours, whereas a warrant issued by a judge of 
the District Court under the same Act is valid for one week. Under section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption 
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District Court is valid for one month. Similarly, section 8 of the Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act 1996, which 
amended the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 to allow a member of An Garda Síochána to issue a search warrant in certain 
circumstances, provides that a warrant issued by a Garda will cease to have effect after 24 hours; by contrast a 
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9
  [2003] 4 IR 423. 
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  High Court 22 July 1987. 
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  [2003] 4 IR 423 at 427. 
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  Ibid. 
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  [2014] IECCA 3. 
 77 
(b) Search warrants issued by Peace Commissioner  
4.07 The power of Peace Commissioners to issue search warrant is usually exercised where it 
is not possible to apply to a judge of the District Court, such as where no court is sitting or 
in urgent circumstances.  Acts providing for such a power include the Road Traffic Act 
1961,14 the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977,15 the Control of Dogs Act 1986,16 the Customs and 
Excise (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1988,17 the Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act 
1989,18 the Video Recordings Act 198919 and the Firearms and Offensive Weapons Act 
1990.20  Notwithstanding the High Court decision in Ryan v O’Callaghan, above, no 
legislative provision enacted or made since 1990 has authorised the issuing of a search 
warrant by a Peace Commissioner.   
(2) Administrative nature of power to issue search warrants 
4.08 The issuing of a search warrant is an administrative function, and it is therefore 
unnecessary for the issuing authority to be a member of the judiciary.  In Ryan v 
O’Callaghan,21 the High Court found that the function of issuing a search warrant was 
“executive rather than judicial in nature”; hence it could be carried out by a non-judicial 
authority.  The Court in Berkeley v Edwards22 expressly approved the decision in Ryan 
and held that issuing a search warrant did not amount to an administration of justice that 
could only be performed by a judge.23  In Farrell v Farrelly24 the decision in Ryan, namely 
that issuing search warrants was not an act that could solely be performed by a member 
of the judiciary, was again accepted and applied.25  In Simple Imports v Revenue 
Commissioners26, the Supreme Court also noted that issuing a search warrant was a 
“purely ministerial act.”27  In light of this and in stark contrast to the normal rules of 
evidence, the Court further outlined that an issuing officer would be “entitled to rely on 
material, such as hearsay, which would not be admissible in legal proceedings.”28  
Although the issuing officer is entitled to rely on the information submitted by the search 
warrant applicant,29 he or she must be satisfied that a warrant is required and justified.  
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The issuing officer must consider and assess the information provided by the applicant 
and determine whether he or she is satisfied of the need to issue a warrant.   
4.09 It is vital that the issuing authority does not simply “rubber stamp” the application, but 
makes an informed and considered decision in his or her own mind.  This principle has 
been enunciated, for example, in Byrne v Grey,30 The People (DPP) v Kenny,31 The 
People (DPP) v Balfe32 and The People (DPP) v Tallant.33  In Damache v Director of 
Public Prosecutions34, the Supreme Court noted that, although the issuing of a search 
warrant is an administrative act, “it must be exercised judicially.”35  In Chapter 3, Part G, 
above, the Commission observed that if an issuing authority is not sufficiently satisfied by 
the information provided by the applicant, he or she may request further information to 
ground the search warrant application.  This helps to ensure that the issuing authority is 
completely satisfied in issuing the warrant and is not relying solely on the opinion of the 
applicant.  The issuing authority is not obliged to issue a search warrant, and if not 
satisfied by the application, he or she may refuse to do so.36  
(3) Requirement that issuing authority be neutral and detached  
4.10 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission discussed the concept of “neutral and 
detached” issuing authorities.37  O’Malley comments that in order to control the exercise of 
State power to intrude upon a person’s rights:  
“the law continues to insist that there be interposed between the person seeking a 
warrant and the person whose property is liable to be searched an impartial decision-
maker who must be satisfied that there are credible and rational grounds for issuing 
the warrant.”38  
4.11 The issuing authority should be impartial “in the sense of having no personal or 
institutional connections with the applicant.”39       
4.12 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission noted that the issue of the neutrality of the 
issuing authority arose in the context of a small number of Irish provisions that permit 
members of An Garda Síochána of a certain minimum rank to issue search warrants.40  At 
the time the Consultation Paper was published, none of these legislative provisions 
specifically required the member who issued the search warrant to be independent of the 
investigation.  The Commission therefore invited submissions as to whether only a 
                                               
30
  [1988] IR 31.  
31
  [1990] 2 IR 110.   
32
  [1998] 4 IR 50.  
33
  [2003] 4 IR 343.  
34
  [2012] IESC 11; [2012] 2 IR 2 66.  
35
  [2012] IESC 11; [2012] 2 IR 2 66 at paragraphs 17 and 34. 
36
  See Consultation Paper on Search Warrants and Bench Warrants (LRC CP 58-2009) at paragraph 4.28.  
37
  Ibid at paragraphs 4.29ff.  
38
  O’Malley The Criminal Process (Round Hall 2009) at 353. 
39
  Ibid.  
40
 Section 29 of the Offences Against the State Act 1939, as inserted by section 1 of the Criminal Justice 
(Search Warrants) Act 2012, section 16 of the Official Secrets Act 1963, section 14 of the Criminal Assets 
Bureau Act 1996, section 26 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, as amended by the Criminal Justice (Drug 
Trafficking) Act 1996 and further amended by section 3 of the Criminal Justice (Search Warrants) Act 2012, 
section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act 2001, section 7 of the Criminal Justice 
(Surveillance) Act 2009. 
 79 
member of An Garda Síochána who is independent of an investigation should be 
authorised to issue a search warrant relating to that investigation.  
4.13 Since the publication of the Consultation Paper, the Supreme Court in Damache v 
Director of Public Prosecutions,41 discussed in detail in Chapter 1 above, declared 
unconstitutional section 29 of the Offences Against the State Act 1939, as amended,42 
because it permitted a member of An Garda Síochána who was not independent of the 
investigation to issue a search warrant in the absence of circumstances of urgency.  The 
Supreme Court accepted, however, that there may be an urgent situation where a 
member of the Garda Síochána who is not independent of the investigation may issue a 
search warrant.   
4.14 The Supreme Court has, therefore, adjudicated on the issue of whether only a member of 
An Garda Síochána who is independent of an investigation should can issue a search 
warrant in relation to that investigation in circumstances which are not urgent.  Other 
legislative provisions still provide for members of An Garda Síochána of a certain 
minimum rank to issue search warrants in circumstances of urgency without containing a 
specific safeguard requiring the member to be independent of the investigation.  For 
example, the Official Secrets Act 1963,43 the Criminal Assets Bureau Act 199644 and the 
Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act 2001,45 which authorise members of An Garda 
Síochána of a certain minimum rank to issue search warrants in exceptional 
circumstances, do not expressly require the member to be independent of the 
investigation.  However, unlike section 29(1) of the Offences Against the State Act 1939, 
which the Supreme Court in Damache found to be unconstitutional, these other provisions 
require circumstances of urgency to be present before a member of An Garda Síochána 
may issue a search warrant.  In Damache, the Supreme Court noted: 
“In exceptional circumstances, such as urgent situations, provision has been made in 
statutes for a member of An Garda Síochána to issue a warrant, which usually has a 
short duration. The requirement of urgency is an important factor in determining the 
proportionality of legislation which may infringe a constitutionally protected right.”46  
4.15 However, no issue of urgency arose in Damache and the Court stated that it had not 
“considered or addressed situations of urgency.”47 The legislation enacted following 
Damache provides that, even in urgent circumstances, a warrant in respect of section 26 
of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 or section 29 of the Offences Against the State Act 1939 
must be issued by a member of An Garda Síochána who is independent of the 
investigation.48   
4.16 Legislative provisions authorising members of An Garda Síochána, who are of a certain 
minimum rank and independent of the investigation, to issue search warrants in 
circumstances of urgency are compatible with the Constitution.  The comments of the 
Supreme Court in Damache suggest that a search warrant issued by a member of An 
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Garda Síochána who is not independent of the investigation might be constitutionally 
permissible where circumstances of urgency are present.  However, the Commission is of 
the view that it is necessary to consider how best the requirement for a neutral and 
detached issuing authority can be achieved in light of: (a) the need for the issuing 
authority to be able to assess the conflicting interests of the State and the person affected 
by the search warrant in an impartial manner as emphasised in Damache; and (b) the 
recommendation of the Commission in Chapter 3, above, that an electronic search 
warrant application process should be available in circumstances of urgency. The 
Commission has therefore considered whether legislative provisions permitting members 
of An Garda Síochána of a certain minimum rank to issue a search warrant should 
remain.  The concept of a neutral and detached issuing authority is commonly discussed 
in United States case law concerned with search warrants.49  Irish courts have, in case 
law prior to Damache, also emphasised the importance of the independence of the issuing 
authority.   
(a) Irish case law concerning neutrality and detachment of issuing authority  
4.17 In The People (DPP) v Balfe,50 the Court of Criminal Appeal held, with regard to issuing 
search warrants, that the “protection and vindication of constitutional rights in this area is 
achieved by the introduction of a competent, detached authority exercising an 
independent jurisdiction.”51 In Director of Public Prosecutions v Sweeney52 a Chief 
Superintendent of An Garda Síochána was involved in the investigation into the provision 
of funding for illegal organisations and terrorism.  Another member of the force, an 
inspector, was appointed to carry out the investigation and report back to the Chief 
Superintendent.  The Chief Superintendent was regularly informed by the inspector of the 
progress of his enquiries.  A conference was held in respect of the investigation where it 
was decided to carry out raids.  Based on the information supplied by the inspector, the 
Chief Superintendent issued a search warrant under the Offences Against the State Act 
1939.  Subsequently, the applicant submitted that the Chief Superintendent did not have 
sufficient evidence available to him, and therefore did not have reasonable grounds upon 
which to issue a warrant.  
4.18 In its assessment of the circumstances in which the warrant was issued, the High Court 
observed that the Chief Superintendent had “kept closely in touch with the information 
which he was being given” by the inspector and that as a result of what he was told he 
formed his own view as regards the grounds for issuing the warrant.53  On this basis the 
Court concluded that the warrant issued by the Chief Superintendent was valid.  It held 
that, although the issuing authority had been quite involved in the investigations and had 
been receiving regular information on the matter from a colleague, the Court did not 
question his detachment or neutrality from the matter in respect of issuing the search 
warrant.  
4.19 Similarly, in The People (DPP) v Birney54 the first applicant challenged the validity of a 
search warrant authorising a search of his residence.  The applicant submitted that the 
warrant was invalid as it had been issued by a member of An Garda Síochána holding the 
rank of superintendent who was not independent of the investigation. On this basis the 
applicant claimed that there had been a breach of the principle nemo iudex in causa sua 
                                               
49
  Consultation Paper on Search Warrants and Bench Warrants (LRC CP 58-2009) at paragraphs 4.31 – 4.34. 
50
  [1998] 4 IR 50. 
51
  Ibid at 61. 
52
  [1996] 2 IR 313.    
53
  Ibid, at 318-319.  
54
  [2007] 1 IR 337; [2006] IECCA 58.  
 81 
(no one should be a judge in their own cause), which is concerned with impartial and 
unbiased decision-making.  The applicant further submitted that, because a Garda 
member involved in the investigation at hand issued the search warrant (the issuing 
superintendent was in charge of the investigation), the guarantee of a fair trial enshrined 
in Article 38 of the Constitution had been offended.  The Court of Criminal Appeal did not 
have jurisdiction to adjudicate on the constitutionality of section 29(1) of the Offences 
Against the State Act 1939, as amended by section 5 of the Criminal Law Act 1976, which 
empowered a member of An Garda Síochána to issue a search warrant.  However, the 
Court stated that the wording of section 29(1) of the1939 Act, which empowered a 
member of An Garda Síochána to issue a search warrant, was “clear and unambiguous.”  
In its assessment of this provision the Court could “see no basis” for holding that the 
issuing Garda should not be one involved in the particular investigation concerned.55  
4.20 However, the Supreme Court subsequently adjudicated upon the constitutionality of 
section 29 of the 1939 Act in Damache v Director of Public Prosecutions.56  The applicant 
challenged the constitutionality of section 29(1) of the 1939 Act, as amended by section 5 
of the Criminal Law Act 1976.  The circumstances were similar to those put forward by the 
applicant in The People (DPP) v Birney & Ors57, in that the search warrant in Damache 
was issued by a Garda superintendent in charge of the investigation.  The applicant 
argued that the search of his home on foot of a search warrant that was issued by a 
Garda Superintendent who was not independent of the investigation was unconstitutional, 
as it violated the protection of the dwelling in Article 40.5 of the Constitution.  The 
Supreme Court agreed with the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in Birney that 
section 29 of the 1939 Act did not prohibit a Garda Superintendent from issuing a search 
warrant.  However, the Court held that section 29 of the 1939 Act, as amended, was 
unconstitutional.  The Court noted that “the principle that the person issuing a search 
warrant should be an independent person is well-established.”58  The Supreme Court cited 
with approval the following views of the High Court (Barr J) in Ryan v O’Callaghan,59 in 
which the constitutionality of section 42(1) of the Larceny Act 1916 was considered: 
“The investigating police officer must swear an information that he has reasonable 
cause for suspecting that stolen property is to be found at the premises to be 
searched and he must satisfy a peace commissioner, who is an independent person 
unconnected with criminal investigation per se, that it is right and proper to issue a 
warrant.”60 
4.21 The Court also relied on jurisprudence of other jurisdictions to illustrate the importance of 
having an independent issuing authority.61  It acknowledged the existence of statutory 
provisions allowing members of An Garda Síochána to issue search warrants, but noted 
that these powers were to be used in circumstances of urgency only.  The Court noted the 
constitutional protection of the dwelling under Article 40.5 and considered whether the 
power under section 29 of the 1939 Act constituted an interference with the protection of 
the dwelling which came within the “in accordance with law” exception specified in Article 
40.5 and stated that: 
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“[t]he procedure for obtaining a search warrant should adhere to fundamental 
principles encapsulating the independent decision maker, in a process which may be 
reviewed.  The process should achieve the proportionate balance between the 
requirements of the common good and the protection of an individual’s rights.  To 
these fundamental principles as to the process there may be exceptions, for example 
when there is an urgent matter.”62 
4.22 The Court was of the view that the person authorising the search should “be able to 
assess the conflicting interests of the State and the individual in an impartial manner.”63  
Therefore, the issuing authority should be “independent of the issue and act judicially”.64  
As these principles were not satisfied in Damache, the Court held that section 29(1) was 
unconstitutional. 
(b) United States 
4.23 In Johnson v United States65 the United States Supreme Court held that a person involved 
in the process of law enforcement would not be sufficiently detached for the purposes of 
determining a search warrant application.66  Similarly, in Coolidge v New Hampshire67 the 
US Supreme Court commented, with regard to issuing search warrants, that “prosecutors 
and policemen simply cannot be asked to maintain the requisite neutrality with regard to 
their own investigations.”68  
(c) European Convention on Human Rights 
4.24 The issue of search and seizure by State authorities has come before the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) on numerous occasions.  Quite often these cases have been 
based, or at least partly based, on the assertion that the search has offended the rights of 
a person to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence under Article 8 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).  The protection offered by Article 
8 is by no means absolute.  Article 8(2) provides that a State may interfere with the rights 
of a person where it is “in accordance with the law” and “necessary in a democratic 
society”.69  The ECtHR has held that the exception provided for in Article 8(2) must be 
interpreted narrowly, however, and the need for same in any given case must be 
convincingly established.70  In addition to the requirement that an interference must be 
necessary and justified, the ECtHR has also clearly stated that the relevant search and 
seizure law and practice in a State must afford adequate and effective safeguards against 
abuse.71  
4.25 Although the lack of judicial assessment and authorisation of a search warrant application 
may not in itself amount to a violation of the Convention, the Court may consider this fact 
in determining whether sufficient safeguards are in place to protect the rights of the 
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person concerned and to prevent an abuse of the law.72  As the Court in Stefanov v 
Bulgaria stated: 73   
“the mere fact that an application for a warrant has been subject to judicial scrutiny will 
not in itself necessarily amount to a sufficient safeguard against abuse. The court 
must rather examine the particular circumstances and evaluate whether the legal 
framework and the limits on the powers exercised were an adequate protection 
against arbitrary interference by the authorities.”74 
(d) Report of the Committee to Review the Offences Against the State Acts 1939-1998  
4.26 In the Report of the Committee to Review the Offences Against the State Acts 1939-1998 
and Related Matters75 (the Hederman Report) the Committee considered the power of a 
Superintendent of An Garda Síochána to issue a search warrant under section 29(1) of 
the Offences Against the State Act 1939 (“the 1939 Act”), as amended.  The Report was 
published prior to Damache v Director of Public Prosecutions76 and section 29(1) of the 
1939 Act had not yet been amended by the Criminal Justice (Search Warrants) Act 2012.  
The Hederman Report recognised:  
“There is no doubt but that the power to issue a warrant under section 29 is a vital 
weapon in the armoury of the Gardaí in their fight against the activities of illegal 
organisations.... Given the utility and importance of this power, the Committee does 
not wish to make any recommendation that would undermine its effectiveness. 
Nevertheless, section 29, as presently drafted, raises some issues of principle which 
call for further consideration.”77       
4.27 The Report considered whether it would be desirable if a section 29 search warrant could 
only be issued by a court where a search of a private dwelling was proposed.  On this 
matter the Report stated:  
“While some members of the Committee would favour this limitation in view of Article 
40.5 of the Constitution and Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights, 
the Committee, on balance, does not consider that this additional limitation should 
form part of its recommendations on this section.”78     
A majority of the Committee recommended that warrants under section 29 of the 1939 Act 
should have a maximum validity period of 24 hours (as there was no such maximum validity 
period at that time).79  However, it did not recommend that a section 29 warrant should be 
issued only by a Court.   
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(e) Report of the Morris Tribunal of Inquiry 
4.28 The Report on the Arrest and Detention of Seven Persons at Burnfoot, County Donegal 
on the 23rd of May 199880 (the Morris Tribunal Report) also considered the power of 
Garda officers to issue search warrants under section 29 of the Offences Against the 
State Act 1939.  As with the Hederman Report, the Morris Tribunal Report concerned 
section 29 of the 1939 Act prior to its amendment by the Criminal Justice (Search 
Warrants) Act 2012.  The Report noted that the power under section 29 was a serious one 
and was an exception to the general position of the law, that a search warrant to search 
the home of a citizen may only be issued by a judge.81  The Report referred to the first 
section of the Hederman Report quoted above, stating that it “wholeheartedly agrees with 
[the] statement”82 that the power to issue search warrants under section 29 of the 1939 
Act “is a vital weapon in the armoury of the Gardaí.”  The Morris Tribunal Report stated 
that the vesting by the Oireachtas of the power under section 29 in a senior officer of An 
Garda Síochána “was calculated to ensure that there is a measure of objectivity 
maintained in the decision as to whether a search warrant will be issued.”83  However, on 
the other hand it observed that on the basis of the experience of the Tribunal and the 
evidence available to it, the level of objectivity and independence of mind required for the 
exercise of this power “is demonstrably eroded if the superintendent concerned in the 
investigation is also the authority to whom the application is made for the warrant.”84  The 
Tribunal was of the view that in cases where the issuing authority is a Garda member with 
some involvement in an investigation, “it seems likely that greater weight will be afforded 
by [him or her] as to the needs of the Garda operation or investigation, and somewhat 
lesser consideration to the rights of the citizen under Article 40.5 of the Constitution and 
Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights concerning the protection of their 
residence.”85  
4.29 With regard to protecting rights, the Report highlighted the importance of ensuring the fair 
exercise of the power to issue search warrants under section 29.  In particular, it 
considered that the power should be exercised by a person capable of acting in a judicial 
and independent way, and the interest in the investigation of crime should be balanced 
with the protection of the rights of the person affected.86  The Tribunal identified certain 
risks which may be associated with the power of members of An Garda Síochána to issue 
search warrants.  For example, it noted the danger that a warrant would be issued almost 
automatically and without proper consideration of the application or the grounds to issue a 
warrant.87  Similarly, the danger that the power under section 29 becomes a “mere 
formality in which the investigating sergeant may as well be empowered to issue a search 
warrant to himself [or herself].”88  
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4.30 Having regard to all the issues involved, the Tribunal concluded that it would be preferable 
that the power to issue a search warrant be vested in a judge.89  The Tribunal further 
noted that, in light of modern technology and rapid communications, there was no reason 
why a judge could not be easily contacted for the purpose of determining a search warrant 
application.  The view of the Tribunal was that there were “very limited occasions upon 
which time would be so pressing as to make it impossible to follow such a procedure.”90  
Nonetheless, the Tribunal recognised that in certain, albeit limited, cases it may not be 
viable to contact a judicial authority and that “a residual power for such eventuality could 
still be vested in a senior officer of the Garda Síochána to be used in exceptional 
circumstances.” The recommendation of the Tribunal was that urgent consideration 
should be given to vesting the power to issue search warrants under section 29 of the 
Offences Against the State Act 1939 in judges of the District or Circuit Court, as this would 
be in keeping with best modern practice on the matter.91 The Morris Tribunal Report goes 
further than the Hederman Report in its recommendations as it recommends that the 
power of Gardaí to issue search warrants should be limited to a greater degree.  
4.31 Notably, in Damache v Director of Public Prosecutions92 the Supreme Court had regard to 
the recommendations of the Morris Tribunal Report in striking down as unconstitutional 
section 29 of the 1939 Act.  Although the Morris Report was concerned with the power of 
members of the Garda Síochána to issue search warrants under a particular provision, the 
risks identified and issues discussed in this section of the Report apply to all search 
warrants issued by members of the Garda Síochána. 
(4) Conclusion:  Garda warrants 
4.32 The Commission has considered whether the powers of members of the Gardaí to issue 
search warrants should remain.  The Hederman Report recognised that the integrity of 
search warrants issued by members of An Garda Síochána may be questioned but did not 
recommend any change to the power.  By contrast, the Morris Tribunal Report strongly 
favoured the limitation of this power and a greater involvement by the courts in issuing 
search warrants.  Both of these Reports were narrow in scope, as they were solely 
concerned with the power of Gardaí to issue search warrants under section 29 of the 
Offences Against the State Act 1939.  Similarly, the decision of the Supreme Court in 
Damache v Director of Public Prosecutions93 concerned only section 29 of the Offences 
Against the State Act 1939, as amended.  However, the concerns identified regarding a 
potential lack of independence in the issuing process apply in all cases where a member 
of An Garda Síochána can issue a search warrant, regardless of the legislative provision 
under which it is issued.   
4.33 One commentator notes that the decision of Damache v Director of Public Prosecutions94 
affirms “at the level of constitutional doctrine the general value of pre-screening by 
independent adjudicators as a safeguard for domestic privacy.”95  The issue under 
consideration by the Supreme Court in Damache was narrow, but the decision 
demonstrates a preference for judicially issued warrants.  Case law of the ECtHR has 
identified the need for adequate and effective safeguards to balance the power of State 
                                               
89
  Ibid at paragraph 6.23. 
90
  Ibid.  
91
  Ibid at paragraph 6.24. 
92
  [2012] IESC 11; [2012] 2 IR 266 at paragraph 53. 
93
  [2012] IESC 11; [2012] 2 IR 266. 
94
  [2012] IESC 11; [2012] 2 IR 266. 
95
  McMahon “Self-service Search Warrants and International Terrorism: Lessons from Damache v Director of 
Public Prosecutions” (2012) 1 Irish Law Journal 2 at 4. 
 86 
authorities to carry out search and seizures.  As a search warrant provides the written 
authority enabling the entry and search of a location, it is necessary to ensure that the 
power to grant that authority is not misused.   
4.34 The Commission agrees with the view of the Morris Tribunal Report that it is preferable 
that the power to issue a search warrant should be conferred on a judge as the authority 
best placed to assess the conflicting interests of the State and the rights of a person 
affected by the search warrant.  The Commission has recommended in Chapter 3 that an 
application for a search warrant should be permitted to be made to the High Court without 
an applicant having to appear personally before a judge, where circumstances of urgency 
giving rise to the immediate need for a search warrant means that the delay of appearing 
in person before a judge would frustrate the effective execution of the search warrant.  
The introduction of a limited electronic search warrant application procedure in urgent 
circumstances would ensure greater access to members of the judiciary.  The 
observations of the Morris Tribunal Report in 2006 regarding the ability of modern 
technology to provide easy access to members of the judiciary are particularly relevant in 
light of the growing use of online audiovisual communication methods such as Skype and 
FaceTime.  If appropriate technology were made available to enable persons to apply to a 
judge for a search warrant in urgent circumstances, there should be no need for legislative 
provisions providing for members of An Garda Síochána to issue search warrants in such 
circumstances.  The Commission has therefore concluded that these legislative provisions 
should be repealed and that no provision should be made in the proposed Search 
Warrants Act for Gardaí to issue search warrants. 
(5) Conclusion: Peace Commissioner warrants 
4.35 The Commission has identified a very small number of search warrant provisions which 
provide that either a judge of the District Court or a peace commissioner may issue search 
warrants.  These include the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, as amended, the Control of Dogs 
Act 1986, the Customs and Excise (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1988, the Video 
Recordings Act 1989, the Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act 1989, and the Firearms 
and Offensive Weapons Act 1990.  
4.36 The Commission acknowledges that the effect of recommending that a judge of the 
District Court should be the sole authority for issuing search warrants (subject only to the 
exception of High Court issued warrants in cases of urgency) would narrow the scope of 
those who can issue search warrants.  However, as all of the above Acts provide that 
either a judge of the District Court or a peace commissioner may issue a search warrant, 
limiting the power to issue warrants to judges would not involve a significant change.  
Furthermore, the Commission has been advised that in practice search warrant 
applications under the relevant Acts are most often made to judges rather than to a peace 
commissioner. 
4.37 The benefit for the prosecution of judicially issued warrants has been noted.  Orange 
notes that a judge of the District Court who has issued a warrant is presumed to have 
acted in accordance with the requirements of the relevant legislation.96  The District Court 
is a court of record.  However, in The People (DPP) v Owens,97 the Supreme Court 
observed that “[t]he peace commissioner, is a public officer but he is not a court of 
record.”98  Therefore, a warrant issued by a judge of the District Court “speaks for itself’’99 
but a warrant issued by a peace commissioner does not.  Where the validity of a search 
warrant that was issued by a judge of the District Court is challenged, it is for the person 
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who is bringing the challenge to prove that the judge has not acted in accordance with 
legislation.100  Consequently, where the search warrant at issue has been issued by a 
judge of the District Court, the prosecution does not need to call the judge to give 
evidence that he was satisfied that the Garda applying for the warrant had reasonable 
grounds to believe evidence relating to an offence was at a location.101 
4.38 The Commission has recommended at paragraph 3.90 that the requirement for the 
applicant to appear personally before the issuing authority to affirm his or her opinion 
under oath could be dispensed with in urgent circumstances, where the delay in 
appearing before a judge of the District Court would frustrate the effective execution of the 
search.  The Commission has been advised that an application before a peace 
commissioner usually takes place where no District Court judge is available.  The 
Commission is of the view that the introduction of the limited telephonic or video link 
search warrant application process would obviate the need to apply to a peace 
commissioner for a warrant and that the legislation providing for the issuing of search 
warrants by a peace commissioner should be repealed. 
4.39 The Commission recommends that the proposed Search Warrants Act should 
provide that the proposed Search Warrants Act should provide that search 
warrants should only be issued by a court, and that this should ordinarily be a 
judge of the District Court.  This should be subject to an exception that search 
warrants may be issued by the High Court where circumstances of urgency exist 
giving rise to the immediate need for a search warrant which would be frustrated by 
the general requirement for the applicant to appear in person before a judge of the 
District Court. 
4.40 The Commission recommends the repeal of legislative provisions empowering 
members of An Garda Síochána and peace commissioners to issue search 
warrants. 
B The Contents of a Standard Search Warrant Form 
4.41 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission observed that a system of individualised 
search warrant forms exists in Ireland.102  This means that each search warrant provision 
has a corresponding search warrant form which is completed by the issuing authority 
when he or she issues a warrant.  The Commission expressed the view that this approach 
is inefficient and an uneconomical use of resources.  
4.42 In the previous Chapter, the Commission discussed search warrant information forms 
which applicants complete and bring to the issuing authority when applying for a search 
warrant.  A comparable system exists with regard to information forms, as each search 
warrant provision has a separate corresponding information form.  In place of the current 
approach of corresponding forms, the Commission has recommended that a standard 
search warrant information form be implemented.  The same form should be used in all 
search warrant applications and the relevant information should be completed within its 
content.  
4.43 The Commission is of the view that for the purposes of consistency and convenience, a 
standard search warrant form should also be introduced in place of the array of forms 
which currently exist.  This standard form should be used by the issuing authority for 
issuing a search warrant in all cases.  A number of benefits would result from this 
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approach.  It would be more efficient to have a standard form rather than different forms 
for each search warrant provision.  The requirement for drafting new forms corresponding 
to new search warrant provisions would be eliminated as the standard form could simply 
be used to issue a warrant under the new provision.  The issuing authority would not need 
to obtain or be provided with the specific corresponding form so as to issue a warrant; 
rather he or she would simply issue the warrant by means of the standard form.  The risk 
of using the incorrect form when issuing a warrant would also be eliminated.   
(1) Current format and content of a search warrant form  
4.44 Although each provision provides for its own search warrant form, warrant forms are 
similar in their format.  The typical format is as follows:  
i) A search warrant form has the name of the Act and the section under which the 
warrant is issued printed at the top of the form.   
ii) The issuing authority must specify the District Court area and the District number to 
which the warrant relates on the form.   
iii) The form generally contain a printed statement to the effect that information in writing 
has been provided and sworn, and that on the basis of this the issuing officer is 
satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting or believing that certain 
material, including evidence of or relating to an offence or other material relevant to 
the enactment containing the provision, is likely to be found at a location named by the 
applicant; 
iv) The issuing authority is required to specify the location to which the search warrant 
relates and the officer authorised to execute the search.    
v) The search warrant form generally states that the executing officer may be 
accompanied by a member of An Garda Síochána and/or any other person.  The 
scope as to who may accompany the executing officer is dictated by the terms of the 
search warrant provision.  
vi) With regard to execution of the warrant, the warrant form usually includes an 
authorisation to use force, or reasonable force, to enter the premises (where such is 
necessary) so as to execute the search. 
vii) It may state the time period during which the execution must occur (for example within 
one week or one month). 
viii) Generally a search warrant form states that material found during the search which is 
believed to be evidence may be seized.  
ix) Some search warrant provisions state that when a warrant is being executed persons 
present at the location may: a) be searched by executing officers and/or; b) be 
requested by executing officers to give their name and address. Where there is such 
an authority to search and request the personal details of a person present at the 
location, this is noted in the warrant form.     
x) The issuing authority is required to sign and date the warrant form, and is usually 
required to specify who the issued warrant is addressed to, for example the 
superintendent of a named Garda station. 
(2) Discussion  
(a) Layout and title of a standard search warrant form 
4.45 The implementation of a single search warrant form to be used by judges in all 
circumstances would require a certain amount of standardisation in respect of the format 
and content of the form.  However, the Commission envisages that the overall layout of a 
standard search warrant form would not be significantly different to the forms currently in 
use.  
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4.46 As regards the title of the document, currently a search warrant has a reference to the Act 
and section under which it is issued, and the words “search warrant” are printed at the top 
of the warrant form.  A standard search warrant form would simply have the words “search 
warrant” printed at the top of the document and the issuing authority would be required to 
specify the suspected offence or grounds under a scheduled enactment.  The current 
practice whereby the issuing authority specifies the District Court area and number would 
continue.  
(b) Information provided to the issuing authority 
4.47 A standard search warrant form should contain a statement that information on oath and 
in writing has been provided to the issuing authority.   
(c) Confirmation of the issuing authority’s satisfaction to issue a warrant 
4.48 The Commission is of the view that a standard form should contain a printed statement to 
the effect that the authority is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting 
that: (a) evidence of or relating to an indictable offence; or (b) material relevant to a 
scheduled enactment under the generally applicable Search Warrants Act is to be found 
at the named location.  Currently, search warrant forms refer to the legislative provision in 
respect of which the issuing authority is satisfied that there are grounds to suspect that 
evidence may be found.  The Commission proposes that a standard form would simply 
include a blank section after the statement of satisfaction for the issuing authority to 
complete as to the relevant legislative provision.   
(d) Specification of assistants at the execution of a search 
4.49 Each search warrant provision specifies who, if anyone, may accompany the executing 
officer.  Examples include: members of An Garda Síochána, other persons from the same 
office as the executing officer, or any person who may be of assistance during the 
execution of the search.  This authority is consequently reflected on the face on the 
corresponding search warrant form. In the next Chapter, Execution of Search Warrants, 
the Commission discusses the presence of assistants at the execution of a search.  The 
Commission has observed that as it is the primary function of members of An Garda 
Síochána to prevent and investigate criminal offences, it is appropriate that there should 
be a broad authority for Garda members to assist in the execution of a search warrant.  
However, the Commission has formed the view that the same breadth of authority should 
not apply to non-Garda members.  The Commission therefore recommends, at paragraph 
5.67 that, where a non-Garda member is required to attend and assist at the execution of 
a search, specific authority for this must be sought by the applicant and granted by the 
issuing authority.  Thus, the Commission is of the view that, while it would be appropriate 
for a standard search warrant form to include a general statement that Garda members 
may attend at the search warrant execution, a general statement to this effect should not 
be included in respect of non-Garda members.  Rather, a standard form should include a 
dedicated section where the issuing authority would specify whether a non-Garda member 
is permitted to assist, and if so, what persons are so permitted. 
(e) Use of reasonable force 
4.50 Search warrant forms contain a statement that force, or reasonable force, may be used for 
the purpose of gaining entry in order to execute a search warrant.  In the next Chapter the 
Commission recommends, at paragraph 5.44, that the term “reasonable force” should be 
employed as the standard provision in search warrant legislation in Ireland.  A standard 
search warrant form, which should state that the warrant authorises entry to the named 
location, “if necessary by the use of reasonable force.”  
(f) Period of validity of the warrant 
4.51 In respect of the execution of the warrant, the relevant period of validity is also referred to 
on the warrant form. Currently, the validity period during which the execution of the 
warrant must occur varies from one provision to another. However, in the next Chapter the 
 90 
Commission recommends, at paragraph 5.05, that a standard validity period of seven 
days should apply to all search warrants. The Commission is of the view that this should 
also be reflected within the terms of a standard search warrant form.   
(g) Seizure of incidentally found material 
4.52 Search warrant forms generally contain a statement that material found during the 
execution of the search, which is believed to be evidence or other material relevant to a 
particular enactment, may be seized.  A similar statement is usually included in the 
application forms used to apply for warrants.   
(h) Details of persons present at the search location 
4.53 As noted earlier, some search warrant provisions provide that persons present at the 
location being searched under warrant may be searched or be requested to provide 
personal details, such as their name and address, by executing officers. Where this 
element is included in a search warrant provision, it will be reflected on the search warrant 
form. In the next Chapter, the Commission considers this issue in the context of a 
standard Search Warrant Act.  The Commission recommends that a generic provision 
should be included in the legislation, stating that where it is necessary and justified an 
executing officer may request personal details or, where the executing officer is a member 
of An Garda Síochána, search persons present.  These powers may be relied upon only 
to the extent that it is reasonable.  A standard search warrant form should acknowledge 
the authority of executing officers to deal with persons present at a search location, where 
this is necessary and reasonable.  
(i) Reference to the addressee 
4.54 As a search warrant will be addressed to a certain person once issued, the warrant form 
refers to the addressee.  Each form contains a printed reference to the office of the 
addressee in accordance with the terms and requirements of the particular search warrant 
provision.  Many warrant forms state that it is addressed to a member of An Garda 
Síochána of a certain rank, such as inspector or superintendent.  Warrants issued under 
some provisions must be addressed to an officer of the relevant investigating office.  For 
example, a warrant issued under section 787 of the Companies Act 2014103 is addressed 
to a designated officer of the Director of Corporate Enforcement, while warrants issued 
under sections 36 and 37 of the Competition and Consumer Protection Act 2014 are 
addressed to an authorised officer of the Competition and Consumer Protection 
Commission.104  For the purpose of a standard search warrant form, the Commission is of 
the view that it should simply include an open and general addressee section so that the 
issuing authority may state who the addressee is, as well as his or her office and/or rank.   
(j) Particularised statements  
4.55 Some other, more particularised statements can be found in a small number of search 
warrant forms.  For example, warrants issued under the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud 
Offences) Act 2001 and section 20 of the Companies Act 1990, as amended,105 state that 
the executing officer may “take any other steps which appear to him/her to be necessary” 
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to preserve or prevent interference with evidence found.  Similarly, warrants issued under 
the Criminal Assets Bureau Act 1996 expressly state that seizure of material is permitted 
only where it is not subject to legal professional privilege.  The Commission has 
considered whether the recommended standard search warrant form should include 
similar statements.  In Chapter 6, below, the Commission discusses The People (Attorney 
General) v O’Brien106 in which the Supreme Court held that unconstitutionally obtained 
evidence should generally be absolutely inadmissible107 unless extraordinary excusing 
circumstances exist.108  In that regard, Walsh J identified two specific excusing 
circumstances in his judgment, namely the imminent destruction of vital evidence or the 
need to rescue a victim in peril.  Thus, case law has recognised that an executing officer 
may, in extraordinary excusing circumstances such as where vital evidence may be 
destroyed, take steps to preserve such evidence.  The Commission is of the view that a 
particularised statement permitting the executing officer to take any other steps which 
appear to him/her to be necessary to prevent the imminent destruction of vital evidence or 
to rescue a victim in peril should be included in the standard search warrant form.  
4.56 The Commission recommends that the proposed Search Warrants Act should 
provide for a standard search warrant form to be used when issuing a search 
warrant, which should replace the array of search warrant forms that currently 
exist. 
C Records of Issued Search Warrants  
4.57 There is no express requirement in Irish search warrant law, nor is there a practice in the 
District Courts, to keep a record of issued search warrants.  However, the Commission 
has been advised that where the applicant is a member of An Garda Síochána, he or she 
often completes the warrant form of the Garda Síochána PULSE system before printing it 
and bringing it to the issuing authority.  Records are therefore often kept on the PULSE 
system.   
4.58 Legislation in other jurisdictions specifically require records to be made of issued search 
warrants.  Examples of legislative provisions providing for retention of records of issued 
search warrants can be seen in England and Wales,109 New South Wales,110 Western 
Australia,111 Victoria,112 Canada,113 and the United States.114   
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4.59 The Commission has considered whether a requirement to keep records of issued search 
warrants should be introduced in Ireland.  The authority afforded by a search warrant to 
enter and search a location and to seize materials from that place is substantial.  In light of 
this, the issuing of a search warrant in respect of a person’s property is a serious matter.  
The Commission is therefore of the view that records should be kept of issued search 
warrants.  The Commission notes that this would enable the examination of an issued 
warrant at a later date should this be required. 
4.60 The Commission has examined the approach in a number of other jurisdictions on this 
matter and it has considered whether it would be appropriate to implement the approach 
of returning the original search warrant to the issuing authority along with a report detailing 
its execution, or an explanation as to why it was not executed.   This manner of record 
keeping is employed, for example, in England and Wales, New South Wales, Western 
Australia, Victoria and Canada.  However, the Commission has formed the view that, as 
there is currently no requirement in Ireland in this regard, it may be too onerous 
(particularly for executing officers) to implement a record requirement of this extent from 
the outset.  Rather, the Commission is of the view that it would be appropriate to introduce 
a record requirement which simply involves keeping a copy of the issued search warrant 
on file.  As a search warrant specifies on its face the time and date when it issued, as well 
as the authority who issued it, filing a copy of the warrant would keep a record of these 
matters.  Nonetheless, the Commission notes that it may be suitable to introduce such a 
requirement in the future.  
4.61 The Commission has recommended at paragraph 4.39 that, with the exception of search 
warrants applied for and issued by the High Court electronically in exceptional 
circumstances, all search warrants should be issued by a judge of the District Court.  
Retaining records of issued search warrants would therefore involve filing a copy of the 
warrant on the court’s database.  In circumstances where a search warrant is issued by a 
judge at a time when he or she is not physically present within the court, the judge should 
be required to cause a copy of the warrant to be filed on the database.  In the event that a 
photocopier or scanner or other such device is not available at the time of issuing so as to 
make a copy of the search warrant, a copy of it should be produced as soon as 
practicable so that it may be filed.  
4.62 In paragraphs 4.64 to 4.789, the Commission discusses the possibility of electronically 
issuing search warrants.  This process would apply where a person applies electronically 
to the High Court for a search warrant in urgent circumstances.  The Commission 
recommends later in this Chapter that where the applicant has not personally appeared 
before the High Court in such urgent circumstances, that is, where the delay applying in 
person would frustrate the effective execution of the search, it should be possible for the 
search warrant to be transmitted to him or her electronically so that he or she can show 
the owner or occupier the search warrant on a device or a printed copy of the 
electronically transmitted warrant.  The Commission envisages that in such 
circumstances, the search warrant would be completed by the High Court using an 
electronic process, and recommends that it should therefore be retained by saving it on a 
central electronic database. 
4.63 The Commission recommends that a copy of each issued search warrant, supplied 
by the applicant, should be retained on file by the District Court; and in the case of 
urgent applications, by the High Court, and where the search warrant has been 
transmitted to the applicant electronically by the High Court, a copy shall be saved 
on an electronic database. 
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D Electronic Issuing of Search Warrants   
4.64 In Chapter 3, above, the Commission has recommended the introduction of a limited 
electronic search warrant application process. It should be possible for search warrant 
information forms to be filed electronically.  As a general rule a person applying for a 
search warrant should continue to be required to appear personally before the issuing 
authority to affirm his or her opinion under oath.  However, the Commission recommends 
that legislation should permit the requirement for the applicant to appear personally before 
the issuing authority to be dispensed with, but only in urgent circumstances, where any 
delay involved in applying in person would frustrate the effective execution of the search.  
In such circumstances, the applicant would need to affirm his or her opinion by telephone 
or video link and would need to file a record of the application as soon as practicable or no 
later than 24 hours after the issuing of the search warrant.  
4.65 In the Issues Paper, the Commission discussed the electronic issuing of search 
warrants.115  The Commission examined a number of jurisdictions where search warrants 
may be issued electronically.  In other jurisdictions, legislative provisions permitting the 
electronic issuing of search warrants generally relate to electronic, telephonic or video link 
search warrant applications, which are usually only permitted in limited circumstances.  
The Commission sought views on whether the executing authority, usually a Garda, 
should generally possess the original search warrant so that he or she can show it to the 
occupier when executing a search.116  The Issues Paper also invited submissions as to 
whether, if it is not practicable for the executing authority to obtain the original search 
warrant from the issuing authority, he or she should be in possession of a signed copy of 
the search warrant that the issuing authority transmitted to him or her by facsimile or other 
electronic means.  
(1) Possession of the search warrant to show the owner or occupier 
4.66 It has been indicated to the Commission that when an applicant, usually a Garda, intends 
to apply for a search warrant, he or she completes the proposed terms of the warrant on a 
computer system.  The applicant prints this and brings it to the issuing authority.  If 
satisfied that there are sufficient grounds to issue a search warrant, the issuing authority 
issues a paper warrant, signs it and gives it to the applicant.  The Gardaí input a record on 
the PULSE system noting that a warrant has been issued and outlining the terms of the 
warrant.  However, no record or copy of the search warrant is retained in the court of 
issue.  Therefore, under the current process, a search warrant is a hard copy, paper 
document that the issuing authority provides to the applicant.  Many search warrant 
provisions in Ireland provide that the search warrant must be produced at the search 
location upon request by the owner or occupier.117  
4.67 Submissions which the Commission received agreed that it is important for the executing 
authority to physically show the owner or occupier the search warrant to inform them of 
the authority of the search.  They also suggested that the owner or occupier should have 
an opportunity to inspect the warrant to see what is expected of him or her.  In The People 
(DPP) v Gormley and White118 the Supreme Court held that a warrant must clearly state 
the authorisation which the warrant gives and must indicate a sufficient legal basis.  The 
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Court stated that such a requirement is necessary as “a person whose rights are affected 
is entitled to know with some reasonable level of precision what it is exactly that the 
warrant authorises.”119  The Court was of the view that a person is “entitled to know the 
legal basis on which it is said that the warrant was issued because it is that legal basis 
which requires them to submit to something which would otherwise be unlawful.”  To 
safeguard fully the fundamental rights to privacy and protection of the dwelling, it is 
appropriate for the executing authority to be in possession of the search warrant to show 
the owner or occupier. 
4.68 The Commission has considered whether the search warrant document, which authorises 
a named Garda to enter and search a premises, should be a hard copy, paper document 
or whether the definition of “search warrant” could also include an electronically 
transmitted document containing the electronic signature of the issuing authority.  The 
2014 General Scheme of a Criminal Procedure Bill provides for the electronic 
transmission of warrants.  It is not confined to a particular type of warrant, and therefore 
includes search warrants.  However, the notes accompanying Head 5, which provides for 
electronic transmission of warrants, states that the provision aims to address a problem 
identified by the Working Group to Identify and Report on Efficiencies in the Criminal 
Justice System which concerns video link hearings where the court is located at a 
distance from where the prisoner is held.  The notes state that “efficiency is then 
undermined where the Irish Prison Service has to despatch a prison officer to the court to 
receive a committal warrant.”120  The accompanying notes state that providing for the 
electronic issuing and transmission of warrants in criminal cases would “remove any doubt 
as to whether such issuing and transmission is permissible.”  Head 5(1) provides that 
“[n]otwithstanding any other enactment or rule of law, a court may issue and or transmit a 
warrant by any means capable of producing a legible record, including by electronic 
means.”121  The Scheme allows for provision in the Rules of Court for matters relevant to 
the issuing, transmission and authentication of warrants.122  “Electronic means” has the 
same definition as that contained in the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997  and the Personal 
Insolvency Act 2012, which includes “electrical, digital, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, 
biometric and photonic means of transmission of data and other forms of related 
technology by means of which data is transmitted.”123  The Scheme defines “legible 
record” as “such a record produced by a person, other than an officer of the court or 
Courts staff member to whom the warrant has been transmitted by the court.”124 
4.69 If this provision were enacted in relation to all warrants, it could have the effect of allowing 
for all search warrants to be issued electronically.  This would mean that in all cases, 
whether or not the applicant has personally appeared before the issuing authority to affirm 
his or her opinion under oath, the search warrant could be issued and transmitted by 
electronic means.  One benefit of electronic issuing in such circumstances would be the 
creation of an electronic repository of search warrants.  The Commission has 
recommended at paragraph 4.63 that a record should be retained of all issued search 
warrants.  If search warrants were electronically issued, the search warrant could be 
created by the issuing authority on a computer system and transmitted to the executing 
authority.  A digital record of the search warrant could then be retained on a centralised 
database.  Providing for electronically issued and transmitted search warrants in all cases 
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  Ibid at paragraph 11.9. 
120
  General Scheme of a Criminal Procedure Bill, Head 5, explanatory note, available at justice.ie. 
121
  Head 5(1) of the General Scheme of the Criminal Procedure Bill 2014. 
122
  Head 5(2) of the General Scheme of the Criminal Procedure Bill 2014. 
123
  Head 5(3) of the General Scheme of the Criminal Procedure Bill 2014. 
124
  Ibid. 
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would encourage the use of ICT in the search warrant issuing process.  It might also 
eventually be more cost effective than using paper warrants as fewer warrants would 
need to be printed. 
4.70 A consultee suggested to the Commission in feedback that owners or occupiers whose 
premises are the subject of a search may not be satisfied of the authority for the search if 
shown an electronic document.  Owners or occupiers might feel more confident if shown a 
paper document than, for example, a search warrant on a tablet or similar device.  One 
way of overcoming this would be to require the electronically issued and transmitted 
warrant to be printed to show the owner or occupier.  However, this would contradict the 
benefit of using ICT to reduce the number of paper issued warrants.  Moreover, the 
Commission has recommended that the person applying for a search warrant should 
generally be required to appear personally before the issuing authority to affirm his or her 
opinion under oath.  If this recommendation were implemented, electronically issued and 
transmitted search warrants would not be of significant benefit, as in almost all cases the 
applicant would be required to attend court and would therefore be in a position to obtain 
a paper version of the search warrant.  Although the Commission would not object to 
allowing for electronic issuing of search warrants in all cases, it does not consider that a 
recommendation to that effect is necessary at present. 
(2) Electronically issuing of search warrants in limited circumstances 
4.71 The Commission has recommended that legislation should permit the requirement for the 
applicant to appear personally before the issuing authority to be dispensed with, but only 
in urgent situations, where any delay involved in applying in person would frustrate the 
effective execution of the warrant.  In such exceptional circumstances, it would be 
impracticable for the applicant to attend the District Court to obtain a search warrant from 
the issuing authority.  In that regard, the Issues Paper invited submissions on whether in 
such circumstances the executing authority should be in possession of a signed copy of 
the search warrant that the issuing authority has transmitted to him or her by facsimile or 
electronic means.  The Commission recognises that facsimile is not as popular a form of  
communication as it was previously and therefore, any exception to paper issued search 
warrants should provide for electronic transmission by, for example, encrypted email, 
rather than fax. 
4.72 In the Issues Paper, the Commission examined the approach used in other jurisdictions, 
where a person applies for a search warrant without personally appearing before the 
issuing authority.  In the United States, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide 
that a judge may transmit the warrant “by reliable electronic means to the applicant”125 or 
“direct the applicant to sign the judge’s name and enter the date and time on the duplicate 
original.”126  In the limited circumstances in which legislation governing the 
Commonwealth of Australia permits electronic search warrant applications, the issuing 
officer must inform the applicant “by telephone, telex, facsimile or other electronic means” 
of the terms of the warrant.127  The applicant must then complete a form of warrant “in 
terms substantially corresponding to those given by the issuing office”128 and record the 
name of the issuing officer and day and time when the warrant was issued.129  The 
Canadian Criminal Code provides that a judge may issue a warrant by electronic means.  
Different procedures apply depending on whether the electronic means produces a written 
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  Rule 4.1(b)(6)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (USA). 
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  Section 3R(5) of the Crimes Act 1914, as amended by the Crimes (Search Warrants and Powers of Arrest) 
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document or not.  Where the means of communication does not produce a written form, 
the judge must complete and sign the warrant and direct the applicant to “complete, in 
duplicate, a facsimile of the warrant.”  The judge must also file a copy of the warrant with 
the court clerk.130  Where the means of telecommunication produces a written document, 
the judge must complete and sign the warrant and transmit the warrant to the applicant 
electronically.131  The New Zealand Search and Surveillance Act 2012 provides that if it is 
“not possible or not practicable” for the executing authority to have it in his or her 
possession at the time of execution of the warrant, one of two documents, which are 
“deemed for all legal purposes to constitute the warrant” may be executed.132  These 
documents include: (a) a facsimile or a printout of an electronically generated copy of a 
warrant issued by the issuing officer; or (b) a copy made by the person to whom the 
warrant is directed, at the direction of the issuing authority and endorsed to that effect. 
4.73 The Issues Paper identified two options which are used in other jurisdictions that can be 
used when the executing authority does not physically possess the original search warrant 
to show the owner or occupier:  
(a) the judge completes the warrant and transmits it electronically to the applicant; 
(b) the applicant completes the warrant setting out the terms specified by the judge. 
The applicant later returns the warrant to the court: this requirement acts as a 
safeguard as it allows the court to inspect the warrant to ensure that the terms are in 
fact the terms that the judge specified.   
4.74 The Commission received considerable feedback suggesting that a search warrant should 
clearly show the signature of the issuing judge.  It was submitted that permitting the 
applicant to fill out a blank search warrant in the terms set by the judge would be 
inappropriate, even if there was a requirement for the warrant to be returned to the court 
of issue so that the issuing authority could inspect it.  Such an approach would be open to 
misinterpretation and would not safeguard the fundamental rights engaged in the search 
warrant process.  Difficulties might arise if the executing authority possessed a form of 
search warrant that he or she had prepared that did not contain a signature of an issuing 
authority (usually, the District Court).  It is important that an issuing authority be able to 
see the search warrant document before its execution to ensure there is independent 
judicial scrutiny at every stage of the process.  Therefore, the Commission is of the view 
that the executing authority should not be permitted to complete the warrant setting out 
the terms specified by the issuing authority. 
4.75 However, most respondents to the Issues Paper were of the view that, where it was not 
practicable for the executing authority to obtain the original, hard copy search warrant 
from the executing authority, should be in possession of a signed copy of the search 
warrant that had been transmitted to him or her electronically.  It was suggested that if the 
requirement for a personal appearance by the applicant could be dispensed with in 
exceptional circumstances, a successful application should logically result in a search 
warrant being issued and transmitted electronically in such circumstances.  This would 
mean that where a search warrant was applied for remotely, it could be transmitted to the 
location of the applicant. 
4.76 It is a matter for practical consideration as to whether the applicant would show the owner 
or occupier a version of the search warrant on a tablet or similar device, or whether the 
applicant would need to print a copy of the electronically transmitted warrant.  Whichever 
of these approaches is used, legislation would need to provide that “search warrant” in 
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  Section 105 of the Search and Surveillance Act 2012 (New Zealand). 
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such circumstances includes an electronically transmitted search warrant or a printed 
copy of an electronically transmitted search warrant.   
4.77 Safeguards would need to be put in place to ensure that search warrants transmitted 
electronically are secure and cannot be interfered with.  Technological advances would 
need to be used to maintain confidentiality in the search warrant process.  The 
Commission has discussed elsewhere Public Key Infrastructure, a system of cryptography 
which ensures a high level of security in e-communications and confidentiality in the 
context of a message sent over an open network such as the internet.133  A system 
allowing for electronic issuing of search warrants would need to facilitate the use of 
electronic signatures to authenticate the warrant. 
4.78 The Commission recommends that the executing authority should possess the 
search warrant so that he or she can show it to the owner or occupier.  
4.79 The Commission also recommends that where, in urgent circumstances, the 
applicant has not personally appeared before the issuing authority, it should be 
possible for the search warrant to be transmitted to him or her electronically so that 
he or she can show the owner or occupier of the premises being searched the 
search warrant on a device or a printed copy of the electronically transmitted 
warrant. 
                                               
133
  See Chapter 7 of the Commission’s Consultation Paper on Documentary and Electronic Evidence (LRC CP 
57-2009). The Commission’s forthcoming Report on Evidence will incorporate the material on documentary 
and electronic evidence discussed in that Consultation Paper. 
 99 
5  
CHAPTER 5 EXECUTION OF SEARCH WARRANTS 
A The Validity Period for Search Warrants    
5.01 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission noted that an Act or Statutory Instrument 
under which a search warrant is issued usually specifies the period of validity for such a 
warrant.  The lengths of validity periods vary.1  Thus, some Acts provide for a validity 
period of one week,2 others for a period of one month3 and some for a period of 28 days.4  
Others contain variable terms.  For example, section 14(4) of the Criminal Assets Bureau 
Act 1996,  as amended by section 16(b) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2005, provides that 
the warrant must be executed “within a period to be specified in the warrant” but that 
period “shall be one week, unless it appears to the [issuing] judge that another period, not 
exceeding 14 days, would be appropriate in the particular circumstances of the case.”   
(1) General validity period of 7 days  
5.02 An examination of the law in a number of other jurisdictions shows that standard and 
generally applicable validity periods in respect of search warrants are usually set out in 
legislation.  The time periods themselves, as well as other requirements and regulations, 
vary from one jurisdiction to another.  Periods varying from 24 hours,5 72 hours,6 7 days,7 
14 days,8 one month9 and three months10 have been provided for in legislation.  Certain 
                                               
1
  Consultation Paper on Search Warrants and Bench Warrants (LRC CP 58-2009) at paragraph 5.06.  
2
  Examples of this period can be found in section 10(2) of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
1997, as amended by section 6(1)(a) of the Criminal Justice Act 2006, section 7(2) of the Illegal Immigrants 
(Trafficking) Act 2000 and section 48(3)  of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001.        
3
  Examples of this can be found in section 9(1) of the  Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act 1989, section 
13(2) of the Criminal Damage Act 1991, section 35(2) of the Control of Horses Act 1996 and section 5(3) of 
the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act 2001.    
4
  In particular section 261(1) of the Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000 and section 48(2) of the National Oil 
Reserves Agency Act 2007.  
5
  Section 73(1)(b) of the New South Wales Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002.  
However, this relates only to telephone warrants. 
6
  Section 155(2) of the Queensland Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000.  However, this validity period 
only applies to a warrant for evidence that is likely to be taken to a place within the next 72 hours.  Section 
73(3) of the New South Wales Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 provides for a 
general expiry period of 72 hours, but this may be extended to up to 6 days under section 73(4) and 73(6)(a). 
7
  Section 3E(5A) of the Commonwealth of Australia Crimes Act 1914, as amended, provides that the warrant 
must state how long it is valid for and that this period must not exceed 7 days.  Section 155(1) of the 
Queensland Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 also provides for a maximum validity period of 7 
days. 
8
  Section 103(4)(h) of the New Zealand Search and Surveillance Act 2012 provides that a search warrant 
should be valid for a period not exceeding 14 days from the date of issue, or if the issuing authority is satisfied 
that a period longer than this is required, he or she may specify a validity period not exceeding 30 days.  The 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (United States) provide, at Rule 41(e)(2), that a search warrant must 
specify the validity period and that this period must exceed 14 days. 
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provisions also enable the extension of the standard period where a term longer than the 
standard term is required.11 
5.03 The Commission has concluded that the proposed Search Warrants Act should provide 
for a standard validity period in respect of issued search warrants.  This would be 
appropriate in light of the general purpose of ensuring consistency in the legislation on 
search warrants.  
5.04 The Commission recommends a validity period of 7 days. Section 10 of the Criminal 
Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1997, as amended by the Criminal Justice Act 
2006, provides for a validity period of one week in respect of search warrants issued 
under its terms.  A standard period of 7 days would therefore be in line with this provision; 
and specifying 7 days would bring clarity in this respect.  The Commission is concerned 
that a longer standard period, for example one month, would afford too broad an authority 
to executing officers and may infringe disproportionately on the rights discussed in 
Chapter 1.  In cases where a search warrant is not executed within a 7 day period it would 
be more appropriate for executing officers to return to the issuing authority for a new 
search warrant rather than to provide for an extensive validity period from the outset.  In 
any event, the Commission has been advised that in practice search warrants are 
executed shortly after they are issued; it is uncommon for the warrant to remain 
unexecuted for the entire duration of its validity period.  
5.05 The Commission recommends that the Search Warrants Act should provide for a 
standard validity period for search warrants of 7 days.  
(2) Exception for urgent electronic search warrants 
5.06 The Commission has recommended at paragraph 3.90 that as a general rule a person 
applying for a search warrant should be required to appear personally before the issuing 
authority to affirm his or her opinion under oath.  However, legislation should permit the 
requirement for the applicant to appear personally before the issuing authority to be 
dispensed with in urgent situations, where any delay involved in applying in person would 
frustrate the effective execution of the warrant.  The Commission is of the view that a 
validity period of 24 hours, rather than 7 days, should apply to these urgently issued 
search warrants.   
5.07 Electronic search warrant applications are intended to be the exception to the general rule 
that a person should appear personally before a judge of District Court, and therefore the 
Commission is of the view that they should only be relied on in cases of urgency.  This 
should be reflected in the validity period applicable so that a search warrant should be 
executed shortly after it has been issued.  If it is not necessary to execute the warrant 
within a short space of time (that is, 24 hours) then it is most likely the case that it could 
be issued following a personal appearance by the applicant before a judge of the District 
Court in the ordinary way. 
5.08 The Commission observed at paragraph 4.12 that a small number of search warrant 
provisions currently enable members of An Garda Síochána of certain minimum rank to 
issue search warrants in limited circumstances. Such warrants are only intended to be 
                                                                                                                                                       
9
  Section 42(2) of the Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (Western Australia) provides that a search warrant must 
set out the time period for its execution, which may not exceed 30 days.  Section 5(2) of the Search Warrants 
Act 1997 (Tasmania) also requires the issuing authority to outline on the warrant how long it remains valid for 
and this period may not exceed 28 days. 
10
  Section 16 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, as amended by section 114(8) of the Serious 
Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (England and Wales). 
11
  Section 73(4) of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (New South Wales), section 
103(4)(h) of the Search and Surveillance Act 2012 (New Zealand). 
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used in cases of urgency, and are therefore subject to more restrictive validity periods.  
Validity periods of 24 hours apply to Garda issued search warrants under section 26 of the 
Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, as amended by the Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act 
1996, section 14 of the Criminal Assets Bureau Act 1996, as amended by the Proceeds of 
Crime Act 2005, and section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act 2001, as 
amended by the Criminal Justice Act 2006. It is proposed that the electronic search 
warrant process which the Commission recommends in the Report would apply in these 
types of urgent situations, although, as discussed in Chapter 4, above, the Commission 
recommends that such urgent applications should be made to the High Court and that the 
current provisions which permit members of An Garda Síochána of a certain rank to issue 
search warrants in urgent situations should be repealed. The Commission is of the view 
that a similar, shorter, validity period should apply in respect of search warrants which are 
applied for and issued electronically by the High Court in situations of urgency. 
5.09 The Commission recommends that where an applicant has applied to the High 
Court for a search warrant in urgent circumstances without appearing personally 
before a judge of the District Court, the validity period of the warrant should be 24 
hours. The Commission recommends that the Search Warrants Act should provide 
that this is an exception to the general standard period of 7 days. 
(3) Extension of the validity period 
5.10 In complex cases, it may not be possible to execute the search warrant within the period 
of 7 days that has been recommended.  Therefore, the Commission recommends that a 
procedure should be provided for under which the validity period of a search warrant may 
be extended.     
5.11 An example of a provision permitting an extension of a search warrant validity period is 
contained in section 787 of the Companies Act 2014.  Section 787(9) provides that the 
validity period of a warrant shall be 30 days.  This, however, may be extended if, during 
the period of validity, an application is made by the executing officer to a judge of the 
District Court seeking an extension of the period and such an application is accompanied 
by information on oath, stating the reasons why this extension is considered necessary.12  
If the judge is satisfied by the grounds put forward, he or she may extend the period of 
validity “by such period as, in the opinion of the judge, is appropriate and just.”13  Where 
an extension order is made the judge “shall cause the warrant to be suitably endorsed to 
indicate its extended period of validity.”14  
5.12 The Commission is of the view that such a procedure should be set out in the proposed 
Search Warrants Act.  It should be possible in any search warrant case to apply to the 
District Court during the 7 day validity period of the initial warrant for an extension of the 
expiration date on the basis of sworn information as to why the extension is necessary.  It 
would then be a matter for the judge of the District Court to determine whether an 
extension of the validity period is justified.  However, the Commission is of the view that 
this procedure should not apply once the warrant has expired. In such circumstances, a 
new search warrant application would be necessary.  Furthermore, the Commission 
proposes that it would be inappropriate for an application for the extension of a warrant to 
be heard side by side with the original search warrant application.  This practice would be 
speculative in nature and would undermine the concept of having a standard validity 
period.  Rather, execution of the search warrant should commence and only then should 
an assessment be made as to whether an extension of the validity period is required.  The 
case for an extension should be presented to a judge of the District Court. The validity 
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  Section 787(10) of the Companies Act 2014. 
13
  Section 787(11) of the Companies Act 2014. 
14
  Section 787(11) of the Companies Act 2014. 
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period should only be extended for a maximum of 7 days. Where a further extension 
period is deemed necessary, the executing officer should be required to return to a judge 
of the District Court and set out the reasons why a subsequent extension is necessary.  
5.13 The Commission is of the view that the Search Warrants Act should specify the maximum 
number of times an applicant should be allowed to return to a judge of the District Court to 
seek to extend the validity period of a search warrant.  This would be necessary to protect 
the rights discussed in Chapter 1 by ensuring that law enforcement authorities and other 
officers would not be permitted to make an unlimited amount of applications for an 
extension of the validity period of a search warrant.  Thus the Commission recommends 
that an applicant should only be permitted to return to a judge of the District Court and 
apply to extend the validity period of a warrant for a period of 7 days on three occasions.  
This would mean that after a period of 28 days during which the applicant has satisfied a 
judge of the District Court on three separate occasions that an extension of the warrant 
period is necessary, the applicant would no longer be able to apply for an extension of the 
same warrant, but would have to apply for a new search warrant in respect of the 
premises.  
(4) Effect on legislation providing for longer validity periods 
5.14 Some of the statutory provisions on search warrants listed in Appendix A to this Report 
provide for much longer validity periods that the general 7 day period which the 
Commission has concluded is appropriate for the proposed Search Warrants Act. For 
example, in the context of issuing of search warrants for investigation into matters of 
enforcement of financial services legislation or company law, section 28(2) of the Central 
Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013 and section 787(9) of the Companies Act 
201415 provide for a validity period of 30 days and 1 month, respectively, and also provide 
that such a validity period may be extended upon application to a judge of the District 
Court if necessary.  The Commission notes that such provisions do not specify a 
maximum number of extensions.  The lengthy validity period and failure to specify a 
maximum number of extensions reflect a need, in such circumstances, for more time in 
such investigations which can involve entry, search or inspection and seizure of a large 
quantity of documents and/or electronic material.  The Commission is of the view that it 
would be inappropriate for the generally applicable Search Warrants Act to specify a 7 day 
validity period in respect of such investigations and to require the applicant to apply for an 
extension of the validity period every 7 days. The Commission has therefore concluded 
that the Search Warrants Act should provide that the standard 7 day validity period and 
maximum number of extensions is without prejudice to specific legislative provisions, such 
as those in the Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013 and the Companies 
Act 2014 (and which are not intended as an exhaustive list of such provisions) that specify 
longer validity periods where these are necessary for investigations under, for example, 
financial services legislation or company law.  
5.15 The Commission recommends that the Search Warrants Act should provide for the 
extension of the search warrant validity period of 7 days where this is deemed 
necessary; and the executing officer should be required to provide information on 
oath as to the reasons why an extension is considered necessary.  
5.16 The Commission recommends that extension of the validity period should not be 
permitted at the time of the initial search warrant application nor once the warrant 
expiration date has passed.  
5.17 The Commission recommends that the extension period should be no more than 7 
days, but that a subsequent application for an extension should be permitted where 
a further extension is required.   
                                               
15
  This replaced section 20(2) of the Companies Act 1990, as amended by section 5(a) of the Companies 
(Amendment) Act 2009.   
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5.18 The Commission recommends that the Search Warrants Act should permit no more 
than three orders to be made extending the validity period of a search warrant.   
5.19 The Commission recommends that the provisions in the Search Warrants Act 
concerning the 7 day validity period and extension of the validity period should be 
without prejudice to specific legislative provisions, including those in the Central 
Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013 and the Companies Act 2014, which 
specify longer validity periods where these are necessary for investigations under, 
for example, financial services legislation or company law. 
B Time of Execution of Search Warrant 
5.20 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission observed that the law in many jurisdictions 
includes specific provisions as to the time when a search warrant can be executed16 but 
that no such provision exists in Irish law.  Some Acts permit entry within a specified 
validity period.17  Other Acts allow for the execution of the warrant “at any time or times.”18  
The Commonwealth of Australia Crimes Act 1914, as amended by the Crimes (Search 
Warrants and Powers of Arrest) Amendment Act 1994, requires the issuing authority to 
state on the face of the warrant “whether the warrant may be executed at any time or only 
during particular hours.”19 
5.21 Provisions in other jurisdictions restricting the time of search warrant executions generally 
either require the warrant to be executed between certain hours during the day20 or at “a 
reasonable hour.”21  The New Zealand Search and Surveillance Act 2012 provides that 
the execution of a warrant may be subject to any conditions specified in the warrant by the 
issuing officer, including “any restriction on the time of execution that is reasonable.”22 
5.22 Such provisions generally permit search warrant executions outside of the permitted hours 
in certain circumstances.  For example, in England and Wales, the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984 provides that entry and search under a warrant “must be at a 
reasonable hour unless it appears to the constable executing it that the purpose of a 
search may be frustrated on entry at a reasonable hour.”23 The Canadian Criminal Code 
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  See generally Consultation Paper on Search Warrants and Bench Warrants (LRC CP 58-2009) at paragraphs 
5.13-5.29.  
17
  For example, section 7(2)(a) of the Child Trafficking and Pornography Act 1998 and section 48(3)(a) of the 
Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001. 
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  For example, section 13(2) of the Criminal Damage Act 1991 and section 40 of the Communications 
Regulation Act 2002. 
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  Section 3E(5) of the Crimes Act 1914. 
20  
The Western Australia Criminal Investigation Act 2006 provides that a search warrant must be executed 
between 6am and 9pm unless the executing officer reasonably suspects that execution outside of those hours 
would endanger the safety of any person, including the officer or jeopardise the effectiveness of the proposed 
search.  Section 72(1) of the New South Wales Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 
provides that a warrant (other than a covert warrant) may be executed by day but must not be executed by 
night unless the issuing officer so authorises.  The Act defines day time hours as those between 6 am and 9 
pm on any day, and night time as being the period between 9 pm on any day and 6 am on the following day.   
21
  In England and Wales, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 provides that entry and search under a 
warrant “must be at a reasonable hour unless it appears to the constable executing it that the purpose of a 
search may be frustrated on entry at a reasonable hour.”  
22
  Section 103(3)(b) of the Search and Surveillance Act 2012. 
23
  Section 16(4) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. 
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1985 provides that a search warrant issued under its terms “shall be executed by day”, 
unless: 
a) the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for it to be executed by night; 
b) the reasonable grounds are included in the information; and  
c) the warrant authorises that it be executed by night.24   
5.23 In New South Wales, the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 
provides that a search warrant may be executed by day “but must not be executed by 
night unless the eligible issuing officer, by the warrant, authorises its execution by night.”25 
The 2002 Act provides that the issuing authority must not authorise the execution of a 
warrant by night unless satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for doing so.  These 
grounds are stated by the 2002 Act to include, but are not limited to, the following: 
a) the execution of the warrant by day is unlikely to be successful because, for example, it 
is issued to search for a thing which is likely to be on the premises only at night or other 
relevant circumstances will only exist at night, 
b) there is likely to be less risk to the safety of any person if it is executed at night, or 
c) an occupier is likely to be on the premises only at night to allow entry without the use of 
force. 
5.24 Restricting the time at which search warrants may be executed would safeguard the rights 
to privacy and inviolability of the dwelling by minimising the intrusiveness of the powers of 
search and seizure which already constitute an interference with such rights. One 
submission which the Commission received suggested that a search warrant provision 
requiring the execution of warrants during specified daytime hours except for in urgent 
circumstances would be appropriate. It noted that in the Supreme Court decision The 
People (DPP) v Gormley and White26 Hardiman J was critical of the practice of arresting 
persons early in the morning where it would be fairly certain that a solicitor would not be in 
a position to attend. The submission suggested that although the Court did not directly 
address the issue of searches, the same circumstances outlined by Hardiman J of 
“unnecessarily heightened drama, sirens, breaking of doors, disturbance and trauma to 
spouses and children”27 are relevant to the execution of search warrants. 
5.25 The Commission has been advised that, in practice, many searches are carried out during 
daytime hours so as not to disrupt those affected at night time. However, cases can arise 
when a search must be carried out either late at night or very early in the morning, for 
example where there is a danger of the destruction or removal of evidence or where the 
investigation is urgent in nature. Furthermore, it may be preferable in some circumstances 
for searches to be carried out at particularly late or early hours because it results in fewer 
members of the general public becoming aware of the execution of a search warrant at a 
location. There is also a risk that if the execution of a warrant was limited to certain hours, 
unlawful activities might be carried out at particular times during the day or night with less 
possibility of discovery. It is evident therefore that flexibility as to the time at which a 
search may be carried out is an important element of the execution process. Following 
consideration of this matter, the Commission has concluded that it is appropriate to 
include in the proposed Search Warrants Act a presumption, which reflects general 
practice, that a search warrant will be executed at a reasonable time unless there are 
specific reasons why this should not be the case. If the search warrant is not to be 
                                               
24
  Section 488 of the Criminal Code 1985. “Day” is defined as between 6am and 9pm. 
25
  Section 72(1) of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW). 
26
   [2014] IESC 17. 
27
  Ibid at paragraph 5. 
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executed at a reasonable time, the reasons for this should be provided when the 
application for the search warrant is being made and should form part of the sworn basis 
for the application. The Commission considers that “reasonable” in this context will 
ordinarily be during daylight hours, or as some jurisdictions discussed above have 
provided between 6 am and 9 pm. The Commission has concluded that, bearing in mind 
that what is reasonable may vary from case to case, it is sufficient to refer to “reasonable” 
in the proposed Search Warrants Act, and that any reference to specific times that might 
be regarded as reasonable for this purpose are better left for consideration in the statutory 
Code of Practice on Search Warrants, which the Commission discusses elsewhere in this 
Report.28 This approach provides appropriate respect for the rights that are at issue in the 
use of search warrants while also taking account of the need for flexibility in the execution 
process in specific cases.  
5.26 The Commission recommends that the proposed Search Warrants Act should 
include a presumption that a search warrant will be executed at a reasonable time 
unless there are specific reasons why this should not be the case; and that if the 
search warrant is not to be executed at a reasonable time, the reasons for this 
should be provided when the application for the search warrant is being made and 
should form part of the sworn basis for the application. The Commission also 
recommends that any reference to what specific times are to be regarded as 
reasonable for this purpose should be a matter for consideration in the statutory 
Code of Practice on Search Warrants recommended in paragraph 6.70 of this 
Report. 
C Scope of Authority to Enter and Search 
5.27 As the fundamental function of a search warrant is to authorise entry and search of a 
specified location, the scope of the authority is set out in the relevant legislative provision, 
as well as the terms of the warrant.  It is notable that the scope of authority varies 
between search warrant provisions currently in place in Ireland.  While some provisions 
authorise entry “at any time”, others provide that entry is permitted “at any time or times.”  
This raises the issue of multiple entry and execution, which the Commission discussed in 
the Consultation Paper.29 
5.28 As to the distinction between the phrases “at any time” and “at any time or times”, Walsh 
has explained that the phrase, “at any time or times” has the effect that the warrant “can 
be used to search the specified premises for the specified items on several occasions” 
within the validity period.30  By contrast, the phrase, “at any time” appears to permit a 
single entry under the warrant during its validity period.  There is no clear reason why 
some provisions confer an authority to enter and search which is broader in scope than 
other provisions. 
5.29 In practical terms, the authority to enter a search location on more than one occasion is 
both functional and, in many cases, necessary.  Where an investigation is complex in 
nature it may be impossible to complete the search within a short period of time, thus 
necessitating a power for executing officers to return to the location on more than one 
occasion.  The Commission has been advised that another practical benefit of such 
powers authorising more than one entry is that the function of the warrant is not frustrated 
if the members of the search team leave the boundaries of the search location.  For 
example, if only a single entry is permitted under the scope of the search warrant and the 
                                               
28
  See paragraphs 6.60ff, below. 
29
  See generally Consultation Paper on Search Warrants and Bench Warrants (LRC CP 58-2009) at paragraphs 
5.75-5.87.  
30
  Walsh Criminal Procedure (Thomson Round Hall 2002) at 415.   
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only member of the search team currently within the location steps outside of the 
boundaries, even for a brief moment, it may be argued that executing officers cannot re-
enter the location again.  By contrast, a search warrant that authorises more than one 
physical entry would permit executing officers to re-enter the location boundaries in such 
circumstances.  
(1) Multiple entry search warrants in other jurisdictions  
5.30 In England and Wales, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, as amended by the 
Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, expressly permits multiple execution 
warrants.  Section 15(2)(a)(iii) provides that when a search warrant application is made, 
the applicant must explicitly state if the application is for a warrant authorising entry and search 
on more than one occasion, and if so the ground(s) upon which he or she is applying for such a 
warrant.  The applicant must also state whether he or she seeks a warrant authorising an unlimited 
number of entries or, if not, the maximum number of entries desired under the warrant.  Section 
15(5) further distinguishes between a multiple execution search warrant and a single execution 
warrant, and provides that “a warrant shall authorise an entry on one occasion only unless it 
specifies that it authorises multiple entries.”  As to the execution of this type of search 
warrant, section 16(3)(B) provides that “no premises may be entered or searched for the 
second or any subsequent time under a warrant which authorises multiple entries unless a police 
officer of at least the rank of inspector has in writing authorised that entry to those premises”.  The 
fact that the warrant form authorises multiple executions is not, in itself, sufficient to enable 
executing officers to do so; they must also obtain the written authority of an officer not below the 
rank of inspector.  This provision was introduced to act as a safeguard against arbitrary or 
excessive multiple executions of a search warrant.    
5.31 In its 2007 Report Search and Surveillance Powers,31 the New Zealand Law Commission 
expressed the view that, given the intrusive and coercive nature of search warrants, they 
should usually only be executed once.32  Nonetheless, the Commission acknowledged 
that there may be occasions where multiple executions should be permitted and was of 
the view that it would be “administratively burdensome, and could prejudice ongoing 
investigations, if the police were required to make multiple warrant applications” in such 
cases.33  The Law Commission therefore recommended that where an applicant satisfies 
an issuing authority that more than one execution of the warrant may be necessary, the 
authority should be permitted to authorise multiple executions and endorse the warrant to 
that effect.34  Arising from the implementation of that 2007 Report, section 98(1)(g) of the 
New Zealand Search and Surveillance Act 2012 provides that, where an applicant 
requires a search warrant to be executed on more than one occasion, the application 
must set out the grounds as to why execution on more than one occasion is believed to be 
necessary.  Section 98(5) of the 2012 Act provides that the issuing authority may 
authorise the search warrant to be executed on more than one occasion during the period 
for which the warrant is in force if satisfied that this is required for the purposes for which 
the warrant is being issued.  With regard to the content of the search warrant, section 
103(4)(j) requires a warrant that may be executed more than once to state the number of 
executions authorised.  Section 103(3)(b)(ii) provides that all search warrants may only be 
executed once, unless execution on more than one occasion has been specifically 
authorised.   
  
                                               
31
  New Zealand Law Commission Report on Search and Surveillance Powers (NZLC R97 2007).  
32
  Ibid at paragraph 4.149. 
33
  Ibid at 123.  
34
  Ibid.  
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(2) “Break from search” provisions in other jurisdictions 
5.32 A particular “break from search” type provision can be found in the Commonwealth of 
Australia Crimes Act 1914, as amended, and in Tasmania’s Search Warrants Act 1997.  
Neither Act contains an express provision in respect of the multiple executions of search 
warrants.  However, both Acts contain a provision allowing for executing officers 
temporarily to leave the search location.  The 1914 Act provides that during the execution 
of a warrant, the executing officer and persons assisting him or her may, provided that the 
warrant is still in force, complete the execution of the warrant after all of them temporarily 
cease its execution and leave the warrant premises: (a) for not more than one hour; (b) if 
there is an emergency situation, for not more than 12 hours or such longer period as 
allowed by an issuing authority, or (c) for a longer period if the occupier of the premises 
consents in writing. The 1914 Act defines “emergency situation” as a situation that the 
executing officer “believes, on reasonable grounds, involves a serious and imminent 
threat to a person’s life, health or safety that requires the executing officer and constables 
assisting to leave the premises.”35 The 1914 Act requires an officer seeking an extension 
of time of longer than 12 hours to re-enter the premises other than in an emergency 
situation to apply to an issuing authority for such an extension.  The issuing authority may 
extend the period during which the executing officer(s) may be away from the premises if: 
(a) he or she is satisfied, by information on oath, that there are exceptional circumstances 
that justify the extension; and (b) the extension would not result in the period ending after 
the expiry of the warrant.36   
5.33 Section 9(2) of Tasmania’s Search Warrants Act 1997 is in similar terms.  It does not, 
however, permit a break of 12 hours or longer on application to an issuing authority in an 
emergency situation as provided for in the Australian Commonwealth’s Crimes Act 1914.  
Although the 1997 Act also requires the consent of the occupier if the execution officer 
and assistants are to leave the search location for more than one hour, such consent is 
not required in writing.   
5.34 These provisions enable executing officers to take a short break from the search location, 
without the danger that they will be refused re-entry on the ground that they have 
expended the authority to enter the location.  The provisions also enable executing 
officers to take longer breaks, perhaps, for example overnight, if the owner consents or in 
an emergency situation under the Commonwealth of Australia Crimes Act 1914.  
(3) Discussion as to the scope of the authority to be set out in the Search Warrants Act 
5.35 The Commission has considered whether the Search Warrants Act should provide that 
entry under a search warrant is permitted “at any time”, or “at any times.” The Commission 
notes that employing “at any times” as the generally applicable term would extend this 
broader scope of authority to all search warrants.   
5.36 The Commission has examined the approach in other jurisdictions where multiple 
execution search warrants are employed and has considered whether a procedure for 
multiple execution search warrants should be introduced in Ireland.  Feedback which the 
Commission received suggested that the introduction of a requirement to state whether 
multiple executions will be necessary could lead to applicants in all cases stating that 
multiple executions are required, as it may be unknown at that stage whether a search will 
take more than one day.   
5.37 However, the Commission notes that it would be impractical for a generally applicable 
Search Warrants Act to prevent an executing authority from taking breaks during the 
execution of a search warrant.  An officer may need to leave the search location for a 
meal or for an overnight break.  In many cases, the amount of material being searched 
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  Section 3C of the Crimes Act 1914. 
36
  Section 3JA of the Crimes Act 1914. 
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means that it is impossible to complete the search in one day, and the executing authority 
must enter a search location a number of times during the validity period to complete the 
execution.  In such circumstances, entry on more than one occasion is justified. 
5.38 The most generally applicable search warrant provision, section 10 of the Criminal Justice 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1997, as amended by the Criminal Justice Act 2006, 
provides for entry under a warrant “at any time or times”.  The Commission is aware of 
cases in which members of An Garda Síochána have used search warrants issued under 
section 10 of the 1997 Act to conduct searches over the course of a number of days 
where necessary.  The Commission is therefore of the view that, bearing in mind the 
recommendation paragraph 5.26 above that there should be a presumption that a search 
will be carried out at a reasonable time, the proposed Search Warrants Act should provide 
for entry “at any reasonable time or times” within the validity period.  It would still be open 
to a person who is affected by the entry to challenge any misuse of the power to enter on 
more than one occasion.  It would be unnecessary for the Act to include a “break from 
search” provision similar to those found in the Commonwealth of Australia and Tasmania, 
as the use of the phrase “at any reasonable time or times” would allow executing officers 
to vacate the search location for a short period during the search to have a break without 
subsequently being prevented from returning to the search location. 
5.39 The Commission recommends that the Search Warrants Act should provide that the 
scope of the authority to enter a location should be “at any reasonable time or 
times.” 
5.40 The Commission recommends that the Search Warrants Act should not require the 
applicant to state at the time of the search warrant application how many entries 
are required. 
D The Use of Force in Executing a Search Warrant 
5.41 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission discussed the use of force when executing a 
search warrant and provisionally recommended that the power to use force when 
executing a search warrant should always be accompanied by a requirement for 
reasonableness.37 The fact that a search warrant authorises entry and search of a location 
without the consent of the owner or occupier may necessarily imply the right to use force, 
if required. The authority granted by the warrant overrides the requirement for the consent 
of the owner or occupier to enter and search the location. Where the owner or occupier is 
unwilling to grant entry to executing officers, force may be used for the purpose of 
executing the warrant.  It may also be the case that force is required to gain entry where 
no person is available to grant access, for example in the case of a derelict building.    
5.42 Currently, the power to use force to gain entry to a location is generally expressly 
recognised within the provision under which the warrant is issued, as well as on the face 
of the search warrant itself.38  It is notable that Irish search warrant provisions provide that 
force may be used where it is necessary, and therefore force may not be used in a 
gratuitous manner.  Determining whether force is necessary will depend on the facts of 
each case.  For example, it may be deemed necessary to use force if the owner or 
occupier refuses a request by the executing officer to enter the location, or if the executing 
officer believes that evidence will be destroyed should the owner or occupier become 
aware that a search is about to be carried out.  
                                               
37
  Consultation Paper on Search Warrants and Bench Warrants (LRC CP 58-2009) at paragraph 5.38. 
38
  See, for example, section 18(7) of the Welfare of Greyhounds Act 2011, which provides that a welfare officer 
or Garda may use “reasonable force” if necessary to enter a premises to exercise his/her powers under the 
Act. 
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5.43 As to the level of force which may be used, while some legislative provisions require that 
force be “reasonable”, others do not refer to such a requirement and simply state that 
force may be used where necessary, without limiting the degree of force in any way.39 The 
use of the word “reasonable” essentially requires that any force used is proportionate and 
not excessive in the circumstances. Because the use of force may lead to the damage of, 
or interference with, a person’s rights (whether an individual or a commercial entity), the 
Commission is of the view that where force is used during the execution of a search 
warrant, that force should be reasonable in the circumstances. The Commission has 
therefore concluded that this should be provided for in the Search Warrants Act.  
5.44 The Commission recommends that the Search Warrants Act should provide that 
where it is necessary to use force during the execution of a search warrant, any 
force used must be reasonable.  
E Giving a Copy of the Search Warrant to the Owner or Occupier 
5.45 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission examined the law in a number of jurisdictions 
where the executing authority is required to give a copy of the search warrant to the owner 
or occupier of the property being searched.40  This requirement is included, for example, in 
the Commonwealth of Australia Crimes Act 1914, as amended,41 in Queensland in the 
Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000,42 and the Crime and Misconduct Act 200143, 
in Western Australia in the Criminal Investigation Act 200644 and in New Zealand in the 
Search and Surveillance Act 2012.45  The Commission notes that a comparable 
requirement does not exist in Irish law. 
5.46 The Commission has observed that many search warrant provisions in Ireland provide 
that the search warrant will be produced upon request by the owner or occupier.46  Thus, 
the owner or occupier is entitled to be shown the warrant at the time of execution.  
However, such provisions do not go so far as to require the executing authority to furnish 
the owner or occupier with a copy of the warrant so that he or she (or in the case of a 
commercial entity, it) can retain the copy.  The Commission has been advised that in 
practice many executing officers afford the owner or occupier an opportunity to examine 
the warrant even though the relevant legislation does not require this, or where the owner 
or occupier does not request to see the document.  This practice is again limited to an 
opportunity to see the warrant, however, and not keep it.  
  
                                               
39
  See, for example, section 7(2) of the Aliens Act 1935, which can be contrasted with section 18(7) of the 
Welfare of Greyhounds Act 2011.   
40
  Ibid at paragraphs 5.48-5.52.  
41
  Section 3H of the Crimes Act 1914, as amended, which also provides that the copy of the warrant need not 
include the signature of the issuing officer or the seal of the relevant court (section 3H(5)).      
42
  Section 158 of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000. 
43
  Section 93 of the Crime and Misconduct Act 2001. 
44
  Section 31 of the Criminal Investigation Act 2006. 
45
  Section 131 of the Search and Surveillance Act 2012. 
46
  For example, section 15 of the Firearms and Offensive Weapons Act 1990, section 35 of the Control of Horses 
Act 1996, section 16A of the Road Transport Act 1986, as amended, section 43 of the Aviation Regulation Act 
2001, section 70 of the Industrial Designs Act 2001, section 37 of the Adventure Activities Standards Authority 
Act 2001, section 23 of the Disability Act 2005, section 64 of the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005 
and section 10 of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1997, as amended by the Criminal 
Justice Act 2006.  
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(1) General requirement to provide copy of search warrant to owner or occupier 
5.47 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission expressed the view that giving a copy of the 
search warrant to the person(s) concerned would lead to greater transparency and 
accountability with regard to the execution process.47  Furthermore, this would enable 
person(s) to identify the authority afforded to executing officers by the warrant in respect 
of their property.  Thus, the Commission provisionally recommended that the practice of 
giving a copy of the warrant to the owner or occupier should be provided for in 
legislation.48  
5.48 The Commission remains of the view that a copy of the search warrant should be given to 
the owner or occupier of the property concerned.  It is important in this respect to 
distinguish between a copy of the search warrant and the information which grounds the 
application.  An application for a search warrant may identify information sources or 
include other such information which, in the interests of the investigation, or perhaps the 
safety of persons concerned, should remain confidential to the investigating authority and 
the issuing authority.  The Commission does not recommend that such information should 
be afforded to the owner or occupier. Rather, the requirement would be limited to a copy 
of the search warrant itself, as this is the legal authority for the entry and search of the 
location.   
5.49  In the Consultation Paper, the Commission suggested that a copy of the warrant should 
generally be given at the commencement of the search warrant execution.49  However, 
following further consideration and consultation, the Commission now recommends that 
the warrant copy should be given upon completion of the search.  Furnishing a person 
with a copy of the warrant at the commencement of the execution may afford that person, 
or any other person at the location concerned or another location, the opportunity to 
remove or destroy evidence.  Giving a copy of the search warrant upon completion of the 
search would retain the benefits of accountability and transparency, while the risk of 
removal or destruction of evidence or frustration of the search would be reduced.     
5.50 On a practical level, the copy of a search warrant should be clearly certified as a copy and 
not the original search warrant so that it may not be used in a manner that implies that it is 
the original.   
5.51 In some instances the owner or occupier may not be present at the search location.  In 
some jurisdictions a copy of the warrant is left at the location to be found on their return.  
For example, in England and Wales the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 provides 
that if there is no person who appears to be in charge of the premises at the time of the 
execution of the search warrant, the officer must leave a copy of the warrant in a 
prominent place on the premises.50  Code of Practice B, which supplements the 1984 Act, 
requires a copy of the search warrant to be left in a prominent place on the premises or 
appropriate part of the premises, and endorsed with the name of the officer in charge of 
the search if the occupier is not present.51  In Queensland, the Police Powers and 
Responsibilities Act 2000 and the Crime and Misconduct Act 2001 provide that if the 
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  Consultation Paper on Search Warrants and Bench Warrants (LRC CP 58-2009) at paragraph  5.55. 
48
  Ibid at paragraph 5.60. 
49
  Ibid at paragraph 5.58.  
50
  Section 16(7) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. 
51
  Provision 6.8 of Code B: Code of Practice for Searches of Premises by Police Officers and the Seizure of 
Property found by Police Officers on Persons or Premises.  The requirement for an officer to give his or her 
name is subject to the limitation set out in provision 2.9 of the Code, which explains that the identity of an 
officer need not be recorded or disclosed in (a) the case of enquiries linked to the investigation of terrorism, or 
(b) where an officer reasonably believes that disclosure of his or her name might put him or her in danger.  In 
such circumstances police identification numbers should be used. 
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occupier is not present a copy of the search warrant should be left in a “conspicuous 
place”.  Similarly, in Western Australia section 31 of the Criminal Investigation Act 2006 
states that in the event of an occupier not being present, the executing officer must leave 
the following in a prominent position on the premises: (i) a notice stating that the place has 
been entered and stating the officer’s official details, and (ii) a copy of the search 
warrant.52   
5.52 The Commission was made aware that it is generally the practice of An Garda Síochána 
to wait for a period of time before executing the search warrant where no-one is present at 
a premises and the matter is not urgent. If on returning to the premises there is still no-one 
present, the Gardaí may decide then to carry out the search. In such a situation, once the 
search has been completed, the executing authority (whether Gardaí or other authorised 
person) should leave a copy of the search warrant in a prominent place on the premises 
indicating that a search has been carried out.  
5.53  The Commission recommends that a copy of the search warrant should be given to 
the owner or occupier of the property upon the completion of the warrant 
execution.   
5.54 The Commission recommends that when the owner or occupier is not present at 
the place at the time of the execution of the warrant the executing authority should 
leave a copy of the search warrant in a prominent location at the place.    
(2) Exceptional cases 
5.55 The Commission acknowledges that in some cases it may not be advisable to give a copy 
of the search warrant to the owner or occupier, for example where it is believed that this 
may jeopardise the investigation concerned, or any other investigation.  However the 
Commission considers that the corollary to this exception should be to enable the person 
to make an application requesting that a copy of the warrant be provided (whether directly 
to the person or to a legal representative). In this respect, section 56 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 2007 provides that where a person is before a court charged with an offence, 
“a copy of any recording of the questioning of the person by a member of the Garda 
Síochána while he or she was detained in a Garda Síochána station, or such questioning 
elsewhere, in connection with the investigation of the offence shall be given to the person 
or his or her legal representative only if the court so directs and subject to such conditions 
(if any) as the court may specify.”  The Commission considers that a similar provision may 
be suitable in respect of withheld copies of search warrants.  Thus when a copy of the 
warrant is withheld on the basis of a belief that giving a copy could be detrimental to an 
investigation, the person could apply to the District Court to obtain a copy of the search 
warrant.  Upon assessing the case, the court could either direct that a copy of the warrant 
be given to the person or to a legal representative (subject to such conditions as the court 
sees fit), or refuse the application. 
5.56 An application under section 56 of the Criminal Justice Act 2007 is usually made when a 
person is before the court charged with a criminal offence. Indeed, the accused person 
will be entitled to a copy of the search warrant prior to trial as part of the disclosure 
process.53  However, the Commission is of the opinion that an owner or occupier should 
be able to apply for a copy of a search warrant where it has been withheld regardless of 
whether or not he or she has been charged with a criminal offence.   
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  Section 31 of the Western Australia Criminal Investigation Act 2006. 
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  See further the Commission’s Report on Disclosure and Discovery in Criminal Cases (LRC 112-2014). 
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5.57 The Commission recommends that the requirement to give a copy of the search 
warrant to the owner or occupier should not be absolute and that the Search 
Warrants Act should provide for an exception that where an executing officer 
believes that it is not advisable to give a copy of the warrant it may be withheld 
from the owner or occupier. 
5.58 The Commission recommends that there should be an appeal from a decision to 
withhold the search warrant copy from the owner or occupier to a judge of the 
District Court. 
F Occupier’s Notice  
5.59 An occupier’s notice is to be distinguished from the search warrant itself.  An occupier’s 
notice aims to provide the occupier of a location searched under the warrant with 
additional and practical information. There is currently no requirement to provide such a 
notice in this jurisdiction.  In the Consultation Paper, the Commission examined a number 
of other jurisdictions where there is a requirement that the occupier be given such a 
notice.54  Such a requirement typically provides that the occupier should be given a 
standard form notice at the time of the execution of the search, containing information 
such as the rights and obligations of the occupier and the powers and procedures relating 
to the search.55   
5.60 During the consultation process the Commission received positive feedback regarding the 
implementation of an occupier’s notice.  An advantage of such a notice would be that, if 
simple language were used, an occupier’s notice would be easier to understand than the 
terms of the search warrant itself.  In addition, the Commission is of the view that an 
occupier’s notice should contain information not contained in the actual search warrant, 
such as the rights and duties of occupiers, an explanation of the concept of privilege and 
rules regarding seizure of materials.  The Commission received submissions suggesting 
that an occupier’s notice should take the form of a standard notice similar to the standard 
notice of rights provided for under the Criminal Justice Act 1984 (Treatment of persons in 
Custody in Garda Síochána Stations) Regulations 1987.  The standard notice of rights is 
provided to individuals who have been arrested and brought to a Garda station. 
5.61 The Commission recommends that an occupier’s notice should be provided to the 
occupier when a warrant is being executed, and should include the following information: 
i) a summary of the powers of search and seizure in the Search Warrants Act; 
ii) an explanation of the rights and obligations of the occupier and owner of any property 
seized; 
iii) an outline of the procedure for seizing material under the search warrant; 
iv) an explanation that reasonable force may be used, if necessary, during the course of 
the search warrant execution;  
v) a statement that any material seized will be securely wrapped and labelled and 
securely stored when removed from the location; and  
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  See Consultation Paper on Search Warrants and Bench Warrants (LRC CP 58-2009) at paragraphs 5.62-
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  Code B: Code of Practice for Searches of Premises by Police Officers and the Seizure of Property found by 
Police Officers on Persons or Premises (England and Wales) at 6.7, section 67(1) of the Law Enforcement 
(Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (New South Wales), section 83(2) of the Confiscation Act 1997 
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 113 
vi) an explanation as to what privilege is and that material which is privileged may not be 
seized, or that if it is seized the owner of the material may challenge this.  
5.62 It may be impossible to provide the occupier with a notice if he or she is not present at the 
location when the search is being executed.  Provisions in some other jurisdictions specify 
what should occur in such a case.  In England and Wales, for example, Code of Practice 
B, which supplements the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 states that if an 
occupier is not present, copies of the search warrant and the occupier’s notice should be 
left in a prominent place on the premises or appropriate part of the premises and 
endorsed with the name of the officer in charge of the search and date and time of the 
search.56  In New South Wales, if there is no occupier at the premises, the notice must be 
served on him or her within 48 hours after the execution of the warrant.57  At paragraph 
5.53, the Commission recommended that a copy of the search warrant should be given to 
the owner or occupier and that, if no such person is present, it should be left in a 
prominent place on the premises.  The Commission is of the view the same requirement 
should apply to the occupier’s notice.   
5.63 The Commission recommends that the occupier of a location which is the subject 
of a search should be provided with an occupier’s notice outlining the nature of the 
authority afforded to executing officers, the procedure for seizing material under 
the warrant and the rights and obligations of the occupier.   
5.64 The Commission recommends that when the occupier is not present at the 
premises at the time of the execution of the warrant the executing authority should 
leave the occupier’s notice in a prominent place on the premises. 
G Persons Accompanying Execution of Search Warrants   
5.65 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission observed that many Irish search warrant 
provisions provide for the named executing officer to be accompanied by other officers or 
persons.58  A number provide that where a warrant is to be executed by a named member 
of An Garda Síochána, he or she may be assisted by other members of An Garda 
Síochána.59  In addition, some Acts provide for a Garda to be accompanied by “other 
persons as may be necessary.”  Under such provisions the executing Garda may benefit 
from the assistance of persons outside of An Garda Síochána.60  This may be particularly 
useful where a technical or other knowledge-specific matter is likely to arise during the 
course of a search.  Similarly, provisions that direct an executing officer who is not a 
member of An Garda Síochána but who holds another office may also provide that the 
                                               
56
  Code B: Code of Practice for Searches of Premises by Police Officers and the Seizure of Property found by 
Police Officers on Persons or Premises at 6.8.  Similarly, in Queensland, section 158 of the Police Powers and 
Responsibilities Act 2000 and section 93 of the Crime and Misconduct Act 2001 provide that, if the occupier is 
not present, the notice may be left in a “conspicuous place.” 
57
  Section 67(4) of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002. 
58
  See generally Consultation Paper on Search Warrants and Bench Warrants (LRC CP 58-2009) at paragraphs 
5.03-5.04.  
59
  Examples of this are included in section 26 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, as amended, section 26 of the 
Control of Dogs Act 1986, section 19 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1935, as amended, and section 10 
of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1997, as amended.  
60
  Examples of provisions allowing for the attendance of “other persons” are found in section 7 of the Child 
Trafficking and Pornography Act 1998, section 143 of the Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000, section 7 of 
the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000, section 48 of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 
2001, section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act 2001, section 7 of the Aliens Act 1935 and 
section 10 of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1997.  
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person executing the warrant can be accompanied and assisted by other parties.  Such 
provisions enable a member of An Garda Síochána, another officer in the same role as 
the executing officer or any other person, to accompany the named person during the 
execution of the warrant.61 
5.66 Members of An Garda Síochána have broad powers and responsibilities with regard to 
crime prevention and criminal investigation.  The Commission is therefore of the view that 
it is sufficient for the law to provide that such Garda members as are necessary may 
attend and assist at the execution of a search warrant.  However, the Commission is of 
the view that a general provision of similar breadth should not apply to persons who are 
not Garda members.  With a view to protecting the privacy rights of persons, it would not 
be appropriate to provide in the proposed Search Warrants Act that any person as may be 
requested can attend at the execution of the warrant.  Rather, the Commission is of the 
view that the Act should require the search warrant applicant to inform the court at the 
time of the application that a particular person will be required to assist in the execution 
and detail the reason(s) why.  It will be a matter for the court, at that stage, to give specific 
authorisation for any such person to be involved in the execution, and this should be 
stated on the face of the issued search warrant.  As a result, there would not be a broad 
and open-ended power permitting the attendance of any person or persons whom the 
executing officer wishes to have present.  This approach would act as a control 
mechanism in respect of the persons who may enter and search a person’s property.  
5.67 The Commission recommends that, where a person who is not a member of An 
Garda Síochána is required to assist with the execution of a search warrant, 
specific permission should be sought from the court issuing the search warrant 
and that where such permission is granted this must be stated on the issued 
search warrant. The Commission therefore also recommends that the Search 
Warrants Act should not contain a broad provision to the effect that any person 
whose assistance is deemed to be necessary may accompany the executing officer. 
H Persons Present at Location Being Searched 
5.68 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission noted that many Irish search warrant 
provisions empower executing authorities not only to search the specified location, but 
also to search persons present at the location at the time of execution.  A number of 
legislative provisions confer additional powers, such as the power to ask for personal 
details or the power to request assistance from a person present at the premises being 
searched.  These provisions do not distinguish between occupiers and non-occupiers, and 
therefore a person may be subject to these powers simply by being present when a 
search warrant is executed.  It is unnecessary for the person to have control over the 
property.62  
(1) Searching persons present during the execution of a search warrant 
5.69 A number of legislative provisions contain powers to search persons present at a location 
in addition to the power to search the premises.63  This power is of particular assistance 
                                               
61
  Such provisions can be found in section 3 of the Customs and Excise (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1988, 
section 87 of the Finance Act 1995, section 787 of the Companies Act 2014 (which replaces section 20 of the 
Companies Act 1990, section 40 of the Communications Regulation Act 2002, section 64 of the Safety, Health 
and Welfare at Work Act 2005, section 23 of the Disability Act 2005, section 18(4) of the Sea-Fisheries and 
Maritime Jurisdiction Act 2006 and section 67 of the Pharmacy Act 2007.  
62
  See generally Consultation Paper on Search Warrants and Bench Warrants (LRC CP 58-2009) at paragraphs 
5.70-5.74.  
63
  Examples of these powers include: section 22(2) of the National Monuments (Amendment) Act 1987, section 
13(2) of the Criminal Damage Act 1991, section 14(4) of the Criminal Assets Bureau Act 1996, section 10(2) 
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where item(s) being searched for can be easily concealed on the body of a person, 
although the power to search persons is not exclusive to such situations.  
(2) Requesting personal details  
5.70 A number of Acts provide that an executing officer may, while acting under the authority of 
a search warrant, request that a person present at the premises being searched provide 
him or her with their name and address.64  This power enables an officer to keep a record 
of all persons present at a premises being searched, and may be of benefit to an ongoing 
investigation where, for example, it is believed that the person present may have some 
connection to or knowledge of the matter being investigated.  This power is additional to, 
and not a substitution for, the power to search persons present.  A number of Acts provide 
for both. In addition to a person’s name and address, section 787(2) of the Companies Act 
2014 provides that an officer may enquire as to a person’s occupation.65 
(3) Requesting assistance 
5.71 In certain circumstances executing officers may require assistance in order to gain access 
to material, for example where passwords are needed to access electronic data.  Some 
Acts contain specific provisions which entitle executing officers to request assistance, and 
subsequently oblige persons capable of offering that assistance to comply.  Section 
787(7)(b) of the Companies Act 201466 provides that where an officer seeks to search a 
computer, he or she may require any person at that place who appears to be in a position 
to facilitate access to the information held in any such computer or which can be assessed 
by the use of that computer: (a) to give any password necessary to operate it; (b) 
otherwise enable the officer to examine information accessible by the computer in a form 
in which the information is visible and legible; or (c) to produce the information in a form in 
which it can be removed and in which it is, or can, be made visible and legible.  Provisions 
to the same effect can be found in section 48(5) of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud 
Offences) Act 2001, section 14(6A) of the Criminal Assets Bureau Act 1996 and section 
17A(5) of the Sea Fisheries and Maritime Jurisdiction Act 2006, as inserted by the 
Criminal Justice Act 2007 . 
(4) Discussion 
5.72 As the Commission has recommended the enactment of a single Search Warrant Act in 
this Report, it is necessary to set out the provisions concerning persons present at the 
premises in place of the current varied statutory schemes.  
5.73 The inclusion of standard provisions in the Search Warrants Act regarding persons 
present at the search premises would broaden the scope of many search powers as such 
                                                                                                                                                       
of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1997, as amended by Criminal Justice Act 2006, 
section 7(2) of the Child Trafficking and Pornography Act 1998, section  7(2) of the Illegal Immigrants 
(Trafficking) Act 2000, section 48(3) of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001 and section 
15(2) of  the Immigration Act 2004. 
64
  Acts which authorise a request for personal details of persons present include: section 22(3) of the National 
Monuments (Amendment) Act 1987, section 9(1) of the Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act 1989, section 
25(1) of the Video Recording Act 1989, Section 14(6) of the Criminal Assets Bureau Act 1996, section 7(3) of 
the Child Trafficking and Pornography Act 1998, section 143(1) of the Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000, 
section 7(3) of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000, section 5(5) of the Prevention of Corruption 
(Amendment) Act 2001 and section 15(3) of the Immigration Act 2004.   
65
  Section 787(2)(c) of the Companies Act 2014 replaced section 20 of the Companies Act 1990, as amended by 
section 30 of the Company Law Enforcement Act 2001 and section 5 of the Companies (Amendment) Act 
2009. 
66
  This replaces section 20(4) of the Companies Act 1990, as amended by section 30 of the Company Law 
Enforcement Act 2001 and section 5 of the Companies (Amendment) Act 2009. 
 116 
powers are not currently provided for in every provision.  Having regard to this, the 
Commission has considered whether it would be appropriate to require a search applicant 
to seek authorisation from the court to exercise any of the above mentioned powers.  The 
Commission has decided that any such requirement could be obstructive in nature.  It 
would require the applicant to speculate as to whether or not persons would be present at 
the search location and whether or not it would be necessary to search those persons or 
request their assistance.  In cases where the power(s) had not been sought and expressly 
afforded by the court and it subsequently transpired, during the execution, that it was 
necessary to deal with persons present, the effective execution of the search warrant 
would be hindered.  Furthermore, the carrying out of such functions by an executing 
officer without express authorisation could result in a challenge to the validity of the 
search warrant execution and the admissibility of evidence found during the search. 
5.74 The Commission has therefore formed the view that it would be more suitable to include in 
the proposed Search Warrants Act provisions to the effect that such powers can be relied 
upon where they are necessary and justified.  Such powers should only be used to an 
extent that is reasonable.  In respect of searching persons present, while it may be 
necessary and reasonable to search a person where the search warrant is concerned with 
finding drugs, it may not be reasonable to search a person where the sole purpose of the 
warrant is to search for a stolen car.  With regard to requesting personal details from a 
person, a clear distinction must be drawn between seeking basic information (such as a 
person’s name and address) and carrying out an interrogation.  For example, it should 
never be permissible to require a person to give an explanation as to why a certain 
material is in his or her possession or to give an account of his or her whereabouts at a 
particular time.  This type of questioning is a matter to be dealt with formally and in 
accordance with proper procedure and due process.67   
5.75 Regarding the requesting of assistance from a person present at a search location, the 
Commission has been advised that it is often unnecessary to do so.  To access electronic 
files, for example, the Commission has been advised that technological advances enable 
an external device to be connected to a computer so that data contained within can be 
copied and removed for examination without the need to turn on the computer or use 
passwords to access the data.  Nonetheless, the majority of transactions are carried out 
electronically, and therefore electronic storage of information has become the norm.  The 
potential has been noted for the absence of “a general power to compel the provision of 
password information or encryption keys on seizure of computer equipment or other digital 
storage device” to cause delays to an investigation.68  If electronic storage of data is the 
norm, circumstances may arise where assistance is required in order to gain access to 
material sought under the search warrant, whether electronic data or otherwise.   
5.76 The Commission recommends that the Search Warrants Act should assist, not hinder, the 
effective execution of a search warrant, while respecting constitutional rights.  Where it is 
necessary to rely on a power, for example to request assistance for the purpose of 
executing the search warrant, this should be permissible.  Regarding the power to search 
persons present at the search location, such a power is generally only conferred on 
members of An Garda Síochána.  The Commission does not recommend extending the 
power to officers of other bodies that exercise search warrant powers.  The power to 
search persons present at the search locations should only apply to members of An 
Garda Síochána. 
                                               
67
  For further discussion on questioning persons in connection with the investigation of an offence see generally 
Walsh Criminal Procedure (Thomson Round Hall 2002) at 283-338.    
68
  More O’Ferrall (presented by Ní Raifeartaigh) “Electronic Evidence Gathering and Use in Criminal 
Proceedings” Irish Rule of Law International Criminal Law and Evidence Update, 8 November 2014. 
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5.77 The Commission recommends that the Search Warrants Act should, where it is 
necessary and justified in the circumstances, authorise executing officers:                
(a) where a person acting under the authority of a warrant is a member of An Garda 
Síochána, to search persons present at a search location;                                         
(b) to request basic personal details from persons present at a search location;     
(c) to request assistance from persons present so as to gain access to materials 
sought under the search warrant; and                                                                            
(d) to require any person that appears to be in a position to facilitate access to 
information held in a computer to take certain steps to assist the executing officer 
to access that information, and that the executing officer may copy any document, 
use any equipment to copy electronically stored information and to seize and retain 
any computer or storage medium in which material is kept. 
(5) Persons present who fail to comply or obstruct the search warrant execution   
5.78 In addition to the above noted powers, the relevant legislative provisions usually contain a 
corollary that a failure to comply with any such request is an offence.  Some Acts provide 
that a person who obstructs or impedes a search is also guilty of an offence, and the 
provisions vary.  For example section 10(4) of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1997, as amended by Criminal Justice Act 2006, section 7(4) of the Child 
Trafficking and Pornography Act 1998, section 7(4) of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) 
Act 2000 and section 15(4) of the Immigration Act 2004 each provide that it is an offence 
to: (a) obstruct or attempt to obstruct the exercise of powers authorised by a search 
warrant; (b) fail or refuse to comply with a request to give one’s name and address; or (c) 
give a false or misleading name or address.  Section 787(1) of the Companies Act 2014 is 
broader and provides that a person shall be guilty of a category 2 offence69 if he or she: 
(a) obstructs the exercise of a right of entry or search conferred by a search warrant; (b) 
obstructs the exercise of a power under a warrant to seize and retain material information; 
(c) fails to give his or her name, address or occupation when requested, or gives false or 
misleading information in this regard; or (d) fails to comply with a request to facilitate an 
executing officer to gain access to information stored on a computer.  Section 14(6) of the 
Criminal Assets Bureau Act 1996 provides that where a person obstructs or attempts to 
obstruct the execution of a warrant, fails to comply with a request to give his or her name 
and address, or gives a name or address which an officer has reasonable cause for 
believing is false or misleading, he or she may be arrested without warrant.  Obstruction 
or failure to comply provisions can also be found in section 9(2) of the Prohibition of 
Incitement to Hatred Act 1989, section 13(4) of the Criminal Damage Act 1991, section 
143(3) of the Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000, section 49(1) of the Criminal Justice 
(Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001 and section 5(6) of the Prevention of Corruption 
(Amendment) Act 2001. 
(6) Discussion  
5.79 The Commission is of the view that the proposed Search Warrants Act should provide that 
refusal by a person to comply with permissible requests by executing officers or 
obstruction or attempted obstruction of the execution of a search warrant should amount 
to an offence.  
5.80 The Commission observes that similar provisions can be found in general search warrant 
legislation in other jurisdictions.  For example, the Tasmanian Search Warrants Act 1997 
provides that it is an offence for a person to refuse, delay or obstruct the admission of the 
executing officer or person assisting to the premises for such time that it may reasonably 
                                               
69
  Under section 871(2), a category 2 offence is punishable on summary conviction to a class A fine or 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or, on conviction on indictment, a fine not exceeding 
€50,000 or imprisonment of up to 5 years. 
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be inferred was intentional.70  In addition, it provides that it is an offence to obstruct a 
police officer or person assisting a police officer who is conducting a search of premises 
or a person on such premises.71 
5.81 Similarly, the New South Wales Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 
states that a person must not, “without reasonable excuse”, obstruct or hinder a person 
executing a warrant issued under the Act. Penalties for this offence are also included.72 
5.82 The Commission recommends that the Search Warrants Act should provide that 
refusal of a person to comply with a permissible request by executing officers or 
obstruction or attempted obstruction of the execution of a search warrant is an 
offence. 
I Incidental Findings during the Course of a Search Warrant Execution  
(1) Seizure of incidentally discovered material 
5.83 In the Consultation Paper the Commission discussed the finding of items during the 
execution of a search warrant for which the warrant was not issued.73  Materials which are 
incidentally found may include items which are related to the offence being investigated, 
but which were not expected to be found at the location and were therefore not listed in 
the search warrant.  Similarly, items which do not relate to the suspected offence with 
which the warrant is concerned, but which are evidence of a separate offence, would also 
fall within this category.  
5.84 The position at common law is that there is no prohibition on the seizure of material 
incidentally found during the execution of a search warrant, provided that the executing 
officer has reasonable grounds for believing that the item(s) are material evidence of the 
commission of an offence.74 Similarly, section 9 of the Criminal Law Act 1976 provides:  
“Where in the course of exercising any powers under this Act or in the course of a 
search carried out under any other power, a member of the Garda Síochána, a prison 
officer or a member of the Defence Forces finds or comes into possession of anything 
which he believes to be evidence of any offence or suspected offence, it may be 
seized and retained for use as evidence in any criminal proceedings or in any 
proceedings in relation to a breach of prison discipline, for such period from the date 
of seizure as is reasonable or, if proceedings are commenced in which the thing so 
seized is required for use in evidence, until the conclusion of the proceedings...”  
5.85 In McNulty v Director of Public Prosecutions,75 the High Court considered the issue of 
discovering evidence for which the search warrant was not issued.  An Garda Síochána 
obtained a warrant to search premises for evidence concerning an alleged rape.  During 
the search, officers discovered tablets, which they suspected were MDMA.  The applicant 
sought an order of prohibition in respect of a drugs charge that was brought against him.  
The respondent referred to section 9 of the Criminal Law Act 1976, which the Court noted 
“gives quite wide powers to the Gardaí in the course of a search to seize evidence which 
                                               
70
  Section 21(1) of the Search Warrants Act 1997. 
71
  Section 21(2) of the Search Warrants Act 1997. 
72
  Section 52 of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002. 
73
  See generally Consultation Paper on Search Warrants and Bench Warrants (LRC CP 58-2009) at paragraphs 
5.100-5.117.  
74
  See McNulty v Director of Public Prosecution [2006] IEHC 74 and Chic Fashions (West Wales) Ltd v Jones 
[1968] 1 All ER 229.   
75
  [2006] IEHC 74. 
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is believed to be evidence of any offence or suspected offence.”76  The Court did not give 
any ruling specifically in relation to section 9 of the 1976 Act, but did refuse to grant the 
order of prohibition and held that the seizure of the drugs was permissible. 
5.86 In The People (DPP) v Balfe77 the Court of Criminal Appeal observed that section 9 of the 
1976 Act had essentially “eroded and rendered virtually irrelevant” the requirement for 
specificity regarding the items which were to be sought under a search warrant. 78  The 
Court was therefore of the view that section 9 of the 1976 Act made it less important to 
describe the goods to be seized under a search warrant.  However, the Court considered 
that some description of the goods must be provided. 
5.87 Walsh notes that material seized under section 9 can be totally unrelated to the suspected 
offence to which the search warrant relates and to the items which the warrant 
“specifically prescribes” or refers to.79  However, it is not the case that section 9 of the 
1976 Act enables a general or “fishing expedition” type search.  The provision does not in 
itself authorise a search: rather any such authority must stem from another power.  
5.88 Legislation enabling the seizure of items incidentally found during the execution of a 
search warrant can also be found in other jurisdictions.  In England and Wales, sections 
19(2) and 19(3) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 provide that a constable 
who is lawfully on a premises may seize anything which is on the premises if he or she 
has reasonable grounds for believing: (a) that it has been obtained in consequence of the 
commission of an offence or is evidence in relation to an offence which he is investigating 
or any other offence; and (b) that it is necessary to seize it in order to prevent it being 
concealed, lost, damaged, altered or destroyed.  The Commonwealth Crimes Act 1914, as 
amended, provides that an executing officer or assisting constable can seize items found 
during the course of a search that he or she believes on reasonable grounds to be 
“evidential material in relation to another offence that is an indictable offence.”80 The 1914 
Act further provides that an executing officer or assisting constable may seize other things 
found in the course of the search that he or she believes on reasonable grounds to be 
“seizable items”.81  Seizable items are defined under the 1914 Act as anything that would 
present a danger to a person or that could be used to assist a person to escape from 
lawful custody. 
5.89 The New Zealand Search and Surveillance Act 2012 provides that an enforcement officer 
who exercises a search power,82 or who is lawfully in any place or in or on a vehicle or is 
conducting a lawful search of a person as part of his or her duties, may seize any item or 
items that he or she, or any person assisting him or her, finds in the course of carrying out 
the search or as a result of observations at that place or in or on that vehicle, if the 
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  Ibid. 
77
  [1998] 4 IR 50.  
78
  Ibid at 61. 
79
  Walsh Criminal Procedure (Thomson Round Hall 2002) at 423-424.   
80
  Section 3F(d)(2) of the Crimes Act 1914, as amended. 
81
  Section 3F(1)(e) of the Crimes Act 1914, as amended.  Similar provisions regarding seizure of incidentally 
found material are contained in section 6(1)(e) and (f) of Search Warrants Act 1997 (Tasmania), section 
49(1)(b) of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (New South Wales) and section 146 
of the Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (Western Australia). 
82
  Section 3(1) of the Search and Surveillance Act 2012 defines “search power” as being: “(a) every search 
warrant issued under this Act or an enactment set out in column 2 of the Schedule to which that provision is 
applied; and (b) every power, conferred under this Act or an enactment set out in column 2 of the Schedule to 
which that provision is applied, to enter and search, or enter and inspect or examine (without warrant) any 
place, vehicle, or other thing, or to search a person.” 
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enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to believe that he or she could have seized 
the item or items under: (a) any search warrant that could have been obtained by him or 
her under this or any other enactment; or (b) any other search power exercisable by him 
or her under this or any other enactment.83  If a person exercising a search power is 
uncertain whether any item found may lawfully be seized, and it is not reasonably 
practicable to determine whether that item can be seized at the place or vehicle where the 
search takes place, the person exercising the search power may remove the item for the 
purpose of examination or analysis to determine whether it may be lawfully seized.84 
(2) Discussion  
5.90 In the Consultation Paper the Commission expressed the view that, having regard to the 
practicalities of searches, as well as the duty of State authorities to protect society and to 
prevent and detect offences, the power in section 9 of the Criminal Law Act 1976 is not 
objectionable.85  In light of this, the Commission provisionally recommended that the 
power to seize material found during the execution of a search (but which has not been 
provided for in the search warrant) should be dealt with in the proposed Search Warrants 
Act.86    
5.91 The Commission sees no reason to depart from this view and recommends that a 
provision as to incidental findings should be included in the Search Warrants Act.  In some 
respects, however, the recommended provisions should be more substantial in nature 
than section 9 of the 1976 Act.87  Firstly, the terms of section 9 simply require the officer to 
“believe” that the material is evidence of an offence or suspected offence; there is no 
requirement for the belief to be a reasonable one.  The Commission is of the view that a 
condition of reasonableness should be established in respect of an officer’s belief that the 
material incidentally found is evidence of, or relating to, an offence.  A requirement of 
reasonableness would involve a greater degree of objectivity.  This would also be in line 
with the common law position.  Secondly, section 9 of the Criminal Law Act 1976 provides 
that members of An Garda Síochána, the Defence Forces or prison officers may seize 
incidentally found material.  However, in light of the number of authorities who are now 
employed in the execution of search warrants, the Commission notes that the 
recommended provisions should be broader and more general in nature in referencing 
executing officers.  In England and Wales, the Police Reform Act 2002 extended the 
power of seizure under section 19 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to non-
police investigating officers.88  Thus an appropriate, designated official, when lawfully on a 
premises, is deemed to have the same powers as a constable under section 19 of the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.89 
5.92 The Commission has considered whether a provision allowing for seizure of incidentally 
discovered material should specify to a greater degree than section 9(1) of the Criminal 
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  Section 123(2) of the Search and Surveillance Act 2012. 
84
  Section 112 of the Search and Surveillance Act 2012. 
85
  Consultation Paper on Search Warrants and Bench Warrants (LRC CP 58-2009) at paragraph 5.118. 
86
  Ibid at paragraph 5.118. 
87
  Ibid at paragraph 5.119. 
88
  Police Reform Act 2002, Schedule 4, Part 2. 
89
  Zander notes that section 19 ofthe Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, as amended, has extended the 
common law position in that it permits the seizure of fruits of a crime or evidence of a crime “regardless of the 
crime and of who is implicated”. Zander The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 6
th
 ed (Thomson, Sweet 
and Maxwell 2013) at 105. Stone has also commented that “generally the PACE [Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984] power is slightly wider than that under the common law”. Stone The Law of Entry, Search 
and Seizure (Oxford University Press 2009) at 121. 
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Law Act 1976, the reasons for which incidentally discovered material may be seized.  
Legislative provisions in other common law jurisdictions take such an approach.  For 
example, in England and Wales the executing officer may seize anything where it is 
“evidence in relation to an offence which he is investigating or any other offence”90 and 
where it is necessary to seize it in order to prevent the evidence being concealed, lost, 
altered or destroyed.”91  In the Commonwealth of Australia, an officer who wishes to seize 
evidential material in relation to another offence, which is an indictable offence, must 
believe, on reasonable grounds, that it is necessary to seize the item to prevent its 
concealment, loss or destruction or use in committing an offence92 or anything that would 
present a danger to the person or could be used to assist a person escape from lawful 
custody.93  Similar specification of the scope of seizure can be found in the Tasmanian 
Search Warrants Act 199794 and the Western Australia Criminal Investigation Act 2006.95.  
The Commission is of the view that the proposed Search Warrants Act should provide that 
the executing officer may seize material incidentally found during the execution of a 
search where he or she has reasonable grounds for believing that: (a) the material is 
evidence of the offence or suspected offence with which the search warrant is concerned 
or any other offence or suspected offence, and (b) it is necessary to seize the material in 
order (i) to prevent it from being concealed lost, altered or destroyed, (ii) to prevent it 
being used in the commission of any other offence, (iii) to preserve its evidential value, (iv) 
to conduct a forensic examination of it.  The Commission is of the view that section 9 of 
the Criminal Law Act 1976 is sufficiently broad as it provides for incidentally found material 
to be “seized and retained for use in any criminal proceedings, for such period from the 
date of seizure as is reasonable or, if proceedings are commenced in which the thing so 
seized is required for use in evidence, until the conclusion of the proceedings.”  The 
Commission sees no need for a Search Warrants Act to specify to a greater degree than 
section 9 of the Criminal Law Act 1976 the reasons for which incidentally found material 
may be seized. 
5.93 An executing officer must be acting within the permitted scope of the search when he or 
she seizes incidentally discovered items.  In respect of section 9 of the Criminal Law Act 
1976, Walsh has observed that an officer may not be able to rely on the provision to seize 
material which he or she “came across in the course of a search which was conducted in 
a manner which bore no relation to the power of search in question.”96  He uses the 
example of searching for a stolen piano, and notes that if unrelated material was found 
under cushions or a mattress, the seizure of that material may be challenged, as looking 
in such places would clearly not be realistic or related to a search for a piano.  In such 
circumstances it would be arguable that the officer had gone beyond the scope of the 
permissible power and that this is not in line with section 9 of the 1976 Act, which provides 
that the officer must be “in the course” of exercising an authority.  If the officer were to act 
beyond this authority he or she may no longer be deemed to be exercising it.  In line with 
this interpretation the Commission is of the view that the proposed Search Warrants Act 
should provide that the executing officer must be in the course of exercising powers under 
the Act at the time when he or she incidentally finds material for which the warrant has not 
been issued.  This approach would apply a plain view doctrine, that is, that executing 
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officers may seize items which come into their plain view while carrying out the search, 
but could not carry out an excessive or disproportionate search of the location in the hope 
that they may come across material not listed on the warrant but which may be evidence 
of a further offence.  The plain view doctrine is routinely applied in the United States, 
where the Supreme Court has indicated that the principle would apply where police have 
a warrant to search an area and in the course of the search encounter other incriminating 
material.97  The Court has held that the requirement for probable cause under the United 
States Constitution was unnecessary to seize evidence for which the warrant was not 
issued, as the evidence was in “plain view”.98 
5.94 The Commission recommends that the Search Warrants Act should provide for the 
power of an executing officer to seize incidentally discovered material and should 
provide that where, in the course of exercising any powers under the Act, the 
executing authority comes into possession of anything which he or she reasonably 
believes to be evidence of, or relating to an offence or suspected offence, he or she 
may seize and retain it. 
J Finding Privileged Material 
(1) Prohibition of seizure and examination of privileged material 
5.95 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission discussed the status and scope of privilege 
and the conditions which must be met for privilege.99 A small number of search warrant 
provisions expressly provide that warrants issued under their terms do not authorise the 
seizure of any materials found during the execution of a search where such materials are 
subject to privilege, notably professional legal privilege.100  However, as it has been 
established that privilege is a rule of law, seizure under any search warrant provision is 
subject to such privilege and it is arguable that it is unnecessary expressly to refer to it.  
Nonetheless, there is considerable case law on the question of the scope of privilege, 
which can be relied upon to determine whether material found during the execution of a 
search warrant is privileged.101     
5.96 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission observed that search warrant legislation in 
other jurisdictions not only expressly refers to legal professional privilege, but often sets 
out a specific procedure to be followed by executing officers.102  The intention of such 
procedures is to protect privileged materials.  
(2) Discussion  
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5.97 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission provisionally recommended that legislation in 
Ireland should clearly set out that privilege relates to material found under any search 
warrant, not just warrants issued under Acts specifically referring to privilege.103  This 
would ensure complete certainty that the privilege applies regardless of the provision 
under which the search warrant has been issued.  
5.98 The Commission maintains this view and recommends that the Search Warrants Act 
recommended in this Report should include a provision outlining that privileged material, 
whether this involves legal privilege or any other recognised form of privilege such as 
litigation privilege or public interest privilege, found during the execution of a search 
warrant may generally not be examined or seized.  
5.99 The Commission recommends that the Search Warrants Act should provide that 
where privileged material is found during the course of a search warrant execution, 
such material may generally not be examined or seized.  
(3) Procedure for determining whether material is privileged 
5.100 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission provisionally recommended that a system 
should be implemented in Ireland whereby if privilege is asserted over material in the 
course of the execution of a search warrant, that material should be securely sealed and 
removed from the scope of the search.104  The secured material should then be assessed 
to determine whether it is in fact legally privileged, and therefore exempt from examination 
under the search warrant.  The Commission has examined the law in other jurisdictions 
and has identified that a common approach in many jurisdictions is that material which 
may be, or is claimed to be, privileged must be secured, sealed and taken to an authority 
for the purpose of determining its status.    
5.101 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission referred to provisions of the Companies 
(Amendment) Act 2009.105  These have since been replaced by section 795(3) of the 
Companies Act 2014, which provides: 
“The disclosure of information may be compelled, or possession of it taken, pursuant 
to the powers in this Part, notwithstanding that the information is privileged legal 
material provided the compelling of its disclosure or the taking of its possession is 
done by means whereby the confidentiality of the information can be maintained (as 
against the person compelling such disclosure or taking such possession) pending the 
determination by the court of the issue as to whether the information is privileged 
material.”106    
5.102 Section 795 of the 2014 Act provides that where information has been disclosed or taken 
possession of, an application shall be made to the High Court, within 7 days after the 
disclosure or the taking of possession, for the purpose of determining whether the material 
is legally privileged: (a) by the person to whom the material has been disclosed or who 
has taken possession of it; or (b) by the person who has been compelled to disclose the 
information, or from whose possession the material has been taken.107  Where 
proceedings have been taken for the purpose of such a determination, the Act provides 
that the court may give such interim or interlocutory directions as it considers appropriate 
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for the purpose of preserving the information “in whole or in part, in a safe and secure 
place in any manner specified by the court.”108  Furthermore, the court may appoint such 
person with suitable legal qualifications, possessing the necessary level of experience and 
being independent of any interest falling to be determined between the parties concerned, 
for the purpose of examining the information and preparing a report for the court.109  Such 
a report would be compiled with a view to assisting the court’s determination as to the 
issue of privilege.  
5.103 The Commission maintains the view that a specific legislative provision should be enacted 
in respect of cases where privilege is asserted over material or where the executing 
authority suspects that material is privileged during the course of the execution of a 
search warrant.  The procedure in the Companies Act 2014 provides useful legislative 
guidance.   The Commission is of the view that the generally applicable Search Warrants 
Act should provide that where there is an apprehension that material attracts privilege, 
whether legal privilege or any other recognised form of privilege such as litigation privilege 
or public interest privilege, the material should be securely sealed and removed from the 
location.  It should then be assessed by a court to determine whether it is in fact 
privileged, and therefore exempt from examination. The benefit of this would be that 
privileged material would not be examined by executing officers during the course of the 
search, and the protection of privilege would not be undermined as a result.    
5.104 This approach does not offer an absolute protection of privileged material, as it requires a 
court to examine the material in order to determine its status.  It is entirely appropriate that 
a court should carry out such an examination, as opposed to officers of the investigating 
authority.  
5.105 The Commission has considered which court should be designated in respect of 
assessing material and determining whether it is privileged.  The Commission has 
concluded that the procedure provided for in the Companies Act 2014 is suitable for this 
purpose and has concluded therefore that such material, which should be sealed and 
removed from a search warrant location, should be examined and assessed by a judge of 
the High Court to determine whether it is privileged. 
5.106 The Commission recommends that the Search Warrants Act should provide for a 
specific procedure to be applied when material is found during the execution of the 
search which may attract privilege.   
5.107 The Commission recommends that the procedure should involve securely sealing 
any material which the executing officer apprehends is privileged without any 
examination of it, removing the material from the search location and storing it in a 
safe and secure place.  An application should be made to the High Court by either 
the executing authority or the person from whom material was taken for a 
determination as to whether or not the material is to benefit from the protection of 
legal privilege.  Where the material is certified as privileged it should not be 
examined by the investigating authority.  If it is determined not to be privileged, the 
material should be placed with the investigating authority if it is examinable under 
the scope of the search warrant. 
(4) Extended power of seizure where privileged and non-privileged material mixed 
5.108 In practice, cases arise where both privileged and non-privileged materials are intermixed.  
This typically occurs with electronic files where part of the file stores privileged material 
while the remainder of the file does not.  Where the non-privileged material is subject to 
the search warrant it may be necessary to seize the entire block of material in order to 
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separate privileged material from non-privileged material.  The Commission has been 
advised that in such cases the investigating authority is careful to only examine the non-
privileged material.  This issue should be addressed in the Search Warrants Act. 
5.109 Although the seizure of privileged material is not ideal, there appears to be no real 
alternative where materials are mixed.  If a file containing some privileged material could 
never be seized, it would be possible to render a block of material unseizable, and 
therefore unexaminable, simply by mixing in some privileged material. 
5.110 The Companies Act 2014 provides for situations where privileged materials are mixed with 
non-privileged materials during the execution of a warrant under the Act.  It provides that 
where: (a) an executing officer finds seizable material at or in the custody or possession of 
a person at the search location which he or she would be entitled to seize but for it being 
comprised in material that he or she has no power to seize; and (b) it is not possible for 
the seizable and other material to be separated on the premises, “the officer’s power of 
seizure shall include power to seize both the seizable information and that from which it is 
not reasonably practicable to separate it.”110  The Act refers to such power as an 
“extended power of seizure.”111  The 2014 Act sets out a list of criteria to be used when an 
issue arises as to whether or not it is reasonably practicable on particular premises for 
something to be separated from something else.112  Procedural safeguards govern the 
exercise of an “extended power of seizure”.  Thus, such a power may not be exercised 
unless the officer: (a) provides for the appropriate storage of the thing(s) subjected to the 
power: (b) allows reasonable access from time to time to them by the owner, lawful 
custodian or possessor (including making copies); and (c) provides for confidentiality to be 
maintained regarding any confidential matter comprised in them.113  An executing officer 
who has exercised an extended power of seizure has a duty to carry out the separation as 
soon as practicable or within the prescribed period and return anything which is not 
material as soon as practicable.114 An additional safeguard is the power of the Director of 
                                               
110
  Section 787(4) of the Companies Act 2014.  This replaced section 20(2B) of the Companies Act 1990 as 
inserted by section 5 of the Companies (Amendment) Act 2009.   
111
  Ibid. 
112
  Section 787(5)(b) of the Companies Act 2014 lists the following criteria, which are the same criteria applicable 
to determining whether or to what extent something found may be seized: (i) how long it would take to carry 
out the determination or separation on those premises; (ii) the number of persons that would be required to 
carry out that determination or separation on those premises within a reasonable period; (iii) whether the 
determination or separation would (or would if carried out on those premises) involve damage to property; iv) 
the apparatus or equipment that it would be necessary or appropriate to use for the carrying out of the 
determination or separation; v) the costs of carrying out the determination or separation on those premises as 
against the costs of carrying out the determination or separation in another place (being a place in which the 
Director of Corporate Enforcement can show it would be appropriate to do the thing concerned and in which 
the Director intends to arrange, or does arrange, for the thing to be done), and (vi) in the case of separation, 
whether the separation would be likely, or if carried out by the only means that are reasonably practicable on 
those premises, would be likely, to prejudice the use of some or all of the separated seizable information for a 
purpose for which something seized under the warrant is capable of being used.  This replaced section 20(2C) 
of the Companies Act 1990 as inserted by section 5 of the Companies (Amendment) Act 2009. 
113
  Section 788 (2) of the Companies Act 2014, which replaced section 20(2D) of the Companies Act 1990 as 
inserted by section 5 of the Companies (Amendment) Act 2009.   
114
  Section 788(6) of the Companies Act 2014, which replaces section 20(2F) of the Companies Act 1990 as 
inserted by section 5 of the Companies (Amendment) Act 2009.   
 126 
Corporate Enforcement or the person affected by an extended power of seizure to apply 
to a court for a direction regarding the procedure.115 
5.111 Other jurisdictions have also introduced legislative provisions to deal with situations where 
privileged material is mixed with material that is not privileged.  In England and Wales, the 
Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001  gives officers limited powers to seize property from 
premises or persons, so as to sift through or examine the material elsewhere.116  The 
2001 Act also deals with the situation where material sought under a search warrant is, or 
is likely to be, contained within a large quantity of material.  Rather than having to 
determine on the spot which elements of the material are relevant, or having to go through 
it all during the execution period of the search, officers may remove the material in order 
to deal with it away from the search scene.117  Stone notes that these “search and sift” 
provisions are particularly useful in connection with investigations into fraud or 
pornography, where material may be well “hidden” within computer files or where it might 
be difficult to determine at first sight whether material is relevant to the search.118  
Provided these powers are confined to such situations “and the police resist the 
temptation to use them for “fishing” expeditions, then they are probably proportionate to 
the legitimate objectives of law enforcement.”119   
5.112 Regarding digitally stored material, the Attorney General for England and Wales has 
introduced guidelines for prosecutors, investigators and defence practitioners to be 
followed in investigations and prosecutions concerning digitally stored material.120 The 
guidelines prohibit the seizure of material which an investigator “has reasonable grounds 
for believing to be subject to legal privilege” unless it is not reasonably practicable on the 
search premises to separate legally privileged material from non-legally privileged 
material.121  Where legally privileged material or material suspected to contain privileged 
material is seized, it must be isolated from other material that has been seized during the 
search.122  A person independent of the investigation may examine the material to 
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determine whether it may be privileged.123  Potentially privileged material may then be 
examined by an independent lawyer.124  Persons dealing with privileged material must 
maintain “proper records showing the way in which the material has been handled and 
those who have had access to it as well as decisions taken in relation to that material.”125  
The guidelines provide that legally privileged material may only be retained where the 
property which comprises the privileged material has been lawfully seized and it is not 
reasonably practicable for the item to be separated from the rest of the property without 
prejudicing the use of the rest of the property.126  
5.113 Outside of the context of investigating corporate crime, there is no generally applicable 
guidance for executing authorities who find privileged material mixed with non-privileged 
material.  In light of the prevalence of electronic stored material in most cases, the 
Commission is of the view that the proposed Search Warrants Act should set out the 
procedure to be followed when an executing authority discovers material which he or she 
would be entitled to seize but for it being mixed with legally privileged material.  In such 
circumstances, the Act should provide for an extended power of seizure similar to that 
contained in the Companies Act 2014. 
5.114 Where it is necessary to seize mixed materials, it is vital that proper controls are in place 
so that the protection afforded to the privileged elements is not compromised.  A number 
of methods could be employed in order to try to ensure this. Thus, the number of people 
who could access the mixed material should be limited.  In addition, there should be strict 
supervision of those who could access the material.  Accountability is also essential.  This 
could be achieved by enabling access audits and tracing whereby it would be possible to 
determine who has accessed material.  This in turn would facilitate the relevant 
supervising authority to identify whether a person has accessed privileged material.  It 
may be advisable for investigating authorities dealing with mixed material files to have a 
rule of conduct in place.  This would require an examining officer to report to his or her 
superior where the officer believes that he or she has unintentionally accessed material 
which might be privileged.  This would offer a level of protection for the individual officer in 
the event that an audit determined that he or she had accessed privileged material.  It 
may also result in the supervising authority paying particular attention to that element of 
the file in future audits, so as to determine whether the examining officer concerned, or 
any other officer, returns to the file even though it has been reported as being potentially 
privileged.  It would also be necessary to require strict confidentiality from examining 
officers, as well as provide sufficient training as to what legally privileged material is and 
why it may not be accessed or examined.  Furthermore, it may be advisable to encourage 
the person concerned to co-operate with the investigating authority, elements of the 
material which are privileged and those which are not could be identified.   
5.115 The Commission recommends that the Search Warrants Act should identify that in 
certain circumstances privileged and non-privileged material may be mixed and 
contained in one file. It should allow for the seizure of all the material in order to 
examine the non-privileged material, where necessary. The examination process 
should be strictly controlled so that the privileged material is not compromised. 
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K Inventories of Seized Materials 
5.116 The Commission has been advised that, in practice, during the execution of a search 
warrant where materials are seized, a log will be created of all of the items taken by 
executing officers.  This ensures that every item is accounted for.  Although this log is 
primarily created for the executing authority’s file, in some circumstances the authority will 
provide the owner or occupier of the property with a copy of the log.  However, there is no 
statutory requirement in this jurisdiction for this type of inventory to be given to the person 
concerned.  By contrast, the law in a number of other jurisdictions does require this. 
(1) Requirement for inventories of seized materials in other jurisdictions 
5.117 The England and Wales Code of Practice B, which supplements the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984, provides that if property is seized and retained, the person who had 
custody of it immediately before seizure must, on request, be provided with a list or 
description of the property within a reasonable time.127  However, the requirement under 
the Code is based upon a request by the person concerned and is not an automatic 
characteristic of the seizure process.  
5.118 In Australia the Commonwealth Crimes Act 1914, as amended, provides that if a thing is 
seized under a warrant, the executing officer or constable assisting must provide a receipt 
for the thing.  The 1914 Act also provides that where more than one item is seized, all 
items may be recorded upon one receipt.  Similarly, the Tasmanian Search Warrants Act 
1997 provides that where an item is seized under a warrant, the executing officer, or a 
person assisting, is required to provide a receipt for the item, and if more than one item is 
seized one receipt will suffice to record these.  
5.119 Section 133(1) of the New Zealand Search and Surveillance Act 2012 provides that the 
person who carries out the search must, at the time of seizure or as soon as practicable 
after seizure (but not later than 7 days), provide the occupier or person in charge of the 
location with a written notice specifying what was seized.  
(2) Discussion 
5.120 The Commission considers the proposed Search Warrants Act should provide that an 
inventory of any seized items should be given to the owner or occupier.  Such a 
requirement should also extend to copies made of electronic files.  The effect of this 
approach would be that both the person(s) concerned and the investigating authority 
would have a matching copy of the log of seized items.  This would enable the person(s) 
concerned to be aware of the items which are in the custody of the relevant authority, 
which may be particularly useful in cases where commercial premises are searched and 
materials relevant to the business of the commercial entity are taken.   It may also protect 
investigating authorities from claims that they have taken materials which they have not in 
fact seized.  The inventory should be completed and given to the person at the conclusion 
of the search.     
5.121 In cases where some materials are returned and others remain in the custody of the 
authority, both the person’s inventory and the authority’s inventory should be amended to 
reflect this change.  The inventory should be a working document, enabling an accurate 
and up to date account of the location of all relevant materials to be kept.  This approach 
should also increase the transparency and accountability of the seizure process.    
5.122 The Commission recommends that an inventory of all seized or copied items 
should be given to the person concerned upon completion of the search and 
seizure under warrant.  The Commission recommends that if some, but not all, of 
the seized materials are returned the inventory should be amended to reflect this. 
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L Electronic Recordings of Execution of Search Warrants  
5.123 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission discussed whether legislation should permit or 
require the audio and/or video recording of the execution of a search warrant.128  The 
Commission observed that legislation in a number of jurisdictions, including the 
Commonwealth, Western Australia, Tasmania and New Zealand provides for such an 
approach.  Such legislation varies from providing that visual or audio recordings may be 
created of the execution of the warrant if the executing authority believes it is desirable to 
do so129 to providing that where it is reasonably practicable a recording must be made. 130 
5.124 The Commission has considered whether a provision for electronically recording the 
execution of search warrants should be introduced in this jurisdiction.  There are 
advantages associated with the power to make a visual and audio recording of an 
execution.  Recordings would protect executing authorities from unfounded claims of 
wrongdoing. They would also protect the occupier from untruths or uncertainties in respect 
of what was found during the search and excessive use of force or improper exercise of 
powers of search during the execution of the warrant.  Recordings might also be useful as 
evidence where the search results in a prosecution.   
5.125 Some consultees suggested that legislation should provide for electronic recording of 
searches.  It was noted that such a practice is used in other EU Member States and that, 
as the EU envisages free movement of evidence, electronic recording of searches is likely 
to become the norm.  It was suggested that electronic recording of interviews in Garda 
stations resulted in a decrease in the number of challenges relating to such interviews.  It 
was also contended that electronic recording of searches could result in a reduction in 
challenges to the admissibility of evidence obtained during searches, resulting in a 
decrease of the amount of court time devoted to such issues. 
5.126 In Ireland, body worn cameras have been used by An Garda Síochána during public 
protests to record demonstrators,131 and are being reviewed for the purpose of being used 
more widely, such as during arrests.132 In England and Wales body worn cameras were 
introduced as part of a police-led domestic violence enforcement campaign in 2006 and 
provided a useful way of gathering evidence for prosecutions where a victim of domestic 
violence was reluctant to give evidence.133  Body worn cameras have since been piloted in 
a number of police areas and the Home Office College of Policing have produced 
guidelines on their use.134  The English Information Commissioner has also published a 
data protection code of practice for surveillance cameras and personal information, which 
deals specifically with body worn cameras.135 It appears that body worn cameras have 
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been used in Ireland without any equivalent data protection code being issued by the Data 
Protection Commissioner under the Data Protection Acts 1988 and 2003.136 
5.127 In the United States, some police departments have trialled and introduced body worn 
cameras.  A 2014 United States Department of Justice Report examined research carried 
out in 2013 on the use of body worn cameras by police departments.  It notes the view of 
the police executives whose departments wore body cameras that the cameras “provide a 
useful tool for law enforcement.”137  The benefits cited by the police executives during the 
study included police accountability and transparency, identification and correction of 
internal agency problems and evidence documentation.138  An experiment conducted by 
the police department in Rialto, California, studied whether the use of body worn cameras 
by police officers would impact the number of complaints relating to officers, including 
officers’ use of force.  It found that there was a 60% reduction in incidents involving the 
use of force following the introduction of the cameras.139  The experiment discovered that 
there was an 88% reduction in the number of citizen complaints between the year before 
the introduction of the cameras and the year following their implementation.140  However, 
the United States Department of Justice Report also notes the policy considerations that 
apply to the implementation of body worn cameras, including “significant implications in 
terms of privacy, community relationships, concerns raised by frontline officers, 
expectations that cameras create in terms of court proceedings and officer credibility, and 
the financial considerations that cameras present.”141  
5.128 Privacy considerations arise due to the ability of the officers to “record inside private 
homes and to film sensitive situations that might emerge during calls for service.”142  It 
appears that in the United States, body worn cameras are sometimes used to record 
search warrant executions.  The United States Department of Justice Report notes the 
view of many law enforcement agencies that “officers have the right to record inside a 
private home as long as they have a legal right to be there” and therefore if an officer is at 
a home on foot of a valid search warrant he or she may record inside the home.143  
However it notes the concern that footage from inside a private dwelling may be publicly 
disclosed.144   
5.129 The College of Policing Guidelines in England and Wales states that, given the right to 
respect for private and family life under Article 8 of the ECHR, police should not use body 
worn cameras in private dwellings under normal circumstances.  However, “if a user is 
present at an incident in a private dwelling and is there for a genuine policing purpose, 
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  McIntyre “Body Cameras will give a new perspective on policing, as water meter protests show” Irish 
Independent, 18 October 2014. 
137
  Police Executive Research Forum Implementing a Body-Worn Camera Program: Recommendations and 
lessons Learned (United States Department of Justice 2014) at 5.  Available at policeforum.org.  
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they are entitled to make a [body worn video] recording in the same way as they would 
record any other incident.”145  
5.130 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission noted that recording the execution of a search 
warrant raised issues concerning the right to privacy, particularly where the place being 
searched is a dwelling. Added to this is the need to ensure that the relevant provisions of 
the Data Protections Acts 1988 and 2003 are observed, and it is notable that when body 
cameras were introduced in England in recent years this was accompanied by a specific 
data protection code of practice. The Commission also acknowledges the positive benefits 
identified in other jurisdictions where body cameras have been introduced into policing 
practice. The introduction of body camera technology is, however, primarily an operational 
policing matter for the relevant authorities to consider in the light of, in particular, the 
relevant data protection legislation. The Commission has therefore concluded that this is 
not a matter that should be included in the Search Warrants Act. 
5.131 The Commission recommends that the Search Warrants Act should not contain any 
provision on the electronic recording of the execution of search warrants (including 
the use of body-worn cameras) as this is primarily an operational policing matter 
for the relevant authorities to consider in the light of, in particular, the Data 
Protections Acts 1988 and 2003.  
                                               
145




CHAPTER 6 ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE AND A SEARCH WARRANTS CODE OF 
PRACTICE 
A Admissibility of Evidence and the Exclusionary Rule in Ireland  
6.01 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission considered the effect of evidence obtained 
illegally or unconstitutionally on foot of a search warrant.1  The Commission is of the view 
that the recommended generally applicable Search Warrants Act should provide statutory 
guidance to be followed when there is a challenge to the validity of a search warrant.   
6.02 The rule governing the admissibility of evidence obtained illegally or unconstitutionally (the 
exclusionary rule) seeks to protect the person and respect due process.2  McGrath 
outlines three main principles that justify the application of the exclusionary rule.3  The first 
is respect for the rule of law which encompasses the theory that the ability of authorities to 
act unlawfully to bring wrongdoers to justice undermines confidence in and integrity of the 
criminal justice system.  McGrath notes that this approach is prevalent in Canada and 
some decisions in the United States.4  The second principle, which primarily forms the 
basis for the exclusionary rule in the United States, is that police and other authorities are 
deterred from obtaining evidence by unlawful means if such evidence cannot later be 
admitted in proceedings.5   The third principle, which is central to the application of the 
exclusionary rule in Ireland, is that of vindication of the rights of the accused (or others 
who have been affected by the unconstitutional action).6   
6.03 The Consultation Paper set out the development of the exclusionary rule in Irish case law, 
including the Supreme Court decisions in The People (Attorney General) v O’Brien7 and 
The People (DPP) v Kenny.8  In the 2015 decision The People (DPP) v JC9 the Supreme 
Court expressly overruled Kenny and set out a new test for the admissibility of 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence.10  The Commission outlines briefly below the 
development of the exclusionary rule and the effect of the decision in JC. 
                                               
1
  Consultation Paper on Search Warrants and Bench Warrants (LRC CP 58-2009) at paragraphs 6.55 to 6.77. 
2
  Ibid at paragraph 6.56. 
3
  McGrath “The Exclusionary Rule in Respect of Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence” (2004) 11(1) DULJ 108 
at 108. 
4
  McGrath refers to section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the United States 
Supreme Court decision Olmstead v United States 277 US 438 (1928). 
5
  United States v Calandra 414 US 338 (1974) at 348 and United States v Leon 468 US 897 (1983) at 906. 
6
  McGrath states that according to the principle of vindication, “the Courts are required to uphold the provisions 
of the Constitution.”  He cites The People (Attorney General) v O’Brien [1965] IR 142 and The People (DPP) v 
Lynch [1982] IR 64 at 76. 
7
  [1965] IR 142.   
8
  [1990] 2 IR 110.   
9
  The People (DPP) v JC [2015] IESC 31. 
10
  Majority judgment of Clarke J (Denham CJ, O’Donnell and MacMenamin JJ concurring), at Part 7 of his 
judgment. 
 134 
6.04 In The People (Attorney General) v O’Brien,11 Gardaí intended to search a dwelling at 118 
Captain’s Road, Crumlin.  However, the search warrant they used described the address 
as 118 Cashel Road.  The Supreme Court had to consider whether evidence obtained as 
a result of the search carried out using the warrant ought to have been excluded at trial on 
the basis that the search was illegal.  Two views emerged from the Court in O’Brien as to 
the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence.  The majority view was expressed by 
Kingsmill Moore J (with whom Budd and Lavery JJ agreed), which favoured the 
undertaking of a balancing exercise.  He stated that, where evidence has been obtained 
as a result of an illegal action, a determination would have to be made in each individual 
case as to whether the public interest would be best served by the admission or the 
exclusion of that evidence.  He stated that a “consideration of all the circumstances” 
should be carried out for the purpose of the determination, including: 
i. the nature and extent of the illegality.   
ii. whether the illegal action was intentional or unintentional.   
iii. if the action was intentional, whether it was the result of an ad hoc decision or 
whether it represented a settled or deliberate policy. 
iv. whether the illegality was one of a trivial and technical nature or a serious 
invasion of important rights, the recurrence of which would involve a real 
danger to necessary freedoms. 
v. whether there were circumstances of urgency or emergency which provide 
some excuse for the action.12    
6.05 The minority view was expressed by Walsh J (with whom Ó Dálaigh CJ agreed), who was 
of the view that such evidence “is not rendered inadmissible and there is no discretion to 
rule it out by reason only of the fact that it was obtained by means of an illegal as distinct 
from an unconstitutional seizure.”13  Walsh J therefore put forward a more inclusionary 
approach to the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence.  Despite favouring differing 
approaches to the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence, the Supreme Court 
concluded that evidence was not automatically rendered inadmissible merely because it 
had been illegally obtained.14 
6.06 In O’Brien the dwelling of both accused persons was searched and therefore Article 40.5 
of the Constitution which guarantees the inviolability of the dwelling was engaged.  There 
was general agreement on the inadmissibility of unconstitutionally obtained evidence. 
Speaking for the majority, Kingsmill Moore J held that where there has been a deliberate 
and intentional violation of constitutional rights, “evidence obtained by such violation 
should in general be excluded.”15  The Court also accepted that there could be 
extraordinary excusing circumstances which might justify or permit the admission of such 
evidence, but he preferred “not to attempt to enumerate such circumstances by 
anticipation and stated that “[t]he facts of individual cases vary so widely that any hard 
and fast rules of a general nature seem to me to be dangerous and I would again leave 
the exclusion or non-exclusion to the discretion of the trial judge.”16   
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  [1965] IR 142.   
12
  Ibid at 160. 
13
  Ibid at 168.   
14
  See generally O’Connor  “The Admissibility of Unconstitutionally Obtained  Evidence in Irish Law” (1982) Ir Jur 
257, at 259-260; McGrath Evidence (Thomson Round Hall 2005) at 356-357.   
15
  [1965] IR 142, 162.   
16
  Ibid. 
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6.07 A similar view was adopted in the minority judgment delivered by Walsh J, although this 
judgment discussed the matter in more detail.  Walsh J stated that the courts:  
“must recognise the paramount position of constitutional rights and must uphold the 
objection of an accused person to the admissibility at his trial of evidence obtained or 
procured by the State... as a result of a deliberate and conscious violation of the 
constitutional rights of the accused person where no extraordinary excusing 
circumstances exist.” 17  
6.08 Three elements can be identified in this approach.  The first is that unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence should generally be “absolutely inadmissible.”18  The second is that this 
rule may be limited and evidence admitted if extraordinary excusing circumstances exist.19  
Walsh J identified two specific extraordinary excusing circumstances in his judgment, 
namely, the imminent destruction of vital evidence or the need to rescue a victim in peril.20  
The third element is that if the breach is not deliberate and conscious, it may not fall within 
the scope of the rule.  To this end Walsh J expressly noted in his judgment that “without a 
deliberate and conscious violation [evidence] is not excludable by reason only of the 
violation” itself.21  
(1) Interpretation of “conscious and deliberate” 
6.09 In decisions subsequent to O’Brien, courts ruled on the interpretation of “conscious and 
deliberate”.22 In The People (DPP) v Kenny23 the Supreme Court strengthened the 
exclusionary rule in Ireland, without expressly overruling O’Brien.   
6.10 Kenny involved a search warrant for which there was no evidence to satisfy the 
requirement that the peace commissioner who issued it had satisfied himself that there 
were reasonable grounds for the suspicion.24  In the Supreme Court, Finlay CJ (with 
whom Walsh and Hederman JJ agreed) delivered the decision of the majority of the Court.  
He held that evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional rights of a person “must be 
excluded” unless a court is satisfied that the act constituting the violation was committed 
unintentionally or accidentally, or is satisfied that there are extraordinary excusing 
circumstances which justify the admission of  evidence at the court’s discretion.25  Finlay 
CJ concluded that the forcible entry into the dwelling place “was neither unintentional nor 
                                               
17
  [1965] IR 142,170.   
18
  Ibid, per Walsh J at 170.   
19
  Ibid.  In Freeman v Director of Public Prosecutions [1996] 3 IR 569, the High Court held that the “imminent 
destruction of vital evidence” exception applied, although the Court warned against attributing too wide a 
scope to the exception.  In The People (DPP) v O’Loughlin [1979] IR 85, the Court of Criminal Appeal did not 
agree with the trial judge exercising his discretion to include unconstitutionally obtained evidence on the 
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IR 1 and The People (DPP) v Delaney [1997] 3 IR 453 where the court applied the “need to rescue a victim in 
peril” exception and, for a discussion, McGrath “The Exclusionary Rule in Respect of Unconstitutionally 
Obtained Evidence” (2004) 26 DULJ 108. 
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  Walsh J also noted at 170 that “evidence obtained by a search incidental to and contemporaneous with a 
lawful arrest although made without a valid search warrant” would come within the category of excusable 
circumstances. 
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  Ibid.   
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  See paragraphs 6.64 - 6.66 of the Consultation Paper discussing The People (DPP) v Madden [1977] IR 336 
and The People (DPP) v Shaw [1982] IR 1. 
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  [1990] 2 IR 110.   
24
  It appeared that he had relied solely on the information submitted by the applicant Garda. 
25
  [1990] 2 IR 110, at 134.  
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accidental” and that there were no extraordinary circumstances to justify the act.26  
Although Finlay CJ accepted that the Gardaí were not aware that they were transgressing 
the constitutional rights of the accused, he held that the evidence had been 
unconstitutionally obtained and was thus inadmissible.27  The approach of the majority in 
Kenny therefore mirrored Walsh J’s minority view in both O’Brien and Shaw that an act 
could amount to a “deliberate and conscious” violation of rights even though the person is 
unaware of the unlawfulness of the act. 
6.11 Kenny was applied in a number of subsequent decisions, discussed in detail in the 
Consultation Paper,28 including The People (DPP) v Laide and Ryan29 and Competition 
Authority v Irish Dental Association,30 resulting in the exclusion of evidence obtained on 
foot of search warrants containing fundamental flaws.   
6.12 The approach of the Supreme Court in Kenny to the exclusion of unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence has been criticised.31  In 2007, the Final Report of the Balance in the 
Criminal Law Review Group commented that the interpretation of the rule in Kenny “has 
effectively imposed a strict exclusionary rule.”32  The Report noted that, as the focus of the 
test is on the physical activity of the official involved, it is completely immaterial whether 
the official does not know, or indeed could not know, that the action amounts to a 
constitutional breach.33  In respect of errors in issued search warrants, the Report noted 
that the Kenny approach does not allow the court to have regard to whether the defect is 
caused by factors outside the control of the Gardaí.34  It suggested waiting to see whether 
new appeal provisions provided for by section 21 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006, which 
inserted a new section 34 into the Criminal Procedure Act 1967 and had recently come 
into force, providing a potential “without prejudice” avenue for the Director of Public 
Prosecutions to “have the issue re-visited by the Supreme Court”,35 would result in a 
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  Ibid.   
27
  Ibid.   
28
  Consultation Paper on Search Warrants and Bench Warrants (LRC CP 58-2009) at paragraphs 6.71 onward. 
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  [2005] IECCA 24; [2005] 1 IR 209. 
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  [2005] 3 IR 208. 
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  See also the extra-judicial comments of the former Chief Justice, Keane CJ, in the Foreword to McGrath 
Evidence (Thomson Round Hall 2005) at xvii where he states that “there is surely room, in the case of trivial 
and unintended infringements of a person’s constitutional rights for a process of balancing against the need to 
uphold the rights of particular individuals the interest of the public in the prosecution of serious crime.”  
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  Final Report of the Balance in the Criminal Law Review Group at 154, available at justice.ie.  The Criminal 
Law Review Group was of the view (at 161) that the current exclusionary rule is “too strictly calibrated” and 
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Chairman was of the view that this reason alone does not merit a significant modification of the exclusionary 
rule. 
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  Ibid.   
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  Ibid at 156.   
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  Ibid at 161. 
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reconsideration of the exclusionary rule.36  Failing that, the Report concluded three options 
would have to be examined:37 
i) constitutional amendment providing for a discretionary exclusionary rule; 
ii) statutory regulation providing for a discretionary exclusionary rule; or 
iii) statutory provision of a list of factors which a court may take into account in 
deciding whether or not to exclude evidence.38 
6.13 The Report considered it likely that the second option would be found to be 
unconstitutional.39  Further, the third option of providing the court with greater flexibility by 
placing a list of factors which the Court could take into account in deciding whether to 
admit illegally or unconstitutionally obtained evidence would involve “some important 
constitutional issues”40 and could create difficulties if the legislation were not referred to 
the Supreme Court under Article 26 of the Constitution.  Academic commentators and 
courts also criticised the approach in Kenny. Collins has commented that “it must be 
questioned how a breach of constitutional rights could ever be accidental and 
unintentional if the one at issue in Kenny was not”,41 and that on the basis of this 
reasoning, it may be the case that an action will be deemed accidental and unintentional 
only where it involves “something the Gardaí were not trying to do.”42  In Director of Public 
Prosecutions (Walsh) v Cash43 the High Court (Charleton J) criticised the Kenny test, 
stating that: 
“a rule which remorselessly excludes evidence obtained through an illegality occurring 
by mistake does not commend itself to the proper ordering of society which is the 
purpose of the criminal law.”44  
6.14 The Court was of the view that the exclusion of improperly obtained evidence should be 
on the basis of balancing interests.45  Its view was that the test propounded by the Court in 
O’Brien would have permitted such balancing, whereas the test in Kenny removed much 
of the flexibility of the original test.  On appeal in 2010, the Supreme Court concluded that 
it was unnecessary to consider the submission that the exclusionary rule as set out in 
O’Brien and Kenny should be reviewed.   
                                               
36
  The 2015 Supreme Court decision in The People (DPP) v JC [2015] IESC 31, discussed at paragraphs 6.25-
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  Final Report of the Balance in the Criminal Law Review Group at 166. 
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6.15 In the 2015 Supreme Court decision The People (DPP) v JC,46 the Court by a majority of 
4-3, overruled Kenny and set out a new balancing test.47 This decision is discussed in 
detail at paragraphs 6.25 - 6.34. 
(2) Errors in search warrants 
6.16 The validity of search warrants is regularly challenged by accused persons who argue that 
evidence obtained as a result of the search warrant should not be admitted as evidence at 
trial.  It has been noted that courts have dealt with challenges to the validity of search 
warrants by sorting challenged search warrants into three general categories:48 
i) warrants with fundamental defects through failure to comply with a statutory 
regime; 
ii) warrants deemed defective through errors or omissions; and  
iii) oversights, errors or omissions in valid warrants. 
6.17 Decisions of the Irish courts have clarified what approach should be taken depending on 
whether the error in a warrant was one of substance or form and, if the error was one of 
form, whether it amounted to a fundamental defect or a mere error or misdescription. 
(a) Errors of substance and errors of form 
6.18 In The People (DPP) v Mallon49 the accused sought to have all charges dismissed on the 
basis that the address contained in the search warrant was incorrect and therefore the 
search of the premises that had taken place was illegal on the basis that the warrant was 
invalid.  A member of An  Garda Síochána had searched and seized drugs at “4 
Marrowbone Lane Close, Dublin 8” where the search warrant authorised a search of “4 
Marrowbone Close, Dublin 8” which, it transpired, did not exist.  The Court of Criminal 
Appeal was critical of the Kenny decision and what was described as the “remorseless 
logic” employed by the Supreme Court whereby trivial errors were now operating 
automatically to exclude evidence. It did not accept that Kenny overruled O’Brien and 
noted that the headnote of the Kenny decision recorded O’Brien as having been 
“followed”, and that O’Brien was thus left intact.50  
6.19 The Court in Mallon cited the decision in The People (DPP) v McCarthy51, where the Court 
of Criminal Appeal set out the following principles distilled from the case law in relation to 
search warrants: 
(a) Warrants should be carefully prepared given that they entitle authorised persons to 
enter the property of a citizen with force, if necessary, and to search and seize on that 
basis. 
(b) Particular care must be taken when the document authorises a search of a 
dwelling house, given the constitutional protection afforded to the dwelling.   
(c) Not every error in a warrant will lead to automatic invalidation. 
(d) In particular, where the substance, as opposed to the form, of a warrant is not 
open to objection, invalidation will not necessarily ensue. 
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  [2015] IESC 31. 
47
  Majority judgment of Clarke J (Denham CJ, O’Donnell and MacMenamin JJ concurring), at Part 7 of his 
judgment. 
48
  See Orange Police Powers in Ireland (Bloomsbury 2014) at 9.57 to 9.88. 
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  [2011] IECCA 29, [2011] 2 IR 544. 
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  [2011] IECCA 29, [2011] 2 IR 544 at paragraph 21. 
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  [2010] IECCA 89. 
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(e) The nature of any error/omission on a warrant must be scrutinised by the court to 
assess whether it is fundamental or not, including errors pertaining to jurisdiction.  
Factors to be taken into account include:  
(i) whether the error is a mere misdescription 
(ii) whether it is likely to mislead  
(iii) whether it undermines the apparent jurisdiction to issue the warrant on its 
face  
(f) It is not possible in relation to non-substantive errors (that is those that affect the 
substance of the legislative requirements pertaining to the warrant) to say that they will 
never lead to invalidation due to the wide variety of possible errors/omissions that may 
occur.52  
6.20 While expressing the view that the outcome of cases concerning search warrants are not 
easily predictable, the Court in Mallon stated that it was possible to detect a broad 
principle with which such decisions complied.  In essence, it clarified that “a mere error will 
not invalidate a warrant, especially one which is not calculated to mislead, or perhaps just 
as importantly, does not mislead.”53  As regards the status of the exclusionary rule 
generally, the Court was of the view that:  
“so long as Irish law maintains an almost absolute exclusionary rule for evidence 
obtained as a result of an illegal and therefore unconstitutional search of a dwelling 
house, courts should be slow to invalidate warrants on the grounds of typographical 
grammatical or transcription errors, which are neither calculated to mislead, nor in 
truth do mislead, any reasonable reader of the words.”54  
6.21 In The People (DPP) v Gormley and White,55 Clarke J, giving the judgment of the 
Supreme Court, explained that a warrant must do two things: it must clearly state the 
authorisation which the warrant gives56 and it must indicate a sufficient legal basis.57  The 
reasons for these requirements are first that, “a person whose rights are affected is 
entitled to know with some reasonable level of precision what it is exactly that the warrant 
authorises.”58 Secondly, a person is “entitled to know the legal basis on which it is said 
that the warrant was issued because it is that legal basis which requires them to submit to 
something which would otherwise be unlawful.”59 
6.22 The Supreme Court referred to the decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeal in Mallon 
and McCarthy, and reiterated the test outlined by O’Donnell J in Mallon: “whether the error 
makes the warrant unintelligible or misleading.”  The Supreme Court explained the 
rationale behind this test as follows: 
“What a person is entitled to know is what a warrant authorises.  Provided that the 
warrant does this in sufficiently clear terms to allow a person to understand what is 
authorised, then the fact that there may be a technical misdescription in matters, such 
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  [2010] IECCA 89.  Cited with approval in The People (DPP) v Jagutis [2013] IECCA 4, at paragraph 5.5. 
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  [2011] IECCA 29, [2011] 2 IR 544 at paragraph 44. 
54
  Ibid at paragraph 54. 
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as the precise formal address of a property to be searched, will not render the warrant 
concerned invalid.”60 
6.23 The second type of issue relating to the form of the warrant concerned the necessity to 
specify a legal basis for the issuing of the warrant and the degree to which a warrant must 
state that the conditions required for it to be issued have been fulfilled.  The Court, relying 
on Simple Imports Limited v Revenue Commissioners,61 and the position in England and 
Wales, as set out in R v Inland Revenue Commissioners ex parte Rossminster,62 was of 
the view that, in general, a warrant issued by a judge is valid if: 
“(a) It specifies the legal power which is being exercised by the issuing of the relevant 
warrant; 
(b) It specifies, or it can reasonably be implied from the text, that the relevant judge is 
satisfied that it should be issued; and 
(c) (Having regard to Simple Imports) It does not contain on its face any recital or 
other statement which would reasonably lead to the conclusion that the judge issuing 
the warrant had approached the question of whether it was appropriate to issue the 
warrant on an incorrect basis having regard to the relevant statute.”63 
6.24 The Court concluded that it was not necessary for the warrant specifically to state that the 
issuing authority was satisfied as to the necessary statutory conditions or was satisfied as 
to accurate criteria and therefore the warrant of arrest was valid.64   
(3) A revised exclusionary rule: The People (DPP) v JC 
6.25 Following the criticism and slow erosion of the version of the exclusionary rule in Kenny, 
the Supreme Court reconsidered the exclusionary rule in The People (DPP) v JC65 and by 
a majority of 4-3 overruled Kenny and set out a revised test.66 
(i) The facts in JC 
6.26 The particular confluence of events in JC was an important factor in the decision of the 
Supreme Court to reconsider the exclusionary rule.  The Gardaí were investigating a 
number of robberies which took place in the spring of 2011.  On 10 May 2011 two Gardaí 
attended at the home of the accused intending to arrest him for the offences.  The Gardaí 
had a warrant to search the premises issued under section 29 of the Offences Against the 
State Act 1939.  The warrant was valid on its face and issued in accordance with the 
requirements of the section and the general law relating to such warrants.  While the 
search was taking place, the accused was taken to Waterford Garda Station where, 
having been appropriately cautioned and after receiving legal advice, he made a number 
of inculpatory statements.  By the time the case reached trial in the Circuit Criminal Court, 
the Supreme Court had, in Damache v Director of Public Prosecutions,67 declared section 
29 unconstitutional.   
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61
  [2000] 2 IR 242. 
62
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6.27 The prosecution accepted that any evidence obtained during the search should be 
excluded but argued that the admissions made in the Garda station should still be 
admitted.  It was argued on behalf of the accused that the warrant must be treated as 
invalid, even though issued prior to the decision of the Supreme Court.  Accordingly, it 
was argued, the entry on to the premises and the arrest were a deliberate and conscious 
breach of his constitutional right to liberty and his constitutional right to inviolability of the 
dwelling, and the statements were made while in unlawful custody, and thus the court was 
obliged, applying Kenny, to exclude the evidence.   
6.28 The trial judge considered the matter carefully and accepted the arguments made on 
behalf of the accused, concluding that the statement made in the Garda station was 
inadmissible.  The prosecution offered no further evidence and the trial judge directed the 
jury to enter a verdict of not guilty.   
6.29 The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed the decision to the Supreme Court under 
section 23 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2010.  Counsel for the accused did not raise a 
jurisdictional objection to the bringing of the appeal under section 23.68  
(ii) The majority reasoning 
6.30 Delivering the majority judgment of the Court, Clarke J (Denham CJ, O’Donnell and 
MacMenamin JJ concurring) considered the existing case law and concluded that:69 
O’Brien may be seen to be at one end of a spectrum which suggests that evidence 
should be admitted unless it can be shown that those gathering the evidence in 
question actually knew that their actions were in breach of constitutional rights.  
Kenny may be seen to be at the other end of the spectrum, where all that it is 
necessary to show, so that evidence may be excluded, is that there was a breach of 
constitutional rights, irrespective of the knowledge or level of care of those involved, 
save in the highly unusual and exceptional circumstances mentioned in the case law. 
6.31 With regard to the strict exclusionary rule that emerged from Kenny, he considered that 
“[t]he solution to what might be seen by some as an over-generous attitude of trial judges 
to the admission of evidence... is not to take away the power to admit [it] in its entirety”70 
but rather the proper test is one that balances the competing rights at issue in cases such 
as this: the rights of the accused to liberty and inviolability of the dwelling, and the right of 
the public to have all relevant evidence before the court in a criminal trial. 
6.32 Addressing the concerns of the minority in the case,71 Clarke J considered the elements of 
a balancing test for the admission of evidence obtained in breach of constitutional rights 
and held that: 
“It would truly require exceptional circumstances for the court to admit evidence which 
is obtained in circumstances where those gathering the evidence knew that they were 
                                               
68
  [2015] IESC 31, majority judgment of Clarke J (Denham CJ, O’Donnell and MacMenamin JJ concurring), at 
paragraph 2.9.  Section 23 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2010 envisages the possibility of a retrial after  an 
appeal (in the event, the Supreme Court did not order a retrial in this case: see The People (DPP) v JC (No.2) 
[2015] IESC 50).  The dissenting judgments of Hardiman and Murray JJ considered that the “without 
prejudice” appeal provided for in section 34 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1967 would have been a more 
suitable basis for the appeal. 
69
  [2015] IESC 31, majority judgment of Clarke J (Denham CJ, O’Donnell and MacMenamin JJ concurring), at 
paragraph 4.5. 
70
  Ibid at paragraph 4.24. 
71
  See in particular those expressed by Hardiman J in Part IV of his judgment, raising concerns about the 
behaviour of certain members of An Garda Síochána and what he referred to as the force publique (that is, 
law enforcement). 
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acting in breach of constitutional rights.  Such a situation has to be viewed by any 
court in the most serious light...   
It is also important to make it clear that the question of whether the taking of evidence 
is in deliberate and conscious breach of constitutional rights in that sense requires an 
analysis of the conduct or state of mind not only of any individuals ‘at the coal face’ but 
also of any other senior official or officials within the relevant enforcement or 
investigation authority who were involved in a material way in the process.  To take 
but a simple example, a senior investigating Garda who is well aware that An Garda 
Síochána does not have authority to carry out a particular search cannot escape the 
consequences of a finding of a deliberate and conscious breach of rights simply by 
procuring that a less experienced or less informed member of the force actually 
carried out the search in question.  In addition, where there is a systemic failure in the 
sense that senior Gardaí are aware of and condone practices which are, to their 
knowledge, likely to lead to breaches of constitutional rights, then the fact that 
individual members of An Garda Síochána involved directly in evidence gathering may 
not have the same knowledge would not justify a finding that there was no deliberate 
or conscious breach of constitutional rights.”72 
6.33 With regard to the question of “inadvertence” the standard must be higher than that 
purportedly set in O’Brien and does not include instances of recklessness or gross 
negligence: 
“There is one sense in which the word ‘inadvertent’ simply means that a person did 
not advert to the problem.  On that basis, a person who, even though grossly 
negligent, might not actually have ‘adverted’ to the fact that they were acting in breach 
of constitutional rights might, nonetheless, be said to have acted inadvertently.  It is 
important to emphasise that the term ‘inadvertent’, in the sense in which it is used in 
this judgment, could not encompass such actions.”73 
(iii) The majority test of admissibility in JC 
6.34 Clarke J went on to set out a comprehensive test for the treatment of evidence obtained in 
breach of constitutional rights: 
“In summary, the elements of the test are as follows:- 
(i) The onus rests on the prosecution to establish the admissibility of all evidence.  
The test which follows is concerned with objections to the admissibility of 
evidence where the objection relates solely to the circumstances in which the 
evidence was gathered and does not concern the integrity or probative value of 
the evidence concerned. 
(ii) Where objection is taken to the admissibility of evidence on the grounds that it 
was taken in circumstances of unconstitutionality, the onus remains on the 
prosecution to establish either:- 
(a) that the evidence was not gathered in circumstances of 
unconstitutionality; or 
(b) that, if it was, it remains appropriate for the Court to nonetheless admit 
the evidence. 
The onus in seeking to justify the admission of evidence taken in 
unconstitutional circumstances places on the prosecution an obligation to 
explain the basis on which it is said that the evidence should, nonetheless, be 
admitted AND ALSO to establish any facts necessary to justify such a basis. 
                                               
72
  [2015] IESC 31, majority judgment of Clarke J at paragraphs 5.8-5.9. 
73
  Ibid, at paragraph 5.14. 
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(iii) Any facts relied on by the prosecution to establish any of the matters referred 
to at (ii) must be established beyond reasonable doubt. 
(iv) Where evidence is taken in deliberate and conscious violation of constitutional 
rights then the evidence should be excluded save in those exceptional 
circumstances considered in the existing jurisprudence.  In this context 
deliberate and conscious refers to knowledge of the unconstitutionality of the 
taking of the relevant evidence rather than applying to the acts concerned.  
The assessment as to whether evidence was taken in deliberate and 
conscious violation of constitutional rights requires an analysis of the conduct 
or state of mind not only of the individual who actually gathered the evidence 
concerned but also any other senior official or officials within the investigating 
or enforcement authority concerned who is involved either in that decision or in 
decisions of that type generally or in putting in place policies concerning 
evidence gathering of the type concerned. 
(v) Where evidence is taken in circumstances of unconstitutionality but where the 
prosecution establishes that same was not conscious and deliberate in the 
sense previously appearing, then a presumption against the admission of the 
relevant evidence arises.  Such evidence should be admitted where the 
prosecution establishes that the evidence was obtained in circumstances 
where any breach of rights was due to inadvertence or derives from 
subsequent legal developments. 
(vi) Evidence which is obtained or gathered in circumstances where same could 
not have been constitutionally obtained or gathered should not be admitted 
even if those involved in the relevant evidence gathering were unaware due to 
inadvertence of the absence of authority. 
B Jurisdictional Comparison 
6.35 Many common law jurisdictions have adopted different rules on the admissibility of illegally 
and unconstitutionally obtained evidence.  Nonetheless, some common themes emerge.  
Broadly speaking, the courts have taken a sliding-scale approach to illegally obtained 
evidence.  Thus, the courts will generally admit evidence obtained under a search warrant 
that contains small errors (such as a typographical error in the address to be searched) 
which do not mislead anyone.  Where the error is more serious however, the courts often 
undertake a balancing exercise whereby, for example, the prejudicial effect on the 
accused is weighed against the probative value of the evidence.  In England and Wales, 
the common law discretion to exclude evidence prejudicial to the accused,74 upheld in the 
decision of R v Sang,75 was placed on a statutory footing by section 82(3) of the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.  Section 82(3) provides that nothing in Part VIII of the 
Act “shall prejudice any power of a court to exclude evidence (whether by preventing 
questions from being put or otherwise) at its discretion.”     
6.36 A more expansive provision was enacted under section 78 of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984, which provides:  
“(1) In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the 
prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court that, having regard to 
all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evidence was 
                                               
74
  For the common law development of the exclusionary rule in England and Wales, see R v Leatham (1861) 8 
Cox CC 498, Kuruma v The Queen [1955] AC 197 and R v Sang [1980] AC 402.  See also Dennis The Law of 
Evidence 4
rd
 ed (Sweet and Maxwell 2010) at 93 to 95 and 311 and Zander The Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984 6
th
 ed.  (Thomson, Sweet and Maxwell 2013) at 463. 
75
  [1980] AC 402.   
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obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the 
fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it.   
(2) Nothing in this section shall prejudice any rule of law requiring a court to exclude 
evidence.” 
6.37 A number of jurisdictions favour an approach which involves balancing competing rights 
and interests.  The application of the exclusionary rule in Canada involves the 
consideration of numerous factors including: 
“The seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct (admission may send the 
message the justice system condones serious state misconduct), the impact of the 
breach on the Charter-protected interests of the accused (admission may send the 
message that individual rights count for little), and society’s interest in the adjudication 
of the case on its merits.”76  
6.38 The Canadian approach favours neither the automatic exclusion of evidence nor its 
general inclusion.  Section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
expressly requires a court to have regard to “all the circumstances” when determining 
whether evidence should be excluded.  Although there is a strong emphasis on individual 
rights, the Canadian approach does not go so far as to be entirely rights-focused or rights-
protectionist.  Rather, there is an overall consideration of how the admission of evidence 
obtained in violation of the Charter is likely to affect the reputation of the justice system.   
6.39 In New Zealand, a prima facie exclusionary rule previously operated whereby evidence 
obtained in breach of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 would generally be 
inadmissible, unless a judge exercised his or her discretion to admit it.77   However, 
following the Court of Appeal decision in R v Shaheed78 and the enactment of the 
Evidence Act 2006, the exclusionary rule in New Zealand now facilitates the consideration 
and balancing of all relevant factors to determine whether the exclusion of evidence is a 
proportionate response to the breach.  Section 30 provides that where the accused or 
judge raises the issue of whether evidence was improperly obtained, the judge must:  
(a) find, on the balance of probabilities, whether or not the evidence was improperly 
obtained; and  
(b) if the judge finds that the evidence has been improperly obtained, determine whether 
or not the exclusion of the evidence is proportionate to the impropriety by means of a 
balancing process that gives appropriate weight to the impropriety but also takes 
proper account of the need for an effective and credible system of justice.79   
Improperly obtained evidence is defined as evidence obtained:  
(a) in consequence of a breach of any enactment or rule of law by a person to whom 
section 3 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 applies80; or  
                                               
76
  R v Grant [2009] SCC 32, paragraph 71.  Grant radically revised the Canadian approach to the admissibility of 
illegally obtained evidence by eliminating a “trial fairness” test laid out in the earlier decision of R v Collins 
[1987] 1 SCR 265 and reframing the remaining factors into a three-pronged test.  For a more detailed 
discussion of the Canadian approach to evidence obtained in breach of the Charter, see Paciocco and 
Stuesser The Law of Evidence 5
th
 ed (Irwin Law 2008) at 350. 
77
  See R v Butcher [1992] 2 NZLR 257, R v Goodwin [1993] 2 NZLR 153, R v H [1994] 2 NZLR 143 and R v Te 
Kira [1993] 3 NZLR 257. 
78
  [2002] 2 NZLR 377. 
79
  Section 30(2) of the Evidence Act 2006. 
80
  Section 3 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990 (New Zealand) provides that the Bill of Rights applies to acts done “(a) 
by the legislative, executive, or judicial branches of the Government of New Zealand; or (b) by a person or 
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(b) in consequence of a statement made by a defendant that is or would be inadmissible 
if it were offered in evidence by the prosecution; or  
(c) unfairly.81   
 For such determination, the judge may, among other matters, have regard to the following 
set of factors: 
(a) the importance of any right breached by the impropriety and the seriousness of the 
intrusion on it; 
(b) the nature of the impropriety, in particular, whether it was deliberate, reckless, or 
done in bad faith; 
(c) the nature and quality of the improperly obtained evidence; 
(d) the seriousness of the offence with which the defendant is charged; 
(e) whether there were any other investigatory techniques not involving any breach of 
the rights that were known to be available but were not used; 
(f) whether there are alternative remedies to exclusion of the evidence which can 
adequately provide redress to the defendant; 
(g) whether the impropriety was necessary to avoid apprehended physical danger to the 
Police or others; 
(h) whether there was any urgency in obtaining the improperly obtained evidence.82 
6.40 A judge must exclude any improperly obtained evidence if its exclusion is proportionate to 
the impropriety.83  
6.41 In the United States, the exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence derives from the 
protection against unlawful search and seizure in the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.84  In the 1960s, the US Supreme Court adopted a relatively strict 
exclusionary rule85 with the aim of deterring police misconduct.86 However, a “good faith” 
defence has emerged which means that evidence obtained in breach of a person’s 
constitutional rights may be deemed admissible in circumstances where the transgression 
was inadvertent.87   Some commentators have suggested that a number of decisions of 
                                                                                                                                                       
body in the performance of any public function, power, or duty conferred or imposed on that person or body by 
or pursuant to law.” 
81
  Section 30(5) of the Evidence Act 2006. 
82
  Section 30(3) of the Evidence Act 2006. 
83
  Section 30(4) of the Evidence Act 2006.  In R v Williams [2007] NZCA 52, the Court of Appeal gave guidance 
on the approach that courts should follow when conducting the balancing exercise put forward by R v 
Shaheed and codified in the Evidence Act 2006. 
84
  The Fourth Amendment states: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized.”  In Weeks v United States 232 US 383 (1914), the United States 
Supreme Court held that seizure of private documents from a citizen without their consent violated the Fourth 
Amendment.   
85
  See Mapp v Ohio 367 US 643 (1961) and Miranda v Arizona 384 US 436 (1966). 
86
  See LaFave, Israel and King Criminal Procedure 4
th
 ed (Thomson West 2004) at 107, Elkins v United States 
364 US 206 (1960) and Terry v Ohio 392 US 1 (1968). 
87
  State v Powell 428 US 465 (1976), United States v Leon 468 US 897 (1984), Herring v United States 555 US 
135 (2009) and Davis v United States 131 SC 2419 (2011).   
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the United States Supreme Court have expanded the “good faith” exception which has 
resulted in the erosion of the exclusionary rule in the United States.88 
C Conclusions on search warrants and illegally or unconstitutionally obtained 
evidence   
(1) Illegally obtained evidence 
6.42 As noted above, a distinction can be drawn between evidence that is obtained illegally 
and evidence that is obtained unconstitutionally.  Although the decision of the Supreme 
Court in JC now governs the admission of unconstitutionally obtained evidence, the test 
regarding illegally obtained evidence appears to have been left unchanged.  Therefore, in 
line with the majority decision in O’Brien, evidence which is illegally obtained is not 
automatically inadmissible.  Rather a determination will be made by the court on the basis 
of “all the circumstances” as to whether the evidence should be excluded or admitted. In 
O’Brien Kingsmill Moore J identified a list of factors with regard to illegally obtained 
evidence to be considered including:  
i) the nature and extent of the illegality;  
ii) whether the illegal action was intentional or not;  
iii) if it was intentional whether it was the result of an ad hoc decision or 
represented a settled or deliberate policy;  
iv) whether the illegality was trivial or technical in nature; or  
v) whether there were circumstances of urgency providing some excuse for the 
illegal action.   
6.43 Kingsmill Moore J did not, however, intend this list to be exhaustive or exclusive.  He 
observed that each case would have to be decided on the basis of its own facts and that it 
would be a matter for a judge to exercise his or her discretion to exclude evidence of facts 
ascertained by illegal means “where it appears that public policy, based on a balancing of 
public interests, requires such exclusion”.89   
6.44 The balancing test put forward by Kingsmill Moore J is similar in a number of respects to 
the balancing tests used in Canada and New Zealand.  Consideration of the nature of the 
breach, the intention of those who committed the breach, and the seriousness of the 
breach or illegality, are common to all three tests.  The Canadian test and that put forward 
in O’Brien also share a common factor with regard to whether there were circumstances 
of urgency or emergency.  It is notable that the factors identified for consideration in both 
Canada and New Zealand are perhaps more comprehensive in nature and scope than 
those contained in the O’Brien test.  However as the O’Brien test was not intended by the 
Supreme Court to be exhaustive, there is no reason why it could not be developed further.   
6.45 In light of the case law discussed above, in particular the decision of the Supreme Court in 
O’Brien,90 and of the Court of Criminal Appeal in The People (DPP) v McCarthy91 and The 
                                               
88
  For academic commentary suggesting that the decisions in Hudson v Michigan 547 US 586 (2006),  Herring v 
United States 555 US 135 (2009) and Davis v United States 131 SC 2419 (2011) extended the “good faith” 
exception, thereby weakening the exclusionary rule, see Lafave “The Smell of a Herring: A Critique of the 
Supreme Court’s Latest Assault on the Exclusionary Rule” (2008-2009) 99 Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology 757; Tomkovicz “Davis v United States: The Exclusion Revolution Continues” (2011) 9 Ohio State 
Journal of Criminal Law 381. 
89
  [1965] IR 142 at 161.   
90
  [1965] IR 142.   
91
  [2010] IECCA 89. 
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People (DPP) v Mallon,92 the courts approach the question of admissibility in two stages. 
The first stage involves determining whether an error or defect in the search warrant is not 
of such a type as to invalidate it and to render the search illegal, and that the evidence 
obtained as a result of the search is therefore admissible having regard to all the 
circumstances of the case. The specific matters that have been identified to date in the 
case law include: (a) that the error or defect consisted of a misdescription or was 
otherwise of a trivial or technical nature; (b) that the error or defect was not likely to 
mislead, and did not mislead, the person to whom the warrant was directed; (c) that the 
error or defect was unintentional or inadvertent; and (d) that the error or defect did not, on 
its face, undermine the apparent jurisdiction to issue the warrant. 
6.46 The second stage of the process arises if the court finds that the evidence was obtained 
illegally because the error passed the threshold test in the first stage. At the second stage, 
the court determines whether it should in its discretion exclude the evidence having regard 
to the range of matters that have also been identified in the case law, which include: (a) 
that the nature and extent of the error or defect was one of substance and not merely of 
form; (b) that the error or defect was likely to mislead, and did mislead, the person to 
whom the warrant was directed; (c) that the error or defect was the result of an intentional 
decision; (d) that the error or defect, on its face, undermined the apparent jurisdiction to 
issue the warrant; (e) that there did not exist exceptional circumstances of urgency or 
emergency that would excuse the error or defect; and (f) that the prejudicial effect of the 
evidence outweighed its probative value. 
6.47 The Commission notes that some legislation, notably the Criminal Justice (Surveillance) 
Act 2009, has attempted to set out a statutory test for the admissibility of illegally obtained 
evidence. The 2009 Act allows a superior officer of An Garda Síochána, the Defence 
Forces or the Revenue Commissioners to apply to a judge (or superior officer in cases of 
urgency)93 for an authorisation for carrying out surveillance on certain conditions being 
satisfied.94  Section 14 of the 2009 Act concerns the admissibility of evidence obtained 
under such an authorisation.  It provides that evidence obtained pursuant to an 
authorisation or approval under the Act may be admitted as evidence in criminal 
proceedings.95 Section 14 of the 2009 Act specifies circumstances in which documents or 
material acquired as a result of surveillance undertaken under an authorisation or 
approval may be admitted in evidence where a member of An Garda Síochána, the 
Defence Forces or officer of the Revenue Commissioners has “failed to comply with a 
requirement of the authorisation or approval concerned.”96  The Court may admit such 
documents or information where, having regard to the matters specified in section 
14(4)(b), the Court decides that: (a) the member or officer concerned acted in good faith 
and that the failure was inadvertent; and (b) the information or document ought to be 
admitted in the interests of justice.97  The factors that the Court must have regard to are: 
(i) whether the failure concerned was serious or merely technical in nature; 
(ii) the nature of any right infringed by the obtaining of the information or 
document concerned; 
(iii) whether there were circumstances of urgency; 
(iv) the possible prejudicial effect of the information or document concerned; and 
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  [2011] IECCA 29, [2011] 2 IR 544. 
93
  Section 7 of the Criminal Justice (Surveillance) Act 2009. 
94
  Section 4 of the Criminal Justice (Surveillance) Act 2009. 
95
  Section 14(1) of the Criminal Justice (Surveillance) Act 2009. 
96
  Section 14(4) of the Criminal Justice (Surveillance) Act 2009. 
97
  Section 14((a) of the Criminal Justice (Surveillance) Act 2009. 
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(v) the probative value of the information or document concerned. 
6.48 The 2009 Act provides that information or material obtained as a result of surveillance 
carried out under an authorisation or approval “may be admitted as evidence in criminal 
proceedings notwithstanding any error or omission on the face of the authorisation or 
written record of approval concerned, if the court, having regard in particular to the 
matters specified above, decides that: (i) the error or omission was inadvertent; and (ii) 
the information or document ought to be admitted in the interests of justice.  The factors 
which the Court should have regard to under section 14(3)(b) are the same as those that 
must be considered under section 14(4)(b). 
6.49 It was noted during the Oireachtas debates on the Criminal Justice (Surveillance) Bill that 
section 14 was “the first statutory attempt in a Government Bill to place in legislative form 
the principles that have been developed through extensive case law on the admissibility of 
evidence on foot of defective search warrants.”98 
6.50 The Commission has concluded that, while the 2009 Act provides a useful set of factors 
that may be considered in that specific statutory context, such an approach could limit the 
range of factors that may need to be considered in a case concerning a search warrant. In 
addition, bearing in mind that the relevant law continues to be developed and refined, new 
factors are likely to arise that may render such a list of statutory factors at best too limited 
and at worst redundant. For that reason, the Commission has concluded that the 
proposed Search Warrant Act should not codify the process by which the courts 
determine whether to admit evidence that has been obtained illegally. The Commission 
has concluded that this should remain a matter for the courts to determine and, where 
required, to develop in the context of the general principles and rules on the admissibility 
of illegally obtained evidence. 
(2) Unconstitutionally obtained evidence 
6.51 Courts in Ireland have taken a much more protectionist approach in respect of 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence than illegally obtained evidence.  This reflects the 
primacy of the Constitution in contrast to legislation and rules of law.  As regards 
jurisdictional comparisons, the United States is the most comparable to Ireland as it also 
has a written constitution and a strict exclusionary rule.  Courts in the United States have 
been greatly concerned with protecting the rights afforded by the Fourth Amendment to 
the Constitution, holding that if a high level of protection is not ensured then the Fourth 
Amendment might as well not exist.  One of the primary rationales of the United States’ 
approach to the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution is to deter 
misconduct on the part of those obtaining evidence.  The deterrence rationale has been 
recognised as one rationale for the exclusionary rule in Ireland but the fundamental goal 
of the Irish approach is the protection of rights.99  
6.52 The emergence of the “good faith” exception in the United States has enabled the courts 
to carry out a greater assessment of the surrounding facts of a case but has not hugely 
limited the strict approach.  That is to say, the exception simply considers whether the act 
was genuinely believed to be lawful.  Cases where there has been a flagrant disregard for 
the law, for example, officers giving false information in a search warrant application, will 
not benefit from the exception.100    
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  Seanad Éireann Debates Vol.196, No.7, 30 June 2009.   
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  The People (DPP) v Kenny [1990] 2 IR 110, 133 to134, where the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he detection 
of crime and the conviction of guilty persons... cannot outweigh the unambiguously expressed constitutional 
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  However, there is a view that the exclusionary rule is being increasingly eroded in the United States through 
the expansion of the “good faith” exception.  See for example Lafave “The Smell of a Herring: A Critique of the 
Supreme Court’s Latest Assault on the Exclusionary Rule” (2008-2009) 99 Journal of Criminal Law and 
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6.53 The Supreme Court decision in The People (DPP) v JC establishes an exception allowing 
for the admissibility of unconstitutionally obtained evidence where the breach was through 
“inadvertence” or where it derives from subsequent legal developments.  This test 
requires good faith on the part of the investigators. Delivering the majority judgment in JC 
Clarke J held that, for example, “investigative agencies cannot hide behind an 
unacceptable lack of knowledge appropriate to their task for the purposes of pleading 
inadvertence.”101 It remains to be seen precisely how the consequences of the ruling in JC 
will develop, but in this way exclusion of the evidence obtained where there has been a 
genuine and unintentional breach may be avoided.  The exception does not go so far as 
to admit any and all evidence where inadvertence arises.  However it will enable the 
courts to carry out a greater analysis of all the facts so as to arrive at a balanced decision, 
rather than automatically excluding evidence.   
6.54 The rule governing the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence, as developed by 
the Supreme Court in The People (DPP) v JC, has the status of a constitutional principle.  
Consequently, any modification of the rule would require a constitutional amendment or 
further consideration of the rule by the Supreme Court.  The test set out by Clarke J in JC 
provides a statement of the procedure to be followed by a court in determining the 
admissibility of unconstitutionally obtained evidence.  As with its approach to illegally 
obtained evidence the Commission does not recommend the inclusion of a statement of 
the test for the admissibility of unconstitutionally obtained evidence in the generally 
applicable Search Warrant Act.  
(3) Breach of the Search Warrants Act should not in itself render evidence 
inadmissible 
6.55 Having regard to the Commission’s view that the Search Warrants Act should not contain 
a test of admissibility for evidence because these rules remain in a state of ongoing 
judicial development, it has also concluded that the requirements of the proposed Search 
Warrant Act should not in themselves become the basis for questions of admissibility. In 
this respect, a good statutory precedent is section 7 of the Criminal Justice Act 1984, 
which provides that failure to comply with the provisions of Regulations made under the 
1984 Act on the treatment of persons while detained in custody “shall not in itself render 
evidence inadmissible.” The Commission has therefore concluded that the Search 
Warrants Act should provide that evidence obtained in breach of its requirements is not of 
itself render evidence inadmissible. 
6.56 The Commission recommends that the proposed Search Warrants Act should 
provide that a failure by a person applying for or executing a search warrant to 
observe any provision of the Act shall not of itself affect the admissibility in 
evidence of any material obtained during a search. 
6.57 The Commission recommends that the proposed Search Warrant Act should not 
include any provision as to the tests by which the courts determine whether to 
admit evidence that has been obtained illegally, or the tests used to determine the 
admissibility of unconstitutionally obtained evidence, and that these should remain 
a matter for the courts to determine and, where required, to develop. 
D Code of Practice on Search Warrants 
6.58 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission considered the implementation of a search 
warrants code of practice.102  The Commission is aware that various bodies responsible 
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  The People (DPP) v JC [2015] IESC 31, at paragraph 5.16. 
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for the execution of search warrants (including, for example, An Garda Síochána, the 
Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement and the Office of the Revenue 
Commissioners) have their own practice and procedural guidelines in place with regard to 
searches and seizures.  However, there is no generally applicable code of practice or set 
of guidelines in place in Ireland.  The Commission provisionally recommended that a 
standard code be introduced.103  Thus all search warrants, regardless of which body is 
carrying out the investigation and executing the warrant, would fall within the scope of the 
code. 
6.59 The Commission remains of the view that a general code of practice would be of 
assistance to both executing authorities and owners or occupiers of property which is the 
subject of a warrant.  As discussed in the Consultation Paper, such a code of practice 
could outline: (i) the best practice approaches to be followed by officers executing a 
search and seizure; (ii) the respective rights and duties of all parties involved in the 
process; and (iii) the safeguards applicable to this process.104  The existence of such a 
code may provide executing authorities with greater certainty as regards the scope of their 
powers and the prescribed limits.  It may also enable occupiers and owners to discern 
whether a search and seizure was conducted in a legitimate manner.   
(1) Jurisdictional comparison    
6.60 The Commission notes that a number of common law countries have developed standard 
codes of practice in respect of search and seizure.  In England and Wales, for example, 
specific codes of practice have been developed to supplement the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984.  Under the 1984 Act, Code B is concerned with searches of premises 
by police officers and the seizure of property found by police officers on persons or 
premises.105   
6.61 In general terms, Code B emphasises the central importance of the right to privacy and 
the principle of respect for personal property.  Acknowledging that powers of entry, search 
and seizure may significantly interfere with an occupier’s privacy, the Code stipulates that 
recourse to these powers must be fully and clearly justified and that officers should 
consider whether the necessary objectives can be achieved by less intrusive means.  The 
need for the police to exercise their powers courteously and with respect for persons and 
property is recognised.  The Code also stipulates that when exercising these powers, the 
police may only employ reasonable force where this is considered necessary and 
proportionate to the circumstances.   
6.62 Code B also provides more specific procedural guidance on issues such as: (i) the making 
of a search warrant application; (ii) general considerations relating to the execution of a 
search; (iii) the seizure and retention of materials; (iv) the rights of property owners or 
occupiers; and (v) the procedures to be followed after the search has been completed.    
6.63 A similar code of practice can be found in Scotland, the Code of Practice Issued under 
Section 410 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.106  Although the Code is not exclusively 
concerned with search warrants, it contains specific provisions concerning search 
warrants as well as general provisions relating to all other investigative orders made under 
the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.  Although the Code is only applicable to warrants issued 
under the 2002 Act, it can nonetheless be regarded as providing guidance on the proper 
conduct of searches and seizures.   
                                               
103
  Ibid at paragraph 5.125. 
104
  Ibid at paragraphs 5.123 – 5.124. 
105
  Code B:  Code of Practice for Searches of Premises by Police Officers and the Seizure of Property found by 
Police Officers on Persons or Premises.  All Codes under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 are 
available at www.homeoffice.gov.uk.   
106
  Available at www.scotland.gov.uk. 
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6.64 As with Code B in England and Wales, the general provisions of the Code of Practice 
Issued under Section 410 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 acknowledge firstly that the 
execution of investigative orders may interfere significantly with the privacy of those 
whose premises are searched.107  Accordingly, the Code stipulates that these powers 
“need to be clearly justified before they are used.”108  Secondly, it outlines that in all cases 
investigative orders should be executed courteously and with respect for the persons and 
property concerned.109  Thirdly, it details that where it appears that the recipient of an 
order has a genuine difficulty in reading or understanding it, the officer shall “where 
necessary and practical identify someone who can act as an interpreter.”110  
6.65 In relation to search warrants more specifically, the Scottish Code features a number of 
key provisions.  Examples include: (i) a requirement for officers to initially attempt to 
communicate with the persons concerned, so as to request access rather than entering 
the premises forcefully (this is subject to exceptions, such as where it is known that the 
occupier is absent, or where it is believed that alerting a person may frustrate the search); 
(ii) a requirement for officers to show an official form of identification upon entry; (iii) a 
stipulation that a search may only be carried out to the extent which is necessary; (iv) a 
stipulation that if a premises has been entered by force, officers must ensure that it is 
secure before leaving; and (iv) a requirement that details of the execution of the search 
should be recorded.111  
(2) Nature and Effect of Search Warrants Code of Practice 
6.66 It is not proposed that the code of practice should replace those that already exist within 
specific organisations which would have the effect of subjecting such organisations to 
multiple codes of practice.  Rather, the proposed code of practice should supplement the 
pre-existing codes of practice that relate to specific organisations.   
6.67 The Commission considers that the proposed Search Warrants Act should provide for a 
code of practice which should not be legislative in nature. The Commission considers that 
such a code may be more effective if it can be developed and amended with relative ease.  
The code of practice should be a functional and relevant working document. It should 
contain practical guidance concerning the main elements of the Search Warrants Act and 
in particular the procedural steps involved in the process.  To this end the code should 
relate to both the officers involved and the owners or occupiers of the property which is 
subject to a search warrant, setting out their respective rights and duties.  Additionally, the 
Commission is of the view that the code should employ plain and simple language so that 
it is readily comprehensible to all persons.  In line with this rationale, the code should also 
be easily accessible to all persons, including that it would be available on the internet.   
6.68 The Commission considers that failure to comply with the terms of the code of practice 
should not of itself affect the admissibility of evidence. Whether a breach would be 
considered a relevant factor in any case (such as where it is claimed that there has been 
misconduct, or a failure to follow proper procedures) would remain a matter for the 
application of the general rules on the admissibility of evidence, which have been 
discussed above in this Chapter. 
  
                                               
107
  Code of Practice Issued under Section 410 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 at paragraph 6. 
108
  Ibid. 
109
  Ibid.   
110
  Ibid at paragraph 7. 
111
  Ibid at paragraphs 16-18, 21 and 23. 
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(3) Indicative Content of Search Warrants Code of Practice  
6.69 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission identified a number of elements which it would 
be appropriate to include in a search warrants code of practice.112 Having considered this 
matter in the preparation of this Report, the Commission considers that among the 
matters that could be included are the following:   
i) What are to be considered as “reasonable time or times” for executing the search 
warrant.113 
ii) The need to ensure that the search is conducted as efficiently as is practicable, 
including in connection with any breaks during the search. 
iii) Upon arrival at the premises to be searched, the executing officer should make the 
search team’s arrival known to the owner or occupier and request access to the 
premises.  Officers need not comply with this requirement, however, if it is reasonably 
believed that informing the owner or occupier may frustrate the purpose of the search 
(for example, by creating a risk that evidence may be destroyed).   
iv) If it is necessary to use force to gain access to the premises, such force must be 
reasonable and must not go beyond what is necessary.   
v) On gaining access, the executing officer should identify himself or herself to the owner 
or occupier as the officer in charge of the execution of the search warrant.   
vi) The executing officer and all accompanying officers and persons should enter the 
premises in a respectful and courteous manner.   
vii) Respect and care should be shown for the premises and property at all times during 
the search.   
viii) Persons present during the search should be treated with respect and courtesy at all 
times.  Officers should be sensitive to the fact that the experience may be upsetting for 
the owner or occupier of the premises.     
ix) Premises should only be searched to the extent necessary and permitted by the 
warrant. 
x) Unnecessary damage to the premises or property contained within it should be 
avoided.   
xi) Where the premises being searched are commercial premises, officers should cause 
the least possible disruption to the organisation and running of the business.    
xii) Any items that are seized should be carefully packaged, clearly labelled, and securely 
stored. 
xiii) An inventory should be made of all items seized.  A copy of this should be given to the 
owner or occupier upon completion of the search, or as soon as practicable 
afterwards.  This requirement need not be complied with if the executing officer 
reasonably believes that giving a copy of an inventory to the owner or occupier might 
frustrate or threaten the current investigation or any other investigation.    
xiv) Material that may be claimed to be subject to privilege (such as legal privilege or 
litigation privilege) should not be examined during the execution.  Where an 
assessment as to the privileged status of the material is required, or it is necessary to 
seize privileged material as it is mixed with other non-privileged material, proper 
procedure regarding the seizure of legal professional privilege should be complied 
with at all times.  
                                               
112
  Ibid at paragraph 5.124. 
113
  See paragraph 5.26, above. 
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xv) On leaving the premises, the executing officer should ensure that it is secure.   
xvi) Seized items should be returned to the owner or occupier as soon as possible, unless 
there is lawful reason for withholding them from the person. 
6.70 The Commission recommends that the Search Warrants Act should provide for a 
code of practice which should contain practical guidance concerning the main 
elements of the Search Warrants Act, including the procedural steps involved in the 
process; that the code of practice should be written in plain, intelligible language; 
and that it should be easily accessible to all persons, including that it should be 
made available on the internet. The Commission also recommends that breach of 
the code of practice should not of itself render any evidence obtained under a 




CHAPTER 7 BENCH WARRANTS, COMMITTAL WARRANTS FOR UNPAID FINES 
AND RELATED PROCEDURE 
A Bench Warrants and Committal Warrants for Unpaid Court Fines 
(1) Bench warrants 
7.01 A bench warrant is a written command, handed down by a judge, ordering the arrest of an 
individual.1   In Callaghan v Governor of Mountjoy Prison,2 the High Court described it as 
“a mechanism for bringing a person to Court who is in breach of his obligation to be in 
court.” The power to issue a bench warrant is an inherent power of the courts, where 
suitable circumstances exist.3    
7.02 The statutory provisions in respect of bench warrants are set out in primary legislation and 
in the District Court Rules 1997.  The circumstances in which a bench warrant may be 
issued include:  
(a) failure of a witness to appear in Court in response to summons: section 13 of the 
Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act 1851 and Order 21, Rule 1(5) of the 1997 Rules;   
(b) a witness is evading service of a summons to appear in court to give evidence: 
section 13 of the Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act 1851 and Order 21, Rule 1(5) of the 
1997 Rules;  
(c) a witness is unlikely to appear or is refusing to appear in court to give evidence: 
section 13 of the Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act 1851 and Order 21, Rule 1(6) of the 
1997 Rules;  
(d) failure of an accused to appear in court in response to a summons: section 11 of the 
Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act 1851 and Order 22, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules;  
(e) an accused is evading service of summons to appear in court or is about to abscond 
or has absconded: section 11 of the Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act 1851 and Order 22, 
Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules;  
(f) failure of an accused to appear on an adjourned date where he or she has been 
serviced with notice after failing to appear on summoned date: section 22(5) of the 
Courts Act 1991;4  
(g) failure by a person charged with an offence and released on bail by a member of An 
Garda Síochána to appear before court as specified in the recognisance: Order 22, 
Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules; and  
(h) failure to appear by a person who has appeared before a court in connection with an 
offence and who has been remanded and admitted to bail to appear before a 
subsequent sitting of a court: Order 22, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules.        
7.03 The bench warrant forms corresponding to these provisions are also contained in the 
District Court Rules 1997.5  In its 2010 Report on Consolidation and Reform of the Courts 
                                               
1
  Consultation Paper on Search Warrants and Bench Warrants (LRC CP 58-2009) at paragraphs 7.02. Although 
a bench warrant is a command to arrest an individual, a bench warrant is separate to and distinct of an arrest 
warrant. The procedure for arrest warrants is set out in Order 16 of the District Court Rules 1997.  
2
  [2007] IEHC 294.  
3
  See, for example, The State (Attorney General) v Roe [1951] IR 172; The State (Attorney General) v Fawsitt 
[1955] IR 39; Stephens v Governor of Castlerea Prison High Court 20 September 2002.    
4
  Section 22(5) of the Courts Act 1991, as amended by section 36 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2010. 
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Acts,6 the Commission recommended that the statutory provisions concerning the role and 
essential jurisdiction of the courts, which are currently contained in 240 separate Acts, 
should be set out in a single Act.7  Appendix A to the 2010 Report sets out a draft Courts 
(Consolidation and Reform) Bill which contains provisions in respect of summary criminal 
procedure.8  Part 2, Chapter 13 of the draft Bill deals with court instruments and 
consolidates the provisions relating to the issue and execution of warrants, unexecuted 
warrants and protection of persons executing warrants.9 
7.04 Where a person fails to appear the court may issue a bench warrant for their arrest, 
despite their absence, where it appears that the summons was duly served.10  
Alternatively, the court has the power to proceed in the absence of the accused where he 
or she is not present and is not represented to answer the complaint where, in the case of 
a summons, it appears that the summons was duly served.11  The Court, therefore, has 
discretion as to whether to issue a bench warrant or proceed in the absence of the 
accused.  The jurisdiction of the Court to issue a bench warrant instead of proceeding in 
the absence of the accused if it is not known for certain that the person received a 
summons is an important safeguard.12  It avoids a person who may not have had notice of 
the proceedings being convicted and sentenced to imprisonment in their absence. 
7.05 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission noted that 26,474 bench warrants were issued 
in Ireland in 2008.13  The Commission also noted that, at any given time, there are 
between 20,000 to 30,000 unexecuted bench warrants.14  An answer to a parliamentary 
question in December 2007 indicated that 36,000 bench warrants remained unexecuted at 
that time.15  In December 2008, the Dáil was informed that there were 36,972 outstanding 
bench warrants.16  In April 2009, figures provided in Dáil debates indicated that there were 
30,000 unexecuted bench warrants.17  In July 2012, the Dáil was informed that there were 
31,134 unexecuted bench warrants.18  The Garda Inspectorate Report on Crime 
Investigation provides figures for the number of warrants recorded on the PULSE system 
                                                                                                                                                       
5
  For further discussion relating to the provisions and forms see Consultation Paper on Search Warrants and 
Bench Warrants (LRC CP 58-2009) at paragraphs 7.12-7.22.     
6
  Report on Consolidation and Reform of the Courts Acts (LRC 97–2010) at paragraph 1.09. 
7
  Ibid at paragraph 1.09. 
8
  Ibid at pp.189–197. 
9
  These provisions are based on the legislation referred to above.   
10
  See Order 23, Rule 2 of the District Court Rules 1997.  
11
  Order 23, Rule 2 of the District Court Rules 1997.  For case law on the authority of the court to proceed in the 
absence of the accused see Rock v Governor of St. Patrick’s Institution Supreme Court 22 March 1993 and 
Callaghan v Governor of Mountjoy Prison [2007] IEHC 294. 
12
  See Brennan v Windle [2003] 3 IR 494. 
13
  Consultation Paper on Search Warrants and Bench Warrants (LRC CP 58-2009) at paragraph 7.04.   
14
  Ibid at paragraph 7.88. 
15
  Dáil Éireann Debates, Vol. 643, No.15, 8 December 2008. 
16
  Dáil Éireann Debates, Vol. 671, No.2, 18 December 2008. 
17
  Dáil Éireann Debates, Vol. 681, No.2, 29 April 2009. 
18
  Dáil Éireann Debates, Vol. 773, No.1, 17 July 2012.   
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(Police Using Leading Systems Effectively) as of 1 January for the years 2012 to 2014.  
31,645 were outstanding in 2012, 30,895 in 2013 and 31,166 in 2014.19 
7.06 The Commission is aware that efforts are being made to reduce the number of 
unexecuted bench warrants.  In July 2012 the Dáil was informed that an Inspector of An 
Garda Síochána in each Garda Division is responsible for managing the execution of 
warrants and that a working group was in operation to “identify, address and prevent 
difficulties in the warrant process.”20  The Commission has also been advised that certain 
sittings of the District Court are devoted to cancelling unexecuted bench warrants that are 
impossible to execute or unlikely to be executed.  For example, if a person in respect of 
whom the bench warrant was issued has died or if the warrant is very old and relates to a 
minor offence, the District Court may cancel the warrant.  This assists in reducing the 
figures for unexecuted bench warrants.   
7.07 The 2014 Report of the Garda Síochána Inspectorate on Crime Investigation notes that 
between 1 January 2012 and 1 January 2014, there was a 2% reduction in the number of 
outstanding warrants. 21  However, there were still 31,166 unexecuted bench warrants on 
1 January 2014.22  Although continuing efforts are being made to improve the area of law 
concerning bench warrants, the Commission remains of the view taken in the Consultation 
Paper that the current number of unexecuted bench warrants is unsatisfactory.   
7.08 It has been repeatedly noted that “the figure for outstanding warrants recorded by PULSE 
at any given time reflects an accumulation of old warrants which has arisen over the 
years.”23  For example, figures supplied in the Crime Investigation Report shows that 89% 
of the bench warrants executed in 2013 were new warrants issued in that year.24  As 
noted in the Report of the Garda Síochána on Crime Investigation, “[w]arrants are issued 
on a daily basis and to be successful in reducing overall numbers, a concerted effort is 
required by a police service to execute more warrants than are being issued by courts.”25  
Following an examination of several cases of such historical warrants, the report of the 
Garda Inspectorate concludes that “very little action has been taken to execute these 
warrants.”26  It may no longer be possible to prove many crimes to which the warrants 
relate.  It recommends that “the Garda Síochána conducts a review of historical warrants 
to establish if the original case is still capable of proof27“ and that a standard policy should 
be developed on when a warrant can be cancelled.   
7.09 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission discussed a number of factors which 
contribute to the large number of issued and unexecuted bench warrants, including:  
 delay and failure to execute bench warrants; 
 inefficient use of the Garda PULSE system; 
                                               
19
  Garda Inspectorate Report on Crime Investigation (2014), part 10 at 19.  This figure reflects the number of 
warrants “on hand”, which is the number of warrants on PULSE awaiting action. 
20
  Dáil Éireann Debates, Vol. 773, No. 1, 17 July 2012. 
21
  Garda Inspectorate Report on Crime Investigation (2014), part 10 at 19.  This figure reflects the number of 
warrants “on hand”, which is the number of warrants on PULSE awaiting action. 
22
  Ibid. 
23
  Dáil Éireann Debates, Vol. 773, No. 1, 17 July 2012; Vol. 784, No. 3, 28 November 2012; Vol. 792, No. 1, 12 
February 2013.   
24
  Garda Inspectorate Report on Crime Investigation (2014), Part 10 at 20. 
25
  Ibid at 23. 
26
  Ibid. 
27
  Ibid. 
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 difficulties in the summons serving process; 
 inability of persons to understand the requirement to appear in court; and 
 management and processing issues, such as difficulties accessing records on the 
Courts Service Case tracking System to identify a person to whom a bench warrant 
relates. 
7.10 The 2014 Report of the Garda Síochána Inspectorate on Crime Investigation28 reviews the 
entire crime investigation process used by An Garda Síochána.  This includes an 
examination of the system of managing and executing warrants, including bench warrants 
and penal warrants (discussed later).  The Report makes short term, medium term and 
long term recommendations, which are mainly of an operational nature, and recommends 
the establishment of an overarching criminal justice service group to oversee the 
implementation of the recommendations.29  It also recommends the introduction of a 
Standard Operating Procedure for the management of warrants and the convening of a 
multi-agency working group to examine and consider changes to the processing of 
warrants.30  The Commission understands that the legislature intends to take steps to 
implement the recommendations of the Garda Síochána Inspectorate.31  This should 
alleviate much of the operational difficulty relating to the management and processing of 
warrants. In the wake of the 2014 Report, a Working Group has been established to 
implement its recommendations, including those concerning bench warrants. For this 
reason, the Commission, which supports those recommendations, considers that it is not 
necessary to make any further recommendations on this matter. 
7.11 The Commission supports the comprehensive recommendations made in 
connection with bench warrants in the 2014 Report of the Garda Síochána 
Inspectorate on Crime Investigation, and accordingly considers that it is not 
necessary to make any further recommendations on this matter.  
(2) Committal Warrants for Unpaid Court Fines 
7.12 A committal warrant is the mechanism used to imprison a person who has been 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment (including a default period of imprisonment) or 
remanded in custody.32  There are a variety of circumstances in which a committal warrant 
may issue, for example, where: 
i) a court imposes a fine on a person which he or she does not pay by the due 
date (often referred to as “penal” warrants);33    
ii) a person is convicted of an offence and the sentence requires the person to 
carry out certain conditions within a timeframe and those conditions are not 
met;34   
iii) a court conditionally suspends a sentence of imprisonment and is satisfied upon 
application being made by the prosecutor that the accused has failed to comply 
with the conditions;35   
                                               
28
  Garda Inspectorate Report on Crime Investigation (2014). 
29
  Ibid, part 10 at 15 - 29. 
30
  Garda Inspectorate Report on Crime Investigation (2014), part 10 at 29. 
31
  Dáil Éireann Debates, 18 November 2014. 
32
  Section 32(7) of the Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act 1851. 
33
  Order 25, Rule 2(a) of the District Court Rules 1997 (SI No.93 of 1997).  The corresponding form is Form 25.5 
or Form 25.6, Schedule B.  
34
  Order 25, Rule 2(b) of the District Court Rules 1997.  The corresponding form is Form 25.7, Schedule B. 
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iv) a person is in contempt of court;36 and  
v) a person, who has been found not guilty by reason of insanity, is committed to a 
designated centre.37  
7.13 Order 26, Rule 9 of the District Court Rules 1997 provides that, where a committal warrant 
is issued, the officer or member of the Gardaí or other person whose duty it is to convey a 
person to prison must deliver the warrant to the governor of the prison specified on the 
warrant.38  If the person is already in the custody of the relevant prison governor, the 
warrant must be delivered or transmitted by post.  The governor must provide a receipt for 
the warrant and detain the person who is the subject of the warrant for the period set out 
in the warrant.39 
7.14 The Commission has received feedback highlighting the large number of committal 
warrants issued for failure to pay fines which have been imposed by courts by the due 
date.  The Irish Prison Services Annual Report 2013 notes that over half of committals to 
prison in 2013 were for unpaid court fines.40  At any given time, a large number of 
committal warrants remain unexecuted.  On 17 July 2012, the Dáil heard that out of a total 
of 124,209 unexecuted warrants, 89,583 were penal warrants (committal warrants issued 
for non-payment of court fines).41  The 2014 Report of the Garda Síochána Inspectorate 
on Crime Investigation42 provides figures for unexecuted penal warrants as of 1 January 
2015 for the years 2012, 2013 and 2014.  89,259 penal warrants awaited action in 2012, 
88,702 in 2013 and 88,613 in 2014.43  Like the figures for unexecuted bench warrants, the 
figure for unexecuted committal warrants reflects an accumulation of warrants over the 
years. 
7.15 Imprisonment for non-payment of fines raises a number of concerns.  A Dáil Sub-
Committee Report on Crime and Punishment described such concerns as follows:44 
 the original offences did not merit imprisonment; 
 the sanction impacts severely on persons without means; 
                                                                                                                                                       
35
  Order 25, Rule 3 of the District Court Rules 1997.  The corresponding form is Form 25.8, Schedule B. 
36
  Section 9 of the Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act 1851, section 6 of the Summary Jurisdiction (Ireland) 
Amendment) Act 1871, Order 25, Rule 5 of the District Court Rules 1997.  The form prescribed for such a 
committal warrant is Form 25.9, Schedule B. 
37
  Section 4(3)(b) of the Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 2006 and Order 23A of the District Court Rules 1997, as 
inserted by the District Court (Insanity) Rules 2007 (SI No.727 of 2007). 
38
  Order 26, Rule 9 of the District Court Rules 1997. 
39
  Ibid. 
40
  See Irish Prison Service Annual Report 2013 at 18 and 26. 
41
  Dáil Éireann Debates, Vol. 773, No. 1, 17 July 2012.  
42
  Garda Inspectorate Report on Crime Investigation (2014). 
43
  Garda Inspectorate Report on Crime Investigation (2014), Part 10 at 19.  This figure reflects the number of 
warrants “on hand”, which is the number of warrants on PULSE awaiting action. 
44
  Report of the Sub-Committee on Crime and Punishment of the Joint Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence 
and Women’s Rights on Alternatives to Fines and the Uses of Prison (March 2000) at 3, cited in Nexus 
Research Co-Operative Report to the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform on Imprisonment for 
Fine Default and Civil Debt (2002) at 10.  See also Joint Committee on Justice, Defence and Equality Report 
on Penal Reform (2013) and Department of Justice and Equality Working Group on Penal Policy Strategic 
Review of Penal Policy (2014) at 23, where the Review Group expresses concern at the high level of 
committals, given the cost and lack of proof that it is an effective means of aiding desistance from crime. 
 160 
 the imprisonment of large numbers of fine defaulters, albeit for short periods, 
exacerbates an already chronic overcrowding at the committal prisons, especially 
Mountjoy Prison; 
 the fines remains uncollected; 
 there are considerable costs associated with incarceration. 
7.16 The high number of persons committed to prison for non-payment of fines has been 
noted.  In 2014, there were 8,965 committals for failure to pay fines.45  The committal of 
persons to prison for failure to pay court fines is inefficient and costly.  The Garda 
Síochána Inspectorate 2014 Report on Crime Investigation provides case studies which 
“show a small fraction of the daily waste of resources across the criminal justice system, 
including Garda time and money in dealing with offenders who do not pay their fines”46 
and gives examples of cases where the cost of executing warrants greatly outweighed the 
value of the original fines.47 
7.17 A Working Group on Penal Policy that was established by the Department of Justice and 
Equality to carry out a strategic review of penal policy notes that persons who default on 
payment of court fines do not spend a significant amount of time in prison.48  However, it 
notes that the processing of such persons “is an unnecessary burden on the 
administration of prisons and undermines the credibility of the criminal justice system.”49  
The Group was more concerned with “the practice of applying, by default, the most severe 
of sanctions – imprisonment – for what otherwise might be generally regarded as a 
relatively minor offence”50 and recommends the early and full implementation of the Fines 
(Payment and Recovery) Act 2014.51 
7.18 The  Fines Act 2010 and Fines (Payment and Recovery) Act 2014 should, when 
commenced, assist in reducing the number of committal warrants issued for non-payment 
of court fines.  Under the Fines Act 2010, a court must take into account the financial 
circumstances of a person before imposing a fine “to ensure as far as practicable that, 
where a court imposes a fine on a person, the effect of the fine on that person or his or 
her dependants is not significantly abated or made more severe by reason of his or her 
financial circumstances.”52  The Fines (Payment and Recovery) Act 2014 contains a 
similar provision regarding the obligation of the court to take into account the capacity of a 
person to pay a fine.  Part 3 of the 2010 Act provides for alternative options for payment 
and enforcement of court fines, including payment by instalments53 and appointment of a 
                                               
45
  Dáil Éireann Debates, Vol. 870, No. 4, 6 March 2015. 
46
  Garda Inspectorate Report on Crime Investigation (2014), part 10 at 27. 
47
  Ibid. 
48
  The Department of Justice and Equality Working Group on Penal Policy Strategic Review of Penal Policy 
(2014) notes at 23 that although the enactment of the Fines (Payment and Recovery) Act 2014 should 
“remove an unnecessary administrative burden in reducing committals to prison, it will not have a significant 
impact on the daily prison numbers of persons in prison on any given day for the non-payment of a fine is low.”  
For example, according to the Irish Prison Service Annual Report 2013 at 18, only 8 of the 4,099 persons in 
custody on 30 November 2013 were committed for non-payment of fines. 
49
  Department of Justice and Equality Working Group on Penal Policy Strategic Review of Penal Policy (July 
2014) at 46. 
50
  Ibid. 
51
  Ibid. 
52
  Section 14 of the Fines Act 2010. 
53
  Section 15 of the Fines Act 2010. 
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receiver or community service in default of payment of a fine.54  However, these provisions 
in the 2010 Act have not commenced and are due to be replaced by provisions of the 
Fines (Payment and Recovery) Act 2014.   
7.19 The 2014 Act provides for the payment of fines by instalments.55  It provides that when a 
person fails to pay a fine by the due date, the court must either make a recovery order (if 
the fine exceeds €500), an attachment order or a community service order.56  A notice in 
writing must be served on the person who has been fined requiring him or her to appear 
before the court on a specified date and time and provide the court with a statement in 
writing of his or her financial circumstances.57  If a person fails to appear in court in 
response to such a notice, the court may either issue a warrant for the arrest of the person 
or if the court considers it appropriate, cause a further notice of writing specifying a new 
court date and time to be served on the person.58  The Court must first, after considering 
the financial statement, consider making an attachment order.  If the court is of the view 
that an attachment order would be inappropriate, it must consider making a recovery order 
or community service order.59  It is only after forming the view that an attachment order, 
recovery order or community service order would be inappropriate that the court may 
make an order committing the person to prison.60  The 2014 Act provides for the deduction 
of the amount of the fine from the pay of a person who is employed.61  The provision for 
attachment orders, community service and recovery orders when a person defaults on a 
court imposed fine should result in the issuing of fewer committal warrants as a court will 
be able to consider these options prior to committing a person to prison.   
7.20 However, it has been suggested to the Commission that, as the majority of issued, 
cancelled and re-issued warrants relate to offences under the Road Traffic Acts, other 
options that would specifically address non-payment of fines in respect of such offences 
ought to be considered.   
7.21 Feedback also suggests that the alternative means of paying and enforcing court fines 
provided for in the Fines (Payment and Recovery) Act 2014 may not fully alleviate 
difficulties associated with persons who repeatedly and purposefully default in payment of 
fines.  Such “strategic” defaulters, it has been suggested, may have the means to pay 
court fines but may refuse to do so and may not be deterred by the possibility of being 
committed to prison.   
B Road Traffic Offences and Warrants 
7.22 As noted above, the majority of cases that come before the District Court are prosecutions 
for cases under the Road Traffic Acts.  The Courts Service Annual Report 2012 indicates 
that, in 2012, almost 60% of summary matters before the District Court related to road 
traffic offences.62   
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7.23 A large proportion of these prosecutions relate to offences that can be dealt with under the 
Fixed Charge Notice system.  This system was introduced to allow for the processing of 
road traffic offences which are sanctioned by fixed charges and penalty points.  A 
significant advantage of this procedure is that fixed charge offences can be dealt with 
without recourse to the courts system.  This reduces the number of such cases before the 
courts. 
7.24 The 2012 Courts Service Annual Report provides a breakdown of the orders made in the 
District Court in respect of specific road traffic offences.  This shows that in respect of the 
147,371 defendants who had orders made against them for road traffic offences, 58,416 
were prosecuted for penalty point offences, most of which would have originated by fixed 
charge notice.63  An answer to a Parliamentary Question from April 2014 indicated that, in 
2013, 47,967 people were summoned to court following failure to pay a fixed charge 
notice within 56 days of receiving the notice.64  This results in the imposition of court fines 
in many of these cases.  In 2012, 19,060 out of the 48,050 fines that were imposed for 
road traffic offences were for penalty point offences.65 
7.25 Consequently, a large number of persons who are imprisoned on foot of committal 
warrants for failure to pay fines have been convicted of road traffic offences.  On 17 July 
2012 the Dáil heard that the majority of unexecuted warrants are penal warrants 
(committal warrants issued for non-payment of fines) issued for non-payment of court 
fines, 93% of which related to road traffic, public order and theft offences.66  The 
unsuitability of imprisonment for such offenders has long been recognised.  In that regard, 
the Commission has examined areas that could be reformed with a view to reducing the 
number of committal warrants issued for non-payment of fines in relation to road traffic 
offences. 
(1) Payment of Fixed Charge Notice upon receipt of summons 
7.26 Section 44 of the Road Traffic Act 2010, which has not been commenced at the time of 
writing, provides for the payment of a fixed charge upon service of a summons.  It 
provides that a person may pay a fixed charge of an amount stated on the notice served 
with the summons in a specified manner no later than 7 days before the date that the 
charge is listed for hearing in court.  If the person pays the fixed charge in the manner 
specified within the timeframe, the proceedings will be discontinued and the person will 
not be required to attend court on the specified date.  Such a fixed charge notice may be 
served by the Courts Service.67  Section 44(3) provides that the amount of the new fixed 
charge notice should be 100% greater than the original fixed charge notice that was 
served on the person.   Evidence by the person to whom the new fixed charge notice is 
addressed that he or she was not served with the fixed charge notice is not a defence to 
the alleged offence.68 
7.27 The 2014 Report of the Garda Síochána Inspectorate on the Fixed Charge Processing 
System reviews the system and identifies technical and administrative issues that it 
considers need to be resolved.69  The report recommends the commencement of section 
44 of the 2010 Act.  It notes that many people attempt to pay the fixed charge notice upon 
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receipt of the summons but the present system does not permit them to do so.70  The 
Criminal Justice (Fixed Charge Processing System) Working Group has been established 
to oversee the implementation of the recommendations contained in the report of the 
Garda Síochána Inspectorate.71  Legislation providing for payment of the fixed charge 
notice on receipt of the summons would allow such cases to be disposed of at an earlier 
stage without having to bring such matters to the court.  If such matters could be dealt 
with before reaching the court system, courts would not need to impose fines in such 
cases and this would reduce the numbers of committal warrants issued for failure to pay 
court imposed fines.  The Commission is of the view that, given the high number of cases 
that come before the District Court are prosecutions for road traffic offences that originate 
by way of fixed charge notice, the commencement of section 44 of the Road Traffic Act 
2010 would greatly assist in reducing the number of bench warrants and committal 
warrants issued for such offences.  Such a reform would also result in a considerable 
reduction of court lists in the District Court, making case management more efficient.72 
7.28 The Commission notes that the introduction of such a system depends on the appropriate 
ICT infrastructure being put in place. 
7.29 The Commission recommends that section 44 of the Road Traffic Act 2010, which 
provides for payment of a fixed charge notice upon receipt of a summons, should 
be commenced. 
(2) Postal response to summons 
7.30 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission invited submissions as to whether a system of 
postal response to summonses should be introduced in respect of minor offences with a 
view to enabling District Courts to deal with cases in a quick and efficient manner and 
assist in reducing the number of bench warrants issued.73  A postal response system 
would permit summary only offences to be dealt with without the need for a defendant 
who wishes to plead guilty to appear in court.  The Consultation Paper noted that such a 
system could help to reduce the need to issue a bench warrant where a person has failed 
to appear for a hearing in respect of a minor offence.74 
(a) Postal response procedure in Britain 
7.31 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission observed that a postal procedure is in place in 
England and Wales under section 12 of the Magistrates Courts Act 1980, enabling 
persons summoned to appear before a Magistrates Court on a summary matter to 
respond by post where the conditions of the section are satisfied.75  Where a summons 
(relating to a summary matter) is issued and sent to a person, it is to be accompanied by:  
(1) a notice explaining the effect of section 12;  
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(2) a statement of the facts which will be put before the court at the hearing in 
respect of the offence, if the accused pleads guilty without appearing,76or a copy 
of written statement(s) complying with subsections (2)(a) and (b) and (3) of 
section 9 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 if such have been submitted to the 
court;77 and 
(3) if any information relating to the accused will or may be put before the court or on 
behalf of the prosecutor, a notice or description of that information.78  
7.32 On receiving these documents, the accused, or a legal representative acting on his or her 
behalf, may inform the court in writing that he or she wishes to plead guilty to the charge 
without appearing before the court.79  The court brings this notification to the attention of 
the prosecutor.80  At the time and place appointed for the hearing, the court may proceed 
to hear and dispose of the case in the absence of the accused (whether or not the 
prosecutor is also absent) as if both parties had appeared and the accused had pleaded 
guilty.81  Before the court accepts the guilty plea and convicts the accused in his or her 
absence, the statement of facts and/or (unless otherwise directed by the court) the written 
statement, which has been sent to the accused with the summons, is read out by the 
clerk, as well as the notification of the guilty plea sent by the accused.82  The accused 
may also make a submission to the court on a matter which may be considered as a 
mitigating factor.  This submission is also read out by the clerk prior to conviction.83  
7.33 Where the court proceeds in the absence of the accused, having received notification of a 
guilty plea, the prosecution is not permitted to: (i) offer any further facts relating to the 
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offence charged; or (ii) give any other information relating to the accused.84  Thus, there 
can be no change made to the information which the accused has been notified of and 
has chosen to plead guilty to.  However, the court has a residual discretion to decide 
whether the case is suitable to be dealt with in the absence of the accused.85  Where a 
court decides not to proceed, the matter can be adjourned and any such adjourned 
hearing will proceed as though the accused had not pleaded guilty by postal notification.86  
The accused, or somebody acting on his or her behalf, can, at any time before the date of 
the hearing, inform the court in writing that he or she wishes to withdraw his or her guilty 
plea.87  The court will inform the prosecutor of this withdrawal and proceed as though the 
guilty plea was never received.88  
(b) Trial by single justice on the papers in England and Wales  
7.34 The Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 introduces a new single justice procedure by 
the insertion of sections 16A to 16E in the Magistrates Courts Act 1980.  The 
implementation of such a procedure means that summary only offences that are not 
punishable by imprisonment, such as television licence evasion and speeding, can be 
dealt with by a single magistrate (rather than three) and there will be no obligation for the 
case to be heard in open court.89  Initiation will be by way of a single justice notice by the 
prosecutor.   
7.35 Under the single justice notice procedure a summary only offence, which is not punishable 
by imprisonment, can be dealt with by a single magistrate where an adult accused has 
been served with a written charge, single justice procedure notice and any other 
documents prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Rules.90  The accused must not have 
sent a written notification stating a desire to plead not guilty or not to be tried in 
accordance with the procedure.91  The court will be empowered to try the charge by 
relying only on the written charge, single justice procedure notice, any documents 
prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Rules and any written submission that the accused 
makes with a view to mitigating the sentence.92  The court may not try or continue to try 
the charge under the procedure where it decides that it is inappropriate to convict an 
accused in that manner or where the accused gives written notice that he or she does not 
wish to be tried under the procedure.93  In these circumstances, the court must adjourn the 
trial and issue a summons.  The explanatory memorandum notes that under the single 
justice notice procedure, “the case [may] be dealt with in the absence of the parties and 
with no obligation to sit in open court, providing greater flexibility as to the date and time 
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when the cases can be heard.”94  The 2015 Act amended the Magistrates Courts Act 1980 
so that section 12, discussed above, which provides for a postal response to summonses, 
does not apply when the single justice procedure is being used.95  It will be possible to use 
the procedure for summary only offences which do not carry a custodial sentence, such 
as speeding and television licence evasion. 96    
(3) Discussion  
7.36 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission invited submissions as to whether a postal 
response system should be implemented in Ireland.  The Commission discussed the 
benefits of such a system.97  It would allow the District Court to deal with minor offences in 
an efficient manner.  It would reduce the number of people attending at a District Court, 
thereby making the organisation of the relevant courtrooms more manageable.  Regarding 
bench warrants, a postal response system would assist in reducing the number of bench 
warrants issued for cases of non-appearance in respect of summary offences.  In some 
cases, failure to appear is not the result of wilful refusal, but rather because in the 
circumstances it is not possible for the person to attend.  This could be as a result of a 
number of things, including family or work commitments, the unavailability of transport, or 
because the particular District Court is quite a distance from where the person lives.  In 
such cases a postal response system would enable the person to inform the court that he 
or she has: (i) received the summons; (ii) is willing to plead guilty to the charge; and (iii) is 
unable to attend at the hearing, but is satisfied for the court to continue in his or her 
absence.  This in turn would have the effect of informing the court that the summons has 
been received and that it should proceed with the matter rather than issue a bench 
warrant to secure the attendance of the person.   
7.37 During the consultation period the Commission received positive responses to the 
suggestion that a postal response system should be implemented.98  It was generally 
agreed that the approach would be useful and efficient, and would help to reduce the 
number of bench warrants issued.  Furthermore, such a system would not be onerous or 
costly to implement.  The Commission therefore recommends that a postal response 
system to summonses, in respect of summary matters, should be implemented in Ireland.   
7.38 The Commission recommends that legislation should provide for a postal response 
system to summonses in respect of summary only offences. 
(4) Registration of fines on National Vehicle Driver File 
7.39 The Commission is of the view that, as a high proportion of persons imprisoned on foot of 
committal warrants for failure to pay fines are convicted of road traffic offences, 
consideration should be given to the introduction of additional means of addressing non-
payment of fines for road traffic offences.  The Report of the Garda Inspectorate 
recommends that the Criminal Justice Working Group should consider alternative 
measures for collecting unpaid court fines.99  One measure that it suggests is the 
collection of unpaid fines at the time of renewal of motor tax, vehicle registration or driving 
                                               
94
  Explanatory Notes accompanying the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill 2014-2015 at 39.   
95
  Section 11(8) of the Magistrates Courts Act 1980, as inserted by section 48 of the Criminal Justice and Courts 
Act 2015.   
96
  Explanatory Notes accompanying the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill 2014-2015 at 39.   
97
  Consultation Paper on Search Warrants and Bench Warrants (LRC CP 58-2009) at paragraph 7.49. 
98
  It is worth noting that there were some concerns that such an approach may interfere with a person’s 
constitutional right to a fair hearing under Article 38.1 of the Constitution.  However, such concerns could be 
addressed by providing for the entitlement of persons to attend court for the hearing if they so wish. 
99
  Garda Inspectorate Report on The Fixed Charge Processing System: A 21
st
 Century Strategy (2014) at 28.   
 167 
licences.100  The 2000 Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General on the Collection of 
Fines also suggests that registration of unpaid fines could assist in increasing the level of 
payment of fines, and therefore reduce the number of persons being committed to prison 
for default of payment.101  A 2014 Report to the Department of Public Expenditure and 
Reform on Debt Management Review recommends that, in due course, a central debt 
management unit should be established to manage moneys owed to all state bodies.102  
The Report suggests that it should be possible to attach an unpaid court fine to an asset 
or other state licence renewal, such as motor tax, driver licence or NCT.103  As noted at 
paragraph 7.18, the Fines (Payment and Recovery) Act 2014, when commenced, will 
provide alternative methods of enforcement of court fines.  However, considering the large 
number of committals that arise in the context of road traffic offences, it would be useful to 
consider a means of enforcement that would be relevant and particular to such offences. 
7.40 Other jurisdictions use measures of enforcement that restrict the use of vehicles, such as 
registration of fines against vehicles, clamping of vehicles and disqualification of persons 
who default in payment to enforce court fines.  Many other jurisdictions have designated 
responsibility for the enforcement and collection of unpaid court fines to administrative 
agencies.  In New South Wales, the Commissioner of Fines Administration may, in certain 
circumstances, hand over the responsibility for enforcement of a fine to the Roads and 
Maritime Services, which is the government agency responsible for vehicle registration 
and licensing of drivers.  Under the Fines Act 1996, the Roads and Maritime Services 
may, where a person who has not paid a fine as required by a notice of a fine 
enforcement order, and has: (1) not paid a fine by an extended due date; or (2) not paid a 
fine by instalments after being allowed to do so, suspend or cancel the driving licence of 
the person.104  The Roads and Maritime Services may not use this method of enforcement 
where the convicted person against whom the fine was imposed is under 18 or where the 
offence in question is not a road traffic offence.105  Under section 66 of the 1996 Act, the 
Roads and Maritime Services must suspend the licence for the balance of its validity 
period.  If the Commissioner of Fines Administration grants an extension of time for 
payment or allows payment by instalments and the person who has defaulted fails to 
comply within 6 months, the Roads and Maritime Services must, if the Commissioner so 
directs, cancel the licence.106  Section 67 of the 1996 Act provides for the cancellation of 
vehicle registration where the fine defaulter does not have a valid license.107  In the case 
of a fine defaulter whose licence has been cancelled or suspended or vehicle registration 
cancelled, the Roads and Maritime Service must refuse to take certain courses of action, 
including: (a) issue or renew the driver’s licence of the person who has defaulted; (b) 
register a vehicle in the name of the fine defaulter or renew his or her registration; and (c) 
transfer the registration of the vehicle to another person. 
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7.41 In South Australia, section 70M of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988  (“the 1988 
Act”) provides that a Fines Enforcement Officer may suspend the driving licence of a 
person who has defaulted in payment of a fine.  The suspension may be cancelled if the 
defaulter pays the fine in full.108  If the Fines Enforcement Officer suspends the driver’s 
licence, they must notify the Registrar of Motor Vehicles of the suspension.109  The Fines 
Enforcement and Recovery Officer may, by written determination, impose a prohibition on 
the debtor transacting any business with the Registrar of Motor Vehicles.110  The 1988 Act 
also provides for the clamping or impounding of any vehicle that the defaulter owns or is 
accustomed to drive and the disposal of uncollected vehicles by sale or other means.111 
7.42 In England and Wales, the Magistrates Court was, prior to the Courts Act 2003, 
responsible for the enforcement of court fines.  An administrative fine recovery system 
was introduced under the Courts Act 2003, which is supplemented by the Fines 
Collections Regulations 2006.  A court must make a collection order before exercising its 
powers of enforcement, which results in the transfer of the fine to a fines officer.  The fines 
officer has the power to collect the fine by issuing a warrant for distress, deduction of the 
fine from benefits, attachments of earnings orders and clamping of the vehicle belonging 
to the person who has defaulted.112  The fines officer may also refer a case back to the 
Magistrates Court, which can impose a range of sanctions.113  A magistrate may, instead 
of issuing a committal warrant, disqualify a person from driving for up to 12 months.114  
The disqualification order ceases to have effect if the fine is paid.115  If part of the fine is 
paid, the period of disqualification is reduced in proportion to the amount of the fine 
paid.116 In respect of clamping orders, legislation provides for the clamping of a vehicle 
registered to the person who has defaulted with a view to selling the vehicle to discharge 
the fine.117  An order to sell the clamped vehicle can only be made by a court.118 
7.43 The Commission has considered whether, as an alternative means of enforcement of 
unpaid court fines, legislation should provide for the placing of restrictions on the vehicle 
of the person who has defaulted in fine payment.  One option would be for legislation to 
empower a court to direct the Department of Transport, Tourism and Sport or the 
Department of Environment, Community and Local Government to refrain from taking 
certain courses of action in respect of a vehicle of a person who has failed to pay a fine 
imposed by the court.  Such legislation could provide that a vehicle that is registered to a 
person who has defaulted in payment of a fine cannot be taxed or the tax renewed until 
the fine is paid in full.  It could also provide that change of vehicle ownership cannot take 
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place until the fine is paid.  Such a measure would apply where the unpaid fine relates to 
an offence under the Road Traffic Acts and could implemented by an amendment to the 
Road Traffic Acts. 
7.44 An advantage of such a measure is that it would be an effective means of encouraging 
persons who have been convicted of offences under the Road Traffic Acts to pay a fine.  
As the majority of cases heard in the District Court relate to offences under the Road 
Traffic Acts, many persons who receive fines are the registered owners of vehicles.  The 
possibility of being prohibited from driving or selling a vehicle as a result of a prohibition 
on renewing motor tax or change of ownership would encourage persons to pay their 
fines.  However, the Commission is aware that difficulties may arise where the vehicle is 
unregistered, making it impossible to register a fine against it on the National Vehicle 
Driver File.  In addition, a number of persons convicted of such offences may not be the 
registered owner of a vehicle or may not have had a driving licence, tax or insurance to 
begin with.  There is also a danger that providing for the registration of unpaid fines 
against a file might result in some people wilfully refusing to register their vehicle to avoid 
an unpaid court fine later being recorded against it. 
7.45 Notwithstanding that it may not be possible to register an unpaid fine against a vehicle on 
the National Vehicle Driver File in all cases, the Commission is of the view that such an 
approach would be an effective way of enforcing unpaid court fines in the context of 
offences under the Road Traffic Acts.  It would provide another alternative approach to the 
issuing of a committal warrant in such cases. 
7.46 The Commission recommends that legislation should provide that, where a court 
imposes a fine on a person who has been convicted of an offence under the Road 
Traffic Acts and the person does not pay the fine by the due date, it may direct the 
Department of Transport Tourism and Sport or Department of the Environment, 
Community and Local Government to refrain from processing motor tax 
applications and changes in vehicle ownership in respect of a vehicle that is 
registered in the name of a person against whom the fine was imposed. 
C Deduction of Unpaid Fines at Source from Social Welfare Payments 
7.47 It was brought to the attention of the Commission that, although the Fines (Payment and 
Recovery) Act 2014 Act provides for the making of attachment orders in respect of 
persons who have not paid a court fine and are in employment or receiving an 
occupational pension, there is no equivalent provision for deductions to be made from 
social welfare payments.  The Commission has considered whether legislation ought to 
provide for such a measure.  During the Parliamentary debates on the Fines (Payment 
and Recovery) Bill 2014, some members of the Houses of the Oireachtas suggested that 
the Act should provide for unpaid court fines to be deducted from social welfare 
payments.119  It was suggested in Dáil Debates that such an approach was “not a valid 
option due to the cost of administration and because social welfare rules mean that only 
approximately €2 per week can be deducted”120 from a person’s social welfare payment.  
7.48 The 2000 Comptroller and Auditor General Report on Value for Money Examination of the 
Collection of Fines explored the effectiveness of the fines system in ensuring that financial 
penalties are imposed and collected, and the management of the system by An Garda 
Síochána and the Courts Service.  The Report noted that many fines imposed by the 
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District Court are not collected, “resulting in a considerable loss of fines revenue”121 and 
commented that in Dublin only 55% of fines imposed by a court are paid.122  It also 
highlighted the long delays in issuing and executing warrants for the arrest of people who 
default on payment of fines.123  The Report put forward other options that could be used to 
enforce court fines without having the use the warrant and imprisonment procedure.  The 
proposed options included: (1)  the payment of fines by instalment, attachment of 
earnings; (2) deduction at source of social welfare benefits; (3) seizure and sale of goods 
and registration of a fine against a vehicle, so that outstanding fines can be collected 
when the vehicle is re-taxed or changes ownership.  As noted above, the Fines (Payment 
and Recovery) Act 2014 provides for all of these options apart from the deduction at 
source from social welfare payments and registration of a fine against a vehicle.  
7.49 The difficulties associated with attaching unpaid fines to social welfare payments were 
highlighted in the 2002 Nexus Research Co-operative Report to the Department of 
Justice, Equality and Law Reform on Imprisonment for Fine Default and Civil Debt.  The 
Report was commissioned by the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform to 
assist in the formulation of legislation respect of the proposals concerning the 
enforcement of fines.  The purpose of the 2002 Report was “to gather qualitative 
information in relation to those persons who find themselves committed to prison for non-
payment of fines and civil debt.”124  Interviews were conducted with offenders who had 
been committed to prison for non-payment of fines.  The study found that the majority of 
persons committed to prison for non-payment of court fines or civil debt are male, many of 
whom are unemployed or in “unskilled occupation.”125  The Report noted that two-thirds of 
persons committed to prison for defaulting in fine payment had been convicted of road 
traffic offences.126  Over 50% of the fines that had been imposed were for below £300.127  
In addition, almost half of those committed to prison were imprisoned for less than 10 
days and 75% were discharged from prison within 5 days of being committed.128   
7.50 The Report concluded that persons committed for failure to pay fines “tend not to be 
representative of the general population,”129 with disproportionately high numbers of those 
committed being unemployed or not capable of work due to disability.  Interviews 
suggested that a “significant minority” of those committed were living in poverty and had 
“troubled family backgrounds with life problems that overshadow the offences and fines at 
issue.”130  The study found that change in employment circumstances was a primary 
reason for fine default, with lack of provision for payment of fines by instalment being an 
impediment.131  Interviewees suggested that allowing for payment of fines by instalment 
taking into account the capacity of the person to pay would be of assistance.  Community 
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service was also put forward as an option.  As discussed above, such measures have 
been provided for in the Fines (Payment and Recovery) Act 2014, which has not yet 
commenced.  However, regarding attachment of fines to earnings, the Report concluded 
that “[l]egislative proposals for attachment of earnings of fine defaulters may be of little or 
no use for those who end up in prison.”132  It suggested that many of those who receive 
fines are not in employment that has an administrative capacity to facilitate attachment.  In 
addition, the Report concluded that “attachment of social welfare entitlements and benefits 
is problematic given that persons dependent on these may be living in or close to the 
poverty line.”133 
7.51 In 2003, the Free Legal Advice Centres (FLAC) published a report in response to a 
government proposal to introduce attachment of earnings for non-payment of civil debt 
and fines.  Most of the discussion in the report related to non-payment of civil debt.  
However, the discussion in the report of the proposed provisions concerning the 
attachment of earnings in the Enforcement of Court Orders Bill 1998, which was ultimately 
defeated, is noteworthy.  Part III of the Bill provided for the attachment of social welfare 
payments.  The report contended that this was “inequitable and would be likely to lead to 
further social exclusion of an already excluded minority.”134  It noted that there is a view 
that social welfare payments are insufficient to meet basic needs of families and 
suggested that a survey of attachment models in European jurisdictions shows that many 
European countries do not allow for attachment of social security.135   
7.52 Regarding non-payment of court fines, the report asserted that failure to pay a court fine 
will often be a result of the inadequacy of a person’s income and noted the lack of 
provision for the payment of fines by instalment, now provided for in the Fines (Payment 
and Recovery) Act 2014.136  The “lack of proportionality in the levying of fines” was also 
noted.137  The Report contended that this is significant given that in many cases, for 
example, failure to pay a television licence, motor tax or insurance, the prosecution arises 
because of a person’s financial difficulties.  It recommended that those with a low income 
or in financial difficulty should be permitted to pay off fines in affordable instalments.138  It 
also recommended the abolition of committal for employed persons or persons in receipt 
of social welfare, in favour of attachment.  The Fines (Payment and Recovery) Act 2014 
favours attachment over recovery, community service and committal.  The FLAC Report 
contended that “[a]ny attachment in the case of social welfare recipients should be 
absolutely minimal” and that community service should be considered as an alternative 
option to attachments in relation to social welfare recipients.139 
(1) Current procedures in Ireland allowing for the deduction at source from social 
welfare payments 
7.53 Legislative provisions in Ireland provide for the deduction at source from social welfare 
payments in a number of specific areas.  These include the following: 
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(a) Recovery of Social Welfare Overpayments 
7.54 When the Department of Social Protection finds that a person has been provided with 
payment to which he or she is not entitled, that person is liable to repay the overpayment.  
This is the case whether the person purposefully concealed the overpayment or whether 
the overpayment was through no fault of the person who received the payment.  Recovery 
of social welfare payments is provided for in section 341 of the Social Welfare 
(Consolidation) Act 2005.140  The amount that could be recovered through deductions was 
previously set out in the Social Welfare (Consolidated Claims, Payments and Control) 
Regulations 2007, as amended.141  The 2007 Regulations provided for recovery through 
the withholding of arrears or deductions from ongoing payments, or both, “provided that 
recovery of the overpayment shall not cause, without the prior written agreement of the 
person liable to repay the overpayment, that person’s weekly payment of benefit or 
assistance, as the case may be, to fall below the weekly rate of supplementary welfare 
allowance appropriate to his or her family circumstances that would be payable if the 
person was not in receipt of the benefit or assistance.”142  For a person in receipt of a 
primary payment, such as Jobseeker’s Allowance or One Parent Family Payment, the 
current maximum rate of payment is €188.  As a result, the maximum sum which the 
Department of Social Protection could recover was €2 per week, as this would bring the 
person’s payment to €186 per week, which is the minimum Supplementary Welfare 
Allowance payment.  However, the 2005 Act was amended by the Social Welfare Act 
2012.  Rather than limiting the recovery of overpayments to the amount of Supplementary 
Welfare Allowance to which the person would be entitled, the 2005 Act, as amended, 
provided that deductions may not, without the prior written consent of the person liable to 
repay the overpayment, exceed 15% of the weekly rate of benefit or assistance to which 
the person is entitled.143  Therefore, a person receiving a weekly payment of €188 can 
now potentially be subject to a reduction of €28 from their payment.   
7.55 The Social Welfare and Pensions (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2013  aims to “further 
improve the Department [of Social Protection]’s ability to recover overpayments by giving 
additional powers of recovery in the case of overpayments by way of a notice of 
attachment to be put in place.”144  Section 15 of the 2013 Act amends the 2005 Act by 
providing the Minster for Social Protection with additional powers exercisable in the event 
of overpayment.  A person who is liable to repay an overpayment must make 
arrangements to repay the amount owed.145  A notice of attachment may be given to a 
person who fails to repay the relevant amount and respond to a notice in writing, 
requesting either repayment of the relevant amount or any representations the person 
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may wish to make and stating that the Minister intends to proceed by way of notice of 
attachment relating to the overpayment.146  Prior to furnishing such a notice, the Minister 
must take into account the circumstances of the overpaid person147 and must give due 
consideration to any responses received before making a notice of attachment.148  The 
2013 Act provides for weekly deductions from a person’s net income through their 
employer.149  The amount deducted cannot be greater than 15% without prior written 
consent or exceed an amount that would result in the income of the person falling below 
the amount of Supplementary Welfare Allowance to which the person would be entitled.150  
In addition, the 2013 Act provides for the attachment of money held by financial institution 
so that the overpaid amount can be attached to any money held on deposit in the financial 
institution or held in a joint account.151  Any notice of attachment in respect of a financial 
institution may not specify an amount that would exceed an amount that would result in 
the overpaid person to become entitled to claim for Supplementary Welfare Allowance.152   
(b) Finance (Local Property) Tax Act 2012 
7.56 The Finance (Local Property) Tax Act 2012  provides for a number of different methods 
that can be used to pay the local property tax.  The Revenue Commissioners may, in 
certain circumstances, direct the Minister for Social Protection to deduct local property tax 
from a person’s payments.153  Those who are in receipt of certain social welfare payments 
may choose to have the property tax deducted at source from their payment.154  It is worth 
noting that Jobseeker’s Allowance and Jobseeker’s Benefit are not included in the 
category of social welfare payments which may be the subject of deductions.  The 
circumstances in which such a direction may be given include: (1) where a liable person 
elects in a return to have the tax deducted from his or her payments;155 (2) where the 
person does not deliver a return containing an election of a specific method of payment; 
(3) elects for a method of payment in a return but defaults in such payment; or (4) agrees 
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with the Revenue Commissioners that the Minister deduct the local property tax from his 
or her payments.156  The Revenue Commissioners must notify the liable person that they 
have directed the Minister for Social Protection to deduct the tax from the person’s 
payments where the person has not chosen this method of payment.157  The Minister may 
not deduct an amount that would reduce the person’s payment below the amount of 
Supplementary Welfare Allowance to which he or she would be entitled.158  Deferral of the 
local property tax is provided for in respect of persons whose income does not exceed a 
certain threshold.159  The 2012 Act, as amended, also provides for a deferral of the local 
property tax where a person has suffered a significant unavoidable financial loss or incurs 
a significant expense.160 
(c) The Household Budget Scheme 
7.57 The Household Budget Scheme, which is operated by An Post, allows those receiving 
social welfare payments to spread the cost of household bills, including Electric Ireland 
(formerly ESB), Ervia (formerly Bórd Gáis), eir (formerly eircom), Airtricity and local 
authority rent, across the year through deduction from social welfare payments.161  Section 
290 of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 governs budgeting in relation to social 
welfare payments and provides for the withholding on consent of an amount of a social 
welfare payment and payment to a specified body designated by the social welfare 
recipient.  The 2005 Act was amended by the Social Welfare Act 2012 to allow a person 
who is the tenant of a housing body and in receipt of social welfare to arrange for rent to 
be deducted from his or her social welfare payment.162  The scheme is optional and there 
is no provision for the making of compulsory deductions.  The maximum amount of a 
person’s social welfare payment that can be deducted is 25%.  The scheme allows for the 
amendment or cancellation of deductions.  The deduction may not exceed 25% of a 
person’s weekly social welfare payment.163    
(2) Legislation providing for deduction of fines from income support in England and 
Wales 
7.58 In England and Wales, provision for the deduction of unpaid fines from income support 
was introduced by the Criminal Justice Act 1991. Where the Magistrates Court has 
imposed a fine or a compensation order on a person who is entitled to income support, 
jobseekers allowance, a state pension credit or an employment and support allowance, 
the Court may apply to the Secretary of State requesting the deduction of sums payable to 
that person to secure payment.  The Secretary of State is empowered to deduct payments 
and provide them to the Magistrates Court towards satisfaction of the unpaid amount.164  
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Section 24(2) of the 1991 Act provides that the regulations allowing for such deductions 
may include provision: 
(a) that, before making an application, the court shall make an enquiry as to the 
offender’s means; 
(b) that the court may require the offender to provide prescribed information in 
connection with an application; 
(c) allowing or requiring adjudication as regards an application, and provision as to 
appeals to appeal tribunals constituted under Chapter I of Part I of the Social Security 
Act 1998 and decisions under section 9 or 10 of that Act; 
(d) as to the circumstances and manner in which and the times at which sums are to 
be deducted and paid; 
(e) as to the calculation of such sums (which may include provision to secure that 
amounts payable to the offender by way of income support, a jobseeker’s allowance, 
state pension credit or an income-related employment and support allowance do not 
fall below prescribed figures); 
(f) as to the circumstances in which the Secretary of State is to cease making 
deductions; 
(g) requiring the Secretary of State to notify the offender, in a prescribed manner and 
at any prescribed time, of the total amount of sums deducted up to the time of 
notification; and 
(h) that, where the whole amount to which the application relates has been paid, the 
court shall give notice of that fact to the Secretary of State.   
7.59 The rationale for the introduction of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 was to encourage the 
use of fines as a sentencing option by providing for a system that would ensure that fines 
would be appropriate to the means of a person and introduce measures to ensure that 
persons with a low income can pay fines.165  The maximum amount of deductions that 
could be made was £2.70 per week.  However, this was increased to £5 following a 
recommendation of a review on correctional services.166  The Courts Act 2003 allows for 
automatic imposition of deduction from benefits as soon as an offender defaults in 
payments.  A 2006 Report by the English Comptroller and Auditor General found that out 
of 406 cases surveyed, 280 were the subject of enforcement orders, only 12 of which 
were enforced by deductions from benefits.167  The Report noted the suggestion, however, 
that deductions from benefit orders had increased nationally from 18,500 in December 
2002 to 31,100 in May 2005.168  The Report also noted that there were difficulties 
deducting from benefits where a person changed benefits or became unemployed, as the 
enforcement process took several weeks to catch up with the change in circumstances.169   
(3) Discussion 
7.60 The Commission has considered whether legislation should provide for the deduction at 
source of unpaid court fines from the social welfare payments of persons who have not 
paid court fines by the due date.  Providing for the deduction of unpaid court fines from 
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social welfare benefits would have some advantages.  Such an approach would be likely 
to reduce the number of persons committed to prison for non-payment of fines, a measure 
which should be a last resort.  It would provide courts with another alternative to issuing a 
warrant in respect of a person who has not paid a court fine, thereby reducing the figures 
for committal warrants issued.  This would eventually lead to a decrease in the figures for 
outstanding committal warrants.  Providing for the deduction of fines from social welfare 
payments would result in the collection of more revenue by ensuring the payment of a 
higher percentage of court fines.  The Commission has also been advised that some 
people who are repeat offenders might strategically refuse to pay a fine or comply with 
any community service order that a court imposes, as they are aware that they will only 
spend a short time in custody if a committal warrant issues.  Deduction from social welfare 
benefits would provide an additional means of enforcing court fines in respect of those 
who have the means to pay the fine but choose not to.  During the Oireachtas debates on 
the Fines (Payment and Recovery) Act 2014, some TDs expressed the view that providing 
for attachment orders to persons who are employed, but not those who are in receipt of 
social welfare, unfairly targets those who are in employment.170  However, others argued 
that the exclusion of social welfare payments from the ambit of the attachment order 
provisions in the 2014 Act discriminates against those in receipt of social welfare, as the 
lack of provision for attachment orders for social welfare recipients means that such 
persons are more likely to be committed to prison.171  However, under the Fines (Payment 
and Recovery) Act 2014 (as yet uncommenced) a court has the option of considering a 
community service order where attachment is inappropriate. 
7.61 There are also arguments against providing for the deduction of court fines from social 
welfare payments.  In the case of most primary social welfare payments, the means of 
applicants are assessed by the Department of Social Protection.  Most persons receiving 
such payments have therefore already undergone a thorough means-assessment 
process, after which a Department official has decided that the person meets the 
threshold that entitles them to a social welfare payment.  Such payments are minimum 
subsistence payments and it can be argued that it would be unjust to provide for such 
incomes to be reduced.  As discussed earlier, a number of legislative provisions exist 
which allow for deduction at source from social welfare payments.  However, it can be 
argued that the legislation providing for the deduction of payments to repay 
overpayments, which allows for the deduction of up to 15% of a person’s payment without 
consent, was enacted for the specific purpose of addressing social welfare fraud,172 and is 
therefore exceptional.  Those who received the overpayments were never entitled to 
them, but allowing for attachment of social welfare payments to unpaid court fines would 
involve compulsorily reducing payments to which persons have already been deemed 
entitled.   
7.62 As discussed at paragraph 7.56, the Finance (Local Property Tax) Act 2012 provides for 
the tax to be deducted from a person’s social welfare payment.  However, deductions can 
only be made in respect of certain social welfare payments which do not include 
Jobseeker’s Allowance or Jobseeker’s Benefit.173  In addition, such deductions can only 
be made where a person chooses this option, where a person fails to deliver a return 
choosing a payment method or chooses a payment method but defaults in payment.174  
Moreover, the lack of power to deduct a sum which would bring a person’s payment to 
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below the rate for Supplementary Welfare Allowance safeguards against a person’s 
income falling below the minimum basic level.  If legislation providing for the deduction of 
unpaid court fines from social welfare were to include a similar safeguard, any deduction 
from a person receiving a primary payment of €188 could not result in the person’s 
payment falling below €186, which is the relevant rate of Supplementary Welfare 
Allowance.  In the case of a person who fails to pay a court fine of €300, only €2 per week 
could be deducted from the person’s weekly payment, and it would therefore take 150 
weeks or almost three years to recover the unpaid fine.  From an economic perspective, 
the administrative costs involved in collecting fines using such a process may outweigh 
the benefits of collecting the fine.   
7.63 It could be argued that legislation providing for deduction of unpaid fines from social 
welfare payments so as to reduce the social welfare payment below the minimum 
subsistence level would be an unconstitutional interference with a person’s property rights 
or socio-economic rights.  It may be argued that social welfare payments amount to 
property rights under Article 43.1 of the Constitution.  Article 45 provides: 
“The State pledges itself to safeguard with especial care the economic interests of the 
weaker sections of the community and, where necessary, to contribute to the support 
of the infirm, the widow, the orphan and the aged.”   
7.64 However, Article 45 also states that the directive principles of social policy are not 
cognisable by the courts.  In Minister for Social, Community and Family Affairs v 
Scanlon,175 the Supreme Court held that benefits were governed by statute and that there 
was no constitutional right to overpaid benefits.176   
7.65 Assuming the deduction of social welfare payments to satisfy unpaid court fines is not 
unconstitutional, it would be possible for legislation to provide for the deduction of a higher 
sum than €2 from social welfare payments.  However, bearing in mind the conclusion of 
the Nexus Research Report that attachment of social welfare payments may be 
problematic given that many people in receipt of such payments live in or are close to 
poverty, the desirability of deducting a greater sum from persons in receipt of social 
welfare is questionable.  The Commission acknowledges that there may be people who 
can afford to pay their fines but choose not to, and deduction of fines from social welfare 
payments might assist in collecting fines from such persons.  However, rather than 
enforcing the fine by providing for deduction from social welfare payments in all cases, the 
provisions of the Fines (Payment and Recovery) Act 2014 should be commenced.  These 
allow for payment of fines by instalments and by enforcement of fines in the cases where 
persons wilfully choose not pay through the alternative measures of recovery orders and 
community service.  Legislative provision for deduction from social welfare payments that 
sets a maximum deduction of €2 per week in the case of a person receiving a primary 
payment is unlikely to be of significant benefit, as it would take a number of years for a 
person to pay off most fines, making such a process costly to administer. 
7.66 A better way of reducing the numbers of persons committed to prison for unpaid court 
fines might be for the courts to consider, where possible, alternative sanctions when 
sentencing offenders.  The  Scheme of the Criminal Justice (Community Sanctions) Bill, 
published in 2014 by the Department of Justice and Equality, sets out a range of 
community sanctions that a court may consider when sentencing a person.  The 
Explanatory Notes published by the Department to accompany the General Scheme 
indicate that it proposed to repeal and replace the Probation of Offenders Act 1907 so as 
to provide the courts with a wide range community sanctions options in cases concerning 
minor offences.  Head 8 of the General Scheme would permit a court to make a discharge 
order without proceeding to conviction where it is satisfied of the guilt of the person but 
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that, having regard to a range of factors, is of the opinion that it is inexpedient to impose 
punishment.177   
7.67 The factors to which a court may have regard include any of the following: 
(1) the character, circumstances, previous convictions, age, health or mental 
condition of the person; 
(2) any previous order made under Head 8 or section 1(1) of the Probation of 
Offenders Act 1907; 
(3) the trivial nature of the offence; 
(4) any extenuating circumstances under which the offence was committed; 
(5) the need to have due regard to the interests of any victim of the offence; 
(6) the satisfaction by the person of all of the specified restorative justice criteria. 
7.68 The General Scheme proposes to put the restorative justice programme on a statutory 
footing and to afford the courts the opportunity to leave a person who has committed an 
offence without a conviction if the relevant factors have been satisfied.  The General 
Scheme also proposes to empower the court to make a binding over order in a summary 
case, or an indictable case being tried summarily, where the court is satisfied of the guilt 
of the person but, having regard to the factors in Head 8(3), is of the view that it would be 
appropriate to discharge the person subject to certain conditions.178  This would replace 
similar provisions in the Probation of Offenders Act 1907, which allow for the dismissal of 
a charge or conditional discharge.179  Under Head 10 of the Scheme, a court would be 
empowered to consider a binding over order in respect of an indictable offence. The 
factors to which a court could have regard are different to those set out for summary 
offences, and do not include the possibility of satisfying specific restorative justice 
criteria.180  The General Scheme provides that a court may not make a discharge order or 
binding over order in relation to a list of specified offences.181  These include a number of 
road traffic offences that relate to drink driving and offences that attract penalty points.   
7.69 The General Scheme also makes provision for community sanctions supervised by the 
Probation Service, including deferred sentence supervision orders,182 probation 
supervision orders183 and reparation orders.184  The General Scheme specifically prohibits 
the making of binding over or discharge orders in respect of a number of road traffic 
offences, including offences that attract penalty points. Thus, if the Scheme were enacted 
more frequent use of community sanctions would not, therefore, assist in reducing the 
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number of people committed for non-payment of fines imposed for road traffic offences.  
However, the imposition of such sanctions in cases involving other minor offences, such 
as public order, minor drugs or assault offences might assist in cases being disposed of in 
a manner that does not result in persons being committed to prison for unpaid fines.   
7.70 The Commission recommends that the Fines (Payment and Recovery) Act 2014 be 
commenced. 
7.71 The Commission recommends that unpaid fines imposed under the Road Traffic 
Acts should be registered on the National Vehicle Driver File in order to reduce the 
number of persons committed to prison for non-payment of court fines.  
7.72 The Commission does not recommend that deduction of fines at source from social 
welfare payments should be provided for at this time.  
 
D Service of Summonses in Criminal Cases 
(1) Service of summonses by registered post 
7.73 The Consultation Paper outlined a number of issues regarding delivery of summonses by 
ordinary post, or “letterbox delivery” as it is more commonly known, as provided for in 
section 22(1) of the Courts Act 1991.  The practice of letterbox delivery does not require 
anyone to sign to say that they have received the documents, nor does it provide for 
personal delivery.185  The lack of a personal element means that an accused person may 
often be unaware that they are expected to appear in court.  In turn, the Courts Service 
and prosecutors may be unaware that the accused did not receive the summons.  
Consequently, the court usually adjourns the case and directs service of the summons by 
alternative means, but may also issue a bench warrant.   
7.74 The Garda Inspectorate has, based on percentages complied by the Comptroller and 
Auditor General, identified that approximately 238,0000 fixed charge notice fines were 
unpaid in 2011 and 2012.186  Approximately 178,000 summonses were issued in 2011 and 
2012 for unpaid fixed charge notice fines.187  85,000 (48%) of these summons were 
served and 93,500 (52%) were not.  This resulted in a potential revenue loss of €7.4 
million due to summonses not being served.188  The Garda Inspectorate Report notes the 
inefficiency involved in such an approach and states that “[s]ummons must be served by a 
member of an Garda Síochána and the time directed to serving summonses, which at 
best has less than a fifty per cent success rate, impacts on Garda availability to undertake 
more urgent policing duties.”189  The Inspectorate recommends that a review be 
undertaken of the process for serving summonses to ascertain the reasons for the 
significant level of unserved summonses and to make recommendations to provide a 
more effective process.190   
(2) Service of summonses in criminal cases  
(a) Statutory provisions relating to the service of summonses 
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7.75 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission outlined the statutory provisions on the service 
of summonses.191   
(b) Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act 1851 
7.76 Section 12(3) of the Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act 1851 provides that a summons shall be 
served upon someone “by delivering to him a copy of such summons, or if he cannot be 
conveniently met with, by leaving such copy for him at his last or most usual place of 
abode, or at his office...or place of business, with some inmate of the house not being 
under sixteen years of age.”  The 1851 Act, therefore, provides for personal service of a 
summons, or if such service would be inconvenient, it may be left at the workplace of the 
person, their residence or another person residing at the person’s home.  The 1851 Act 
therefore requires an element of personal service. 
(c) Courts Act 1991 
7.77 Section 22 of the Courts Act 1991 relates to summonses in respect of summary only 
offences and offences that can be tried summarily pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act 
1951.192  Section 22(1) of the 1991 Act states:  
“[N]otwithstanding section 12 of the Act of 1851 and without prejudice to the provisions 
of any Act authorising the service of summons....a summons issued in a case of 
summary jurisdiction under section 11(2) or 13 of the Act of 1851 or section 1 of the 
Act of 1986 [Courts No. 3 Act 1986] may be served upon the person to whom it is 
directed  
(1) by sending, by registered prepaid post, a copy thereof in an envelope addressed 
to him at his last known residence or most usual place of abode...   
(2) by sending, by any other system of recorded delivery prepaid post specified in 
rule of court, a copy thereof in such an envelope as aforesaid, or 
(3) by delivery by hand, by a person other than the person on whose behalf it 
purports to be issued authorised in that behalf by rules of court, of a copy thereof 
in such an envelope as aforesaid.” 
7.78 By allowing for service by registered post or recorded delivery prepaid post, the 1991 Act 
provides for alternative means of service to the personal service required by the Petty 
Sessions (Ireland) Act 1851.  
7.79 Under section 22(2) of the 1991 Act, service will be deemed good “upon proof that a copy 
of the summons was placed in an envelope and that the envelope was addressed, 
recorded, prepaid and sent or was delivered in accordance with... subsection (1).”  It is for 
the person claiming that they did not receive the summons to rebut the presumption of 
good service by demonstrating that they did not receive the summons or notice of the 
hearing date to which the summons relates.193  Where a summons is served by registered 
prepaid post or recorded prepaid post, the summons is deemed to be served upon the 
person “at the time at which the envelope containing a copy of the summons would be 
delivered in the ordinary course of post.”194  A person may prove that the provisions of 
section 22(1)(a) or (b) have been complied with by a statutory declaration “exhibiting the 
record of posting of the envelope... and stating, if it be the case, that the original summons 
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was duly issued at the time of posting and that the envelope has not been returned 
undelivered to the sender.”195 
(d) District Court Rules 1997 
7.80 At the time that the Consultation Paper was published, the District Court Rules 1997 did 
not specify the methods of service that may be used to serve a summons on a person.  
Order 10, rule 5 simply required documents to be delivered to the person or left at one of 
a number of places.196  However, Order 10 has since been amended, and now provides 
that in a case of summary jurisdiction pertaining to section 22 of the Courts Act 1991,197 a 
summons may be served: 
“(a) by sending, by registered prepaid post, a copy thereof in an envelope addressed 
to that person at his or her last known residence or most usual place of abode or at his 
or her place of business in the State, or  
(b) by delivery by hand, by a person (other than the person on whose behalf it 
purports to be issued) authorised by these Rules in that behalf, of a copy thereof in 
such an envelope as aforesaid.” 198 
(3) Discussion 
7.81 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission invited submissions as to whether summonses 
in respect of criminal proceedings delivered by post should be served by registered post 
only, thereby removing standard letter box delivery.  However, such a reform would not 
affect the law on personal service of summonses by hand.  The procedure for registered 
postal delivery set out in section 22 of the Courts Act 1991 would apply to any summons 
not personally served by hand.  One of the main advantages for this suggestion is that it 
would provide greater certainty regarding delivery.  Courts could more often proceed with 
a hearing in the absence of the person without having to adjourn the case to allow for an 
alternative means of service in the knowledge that the person has received the summons.  
This would ultimately reduce the number of bench warrants issued in such circumstances 
and would result in greater speed and efficiency regarding court lists.   
7.82 Notwithstanding the advantages of dispensing with standard letterbox delivery, it has been 
suggested to the Commission that there may be practical difficulties associated with 
requiring either registered post or personal delivery of summonses.   The cost of requiring 
registered or recorded post would be higher than those relating to standard post.  The 
Garda Síochána Inspectorate Report on Crime Investigation notes that it costs €5.25 to send a 
summons by recorded delivery.
199
  However, as noted in the Consultation Paper, the cost of 
adjourning a hearing or issuing and executing a bench warrant where it is unknown 
whether a person received the summons is high.200  In addition, the potential loss of €7.4 
million revenue over 2 years due to the number of unserved summonses, as noted by the 
Garda Síochána Inspectorate Report on the Fixed Charge Processing System, is very 
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high.201  Although service by registered post would be more costly, revenue would be 
generated by persons paying subsequently imposed court fines.  
7.83 It has also been suggested that it is possible for any person present to sign for registered 
post at a premises, and there would be therefore no guarantee that the person to whom 
the summons was directed would receive it.  However, if this occurred, a court would see 
that the person who signed for the summons was not the person to whom the summons 
was addressed.  Service by registered post would still involve an element of personal 
service if another person signed for it and such an approach would carry a greater degree 
of certainty as to service than standard letterbox service. 
7.84 A concern was also raised that some people would simply refuse to sign for the registered 
post.  The Garda Síochána Inspectorate Report on Crime Investigation notes that in “one 
busy division that posted approximately 1,000 summonses per month... 50% of the 
summonses are returned as unserved.”202  As a result, Gardaí must personally serve the 
summonses.  In contrast, the Report notes that in another Garda division, 81% of 
summonses were successfully served.203  The Report observed that Gardaí spend a 
significant amount of time serving summonses.  It recommends that “the Department of 
Justice and Equality convene a working group to ensure a more efficient summons 
process system”204 which should “examine the issue of summons service and explore new 
ways to deal with summonses such as E-service.”205 
7.85 In the Commission’s 2010 Report on Consolidation and Reform of the Courts Acts, 
section 240 of the draft Bill attached to the Report removes the traditional “letterbox 
delivery” method as provided for in section 22 of the Courts Act 1991 and provides that 
service of summons may be carried out by either registered postal service, personal 
service or any other method of “recorded delivery service” specified in the District Court 
Rules 1997.206 Section 232 of the draft Bill defines personal service as including: (a) 
delivery at any place to the person to be served; (b) delivery at the usual place of 
residence of the person to another person of full age who is: (i) the wife, husband, child, 
father, mother, brother, sister, or another relation of the person to be served, (ii) the civil 
partner of the person; or (iii) also residing at that place; or (c) delivery at the place of 
business of the person to another person of full age who is the employer or employee of 
the person. 
7.86 In recommending the removal of the “letterbox” method of delivery, the Commission took 
into account the considerable practical difficulties that “letterbox” service creates in the 
District Court.207  In particular, it results in a great many non-attendances on the return 
dates of criminal summonses and the judge must either adjourn the case and direct 
another form of service or issue a bench warrant.  Many cases proceed in the absence of 
the defendant on the adjourned date, which results in the defendant applying to the Court 
to set aside the proceedings of which he or she was unaware until receiving notice of a 
default warrant or non-payment of a fine.208   
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7.87 Personal service or service by registered post are preferable to letterbox service.  
However, in light of the feedback which it has received since the publication of the 
Consultation Paper, the Commission is of the view that there would be too many practical 
difficulties associated with requiring personal service or service by registered post in all 
cases.   
7.88 The Commission agrees with the recommendation of the Garda Inspectorate Report, 
Crime Investigation, that other methods of serving summonses ought to be explored.  
However, the Commission does not believe that electronic service would be appropriate.  
Courts in Ireland and other jurisdictions have, in specific cases, allowed for service of 
documents in civil cases to be carried out by electronic means.  For example, in 2012, the 
High Court in Ireland allowed service of a civil summons through Facebook where a 
solicitor had been trying unsuccessfully to serve proceedings on a defendant who had left 
the jurisdiction.209  In the United States decision of Mpafe v Mpafe210, a court allowed 
substituted service of divorce proceedings by email, Facebook, MySpace or any other 
social networking site on a defendant who was believed to have left the country.  In the 
Australian case MKM Capital v Corbo and Poyser211 the Court allowed service by private 
Facebook mail of a foreclosure notice on a couple who could not be found by traditional 
means. 
7.89 However, legislation in other common law jurisdictions generally provides for service of 
summonses in criminal cases by personal service or post, but not electronically.  In 
England and Wales, service of documents is governed by the Criminal Procedure Rules 
2013.  The Rules provide that a document may be served by handing over the 
document,212 by leaving or posting it,213 by document exchange214 or by electronic 
means215.  However, Rule 4.7 provides that certain documents may be served only by 
handing them over under Rule 4.3 or leaving or posting them under Rule 4.4.  One of the 
specified documents is a summons.216  The person who serves a document may prove it 
by signing a certificate explaining how and when it was served.217 
7.90 In the United States, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that a summons is 
served on a person by: (a) delivering a copy to the defendant personally; or (b) leaving a 
copy at the defendant’s usual place of abode with a person of suitable age and discretion 
residing at that location and by mailing a copy to the defendant’s last known address.218  
Service on an organisation is affected by delivering a copy of the summons to an officer, a 
managing or general agent, or to another agent appointed or legally authorised to receive 
service.  A copy must also be mailed to the organisation’s last known address.219 
7.91 In Canada, the Criminal Code provides that a summons must be served on a person by 
delivering it personally to the person or, if that person cannot conveniently be found, 
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leaving it for him or her at his or her latest or usual place of abode with a resident who 
appears to be at least 16 years of age.220  In New Zealand, the Criminal Procedure Act 
2011 provides that a summons for a category 1 offence (an offence carrying on conviction 
the possibility of a fine only) may be served: (a) by personal service; (b) by sending it to 
the person’s address for service; or (c) if no address has been provided, by sending it to 
the person’s last known postal address or place of residence or business; or (d) by being 
left for the person at the person’s place of residence with a member of the person’s family 
living with him or her who appears to be over the age of 18 years; or (e) by any other 
method agreed by the parties or approved by the court or registrar.221  A document is 
personally served when it is left with the person to be served or, if that person does not 
accept it, by putting it down and bringing it to the notice of the person222 or the person’s 
lawyer if the lawyer has provided an address for service, unless the court directs 
otherwise.  However, a court may direct personal service in any case.223  However, a 
summons for a category 2, 3 or 4 offence (an offence carrying on conviction the possibility 
of a sentence of imprisonment) must be served by personal service or leaving it for the 
person at the person’s place of residence with a member of the person’s family living 
there who appears to be over the age of 18.224 
7.92 In Australia, a summons must generally be served personally or by leaving it at the 
person’s last place of abode.  However, service can be affected by post in some or all 
cases depending on the State.225 
7.93 The practical difficulties regarding uncertainty of delivery when sending summonses by 
ordinary post or letterbox delivery would also be present if service of summonses could be 
carried out electronically in criminal cases.  Most email facilities do not indicate whether 
an email has been received or read.  It would, therefore, be very difficult for judges to 
satisfy themselves that an accused person has received the summons or is aware of the 
court date.  It is clear from the decision of Brennan v Windle226 that principles of natural 
and constitutional justice and fair procedures mean that a judge cannot proceed to 
sentence a person to imprisonment in their absence where he or she is not satisfied that 
an accused is aware of the proceedings.  Therefore, legislation allowing for electronic 
service of court summonses in criminal cases would have to provide that a court could 
adjourn proceedings and direct an alternative means of service or issue a bench warrant if 
it was not satisfied that the defendant was aware of proceedings.  Such a procedure could 
result in the court having to adjourn a large number of cases.  This could result in delays 
in proceedings, high costs and inefficiency in the management of court lists.  It could also 
result in the issuing of more bench warrants.  
7.94 The Commission recommends that, where possible, summonses should be served 
by personal delivery or by registered post but that since it would be impractical to 
require personal service or service by registered post in all cases, the Commission 
recommends that letterbox service should remain as an alternative option. 
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(4) Delivery of summons to incorrect address 
7.95 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission also noted concerns that were raised 
regarding instances where summonses have been inadvertently sent to an incorrect 
address resulting in a person being unaware of the requirement to attend court.227  The 
Commission notes that this issue would not be remedied by removing letterbox service of 
summonses, as the registered post could still be directed to an incorrect address.  The 
Consultation Paper suggested that it is likely that the use of an incorrect address may 
become known at an earlier stage if a registered postal summons delivery service was 
employed.  However, the Commission received submissions suggesting that a registered 
postal system would not be of assistance in this regard as a summons cannot be 
interfered with until such time as the return date has lapsed.  Thus, to amend a summons 
before the court date with a view to re-delivering it to the person named thereon, a change 
in the law pertaining to amending a summons prior to the return date would be required.  
At present, it is possible to amend a summons in accordance with the procedure laid 
down by in the District Court Rules 1997.228  However it is only possible to do so once the 
return date has passed and a mistake has become apparent.  
7.96 The Commission received feedback suggesting that the availability of a person’s Personal 
Public Service (PPS) number would enable the Courts Service and Gardaί to direct 
summonses to an accurate address.  The accessing of PPS numbers by a public body 
such as the Courts Service engages the right to privacy and is subject to the requirements 
set out by the Data Protection Act 1988  and the Data Protection (Amendment) Act 2003.  
However, other legislation provides for the sharing of a person’s data for the purpose of 
enabling a court to perform its functions.  In that regard, section 14(3) of the Fines 
(Payment and Recovery) Act 2014 states that when a Court is making an attachment of 
earnings order following a failure of a person to pay a fine by the due date, the person’s 
address and PPS number must be included in the attachment order.  Section 23 of the 
2014 Act provides: 
“Notwithstanding any enactment or rule of law, a relevant person shall, upon request 
from a court, provide the court with such information in the possession or control of the 
relevant person as the court may reasonably require for the purpose of enabling the 
court to perform it functions under this Act in relation to recovery orders or 
attachments orders” 
7.97 “Relevant persons” for the purposes of section 23 of the Act are defined as: (a) the 
Revenue Commissioners; (b) the Minister for Social Protection; or (c) such persons as 
may be prescribed. Other legislation also permits the sharing of data using the PPS 
number as a unique identifier for certain purposes such as for the administration and 
control of Health Service Executive schemes.229   
7.98 The Commission is of the view that a similar provision allowing for the sharing of data 
might assist in overcoming the issue of summons being sent to incorrect addresses.  
However, the guidelines would need to be set out to safeguard the right to privacy and 
promote compliance with data protection requirements.  The Data Protection 
Commissioner has approved codes of practice set out by bodies such as An Garda 
Síochána and the Revenue Commissioners for the purposes of section 13 of the Data 
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Protection Acts 1988, as amended.230  The Department of Social Protection has also set 
out guidelines to promote and facilitate the proper use of PPS numbers in accordance 
with data protection legislation.231  The Commission is of the view that any provision 
allowing for the sharing of data between the Courts Service and other bodies for the 
purpose of directing summonses to an accurate address should be supplemented by a 
code of practice or guidelines to promote proper use of PPS numbers in accordance with 
data protection legislation.   
7.99 This approach would also improve the collection rates of fines imposed by the courts by 
the Courts Service so that fines can be collected by their due date.  As a result, courts 
would not have to consider alternative options of enforcing fines, including issuing 
committal warrants.  The Report to the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform on 
Debt Management notes that the Courts Service collects debts by issuing bills and 
following up with a reminder but legislation does not allow for other means of collecting 
debts, such as phoning the defaulter or negotiating payment plans.  It notes that “[m]uch 
of the debt management activity is outside of the Courts Service control.  The quality of 
data, which underpins the Courts Service’s ability to collect fines, is poor and hard to 
verify.”232  The Report notes that the Courts Service relies on the capture of data, such as 
names, addresses and contact details by the prosecutor (usually the Gardaí).  The Report 
recommends that, ideally, a person should be required to provide a unique identifier such 
as a PPS number, driver licence number or vehicle registration number to verify the 
person’s identity and address.233  It further recommends that where this is impossible, 
such as where a person does not appear in court, it should be possible to attach the fine 
to an asset or other state licence renewal (the Commission has made a recommendation 
in respect of this at paragraph 7.46 above).234  The Report concludes that the Courts 
Service should also have access to other state databases to assist in verifying identity and 
gain access to contact details.235 The Commission supports this approach and 
recommends that such data sharing be permitted, subject to appropriate protections in 
accordance with data protection legislation.   
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7.100 The Commission recommends that legislation should allow for the sharing of data 
between the Courts Service and other bodies such as the Revenue Commissioners 
and Minister for Social Protection for the purpose of directing a summons to an 
accurate address.  The Commission recommends that such legislation should be 
supplemented by guidelines promoting the proper use of PPS numbers in 
accordance with data protection legislation. 
E Return of Unexecuted Bench Warrants 
7.101 The Consultation Paper noted that the large number of unexecuted bench warrants is 
often a result of delay or a pragmatic decision not to execute them.  The Garda Síochána 
Inspectorate Report on Crime Investigation stated that the Inspectorate visited Garda stations 
and, while there, examined the activity carried out to execute warrants.236  It observed that 
“[i]n some divisions, it was clear that there were concerted efforts by all Gardaí to try to 
execute warrants.  In other divisions some Gardaí held a view that warrants were the 
remit of the warrant unit.”237  The Report also noted that PULSE has a tab on which 
Gardaí can record attempts and actions carried out to execute warrants.  However, it 
stated that “[m]any warrants checked by the Inspectorate appeared to have little or no 
action recorded on PULSE.”238  A number of case studies were outlined highlighting “key 
issues in respect of the management of warrants and failure to execute them.”239  The 
Report recommended that “the Garda Síochána develops a Standard Operating 
Procedure for the management of warrants.”  To achieve this, it recommends a number of 
actions, including240: 
 move to a divisional approach for the management of warrants; 
 confirm that all warrants are entered onto the PULSE system; 
 ensure that all reasonable opportunities to execute a warrant are explored and 
entered on PULSE; 
 provide for good supervision around dealing with warrants and failures to execute 
warrants; 
 provide appropriate staffing levels in all warrant units; and 
 ensure that a person in Garda custody is never released without searching for 
and executing outstanding warrants. 
7.102 The Commission agrees that the implementation of such operating procedures would 
address difficulties relating to the management of warrants.  However, it has also 
considered whether legislation should require Gardaí after a certain period of time to 
return to the Court that issued a bench warrant and explain why it has not been executed. 
(1) Return of  unexecuted warrants to court of issue 
7.103 Section 33 of the Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act 1851 provides for the return of unexecuted 
warrants.  It states that whenever a person to whom a warrant is addressed is unable to 
find the person in respect of whom the warrant was issued, he or she should return the 
warrant to the court that issued it within such time as fixed by the warrant or within a 
reasonable time.  A certificate should be provided containing the reasons why the warrant 
has not been executed and the judge may examine the person under oath in relation to 
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the non-execution of the warrant and may re-issue the warrant or issue another warrant 
for the same purpose from time to time as shall seem expedient.  Order 26, Rule 11 of the 
District Court Rules 1997 is almost identical to section 33 of the 1851 Act, but specifically 
excludes the following from its ambit: 
1. A warrant for the arrest of a person charged with an indictable offence; 
2. A warrant for the arrest of a person who has failed to appear in answer to a 
summons in respect of an offence; 
3. A bench warrant for the arrest of a person who has failed to appear in compliance 
with the terms of a recognisance; or 
4. A search warrant. 
7.104 As discussed in Chapter 5, above, legislative provisions relating to search warrants 
specify their validity periods.  Order 26, Rule 11 of the District Court Rules 1997 provides 
that when the warrant does not specify a time period for its return to the court that issued 
it, it should be returned within a reasonable time not exceeding 6 months.  The certificate 
must be in Form 26. 4, as set out in schedule B to the 1997 Rules.241   
7.105 In Brennan v Windle,242 the Supreme Court held that “[a] person who holds a warrant 
which has expired is not entitled, as of right, to have it reissued, but only on proof of 
particular matters.”243  Form 26.4 provides for the specification of why “after a diligent 
search” the person or goods against whom the warrant was issued cannot be found. 
7.106 Failure to produce a certificate relating to the non-execution of the warrant will result in the 
quashing of a re-issued warrant.  For example, in Daly v Coughlan244 the High Court 
quashed a committal warrant which a judge of the District Court attempted to issue 17 
months after it was originally issued.  The endorsement on the warrant stated that it was 
being re-issued “within 6 months.”  The High Court held that the warrant lacked jurisdiction 
as the warrant did not contain an endorsement stating that the judge of the District Court 
had made enquiries with the relevant Garda regarding the non-execution of the warrant. 
7.107 Failure by Gardaí to return a warrant within the prescribed time will not result in a judge of 
the District Court lacking jurisdiction to re-issue the warrant.245  However, failure of the 
Gardaí to explain why a warrant was not executed will mean that a judge of the District 
Court who purports to re-issue the warrant will not have jurisdiction to do so.246   
(2) Failure or delay in execution of bench warrants 
7.108 As noted above, Order 26, Rule 11 of the District Court Rules 1997 provides that the duty 
to return unexecuted warrants does not apply to bench warrants.   
7.109 Despite there being no specific time limit for the execution of bench warrants, there have 
been many cases where applicants have sought orders of prohibition or quashing of their 
convictions on the grounds that a delay in the execution of a bench warrant breached their 
right to a fair trial with reasonable expedition.  In the Consultation Paper, the Commission 
discussed the duty of the Gardaí to execute bench warrants expeditiously.247  In the 
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Supreme Court decision Cormack and Farrell v Director of Public Prosecutions,248 the 
Supreme Court considered jointly two applications for orders of prohibition resulting from 
the delay in the execution of bench warrants which had been issued against them.  
Regarding blameworthy prosecutorial delay, the Supreme Court stated:249  
“In the context of delay...  the legal position in relation to the execution of bench 
warrants may be simply stated. There is an obligation on An Garda Síochána to 
execute same promptly or within a reasonable time. A failure to do so may amount to 
blameworthy prosecutorial delay. However, members of the Gardaí cannot 
automatically be assumed to be in default where immediate execution of warrants 
does not occur, bearing in mind the multiple other duties and obligations requiring to 
be performed by them. They may encounter all sorts of difficulties when endeavouring 
to execute bench warrants which are brought about by deceit and false information 
given to them. Nonetheless, it must be the case that a point in time will arise where 
the continuing failure to execute a bench warrant will amount to blameworthy 
prosecutorial delay sufficient to trigger an inquiry into whether an applicant’s right to 
an expeditious trial has been compromised to such a degree as to warrant prohibition. 
It is impossible to be more specific as to what timeframe for the execution of a warrant 
should obtain other than to stress that warrants must be executed promptly or at least 
within a reasonable time. For reasons set out below, that permissible timeframe must 
be one of shorter duration where summary proceedings are concerned.” 
7.110 Courts must consider all of the relevant facts in a particular case when adjudicating in 
cases involving a delay in the execution of bench warrants.  The contribution of the 
accused to the delay will be weighed against them and a person will be required to show 
that any delay has had a prejudicial effect on the case.  In addition, courts expect Gardaí 
to take active steps to execute bench warrants. 
7.111 The High Court decision Murphy v Shields250 concerned the complete failure to execute a 
bench warrant, rather than a delay in its execution.  The applicant’s hearing for drunken 
driving had been adjourned a number of times.  On the fourth occasion, the applicant and 
his solicitor failed to appear in court due to hazardous weather conditions.  Another 
solicitor applied for an adjournment on behalf of the applicant but the judge issued a 
bench warrant.  The warrant remained unexecuted at the time the applicant brought 
judicial review proceedings seeking the quashing of the decision of the judge of the 
District Court to issue the bench warrant.  He contended that the judge of the District 
Court had acted unreasonably and outside his jurisdiction.  The High Court was of the 
view that the judge had jurisdiction to issue the bench warrant and had exercised his 
discretion correctly.  However, the Court was critical of the general attitude of Gardaí 
towards the execution of bench warrants and stated that “members of An Garda Síochána 
to whom a warrant is issued for execution must be accountable to the Court which issued 
the warrant for its prompt execution and in default of a prisoner being expeditiously 
produced, have an explanation for his non-production and furnish an explanation of what 
steps were taken to bring about his apprehension.”251 The Court, in exercise of its “general 
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supervisory jurisdiction”,252 granted certiorari, not because of the issuing of the warrant, 
but “because of its continued existence a year later.”253   
(3) Discussion  
7.112 The Commission is aware that delay or failure to execute a bench warrant can have a 
number of negative effects.  A lengthy delay in executing a bench warrant may have a 
prejudicial effect on a person whose trial is delayed as a result if, for example, witnesses 
that previously might have helped the defence are no longer available.  It can also be 
argued that a person in respect of whom a bench warrant issued is entitled to “peace of 
mind”254 and not to have the threat of an unexecuted warrant hanging over him or her.  In 
addition, the public interest in the prosecution of crime and the interests of the victim of a 
crime are negatively affected if bench warrants are not dealt with expeditiously as there is 
a lack of progress in the relevant case.  Delay and failure to execute bench warrants 
contribute to the high figures for unexecuted bench warrants, which result in general 
inefficiency in the courts system. 
7.113 The Commission has considered whether there should be a duty on Gardaí to return to 
the court which issued the warrant after a certain period of time and explain what efforts 
have been made to execute the warrant and any reasons why it has not yet been 
executed.  It could then be open to the issuing authority to extend the validity period of the 
warrant or to cancel the warrant if he or she was of the view that insufficient efforts had 
been made to locate the person to whom the warrant related.  Such an approach would 
encourage Gardaí to take active steps to execute outstanding warrants as soon as 
possible.  This would result in cases in which bench warrants are issued being disposed 
of more quickly and would result in fewer unexecuted bench warrants.   
7.114 However, the imposition of a formal time limit might not take account of different factors in 
individual cases.  For example, while it might be easy for Gardaí to locate a person who 
has a bench warrant against them within a certain time period in some cases, it might be 
more difficult in a case where, for example, an accused had left the county for some time.  
Courts have held that it is not possible or desirable to impose strict time periods on the 
validity of bench warrants and each case involving a delay in the execution of a bench 
warrant that is under consideration should require a balancing of all of the factors.255  A 
procedure requiring Gardaí to return to the Court of issue to explain why a bench warrant 
had not yet been executed might result in person purposefully absconding or avoiding 
arrest until the date for returning the warrant had passed.  In addition, it might be too 
onerous and require a disproportionate commitment of Garda resources if Gardaí were 
required to execute bench warrants within a certain period of time.  Much Garda and court 
time and resources would be taken up with Gardaí returning to court to explain why a 
bench warrant had not been executed.   
7.115 It is important that bench warrants be executed expeditiously.  However, having 
considered the advantages and disadvantages, the Commission is of the view that there 
should not be a requirement that Gardaí return to court to explain why a bench warrant 
has not been executed.  Rather, it should remain the case that delay in the execution of a 
bench warrant may be challenged and dealt with on a case by case basis.   
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7.116 The Commission recommends that the arguments that a delay or failure to execute 
a bench warrant breached a person’s right to a fair trial should continue to be 
adjudicated upon on a case by case basis and there should not be a duty on Gardaí 
in all cases to return to a court that issued a bench warrant and explain why the 
bench warrant remains unexecuted. 
F Inspection of PULSE 
7.117 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission provisionally recommended that a protocol 
should be put in place requiring members of An Garda Síochána to inspect PULSE 
records to determine whether an unexecuted bench warrant exists in respect of a person.  
The Commission also provisionally recommended the introduction of a certification 
process whereby members of An Garda Síochána would have to sign a declaration 
stating that he or she had examined PULSE records.  Such a declaration requirement 
would have to be satisfied before a member granted station bail, before bringing the 
person before a court to be dealt with by a judge, or in respect of any other matter to be 
dealt with by An Garda Síochána.  The requirement could be implemented through a 
standard declaration form to be completed, and attached to the relevant file or papers, 
such as a bail bond or charge sheet.  Alternatively, a declaration section could be added 
to existing forms so that a member would simply have to tick a box stating that PULSE 
had been checked to determine whether there was an unexecuted bench warrant against 
the person, and then sign the declaration section. 
7.118 PULSE (Police Using Leading Systems Effectively) is the database currently employed by 
the Gardaí to store and share knowledge across the organisation and with other 
organisations, such as the Courts Service.  All incidents of notable concern are logged on 
PULSE, which stores the details and provides an identification number specific to the 
person in question. Thus, when a court issues a bench warrant, the Gardaí are informed 
and a record reflecting this is created on PULSE.  The Consultation Paper highlighted a 
number of issues pertaining to the manner in which PULSE is used. Most commonly, this 
relates to a failure by the Gardaí to properly inspect PULSE so that persons are often 
granted station bail when there is an unexecuted bench warrant against them.  
Alternatively, the court may not be informed that a person before them has an unexecuted 
warrant against them.  The Consultation Paper suggested that a specific protocol be 
established in respect of PULSE in order to address these issues.  A simple document 
certification procedure whereby the Garda in question was obliged to declare formally that 
he or she has inspected PULSE would suffice.   
7.119 The Report of the Garda Síochána Inspectorate on Crime Investigation mentions that, 
following the Guerin Report, a system will be implemented requiring a sergeant or 
member in charge of detained persons at Garda stations to cover 5 key points before 
releasing a person from custody.256  One of these is ensuring that the person does not 
have an outstanding bench warrant against them.   
7.120 The Commission received a submission suggesting that a document certification 
procedure is unnecessary as Gardaί can give evidence under oath confirming that they 
have inspected PULSE and there are no outstanding bench warrants against the relevant 
person. While the Commission acknowledges that Gardaí can give such evidence, it is 
important that every Garda who is considering whether to grant a person station bail, or a 
court that is considering an application for bail, is aware that an unexecuted bench 
warrant exists in respect of a person.  Firstly, the existence of an unexecuted bench 
warrant is a factor that may be relevant to whether a person should be granted bail or not.  
Secondly, failure of a member of An Garda Síochána to check PULSE or inform the Court 
of an unexecuted bench warrant does not assist in reducing the high number of 
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unexecuted bench warrants.  One measure that An Garda Síochána recommends is to 
“ensure that a person in Garda custody is never released without searching for and 
executing outstanding warrants.”257 
7.121 Thus, the Commission recommends the implementation of a procedure whereby the 
member of the Gardaí dealing with a person should be required to sign a formal 
declaration stating that he or she has examined PULSE and satisfied himself or herself 
that there are no outstanding bench warrants to be executed in respect of the person.   
7.122 Some IT improvements may be required if a protocol requiring members of An Garda 
Síochána to inspect PULSE records to determine whether an unexecuted bench warrant 
exists is to be effective.  A check of PULSE may not always identify the existence of an 
unexecuted bench warrant against a person.  The Report of the Garda Síochána 
Inspectorate on Crime Investigation notes that when a warrant is recorded on PULSE, a 
warning marker is created in respect of a person’s record.258  The warning marker should 
show up when an intelligence check is carried out and flag the existence of a warrant.  
However, the Report notes that the warning marker “does not update the original PULSE 
record for the crime the suspect is linked to, and it does not link the warrant to the address 
where the person resides.”259  As a result, a Garda visiting an address of a person may be 
unaware that that person has an outstanding warrant.  The Report recommends that “the 
Garda Síochána reviews the system of PULSE warning markers and sources and IT 
solution to ensure that markers are automatically flagged to an address or an incident on 
PULSE to which the person is connect.”260  Such an IT solution would ensure that all 
relevant information is highlighted when members of An Garda Síochána are checking 
PULSE for unexecuted warrants in respect of a person. 
7.123 The Commission recommends that a protocol should be put in place requiring 
members of An Garda Síochána to inspect PULSE records to determine whether an 
unexecuted bench warrant exists in respect of a person.   
7.124 The Commission also recommends the introduction of a certification process 
whereby a declaration would have to be signed by a member of An Garda Síochána 
dealing with a person stating that he or she has examined PULSE records. 
G Unexecuted Bench Warrants and Station Bail 
7.125 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission invited submissions as to whether a member 
of An Garda Síochána of a certain minimum rank should be given a discretionary power to 
grant station bail where a person has an unexecuted bench warrant against him or her.  
The Consultation Paper outlined the statutory power of Gardaí in certain cases to release 
a person on bail to appear before the District Court where it is considered “prudent” to do 
so.261  However, where there is a warrant in existence for any such person this option is 
not currently available.262  In such circumstances, the person must be brought before the 
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District Court as soon as possible,263 which often requires the convening of an emergency 
sitting of the court.  Such a process is costly and it is in this context that the Commission 
invited submissions on whether there should be a discretion to grant station bail. The 
Consultation Paper noted that this may be a suitable solution in circumstances where:  
(1) a bench warrant has existed for a long time and/or pertains to a minor matter; 
and  
(2) a member of An Garda Síochána of a certain rank does not believe that the 
person is likely to abscond or evade justice.264   
7.126 Giving Gardaí of a certain minimum rank discretion to release a person against whom a 
live bench warrant exists would reduce the need to convene out of hours court sittings as 
the person could instead be released on station bail and given a court time and date to 
appear in court.  This would reduce costs because Gardaí, judges and court staff would 
not need to travel to a court so that the bench warrant could be executed.  In cases where 
a bench warrant has remained unexecuted for a long period of time or relates to a minor 
offence, there may not be a great risk that the warrant cannot be executed in the very 
near future.  For example, there may be no real concern that the person will abscond.  He 
or she may have a long term fixed address, and it may therefore not be difficult to find him 
or her at a later time.  Therefore the person could be released on station bail until the next 
scheduled sitting of the relevant court.   
7.127 A bench warrant is a command to An Garda Síochána to arrest a person and bring them 
before a court.  In the Supreme Court decision Cormack and Farrell v Director of Public 
Prosecutions,265 the Court stated: 
“The law unambiguously requires Gardaί to execute bench warrants without delay and 
within a reasonable timeframe.  In this context the courts must ensure that court 
processes and orders are given due respect by the relevant State authorities and the 
execution of a bench warrant is not something to be simply left to the relevant State 
authority as a matter of discretion.”266 
7.128 The Court cited the following passage from the High Court decision Dunne v Director of 
Public Prosecutions,267 which has been referred to in numerous cases:268  
“A warrant of apprehension is a command issued to the Gardaí by a Court established 
under the Constitution to bring a named person before the Court to be dealt with 
according to law.  It is not a document which merely vests a discretion in the Guards 
to apprehend the person named in it; it is a command to arrest that person 
immediately and bring him or her before the Court which issued it.  That it is a 
command rather than merely an authority of permission to arrest can be clearly seen 
from the terms of the warrant in the instant case.” 
7.129 The status of a bench warrant, namely, a court order or command to arrest, may mean 
that it would be unsuitable to afford a discretion to Gardaí to release a person against 
whom there is an outstanding bench warrant.  Moreover, if a bench warrant exists in 
respect of a person, it means that he or she previously failed to appear in court.  This 
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means that there may be an increased risk that such a person will not appear in court if 
released on station bail.  When considering whether to grant a person bail, courts take 
into account whether and, if relevant, the number of times that the person has previously 
failed to appear in court.  There is a danger that giving Gardaí of a certain minimum rank 
discretion to release a person on station bail where there is a live warrant would have the 
effect of increasing the number of bench warrants issued if the court had to issue another 
bench warrant as a result of that person subsequently failing to appear in court.   
7.130 It can also be argued that the most suitably placed authority to decide whether or not to 
grant bail to a person who has been arrested on foot of a bench warrant is a court.  The 
District Court Rules 1997 already provide for the endorsement of a warrant of arrest by a 
judge when issuing the warrant authorising the release of a person arrested on foot of a 
warrant.  Section 8(1) of the Bail Act 1997 provides that, where a court issues a warrant 
for the arrest of a person, it may direct that the person be released on arrest upon 
entering into recognisances with or without sureties to appear before the court at a 
specified date and time.269  Order 17, Rule 5 of the District Court Rules 1997 mirrors the 
power of endorsement contained in section 8(1) of the 1997 Act.270  Form 26.1 is the 
relevant form in this regard and is set out in schedule B to the District Court Rules 1997.  
Thus, it is already possible, in cases involving minor offences, for a person to be released 
on station bail once a judge has endorsed the warrant to that effect at the time of issue.  
There is also a concern that providing for a discretion in respect of a minor offence where 
the bench warrant was very old would have a net-widening effect so that it would 
eventually lead to persons against whom a live bench warrant exists being released on 
station bail for more serious offences.  The Commission is also aware that in many cases, 
an unexecuted bench warrant comes to light when Gardaí arrest a person for a new 
alleged offence, bring him or her to the Garda station and discover on PULSE that there is 
an unexecuted bench warrant in respect of that person.  If this is the manner in which 
unexecuted bench warrants are discovered in a large number of cases, it may not be 
effective to recommend that Gardaí should have a discretion to release a person on bail in 
such circumstances.   
7.131 In light of the significant concerns that giving Gardaí of a certain rank a discretion to 
release a person on station bail when an unexecuted bench warrant exists, the 
Commission is of the view that legislation should not provide for such a discretion.  
Rather, the provision in section 8(1) of the Bail Act 1997 which allows a judge to endorse 
a warrant for the arrest of a person authorising the release of the person upon entering 
into recognisances can be used where the bench warrant relates to a minor offence. 
7.132 The Commission recommends that section 8(1) of the Bail Act 1997, which provides 
for the endorsement of a warrant of arrest by a judge when issuing the warrant 
authorising the release of a person arrested on foot of a warrant on station bail, 
should be used where appropriate, and there should be no discretion for a member 
of An Garda Síochána of a certain minimum rank to release a person on station bail 
where an unexecuted bench warrant exists in respect of that person. 
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H Explaining the Requirement to Appear as a Condition of Bail 
7.133 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission noted that a person’s failure to appear in Court 
after being granted bail may be due to a lack of awareness or understanding of his or her 
obligation to appear.271  For example, where a person is released on bail from a Garda 
station, he or she may be under the impression that the matter has been completely dealt 
with and may not realise that he or she has been released on bail and is required to 
appear in court.  Alternatively, when a person leaves court, he or she may be unaware of 
the requirement to attend at a subsequent court sitting, particularly where he or she has 
not had a legal representative present to explain the proceedings.  
7.134 The Commission therefore provisionally recommended that a procedure should be put in 
place so that where bail is granted to a person (whether Garda station bail or court 
granted bail), the person should clearly understand the bail condition that he or she is to 
appear before the court at a later date.272  The Commission is aware that it is the practice 
of many judges to ask individuals whether they understand their bail conditions.  However, 
it may be appropriate to set out this requirement in rules of court or a code of practice or 
practice direction.  
7.135 The Commission identified a number of best practice approaches which could be set out 
in respect of such a procedure.  With regard to Garda station bail the Commission noted 
the following273:  
(1) in cases where there is a language barrier between the relevant authority and the 
person concerned, it may be advisable to call upon an interpreter to explain the 
bail condition to appear in court to the person;  
(2) where a person appears to be under the influence of an intoxicating substance 
the matter should be followed up by meeting with the person at another time, 
when he or she may be better able to understand his or her obligations; 
(3) where a person appears to have literacy problems, any document setting out the 
requirement to appear should be clearly explained, so that he or she understands 
its content;  
(4) where a person’s capacity may be in question, a suitable or relevant assisted 
decision-maker, social worker, carer, solicitor or other person should be 
contacted to follow up on the matter. 
7.136 In respect of court bail, the judge or legal representative involved should be certain that 
the person understands the requirement to attend at the court on a future date. This may, 
for example, involve taking the person to a quiet area of the court, or relying on an 
interpreter, to explain the matter completely. 
7.137 The Commission also provisionally recommended in the Consultation Paper that, as an 
overall precaution, it would be advisable to give a person who has been granted bail and 
who is required to appear before a court a simple document noting his or her obligation to 
appear, and the time and date set for that appearance.274   
7.138 The Commission received a submission suggesting that such a code of practice is 
consistent with the existing practice of the Gardaí in respect of station bail.  Each arrested 
                                               
271
  Consultation Paper on Search Warrants and Bench Warrants (LRC CP 58-2009) at paragraph 7.51 
272
  Ibid at paragraph 7.57. 
273
  Ibid at paragraph 7.54. 
274
  Ibid at paragraph 7.57. 
 196 
person is given a copy of the charge sheet and a copy of the station bail document275 
which outlines the offence that the person has been charged with and the requirement to 
appear at a court on a specific date and time.  The submission suggests that these simple 
documents.  The requirement to attend court is also explained to the person by a member 
of the Garda station staff in ordinary language.  Where there is an issue pertaining to 
language an interpreter is called to the station to explain this to the person in their native 
language.    
7.139 The Commission is of the view that it would be appropriate to set out current practice in a 
code of practice so that when a person is granted bail, the relevant authority, or a 
decision-making assistant, should ensure that the person fully understands his or her 
requirement to appear before a court, as a condition of the bail agreement.  Such an 
approach should help to reduce the number of people who fail to attend at court due to 
being unaware or unable to understand that they are under an obligation to appear.  In 
turn, this should help to reduce the number of bench warrants issued in respect of non-
appearance of persons who have been admitted to bail.   
7.140 In light of submissions received, the Commission has considered whether Form 17.2, 
which is the document provided to persons released on station bail, is simple enough to 
make it clear to that person that he or she must appear at a sitting of the District Court at a 
specific date, time and location.  Part 2 of the form contains such information but the form 
also contains a large amount of other information that might confuse a person who is not 
familiar with court proceedings and bail procedure.  For example, the form uses terms 
such as “recognisance”, “surety” and “estreated”.  It is important that Gardaí provide the 
person with a form which specifies the conditions of his or her bail, such as any sum of 
money to be lodged or independent surety.  However, the Commission is of the view that 
Gardaí should provide a person being released on station bail with a separate document 
indicating the requirement to appear at a District Court at a specified time, date and 
location.  This document should use plain language so that it can be easily understood.  
Such an approach would be beneficial in cases where it does not immediately appear to 
the authority concerned that a person is having difficulty understanding the condition to 
appear, or where a person is not comfortable with outlining that he or she does not in fact 
understand the bail conditions.  Providing the person with a simple written notice enables 
him or her to show the notice to another person who can assist in explaining the condition 
to appear, and perhaps assist the person to fulfil the obligation.  
7.141 The Commission recommends that where a person is granted bail, whether at a 
Garda station or by a court, the relevant authority should have in place a clear 
procedure to ensure that he or she is notified of and understands the obligation to 
appear before a court at a later date, as a condition of the bail agreement. 
7.142 The Commission also recommends that where a person is granted bail, he or she 
should be provided with a document at that time setting out, in plain intelligible 
language, his or her requirement to attend at a court sitting, as well as the time and 
date upon which he or she is required to appear. 
I Informing Courts of Existing Bench Warrants 
7.143 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission invited submissions as to whether a District 
Court rule or code of practice should be implemented requiring judges of the District Court 
and Gardaί to determine if there are any unexecuted warrants against an individual 
appearing before the court.276  The Commission also sought views on how all records 
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relating to an individual could be made easily accessible to the Courts Service so that the 
court may be fully informed when dealing with that person.277   
(1) Requirement of judges of the District Court and/or Gardaí to ascertain if there are 
any unexecuted warrants 
7.144 The Consultation Paper noted that, in some cases where persons appear in court, the 
existence of an unexecuted bench warrant is not brought to the attention of the court.278  
This can result in the court taking an approach that it would not necessarily have taken if it 
had been aware of the outstanding warrant.  For example, a court might grant bail or 
impose less stringent bail conditions than it would have if it had been aware of the 
outstanding bench warrant.  The Consultation Paper noted that some judges make 
specific enquiries as to whether there are any unexecuted bench warrants against a 
person and that this seems to be a best practice approach.279  The Commission is of the 
opinion that a process requiring Gardaí to check PULSE to determine whether there are 
any existing bench warrants would assist in keeping courts informed of outstanding bench 
warrants.  Such a requirement should be supplemented by a District Court rule or practice 
direction requiring judges of the District Court to enquire with the relevant Garda and 
Courts Service staff as to whether there are any unexecuted bench warrants in respect of 
a person who is before the court.  A judge making oral enquiries in relation to the 
existence of any unexecuted warrants would remind Gardaí and Courts Service staff of 
the need to check to see whether there are any unexecuted warrants.  The incorporation 
of best practice into standard procedure would result in more warrants being executed 
and may assist in reducing the number of unexecuted bench warrants.   
7.145 The Commission recommends that the current practice of judges enquiring as to 
whether there are any unexecuted warrants against a person appearing before the 
court should be implemented in a District Court rule or practice direction.   
(2) Court Records 
7.146 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission noted that there are often difficulties 
identifying a person and his or her records on the Courts Service Criminal Case Tracking 
System (CCTS).280  When a court issues a bench warrant, it is recorded on the CCTS.  
Usually the person’s name address and date of birth is recorded.    Lack of precision and 
inconsistencies in the format of recording information on the CCTS can lead to difficulties 
accessing all or any of a person’s records on the system.  As a result, a search of the 
CCTS in respect of a person being dealt with by the court may not bring up records of 
outstanding warrants against that person.  Other issues, such as a person providing a 
false address or having a common name, contribute to difficulties in locating complete and 
accurate records through a search of the CCTS.  The Commission also received feedback 
suggesting that not all warrants that have been issued contain the date of birth of the 
relevant person.  This can result in an inability to identify the person to whom the warrant 
relates if it is a common name or if more than one person in a family has a certain name.   
7.147 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission invited submissions as to how all records 
relating to a person could be easily accessible to the Court so that the Court may be fully 
informed when dealing with that person.281   
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(a) A unique identifier 
7.148 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission suggested that including a person’s PPS 
number on records might assist in precisely and definitively identifying a person’s court 
records.282  The Commission received feedback suggesting that the availability of PPS 
numbers would greatly assist the Courts Service in this regard.   
7.149 The issue of warrant records is discussed in the Garda Síochána Inspectorate Report on 
Crime Investigation.283  The Report noted that there are many reference numbers 
associated with warrants, including a PULSE number, court case file number, charge 
sheet number and warrant number, and suggests that “[a] unique reference number 
shared between the court and the Garda Síochána would certainly reduce some of the 
confusion over a warrant reference number.”284 
7.150 The use of PPS numbers to help identify persons would necessitate legislation requiring a 
person who is arrested or suspected of an offence that is non-arrestable to provide a 
Garda with their PPS number.  There could be a penalty for refusing to give a PPS 
number or giving a false PPS number.  Alternatively, if the Commission’s recommendation 
that legislation should allow for data sharing between the Courts Service and other state 
bodies to enable summonses to be sent to an accurate address is implemented, a PPS 
number could be obtained from another public service body.  The PPS number could then 
be used on all documents during proceedings on both the PULSE system and CCTS.   
7.151 As with the recommendation at paragraph 05 regarding sharing data between the Court 
Service and other agencies, the introduction of a provision allowing for PPS numbers to 
be used on the CCTS and PULSE systems as a unique identifier would need to be 
supplemented by a code of practice or guidelines to promote proper use of PPS numbers 
in accordance with data protection legislation.   
7.152 The Commission recommends that legislation should provide for access by the 
Courts Service to PPS numbers to be used as a unique identifier to assist the 
Courts Service in identifying a person on the Criminal Case Tracking System for the 
purpose of executing bench warrants. Any provision allowing for PPS numbers to 
be used on the CCTS and PULSE systems as a unique identifier would need to be 
supplemented by a code of practice or guidelines to promote proper use of PPS 
numbers in accordance with data protection legislation. 
 
(b) Tracking warrants and verification of identity 
7.153 The Report of the Garda Síochána Inspectorate on Crime Investigation notes that there 
may be a significant gap between the records of warrants first issued in court and those 
recorded on the PULSE system.285  Garda Internal audits in 2010 and 2011 found 
“indications that significant numbers of warrants are not tracked correctly”286 and 
considerable differences between the records kept by the courts and on the PULSE 
system.  Regarding the tracking of warrants, the Report notes that two previous warrant 
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audits conducted over the past three years discovered that “22% of warrants could not 
physically be located on the day that the audits were conducted.”  As a result, Gardaí are 
occasionally unable to find a warrant when they stop or arrest a person, and sometimes 
release persons from Garda stations without executing the warrant.  The Commission has 
been advised that the Courts Service uses identification numbers provided to them by An 
Garda Síochána using the PULSE system.  Occasionally, however, a second, separate 
PULSE identification number is created for a person, making it difficult for the Courts 
Service to locate the person’s complete records. It recommended that “the Garda 
Síochána in conjunction with the Courts Service reviews the process for tracking warrants 
from the courts to Garda stations.”287 
7.154 The Garda Síochána Inspectorate Report also notes that the issuing of many warrants is 
a result of “ineffective verification of the identity of a person that the Garda Síochána or 
other agencies have dealt with.”  It noted the importance of verifying the identity of a 
suspect when first dealing with them either away from a Garda station or at a Garda 
station.  An inaccurate identification can result in a warrant being issued for a wrong 
person or a person that does not exist, and therefore there are many unexecuted warrants 
in false names and for non-existent addresses or for persons with no connection to a 
case.288  As already noted, incorrect identification, whether when a person is being dealt 
with by Gardaí or another agency or when false or inaccurate details are entered on the 
CCTS system, can result in problems accessing correct records for a person before the 
court and a failure to identify that an outstanding bench warrant exists in respect of that 
person.  The Garda Inspectorate Report suggests that “a small investment of time to 
conduct proper enquiries at the first stage of dealing with an offender will significantly 
reduce the number of warrants that are issued by the courts and recommended that An 
Garda Síochána should implement a Standard Operating Procedure for identity 
verification.289  These observations are consistent with feedback that the Commission 
received.  The Commission supports this recommendation and is of the view that a 
standard operating procedure for identity verification would assist in reducing the number 
of issued and unexecuted warrants. 
7.155 The Commission recommends the implementation of a standard operating 
procedure by An Garda Síochána for identity verification to ensure the proper 
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8  
CHAPTER 8 SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
The recommendations made by the Commission in this Report are as follows.   
Chapter 2: a generally applicable Search Warrants Act 
8.01 The Commission recommends the enactment of a generally applicable Search Warrants 
Act. [paragraph 2.27] 
8.02 The Commission recommends that the proposed Search Warrants Act should apply to all 
indictable offences and (in accordance with the recommendation in paragraph 2.55) to 
those summary offences for which existing legislation provides for search warrant powers. 
[paragraph 2.40] 
8.03 The Commission recommends that existing legislative provisions which authorise search 
warrants to be issued for the investigation of specific indictable offences should be 
repealed. [paragraph 2.50] 
8.04 The Commission recommends that the repeal of these legislative provisions should be 
achieved by way of textual amendment and not a blanket non-textual amendment. 
[paragraph 2.51] 
8.05 The Commission recommends that, in the future, where new legislation is enacted or 
made that provides for search warrants, the legislation should provide that the generally 
applicable Search Warrants Act should apply to that legislation and that the new 
legislation should also expressly amend a Schedule to the Search Warrants Act to include 
a reference to the new legislation. [paragraph 2.52] 
8.06 The Commission recommends that the Search Warrants Act should apply to existing 
search warrant provisions that apply to summary offences, and that these provisions 
should be listed in a Schedule to the Act. [paragraph 2.55] 
8.07 The Commission recommends that the Search Warrants Act (other than provisions 
relating to the use in any subsequent criminal proceedings of material seized during a 
search) should apply to a scheduled list of Acts and Statutory Instruments which authorise 
the issuing of a search warrant where suspicion or belief that evidence relating to an 
offence is not a requirement or not the only requirement for the issuing of a warrant (in 
particular, Acts and Statutory Instruments that authorise the issuing of search warrants to 
regulatory authorities for purposes of regulatory supervision and inspection). [paragraph 
2.71] 
8.08 The Commission recommends that the key elements of the Search Warrants Act should 
be supplemented by elements in other legislation only where there is a particular need to 
do so, such as the need for a longer validity period in the Companies Act 2014.1 
[paragraph 2.72] 
8.09 The Commission recommends that the Search Warrants Act should not alter or affect any 
common law rule or statutory provision that authorises a person to enter property without 
a search warrant. [paragraph 2.75] 
8.10 The Commission recommends that the proposed Search Warrants Act should contain 
transitional provisions to safeguard the validity of search warrants issued under any prior 
legislative provisions. [paragraph 2.84] 
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Chapter 3: application for search warrants 
8.11 The Commission recommends that the proposed Search Warrants Act should use the 
term “applicant” to refer to the person applying for a search warrant. [paragraph 3.03] 
8.12 The Commission recommends that a single, standard requirement should be used to 
describe the opinion required by the search warrant applicant. [paragraph 3.12]   
8.13 The Commission recommends that “reasonable grounds for suspicion” should be the 
standard requirement in respect of an application for a search warrant. [paragraph 3.21] 
8.14 The Commission recommends that “information on oath and in writing” should be the 
standard requirement for an applicant to affirm his or her opinion. [paragraph 3.36] 
8.15 The Commission recommends that the proposed Search Warrants Act should retain the 
current requirement that a search warrant may be issued where material in respect of an 
offence is to be found at a specified location, and that the recommended Search Warrants 
Act should not therefore provide for anticipatory warrants. [paragraph 3.47] 
8.16 The Commission recommends that the power of an authority considering whether to issue 
a search warrant to request further information from an applicant should be placed on a 
statutory footing in the Search Warrants Act. Such a provision should not create a positive 
obligation but should simply acknowledge the power to request additional information 
where it is necessary and appropriate to do so. [paragraph 3.52]  
8.17 The Commission recommends that the proposed Search Warrants Act should provide for 
a standard search warrant information form to be used when applying for a search 
warrant, which should replace the array of “information for search warrant” forms that 
currently exist. [paragraph 3.63] 
8.18 The Commission recommends that the proposed Search Warrants Act should allow for 
search warrant information forms to be filed electronically. [paragraph 3.71] 
8.19 The Commission recommends that as a general rule a person applying for a search 
warrant should be required to appear personally before a judge of the District Court to 
affirm his or her opinion under oath; but that the proposed Search Warrants Act should 
also provide that an application may be made without the applicant appearing personally 
before a judge where circumstances of urgency giving rise to the immediate need for a 
search warrant means that the delay of appearing in person before a judge would frustrate 
the effective execution of the search warrant. [paragraph 3.90] 
8.20 The Commission recommends that in the urgent circumstances allowing for the removal 
of the requirement for a personal appearance by the applicant, the issuing authority 
should be a judge of the High Court. [paragraph 3.96] 
8.21 The Commission recommends that in cases where the applicant has not appeared 
personally before a judge, he or she should be required to communicate with the judge of 
the High Court considering the application by video link or telephone to affirm his or her 
opinion under oath and answer any questions that the issuing authority deems necessary.  
Where the applicant has affirmed his or her opinion by video link or telephone, the 
applicant should be required to file a record of the search warrant application with the 
High Court as soon as practicable thereafter and not later than 24 hours after the issuing 
of the search warrant. [paragraph 3.104] 
8.22 The Commission recommends that where a judge wishes to be informed of previous 
search warrant applications, he or she may enquire as to this matter as part of his or her 
power to request further information of an applicant, but that the proposed Search 
Warrants Act should not include a mandatory requirement to inform the court of previous 
search warrant applications. [paragraph 3.110] 
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Chapter 4: issuing search warrants 
8.23 The Commission recommends that the proposed Search Warrants Act should provide that 
search warrants should only be issued by a court, and that this should ordinarily be a 
judge of the District Court.  This should be subject to an exception that search warrants 
may be issued by the High Court where circumstances of urgency exist giving rise to the 
immediate need for a search warrant which would be frustrated by the general 
requirement for the applicant to appear in person before a judge of the District Court. 
[paragraph 4.39] 
8.24 The Commission recommends the repeal of legislative provisions empowering members 
of An Garda Síochána and peace commissioners to issue search warrants. [paragraph 
4.40] 
8.25 The Commission recommends that the proposed Search Warrants Act should provide for 
a standard search warrant form to be used when issuing a search warrant, which should 
replace the array of search warrant forms that currently exist. [paragraph 4.56]  
8.26 The Commission recommends that a copy of each issued search warrant, supplied by the 
applicant, should be retained on file by the District Court; and in the case of urgent 
applications, by the High Court, and where the search warrant has been transmitted to the 
applicant electronically by the High Court, a copy shall be saved on an electronic 
database. [paragraph 4.63] 
8.27 The Commission recommends that the executing authority should possess the search 
warrant so that he or she can show it to the owner or occupier. [paragraph 4.78] 
8.28 The Commission also recommends that where, in urgent circumstances, the applicant has 
not personally appeared before the issuing authority, it should be possible for the search 
warrant to be transmitted to him or her electronically so that he or she can show the owner 
or occupier of the premises being searched the search warrant on a device or a printed 
copy of the electronically transmitted warrant. [paragraph 4.79] 
Chapter 5: execution of search warrants 
8.29 The Commission recommends that the Search Warrants Act should provide for a standard 
validity period for search warrants of 7 days. [paragraph 5.05] 
8.30 The Commission recommends that where an applicant has applied to the High Court for a 
search warrant in urgent circumstances without appearing personally before a judge of the 
District Court, the validity period of the warrant should be 24 hours. The Commission 
recommends that the Search Warrants Act should provide that this is an exception to the 
general standard period of 7 days. [paragraph 5.09] 
8.31 The Commission recommends that the Search Warrants Act should provide for the 
extension of the search warrant validity period of 7 days where this is deemed necessary; 
and the executing officer should be required to provide information on oath as to the 
reasons why an extension is considered necessary. [paragraph 5.15] 
8.32 The Commission recommends that extension of the validity period should not be 
permitted at the time of the initial search warrant application nor once the warrant 
expiration date has passed. [paragraph 5.16] 
8.33 The Commission recommends that the extension period should be no more than 7 days, 
but that a subsequent application for extension should be permitted where a further 
extension is required. [paragraph 5.17] 
8.34 The Commission recommends that the Search Warrants Act should permit no more than 
three orders to be made extending the validity period of a search warrant. [paragraph 
5.18] 
8.35 The Commission recommends that the provisions in the Search Warrants Act concerning 
the 7 day validity period and extension of the validity period should be without prejudice to 
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specific legislative provisions, including those in the Central Bank (Supervision and 
Enforcement) Act 2013 and the Companies Act 2014, which specify longer validity periods 
where these are necessary for investigations under, for example, financial services 
legislation or company law. [paragraph 5.19] 
8.36 The Commission recommends that the Search Warrants Act should include a 
presumption that a search warrant will be executed at a reasonable time unless there are 
specific reasons why this should not be the case; and that if the search warrant is not to 
be executed at a reasonable time, the reasons for this should be provided when the 
application for the search warrant is being made and should form part of the sworn basis 
for the application. The Commission also recommends that any reference to what specific 
times are to be regarded as reasonable for this purpose should be a matter for 
consideration in the statutory Code of Practice on Search Warrants recommended in 
paragraph 6.70 of this Report. [paragraph 5.26] 
8.37 The Commission recommends that the Search Warrants Act should provide that the 
scope of the authority to enter a location should be “at any reasonable time or times.” 
[paragraph 5.39] 
8.38 The Commission recommends that the Search Warrants Act should not require the 
applicant to state at the time of the search warrant application how many entries are 
required. [paragraph 5.40] 
8.39 The Commission recommends that the Search Warrants Act should provide that where it 
is necessary to use force during the execution of a search warrant, any force used must 
be reasonable. [paragraph 5.44] 
8.40 The Commission recommends that a copy of the search warrant should be given to the 
owner or occupier of the property concerned upon the completion of the warrant 
execution.  [paragraph 5.53] 
8.41 The Commission recommends that when the owner or occupier is not present at the place 
at the time of the execution of the warrant the executing authority should leave a copy of 
the search warrant in a prominent place at the place. [paragraph 5.54] 
8.42 The Commission recommends that the requirement to give a copy of the search warrant 
to the owner or occupier should not be absolute and that the Search Warrants Act should 
provide for an exception that where an executing officer believes that it is not advisable to 
give a copy of the warrant it may be withheld from the owner or occupier. [paragraph 5.57] 
8.43 The Commission recommends that there should be an appeal from a decision to withhold 
the search warrant copy from an owner or occupier to a judge of the District Court. 
[paragraph 5.58] 
8.44 The Commission recommends that the occupier of a location which is the subject of a 
search should be provided with an occupier’s notice outlining the nature of the authority 
afforded to executing officers, the procedure for seizing material under the warrant and 
the rights and obligations of the occupier. [paragraph 5.63] 
8.45 The Commission recommends that when the occupier is not present at the premises at 
the time of the execution of the warrant the executing authority should leave the 
occupier’s notice in a prominent place on the premises. [paragraph 5.64] 
8.46 The Commission recommends that, where a person who is not a member of An Garda 
Síochána is required to assist with the execution of a search warrant, specific permission 
should be sought from the court issuing the search warrant and that where such 
permission is granted this must be stated on the issued search warrant. The Commission 
therefore also recommends that the Search Warrants Act should not contain a broad 
provision to the effect that any person whose assistance is deemed to be necessary may 
accompany the executing officer. [paragraph 5.67] 
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8.47 The Commission recommends that the Search Warrants Act should, where it is necessary 
and justified in the circumstances, enable executing officers:  
(a) where the person acting under the authority of the warrant is a member of An Garda 
Síochána, to search persons present at a search location;  
(b) to request basic personal details from persons present at a search location;  
(c) to request assistance from persons present so as to gain access to materials sought 
under the search warrant; and  
(d) to require any person that appears to be in a position to facilitate access to 
information held in a computer to take certain steps to assist the executing officer to 
access that information, and that the executing officer may copy any document, use 
any equipment to copy electronically stored information and to seize and retain any 
computer or storage medium in which material is kept. [paragraph 5.77] 
8.48 The Commission recommends that the Search Warrants Act should provide that refusal of 
a person to comply with a permissible request by executing officers or obstruction or 
attempted obstruction of the execution of a search warrant is an offence. [paragraph 5.82] 
8.49 The Commission recommends that the Search Warrants Act should provide for the power 
of an executing officer to seize incidentally discovered material and should provide that 
where, in the course of exercising any powers under the Act, the executing authority 
comes into possession of anything which he or she reasonably believes to be evidence of, 
or relating to an offence or suspected offence, he or she may seize and retain it. 
[paragraph 5.94] 
8.50 The Commission recommends that the Search Warrants Act should provide that where 
privileged material is found during the course of a search warrant execution, such material 
may generally not be examined or seized. [paragraph 5.99] 
8.51 The Commission recommends that the Search Warrants Act should provide for a specific 
procedure to be applied when material is found during the execution of the search which 
may attract privilege.  [paragraph 5.106]   
8.52 The Commission recommends that the procedure should involve securely sealing any 
material which the executing officer apprehends is privileged without any examination of it, 
removing the material from the search location and storing it in a safe and secure place.  
An application should be made to the High Court by either the executing authority or the 
person from whom material was taken for a determination as to whether or not the 
material is to benefit from the protection of legal privilege.  Where the material is certified 
as privileged it should not be examined by the investigating authority.  If it is determined 
not to be privileged, the material should be placed with the investigating authority if it is 
examinable under the scope of the search warrant. [paragraph 5.107] 
8.53 The Commission recommends that the Search Warrants Act should identify that in certain 
circumstances privileged and non-privileged material may be mixed and contained in one 
file.  It should allow for the seizure of all the material in order to examine the non-
privileged material, where necessary.  The examination process should be strictly 
controlled so that the privileged material is not compromised. [paragraph 5.115] 
8.54 The Commission recommends that an inventory of all seized or copied items should be 
given to the person concerned upon completion of the search and seizure under warrant.  
The Commission recommends that if some, but not all, of the seized materials are 
returned the inventory should be amended to reflect this. [paragraph 5.122] 
8.55 The Commission recommends that the Search Warrants Act should not contain any 
provision on the electronic recording of the execution of search warrants (including the 
use of body-worn cameras) as this is primarily an operational policing matter for the 
relevant authorities to consider in the light of, in particular, the Data Protections Acts 1988 
and 2003. [paragraph 5.131] 
 206 
Chapter 6: admissibility of evidence and a search warrants code of practice 
8.56 The Commission recommends that the proposed Search Warrants Act should provide that 
a failure by a person applying for or executing a search warrant to observe any provision 
of the Act shall not of itself affect the admissibility in evidence of any material obtained 
during a search. [paragraph 6.56]  
8.57 The Commission recommends that the proposed Search Warrant Act should not include 
any provision as to the tests by which the courts determine whether to admit evidence that 
has been obtained illegally, or the tests used to determine the admissibility of 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence, and that these should remain a matter for the courts 
to determine and, where required, to develop. [paragraph 6.57] 
8.58 The Commission recommends that the Search Warrants Act should provide for a code of 
practice which should contain practical guidance concerning the main elements of the 
Search Warrants Act, including the procedural steps involved in the process; that the code 
of practice should be written in plain, intelligible language; and that it should be easily 
accessible to all persons, including that it should be made available on the internet. The 
Commission also recommends that breach of the code of practice should not of itself 
render any evidence obtained under a search warrant inadmissible. [paragraph 6.70] 
Chapter 7: bench warrants, committal warrants and related procedure 
8.59 The Commission supports the comprehensive recommendations made in connection with 
bench warrants in the 2014 Report of the Garda Síochána Inspectorate on Crime 
Investigation, and accordingly considers that it is not necessary to make any further 
recommendations on this matter. [paragraph 7.11] 
8.60 The Commission recommends that section 44 of the Road Traffic Act 2010, which 
provides for payment of a fixed charge notice upon receipt of a summons, should be 
commenced. [paragraph 7.29] 
8.61 The Commission recommends that legislation should provide for a postal response 
system to summonses in respect of summary only offences. [paragraph 7.38] 
8.62 The Commission recommends that legislation should provide that, where a court imposes 
a fine on a person who has been convicted of an offence under the Road Traffic Acts and 
the person does not pay the fine by the due date, it may direct the Department of 
Transport Tourism and Sport or Department of the Environment, Community and Local 
Government to refrain from processing motor tax applications and changes in vehicle 
ownership in respect of a vehicle that is registered in the name of a person against whom 
the fine was imposed. [paragraph 7.46] 
8.63 The Commission recommends that the Fines (Payment and Recovery) Act 2014 be 
commenced. [paragraph 7.70] 
8.64 The Commission recommends that unpaid fines imposed under the Road Traffic Acts 
should be registered on the National Vehicle Driver File in order to reduce the number of 
persons committed to prison for non-payment of court fines. [paragraph 7.71] 
8.65 The Commission does not recommend that deduction of fines at source from social 
welfare payments should be provided for at this time. [paragraph 7.72] 
8.66 The Commission recommends that, where possible, summonses should be served by 
personal delivery or by registered post but that since it would be impractical to require 
personal service or service by registered post in all cases, the Commission recommends 
that letterbox service should remain as an alternative option. [paragraph 7.94] 
8.67 The Commission recommends that legislation should allow for the sharing of data 
between the Courts Service and other bodies such as the Revenue Commissioners and 
Minister for Social Protection for the purpose of directing a summons to an accurate 
address.  The Commission recommends that such legislation should be supplemented by 
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guidelines promoting the proper use of PPS numbers in accordance with data protection 
legislation. [paragraph 7.100] 
8.68 The Commission recommends that arguments that a delay or failure to execute a bench 
warrant breached a person’s right to a fair trial should continue to be adjudicated upon on 
a case by case basis and there should not be a duty on Gardaí in all cases to return to a 
court that issued a bench warrant and explain why the bench warrant remains 
unexecuted. [paragraph 7.116] 
8.69 The Commission recommends that a protocol should be put in place requiring members of 
An Garda Síochána to inspect PULSE records to determine whether an unexecuted 
bench warrant exists in respect of a person. [paragraph 7.123] 
8.70 The Commission recommends the introduction of a certification process whereby a 
declaration would have to be signed by a member of An Garda Síochána dealing with a 
person stating that he or she has examined PULSE records. [paragraph 7.124] 
8.71 The Commission recommends that section 8(1) of the Bail Act 1997, which provides for 
the endorsement of a warrant of arrest by a judge when issuing the warrant authorising 
the release of a person arrested on foot of a warrant on station bail, should be used where 
appropriate, and there should be no discretion for a member of An Garda Síochána of a 
certain minimum rank to release a person on station bail where an unexecuted bench 
warrant exists in respect of that person. [paragraph 7.132] 
8.72 The Commission recommends that where a person is granted bail, whether at a Garda 
station or by a court, the relevant authority should have in place a clear procedure to 
ensure that he or she is notified of and understands the obligation to appear before a 
court at a later date, as a condition of the bail agreement. [paragraph 7.141] 
8.73 The Commission recommends that where a person is granted bail, he or she should be 
provided with a document at that time setting out, in plain intelligible language, his or her 
requirement to attend at a court sitting, as well as the time and date upon which he or she 
is required to appear. [paragraph 7.142] 
8.74 The Commission recommends that the current practice of judges enquiring as to whether 
there are any unexecuted warrants against a person appearing before the court should be 
implemented in a District Court rule or practice direction. [paragraph 7.145] 
8.75 The Commission recommends that legislation should provide for access by the Courts 
Service to PPS numbers to be used as a unique identifier to assist the Courts Service in 
identifying a person on the Criminal Case Tracking System for the purpose of executing 
bench warrants.  Any provision allowing for PPS numbers to be used on the CCTS and 
PULSE systems as a unique identifier would need to be supplemented by a code of 
practice or guidelines to promote proper use of PPS numbers in accordance with data 
protection legislation. [paragraph 7.152] 
8.76 The Commission recommends the implementation of a standard operating procedure by 




APPENDIX A SEARCH WARRANT POWERS IN ACTS AND STATUTORY 
INSTRUMENTS  
The list of statutory search warrants powers in this Appendix has been prepared by the 
Commission to illustrate the extensive number of such provisions in existing legislation (up to 
July 2015).1 As noted in the Report, section 10 of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1997 as substituted by section 6(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2006 is the most 
widely-applicable search warrant power as it allows a judge of the District Court to issue a 
search warrant where he or she has reasonable grounds for suspecting that evidence relating to 
the commission of an arrestable offence may be found on a particular premises.  An arrestable 
offence is an offence that carries a sentence of imprisonment of 5 years or more. There is an 
overlap between section 10 of the 1997 Act and a number of provisions in the list below that 
also allow for the issuing of a search warrant for an offence punishable by a minimum of 5 years 
imprisonment.  However, the list also includes examples of powers to issue a search warrant 
where the suspected offence carries a maximum penalty of less than 5 years imprisonment.2 
Agriculture 
Legislation Provision 
European Union (Direct Support Rural Development Schemes) 
Offences and Control Regulations 2015 (93/2015) 
Regulation 8 
European Union (Identification of Equidae) Regulations 2014 (207/2014) Regulation 27 
European Union (Animal By-Products) Regulations 2014 (187/2014) Regulation 16 
European Union (Marketing of Vegetable Propagating and Planting 
Material, Other than Seed) Regulations 2014 (152/2014) 
Regulation 9 
European Union (Good Agricultural Practice for Protection of Waters) 
Regulations 2014 (31/2014) 
Regulation 25 
European Union (Biocidal Products) Regulations 2013 (427/2013) Regulation  28 
European Communities (Swine Vesicular Disease) Regulations 2013 
(73/2013) 
Regulation 24 
European Communities (African swine fever) Regulations 2013 (4/2013) Regulation 24 
European Communities (Direct Support Schemes) Offences and Control 
Regulations 2012 (115/2012) 
Regulation 7- 
European Communities (Classical Swine Fever) Regulations 2012 
(516/2012) 
Regulation 25 
European Communities (Import of Personal Consignments of Products 
of Animal Origin) Regulations 2012 (374/2012) 
Regulation 6 
European Communities (Control of Foot and mouth Disease) Regulation 49 
                                               
1
  The subject headings under which the powers are listed are based on those in the Classified List of 
Legislation-In-Force prepared and maintained by the Commission on its website, lawreform.ie. 
2
  Every care has been taken in the preparation of this list.  However the Commission does not guarantee that 
the list is complete. 
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Regulations 2012 (51/2012) 
European Communities (Newcastle Disease) Regulations 2012 
(57/2012) 
Regulation 22 
European Communities (Sustainable Use of Pesticides) Regulations 
2012 (155/2012) 
Regulation 18 
European Communities (Phytosanitary Measures) (Brown Rot in Egypt) 
Regulations 2012 (211/2012) 
Regulation 6 
European Communities (Sheep Identification) Regulations 2011 
(309/2011) 
Regulation 14 
European Communities (Equine) Regulations 2011 (357/2011) 
as amended by European Communities (Equine) (Amendment) 
Regulations 2012 (371/2012) 
Regulation 21 
Regulation 2 
European Communities (Potato Cyst Nematodes) Regulations 2011 
(359/2011) 
Regulation 10 
European Communities (Carnation Leaf-Rollers) Regulations 2011 
(360/2011) 
Regulation 8 
European Communities (Marketing Standards) (Crops and oils) 
Regulations 2011 (378/2011) 
Regulation 10 
European Communities (Marketing of Fruit Plant Propagating Material) 
Regulations 2011 (384/2011) 
Regulation 12 
European Communities (Seed Potatoes) Regulations 2011 (532/2011) Regulation 16 
European Communities (Common Agricultural Policy) (Scrutiny of 
Transactions) Regulations 2010 (422/2010) 
Regulation 6 
European Communities (Control of Salmonella In Broilers) Regulations 
2009 (64/2009) 
Regulation 11 
European Communities (Bovine Breeding) Regulations 2009 (19/2009) Regulation 13 
European Communities (Identification of Bovines) Regulations 2009 
(77/2009) 
Regulation 18 
European Communities (Control of Animal Remedies and their 
Residues) Regulations 2009 (183/2009) 
Regulation 29 
European Communities (Phytosanitary Measures) (Anoplophora 
Chinensis) Regulations 2009 (391/2009) 
Regulation 8 
European Communities (Agriculture, Fisheries and Food) (Compliance) 
Regulations 2009 (424/2009) 
Regulation 6 
European Communities (Food and Feed Hygiene) Regulations 2009 
(432/2009) 
Regulation 14 
European Communities (Machinery) Regulations 2008 (407/2008) Regulation 36 
 European Communities (Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies 
and Animal By-Products) Regulations 2008 (252/2008) 
 Regulation 22 
 European Communities (Approval and Registration of Dealers of Ovine 
Animals) Regulations 2008 (100/2008) 
 Regulation 12 




 European Communities (Milk Quota) Regulations 2008 (227/2008) Regulation 35 
 European Communities (Marketing of Meat of Bovine Animals Aged 12 
Months Or Less) Regulations 2008 (245/2008) 
Regulation 28 
European Communities (Control of Salmonella in Laying Flocks of 
Domestic Fowl) Regulations 2008 (247/2008) 
Regulation 13 
European Communities (Pesticide Residues) Regulations 2008 
(565/2008) 
Regulation 6 
 European Communities (Potato Brown Rot) Regulations 2007 
(198/2007) 
Regulation 7 
 European Communities (Protection of Geographical Indications and 
Designations of Origin for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs) 
Regulations 2007 (704/2007) 
Regulation 9 
European Communities (Animal Transport and Control Post) 
Regulations 2006 (675/2006) 
Regulation 12 
Health (Country of Origin of Beef) Regulations 2006 (307/2006) 
as amended by Health (Country of Origin of Beef) (Amendment) 
Regulations 2007 (85/2007) 
 
Regulation 9  
Regulation 5 
European Communities (Control on Imports of Products of Animal Origin 
from Madagascar) Regulations 2006 (190/2006) 
Regulation 5 
European Communities (Goat Identification) Regulations 2005 
(792/2005) 
Regulation 14 
European Communities (Fertiliser) Regulations 2005 (360/2005) Regulation 10 
European Communities (Feed Additives) Regulations 2005 (242/2005) Regulation 13 
 European Communities (Phytosanitary Measures) Regulations 2004 
(578/2004) 
Regulation 9 
European Communities (Control of Organisms Harmful To Plants and 
Plant Products) Regulations 2004 (894/2004) 
Regulation 12 
European Communities (Feedingstuffs) (Genetically Modified Feed) 
Regulations 2004 (424/2004) 
Regulation 6 
European Communities (Organic Farming) Regulations  2004 
(112/2004) 
as amended by European Communities (Organic Farming) 




Opean Communities (Seed of Oil Plants and Fibre Plants) Regulations 
(280/2003) 
Regulation 13 
European Communities (Authorization, Placing on The Market, Use and 
Control of Plant Protection Products) Regulations 2003 (83/2003) 
as amended by  European Communities (Authorization, Placing On the 
Market, Use and Control of Plant Protection Products) (Amendment) 
(No. 4) Regulations 2009 (329/2009) 
 
Regulation 31A  
Regulation 2 
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European Communities (Classification, Packaging and Labelling of 
Plant Protection Products and Biocide Products) Regulations 2001 
(624/2001) 
as amended by European Communities (Classification, Packaging and 
Labelling of Plant Protection Products and Biocide Products) 





European Communities (Veterinary Checks on Products Imported From 
Third Countries) Regulations 2000 (292/2000) 
Regulation 19 
 European Communities (Trade in Certain Animal Products) Regulations 
1996 (102/1996) 
Regulation 27 
European Communities (Trade in Animals and Animal Semen, Ova and 
Embryos) Regulations 1996 (12/1996) 
Regulation 19 
European Communities (Trade in Bovine Breeding Animals, Their 
Semen, Ova and Embryos) Regulations 1994 ( 297/1994) 
Regulation 24 
European Communities (Trade in Animals and Animal Products) 





Animal Health and Welfare Act 2013 (15/2013) Section 45(1) 
European Union (Protection of Animals at the Time of Killing) 
Regulations 2013 (292/2013) 
Regulation 22 
Veterinary Practice Act 2005 (22/2005) 
as amended by Veterinary Practice (Amendment) Act 2012 (25/2012) 
Section 126(1) 
 Section 7  
European Union (Protection of Animals used for Scientific Purposes) 
Regulations 2012 (543/2012) 
Regulation 72 
Welfare of Greyhounds Act 2011 (29/2011) Section 19 
Dog Breeding Establishments Act 2010 (29/2010) Section 19(4) 
European Communities (Welfare of farmed animals) Regulations 2010 
(311/2010) 
Regulation 32 
 European Communities (Cat and Dog Fur) (Restriction on Trade) 
Regulations 2008 (513/2008) 
Regulation 7 
European Communities (Health of Aquaculture Animals and Products) 
Regulations 2008 (261/2008) 
Regulation 28 
 European Communities (Avian Influenza) (Control on Imports) 
Regulations 2008 (17/2008) 
Regulation 6 
European Communities (Avian Influenza) (Precautionary Measures) 
Regulations 2008 (7/2008) 
Regulation 8 
European Communities (Animal Remedies) (No. 2) Regulations 2007 
(786/2007) 
Regulation 53 






European Communities (Avian Influenza) (Control on Movement of Pet 
Birds) Regulations 2007 (96/2007) 
Regulation 6 
 European Communities (Avian Influenza) (Control on Imports of Birds) 
Regulations 2005 (709/2005) 
Regulation 6 
Control of Horses Act 1996 (37/1996) Section 35(1) 
Control of Dogs Act 1986 (32/1986) Section 26(1) 
Betting and Gaming 
Legislation Provision 
Gaming and Lotteries Act 1956 (2/1956) Section 39(1) 
Broadcasting 
Legislation Provision 
Wireless Telegraphy Act 1926 (45/1926)  
as amended by Broadcasting Act 2009 (18/2009) 
Section 8(1)  
Section 182  
Broadcasting Act 1990  (24/1990) Section 14(1) 
Wireless Telegraphy Act 1926 (45/2009)   
as amended by  Broadcasting Authority Act 1960 (10/1960) 
 
Section 12A(11)  
Section 34 and schedule 3, 
Part 2  
Child Care 
Legislation Provision 
Child Care Act 1991 (17/1991)  
as amended by Child and Family Agency Act 2013 (40/2013) 
Section 58J(2) Section 92  
Child Care Act 1991 (17/1991)  
as amended by Health Act 2004 (42/2004) and Child and Family 
Agency Act 2013 (40/2013) 
Section 35  
Section 75  
Section 97 and schedule 2, 
part 4  
Child Care Act 1991  
as amended by Child and Family Agency Act 2013 
Section 46(6)  
Section 97  
Child Care Act 1991  
as amended by Children Act 2001 
Section 23T  
Section 16  
Civil Liability  
Legislation Provision 






Package Holidays and Travel Trade Act 1995 (17/1995) 
as amended by State Airports (Shannon Group) Act 2014 (27/2014)  
Section 21A(1) 
Section 55  
Commissions of Investigation 
Legislation Provision 
Commissions of Investigation Act 2004 (23/2004) Section 29(1) 
Company Law  
Legislation Provision 
Companies Act 2014 (38/2014) Section 787(1) 
Companies Act 1990 (33/1990)  
as amended by Company Law Enforcement Act 2001 (28/2001) and 
Companies (Amendment) Act 2009 
Section 20  
Section 30  
Section 5  
Competition, Consumer Protection and Consumer Credit 
Legislation Provision 
Competition and Consumer Protection Act 2014 (29/2014) Section 36(4) 
European Union (Provision of Services) Regulations 2010 (533/2010) Regulation 46 
European Communities (Directive 2000/31/EC) Regulations 2003 
(68/2003) 
Regulation 22 
European Communities (Requirements To Indicate Product Prices) 
Regulation 2002 (639/2002) 
Regulation 10 
Consumer Credit Act 1995 (24/1995) Section 106(1) 
Consumer Credit Act 1995 (24/1995) 
as amended  by Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of 
Ireland Act 2003 (12/2003) 
Sections 8C and 8O  
Section 35 and schedule 2, 
part 21  
European Communities (Application of Rules on Competition To Rail 
and Road Transport) Regulations 1993 (416/1993) 
Regulation 5 
European Communities (Application of the Rules on Competition To 
Maritime Transport) Regulations 1993 (386/1993) 
Regulation 6 
European Communities (Rules on Competition) Regulations 1993 
(124/1993) 
Regulation 6 
European Communities (Application of the Rules on Competition To Air 
Transport) Regulations 1992 (379/1992) 
Regulation 6 





European Communities (Internal Market in Natural Gas and Electricity) 
(Amendment) Regulations 2015 (16/2015) 
Regulation 23 
European Union (Wholesale Energy Market Integrity and Transparency) 
Regulations 2014 (480/2014) 
Regulation 9 
European Union (Energy Performance of Buildings) Regulations 2012 
(243/2012) 
Regulation 30 
European Communities (Electronic Communications Networks and 
Services) (Privacy and Electronic Communications) Regulations 2011 
(336/2011) 
Regulation 19 
Electricity Regulation Act 1999 (23/1999) 
as amended by Petroleum (Exploration and Extraction) Safety Act 2010 
(4/2010) 
Section 13W  
Section 3  
National Oil Reserves Agency Act 2007 (7/2007) Section 48(1) 
Communications Regulation Act 2002 (20/2002) Section 40 
European Communities (Conditional Access) Regulations 2000 
(357/2000) 
Regulation 5 
Electricity Regulation Act 1999 (23/1999)  
as amended by Gas (Amendment) Act 2000 (26/2000) and  
Gas (Interim) (Regulation) Act 2002 (10/2002) 
Section 12  
Section 13  
Section 18(c)  
European Communities (Use of Standards For The Transmission of 
Television Signals) Regulations 1998 (262/1998) 
Regulation 13 
Energy (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 (35/1995)  
as amended by Energy (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2012 (3/2012) 
Section 16(5)  
Section 5  
Courts  
Legislation Provision 
Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act 1851 Section 6 
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 
Legislation Provision 
Offences Against the State Act 1939 (13/1939)  
as amended by Criminal Law Act 1976 (32/1976) and  
Criminal Justice (Search Warrants) Act 2012 (33/2012) 
Section 29  
Section 5  
Section 1  
Criminal Justice (Psychoactive Substances) Act 2010 (22/2010) Section 12 
Criminal Procedure Act 2010 (27/2010)  Section 18(2) 
Criminal Justice (Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing) Act 2010 
(6/2010) 
Section 78(1) 
Criminal Justice (Surveillance) Act 2009 (19/2009) Sections 5(2) and 7(2) 




International Criminal Court Act 2006 (30/2006) Section 51(5) 
Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act 2001 (27/2001)  
as amended by Criminal Justice Act 2006 
Section 5(1)  
Section 191  
Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001 (50/2001)  
 as amended by Criminal Justice Act 2006 
Section 48(2)  
Section 192  
Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1997 (4/1997)  
as amended by Criminal Justice Act 2006 (26/2006) 
Section 10  
Section 6(1)  
Criminal Assets Bureau Act 1996 (31/1996) 
as amended by Proceeds of Crime (Amendment) Act 2005 (1/2005) 
and Criminal Justice Act 2006 (26/2006) 
 
Section 14(1)  
Section 16(1)  
Section 190  
Criminal Justice Act 1994 (15/1994)  Section 55(3) Act 
European Arrest Warrant Act 2003 (45/2003) Section 25(3) 
Criminal Justice (Location of Victims’ Remains) Act 1999 (9/1999) Section 8(1) 
International War Crimes Tribunals Act 1998 (40/1998) Section 30(2) 
Sexual Offences (Jurisdiction) Act 1996 (38/1996) Section 10(1) 
Criminal Justice (Joint Investigation Teams) Act 2004 (20/2004) Section 7(9) 
Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1993 (20/1993) Section 10(2) 
Criminal Damage Act 1991 (31/1991) Section 13(1) 
Firearms and Offensive Weapons Act 1990 (12/1990) Section 15 
Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1935 (6/1935) 
as amended by Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1993 (20/1993) 
Section 19(1)  
Section 12  
Firearms Act 1925 (17/1925)   
as amended by Firearms Act 1964 (1/1964) 
Section 24  
Section 23  
Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885 (69/1885) Section 10 
Explosive Substances Act 1883 (3/1883) Section 8(1) 
Explosives Act 1875  
as amended by Criminal Justice Act 2006 (26/2006) 
Section 73  
Section 69 
Customs, Excise and Exports 
Legislation Provision 
Customs Act 2015 (18/2015) Section 29 
Control of Exports Act 2008 (1/2008) Section 7(11) 
Customs and Excise (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1988 (10/1988) Sections 3(2) and 5(1) 
Customs Consolidation Act 1876 (36/1876)  
as amended by Finance Act 1936 (31/1936) 
Section 205  




Drugs and Drug Trafficking 
Legislation Provision 
Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act 1996 (29/1996) as amended by 
Criminal Justice (Search Warrants) Act 2012 (33/2012) 
Section 8  
Section 3  
Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 (12/1977) 
as amended by Misuse of Drugs Act 1984 (18/1984) and  
Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act 1996, as amended by  
Criminal Justice (Search Warrants) Act 2012 (33/2012) 
Section 26  
Section 13  
Section 8  
Section 2  
Employment Law 
Legislation Provision 
Employment Permits Act 2006 (16/2006) Section 22(8)  
Employees (Provision of Information and Consultation) Act 2006 
(9/2006) 
Section 18(7) 
European Communities (Organisation of Working Time)(Mobile Staff in 
Civil Aviation) Regulations 2006 (507/2006) 
Regulation 13 
Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005 (10/2005) Section 64(7) 
Employment Permits Act 2003 (7/2003) Section 2(5) 
Carer’s Leave Act 2001 (19/2001) Section 32(7) 
National Minimum Wage Act 2000 (5/2000) Section 33(6) 
Employment Equality Act 1998 (21/1998) Section 94(5) 
Organisation of Working Time Act 1997 (20/1997) Section 8(7) 
Protection of Young Persons (Employment) Act 1996 (16/1996) Section 22(6) 
Environmental Protection and Geography 
Legislation Provision 
European Union (Household Food Waste and Bio-waste) Regulations 
2015 (191/2015) 
Regulation 8 
European Union (Batteries and Accumulators) Regulations 2014 
(283/2014) 
Regulation 41 
European Union (Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment) 
Regulations 2014 (149/2014) 
Regulation 38 
European Union (Household Food Waste and Bio-waste) Regulations 
2013 (71/2013) 
Regulation 8 
European Union (Installations and Activities Using Organic Solvents) 
Regulations 2012 (565/2012) 
Regulation 22 
 European Communities (Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading) 







European Communities Mercury (Export Ban and Safe Storage) 
Regulations 2012 (27/2012) 
Regulation 8 
European Communities (Plant Protection Products) Regulations 2012 
(159/2012) 
Regulation 19 
Air Pollution Act 1987 (6/1987) 
as amended by Environment (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2011 
(20/2011) 
Section 14(6A)  
Section 11  
European Communities (Waste Directive) Regulations 2011 (126/2011)  Regulation 46 
European Communities (Shipments of Hazardous Waste exclusively 
within Ireland) Regulations 2011 (324/2011) 
Regulation 13 
European Communities (Assessment and Management of Flood Risks) 
Regulations 2010 (122/2010) 
Regulation 4 
Dumping at Sea Act 1996 (14/1996) 
as amended by Foreshore and Dumping at Sea (Amendment) Act 2009 
Section 6(8A) 
 Section 34  
European Communities (Control of Dangerous Substances From 
offshore Installations) Regulations 2009 (358/2009) 
Regulation 12 
European Communities (Environmental Liability) Regulations 2008 
(547/2008) 
Regulation 23(7) 
 European Communities (Control of Dangerous Substances in 
Aquaculture) Regulations 2008 (466/2008)  
Regulation 12 
Ordnance Survey Ireland Act 2001 (43/2001) Section 10(6) 
Waste Management Act 1996 (10/1996) Section 14(7) 
Environmental Protection Agency Act 1992 (7/1992) Section 13(6)  
Equality 
Legislation Provision 
Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission Act 2014 (25/2014) Section 14(1) 
Disability Act 2005 (14/2005) Section 23(1) 
Equal Status Act 2000 (8/2000) Section 33(4) 
Finance and Taxation 
Legislation Provision 
European Union (European Markets Infrastructure) Regulations 2014 
(443/2014) 
Regulation 8 
Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013 (26/2013) Section 28 
Personal Insolvency Act 2012 (44/2012) Section 181(14) 
European Union (Requirements for Credit Transfers and Direct Debits in Regulation 8 
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Euro) Regulations 2013 (132/2013) 
Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 (39/1997)  
as amended by Finance Act 1997 (11/2007) 
Section 908C  
Section 124  
Transparency (Directive 2004/109/EC) Regulations 2007 (277/2007) Regulation 55 
European Communities (Markets in Financial Instruments) Regulations 
2007 (60/2007) 
as amended by Credit Union and Co-operation with Overseas 
Regulators Act 2012 (40/2012) 
Regulation 174(1) 
Section 70 and schedule , 
part 4 item 5 
 
Finance Act 2001 (7/2001) Section 136(5)  
Dormant Accounts Act 2001 (32/2001) Section 23(7) 
Stamp Duties Consolidation Act 1999 (31/1999) Section 140 
Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 (39/1997)  
as amended by Finance Act 2013 (8/2013) 
Section 911(2)  
Section 101  
Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 (39/1997)  
as amended by Finance Act 1997 (11/2007) 
Section 908C  
Section 124  
Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 (39/1997)  
as amended by Finance Act 1999 (2/1999) 
Section 905(2A)  
Section 207  
Pensions Act 1990 (25/1990) 
as amended by  Pensions (Amendment) Act, 1996 (18/1996) 
Section 18(4D)  
Section 6  
Investment Intermediaries Act 1995 (11/1995)  Section 75(1)  
Finance Act 1995 (8/1995) Section 87(3) 
Bankruptcy Act 1988 (27/1988) Section 28 
Food and Food Safety 
Legislation Provision 
European Union (Origin Labelling of Meat) Regulations 2015 (113/2015) Regulation 10 
European Union (Marketing of fruit juices and certain similar products) 
Regulations 2013 (410/2013) 
Regulation 6 
European Communities (Spirits Drinks) Regulations 2009 (429/2009) 
as amended by European Communities (Spirits Drinks)(Amendment) 
Regulations 2013 (118/2013) 
Regulation 4C  
 
European Union (Cereal Seed) Regulations 2013 (217/2013) Regulation 22 
European Communities (Marketing of Seeds) Regulations 2009 
(431/2009) 
Regulation 12 
 European Communities (Marketing Standards For Eggs) Regulations 
2009 (140/2009) 
Regulation 7 
European Communities (Control of Salmonella In Broilers) Regulations 
2009 (64/2009)  
Regulation 11 




Food) Regulations 2007 (587/2007) 
 European Communities (Trade in The Production, Processing, 
Distribution and Introduction of Products of Animal Origin For Human 
Consumption) Regulations 2004 (820/2004) 
Regulation 11 
European Communities (Ethyl Alcohol) Regulations 2004 (30/2004) Regulation 6 
 European Communities (Veterinary Checks on Fish and Fishery 
Products Imported From Third Countries) Regulations 2003 (548/2003) 
Regulation 20 
 European Communities (Marketing of Honey) Regulations 2003 
(367/2003) 
Regulation 6 
 European Communities (Marketing of Fruit Jams, Jellies, Marmalades 
and Sweetened Chestnut Purée) Regulations 2003 (294/2003) 
Regulation 6 
European Communities (Marketing of Sugar Products) Regulations 
2003 (289/2003) 
Regulation 6 
European Communities (Labelling, Presentation and Advertising of 
Foodstuffs) Regulations 2002 (483/2002) 
Regulation 17 
European Communities (Suspending the Placing on the Market, the 
Importation and the use in Manufacture of Jelly Confectionary 
Containing the Food Additive E425 Konjac) Regulations 2002 
(442/2002) 
Regulation 11 
European Communities (Additives, Colours and Sweeteners in Food 
Stuffs) Regulations 2000 (437/2000) 
Regulation 27 
Food Safety Authority of Ireland Act 1998 (29/1998) Section 50(4) 
Animal Remedies Act 1993 (23/1993) Section 12(1) 
European Communities (Food Imitations (Safety) Regulations 1991 
(265/1991) 
Regulation 8 
Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission 
Legislation Provision 
Garda Síochána Act 2005 (20/2005) 
as amended by Criminal Justice Act 2007 
Sections 98(1) and 99  
Section 43  
Health and Health Services 
Legislation Provision 
European Union (Application of Patients Rights in Cross-Border 
Healthcare) (Amendment) Regulations 2015 (65/2015) 
Regulation 17 
European Union (Prevention of Sharp Injuries in the Healthcare Sector) 
Regulations 2014 (135/2014) 
Regulation 11 
Public Health (Sunbeds) Act 2014(12/2014) Section 17(6) 
European Union (Prevention of Sharps Injuries in the Healthcare Sector) 
Regulations 2014 (135/2014) 
Regulation 11 




Transplantation) Regulations 2012 (325/2012) 
European Communities (Control of Drug Precursors) Regulations 2009 
(558/2009) 
Regulation 24 
European Communities (Quality and Safety of Human Tissues and 
Cells) Regulations 2006 (158/2006) 
Regulation 22 
European Communities (Quality and Safety of Human Blood and Blood 
Components) Regulations 2005 (360/2005)  
Regulation 19 
European Communities (Clinical Trials on Medicinal Products For 
Human Use) Regulations 2004 (190/2004) 
Regulation 48 
Public Health Tobacco Act 2002 (6/2002)  
as amended by Public Health (Tobacco)(Amendment) Act 2004 
(6/2004) 
Section 48(7) 
 Section 17  
European Communities (In Vitro Diagnostic Medical 
Devices) Regulations 2001 (304/2001) 
Regulation 18 
Regulation 12 of the Medicinal Products (Licensing and Sale) 
Regulations 1998 (142/1998) 





Regulation of Information (Services Outside the State for Termination of 
Pregnancies) Act 1995 (5/1995) 
Section 9 
European Communities  (Active Implantable Medical 
Devices) Regulations 1994 (253/1994) 
Regulation 18 




Immigration Act 2004 (1/2004) Section 15(1) 
Aliens Act 1935 (14/1935) 
as amended by Immigration Act 2003 
Section 7  
Section 4  
Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000 (29/2000) Section 7(1) 
Intellectual Property 
Legislation Provision 
Industrial Designs Act (39/2001) Section 70(1) 
Copyright and Related Rights Act  2000 (28/2000) Section 261(1) 
Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000 (28/2000) Section 143(1) 
Trade Marks Act 1996 (6/1996) 
as amended by Patents (Amendment) Act 2006 







Copyright Act 1963 (10/1963)  
as amended by Copyright (Amendment) Act 1987 (24/1987) 
Section 27(5)  
Section 2  
Licensed Sale of Alcohol 
Legislation Provision 
Intoxicating Liquor Act 1962 (21/1962) Section 26(9) 
Licensing Act (Ireland) 1874 (69/1874)  Section 24 
Beerhouses (Ireland) Act 1864 (35/1864) 
as amended by Licensing (Ireland) Act 1905 and Intoxicating Liquor Act 
1927 (15/1927) 
Section 6  
Section 63 Act 
Spirits (Ireland) Act 1854 (89/1854)  
as amended by Finance Act 1995 (8/1995) and  
Finance Act 2001 (7/2001) 
Sections 2 and 4  
Section 95 and schedule 5  
Section 240 and schedule 5  
Illicit Distillation (Ireland) Act 1831 (55/1831) 
as amended by the Intoxicating Liquor Act 1960 (18/1960) 
Section 17  
Section 22  
Illicit Distillation (Ireland) Act 1831 (55/1831) 
as amended by the Intoxicating Liquor (General) Act 1924 
Section 18  
Section 27  
Local and National Government 
Legislation Provision 
Regulation of Lobbying Act 2015 (5/2015) Section 19(6) 
Local Government Act 2001 (37/2001) Section 213(7)  
Official Secrets Act 1963 (1/1963) Section 16(1) 
National Monuments 
Legislation Provision 
Architectural Heritage (National Inventory) and Historic Monuments 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1999 (19/1999) 
Section 3(8) 
National Monuments (Amendment) Act 1987 (17/1987) Section 22(1)  
Natural Resources  
Legislation Provision 
Forestry Act 2014 (31/2014) Section 24(6) 
European Union (Timber and Timber Products) (Placing on the Market) 
Regulations 2014 (316/2014) 
Regulation 11 






European Union (Making Available on the Market of Pyrotechnic 
Articles) Regulations 2015 (174/2015) 
Regulation 28 
European Union (Packaging) Regulations 2014 (282/2014) Regulation 33 
European Union (End-of-Life Vehicles) Regulations 2014 (281/2014) Regulation 32 
European Union (Ecodesign Requirements for Certain Energy-related 
Products) (Amendment) Regulations 2013 (454/2013) 
Regulation 19 
European Union (Cosmetic Products) Regulations 2013 (440/2013) Regulation 9 
 European Union (Construction Products) Regulations 2013 
(225/2013) 
Regulation 13 
European Union (Paints, Varnishes, Vehicle Refinishing Products and 
Activities) Regulations 2012 (564/2012) 
Regulation 21 
European Union (Restriction of Certain Hazardous Substances in 
Electrical and Electronic Equipment) Regulations 2012 (513/2012) 
Regulation 31 
European Communities (Placing on the Market of Pyrotechnic Articles) 
Regulations 2010 (1/2010) 
Regulation 15 
European Communities (Electromagnetic Compatibility) Regulations 
2007 (109/2007) 
Regulation 19 
European Communities (General Product Safety) Regulations 2004 
(199/2004) 
Regulation 14 
European Communities (Radio Equipment and Telecommunications 
Terminal Equipment) Regulations 2001(240/2001)  
Regulation 16 
European Communities (Noise Emissions by Equipment for Use 
Outdoors) Regulations 2001 (632/2001) 
Regulation 14 
as amended by Water Services (Amendment) Act 2012 (2/2012) Section 3  
European Communities (Marketing of Forest Reproductive Material) 
Regulations 2002 (618/2002) 
Regulation 14 
Fisheries (Consolidation) Act 1959 (14/1959) 
as amended by Fisheries Act 1980 (1/1980) 
Section 297(1)  
Section 71  
Foyle Fisheries Act 1952 (5/1952) 
as amended by the Foyle and Carlingford Fisheries Act 2007 (17/2007) 
Section 60  
Section 24  
Planning and Development 
Legislation Provision 
Housing (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2014 (21/2014) Section 14(5) 
Planning and Development Act 2000 (30/2000)  
as amended by Planning and Development (Amendment) Act 2010 
(30/2010) 
Section 253(4)  
Section 73(c)  
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Property Services (Regulation) Act 2011 (40/2011) Section 66(14) 
Public Safety 
Legislation Provision 
Chemicals Act 2008 (13/2008) Section 12(8) 
Explosives Act 1875 (17/1875) 
as amended by Criminal Justice Act 2006 (26/2006) 
Section 73  
Section 69 and sch. 2  
Explosives Act 1875 
as amended by Criminal Justice Act 2006 
Section 80  
Section 68  
Licensing of Indoor Events Act 2003 (15/2003) Section 21(40) 
Transport 
Legislation Provision 
Vehicle Clamping Act 2015 (13/2015) Section 24 
State Airports (Shannon Group) Act 2014 (27/2014) Section 55 
Taxi Regulation Act 2013 (37/2013) Section 42 
European Union (Railway Safety) (Reporting and Investigation of 
Serious Accidents, Accidents and Incidents) Regulations 2014 
(258/2014) 
Regulation 12 
Road Safety Authority (Commercial Vehicle Roadworthiness) Act 2012 
(16/2012) 
Section 26(2) 
European Union (Labelling of Tyres) (Fuel Efficiency) Regulations 2012 
(342/2012) 
Regulation 12 
Road Transport Act 2011 (31/2011) Section 17 
European Communities (Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road and 
Use of Transportable Pressure Equipment) Regulations 2011 
(349/2011) 
Regulation 20 
European Communities (Road Transport) (Working Conditions and 
Road Safety) Regulations 2008 (62/2008) 
as amended by European Union (Road Transport) (Working Conditions 











Sea-Fisheries and Maritime Jurisdiction Act 2006 (8/2006)  
as amended by Criminal Justice Act 2007 (29/2007) 
Section 17A  
Section 44  
Railway Safety Act 2005 (31/2005) Section 73(14) 
European Communities (Two and Three Wheel Motor Vehicle Entry into 
Service) Regulations 2005 (412/2005) 
Regulation 10 
Aviation Regulation Act 2001 (1/2001) Section 43 
Transport (Railway Information) Act 2001 (55/2001) Section 36 
Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road Act 1998 (43/1998) Section 7 
Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act 2000 
(14/2000) 
Section 28(1) 
Road Transport Act 1986 (16/1986) 
as amended by Road Transport Act 1999 
Section 16A  
Section 15  
Merchant Shipping (Salvage and Wreck) Act 1993 (34/1993) Section 57(1) 
Irish Aviation Authority Act 1993 (29/1993)  
as amended by Aviation Act 2006 (7/2006) 
Section 57B  
Section 3(1) 
Road Traffic Act 1961 (24/1961) Section 106(6) 
Video and Publications 
Legislation Provision 
Video Recordings Act 1989 (22/1989) 
as amended by Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2008  
Section 25  
Section 69  
Censorship of Publications Act 1946 (1/1946) Section 17(1) 
Censorship of Publications Act 1929 (21/1929) Section 19(1) 
Wildlife 
Legislation Provision 
European Union (Birds and Natural Habitats) (Sea-fisheries) 
Regulations 2013 (290/2013) 
Regulation 13 
European Communities (Birds and Natural Habitats) Regulations 2011 
(477/2011)  
Regulation 6 
European Communities (Birds and Natural Habitats)(Restrictions on 
use of Poisoned Bait) Regulations 2010 (481/2010) 
Regulation 9 
European Communities (Zootechnical and Genealogical Conditions 
Applicable To Imports From Third Countries) Regulations 1998 
(26/1998) 
Regulation 7 
Wildlife Act 1976 (39/1976) 
as amended by Wildlife (Amendment) Act 2000  (38/2000)  
Section 73(1)  
Section 67. 
 227 
APPENDIX B SELECTED EXAMPLES OF WARRANTLESS POWERS OF ENTRY, STOP 
AND SEARCH IN ACTS AND STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS 
The list of statutory warrantless powers of entry in this Appendix has been prepared by the 
Commission to illustrate that in a number of instances existing legislation confers both a power 
of entry based on a judicial search warrant and also a power of entry without a search warrant. 
This is especially the case where the legislation confers such a power on a statutory regulatory 
body.1 For this reason, the Commission recommends in the Report that the proposed Search 
Warrants Act should provide that its provisions do not alter or affect any rule of law or 
enactment that confers a power of entry without the need for a search warrant: see section 13 
of the draft Bill in Appendix C.2  
Animals 
Legislation Provision 
Animal Health and Welfare Act 2013 Sections 38(1) and 40 
Dog Breeding Establishments Act 2010 (29/2010) Section 19(1) 
Welfare of Greyhounds Act 2011(29/2011) Section 18(1) 
Control of Dogs Act 1986 (32/1986) 
as amended by Control of Dogs (Amendment) Act 1992 (13/1992) 
Section 16(1)  
Section 7  
Control of Horses Act 1996 (37/1996) Section 34(1) 
Animal Remedies Act 1993 (23/1993) Section 11(1) 
 
Betting and Gaming 
Legislation Provision 








Child Care Act 1991 (17/1991) Section 23T  
                                               
1
  As with the list of search warrant powers in Appendix A, the subject headings under which the warrantless 
search powers are listed in this Appendix are based on those in the Classified List of Legislation-In-Force 
prepared and maintained by the Commission on its website, lawreform.ie. 
2
  Whilst every care has been taken in the preparation of this list The Commission does not guarantee that the 
list is complete. 
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as amended by Children Act 2001 and  
Health Act 2004 (42/2004) 
Section 16  
Section 75 and schedule 7, 
part 6  
Child Care Act 1991 (17/1991) 
as amended by Child and Family Agency Act 2013 (40/2013) 
Section 58J  
Section 92  
Children Act 2001 (24/2001)  
as amended by Health Act 2004 (42/2004) 
Section 254  
Section 75 and schedule 7, 
part 11  
Education Act 1998 (51/1998) Sections 10(2) and 13(3) 
 
Commissions of Investigation 
Legislation Provision 
Commissions of Investigation Act 2004 (23/2004) Section 28(1) 
 
Competition, Consumer Protection and Consumer Credit 
Legislation Provision 
Competition and Consumer Protection Act 2014  (19/2007) Sections 36(1) and 37(2) 
Consumer Credit Act 1995 (24/1995) 
as amended by Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland 
Act 2003 (12/2003) 
Sections 8B and 8N of the 
Section 35 and schedule 1 
part 21  
Consumer Credit Act 1995 (24/1995) Section 105(1)  
 
Communications and Energy 
Legislation Provision 
Communications Regulation Act 2002 (20/2002) 
as amended by Communications Regulation (Premium Rate Services and 
Electronic Communications Infrastructure) Act 2010 (2/2010) 
Section 39(3)  
Section 16  
 
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 
Legislation Provision 
Criminal Justice (Psychoactive Substances) Act 2010 Section 12(1) 
Criminal Justice (Surveillance) Act 2009 Section 7 
Criminal Justice Act 1994 Section 35(1)  
Firearms and Offensive Weapons Act 1990 (12/1990) 
as amended by Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2009 
(28/2009) 
Section 9F  
Section 40  
Firearms and Offensive Weapons Act 1990 (12/1990) 
as amended by Criminal Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2009 
(28/2009) 
Section 16  
Section 1  
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Firearms and Offensive Weapons Act 1990 (12/1990)  
as amended by Criminal Justice Act 2006 (26/2006) 
Section 8A  
Section 64 and schedule 1  
Firearms Act 1925 (17/1925) Section 21(1)  
Explosive Substances Act 1883 (3/1883) Section 8(1) 
Explosives Act 1875  
as amended by Criminal Justice Act 2006 (26/2006) 
Section 73  
Section 69  
 
Customs, Excise and Exports 
Legislation Provision 
Customs Act 2015 (18/2015) Sections 25 to 35 
Customs Consolidation Act 1876 (36/1876) (to be replaced by 2015 Act) Section 134 and section 203 
Finance Act 2001 (7/2001) Section 136(1) 
 
 
Employment Law  
Legislation Provision 
Safety Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005 (10/2005) Section 64(1) 








Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013 (26/2013) Section 26(1) 
 
Food and Food Safety 
Legislation Provision 
Food Safety Authority of Ireland Act 1998 (29/1998) Section 50(1) 
 
Health and Health Services 
Drugs and Drug Trafficking 
Legislation Provision 
Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 (12/1977) 
as amended by Misuse of Drugs Act 1984 (18/1984) 




Irish Medicines Board Act 1995  
as amended by Irish Medicines Board (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
2006 
Section 32B  




Immigration Act 2004 (1/2004) Section 3 
Criminal Law Act 1976 
as amended by Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000  
Section 8  




Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000 Section 257  
 
Licensed Sale of Alcohol 
Legislation Provision 
Spirits (Ireland) Act 1854 
as amended by Finance Act 1995  
Section  
Section 95  
Refreshment Houses (Ireland) Act 1860 
as amended by Finance Act 1989 
Section 20  
Section 50(2)  
Beerhouses (Ireland) Act 1864, section 6 
as amended by Intoxicating Liquor Act 1927 
Section 6  
Section 63 and schedule 2  
Licensing Act (Ireland) 1874 
as amended by Intoxicating Liquor Act 1927 and  
Intoxicating Liquor Act 1988 
Section 23  
Section 22  
Section 51 and schedule  
 
Planning and Development 
Legislation Provision 
Planning and Development Act 2000 
as amended by Planning and Development (Amendment) Act 2010 
Section 253(1)  








European Communities (Electromagnetic Compatibility) Regulations 2007 
(S.I. No.109 of 2007) 
Regulation 18 
European Communities (General Product Safety) Regulations 2004 (S.I. 









Wildlife Act 1976 
as amended by Wildlife (Amendment) Act 2000 and  
Wildlife (Amendment) Act 2010 
Section 72(3)  
Section 65  
Section 6  
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3. Application to District Court for search warrant 
 
4. Search warrant issued by District Court  
 
5. Period of validity of search warrant 
 
6. Executing search warrant 
 
7. Saving for privileged information 
 
8. Extended power of seizure 
 
9. Application to High Court for search warrant in urgent circumstances 
 
10. Effect of failure to comply with Act on admissibility of evidence 
 




13. Effect of Act on powers to enter property without warrant 
 
14. Transitional arrangements 
 
SCHEDULE 1 
Application of this Act where search warrant does not involve criminal investigation 
 
SCHEDULE 2 





ACTS REFERRED TO 
 
Animal Health and Welfare Act 2013 (No. 15 of 2013) 
Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013 (No. 26 of 2013) 
Communications Regulation Act 2002 (No. 20 of 2002) 
Companies Act 2014 (No. 38 of 2014) 
Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1997 (No. 4 of 1997) 
Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001 (No. 50 of 2001) 
National Oil Reserves Agency Act 2007 (No. 7 of 2007) 














AN ACT TO CONSOLIDATE AND REFORM THE PROCEDURES INVOLVED IN APPLYING 
FOR, ISSUING AND EXECUTING SEARCH WARRANTS, TO REPEAL VARIOUS 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS RELATING TO SEARCH WARRANTS AND TO PROVIDE FOR 
RELATED MATTERS  
 
 




Short title and commencement 
1.—(1) This Act may be cited as the Criminal Justice (Search Warrants) Act 2015. 
 
(2) This Act comes into operation on such day or days as the Minister may appoint by order 
or orders either generally or with reference to any particular purpose or provision, and different 
days may be so appointed for different purposes or provisions. 
 
Explanatory note 










(a) in the case of an application referred to in section 3(1)(a) or section 9(2)(a)(i), a member 
of An Garda Síochána not below the rank of sergeant, 
 
(b) in the case of an application referred to in section 3(1)(b) or section 9(2)(a)(ii), a person 
authorised to apply for a search warrant by any enactment specified in Schedule 1, and 
 
(c) in the case of an application referred to in section 3(1)(c) or section 9(2)(a)(iii), a person 
authorised to apply for a search warrant by any enactment specified in Schedule 2; 
 
“commission” in relation to an offence, includes an attempt to commit such offence;  
 
“live television link” means any communications technology facility which the Court is satisfied is 
of sufficient integrity and reliability to enable a person who is not present before the Court to see 
and hear the Court and to be seen and heard by the Court; 
 
“material” means any tangible or intangible thing and includes a copy of the thing; 
 
“Minister” means the Minister for Justice and Equality;  
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“occupier” includes the owner of a place; 
 
“place” means a physical location and includes any building or part thereof, dwelling or part 
thereof, commercial premises, vehicle, whether mechanically propelled or not, vessel, whether 
sea-going or not, aircraft, whether capable of operation or not, hovercraft or any land or 
watercourse; 
 
“prescribed” means prescribed by rules of court; 
 
“privileged material” means material which, in the opinion of a court, a person is entitled to 








Application to District Court for search warrant  
3.— (1) An applicant may apply to the District Court for a search warrant to be issued under 
section 4 where he or she provides information on oath and in writing—  
 
(a) that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that evidence of or relating to an 
indictable offence may be found at a specified place,  
 
(b) that a search warrant is required to facilitate the applicant in the performance of his 
or her functions under the provisions of any enactment specified in column 3 of 
Schedule 1, or 
 
(c) that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that evidence of or relating to a 
summary offence under the provisions of any enactment specified in column 3 of 
Schedule 2 may be found at a specified place.  
 
(2) Subject to section 9, an application for a search warrant shall be made using the 
prescribed search warrant information form, which may be filed electronically. 
 
(3) The applicant shall provide any additional information which the District Court requests 
so as to ground the application.  
 
(4) Subject to section 9, the applicant shall appear in person before a judge of the District 




Section 3 implements the recommendations in Chapter 2 concerning the scope of the proposed 
Search Warrants Act and in Chapter 3 regarding the process of applying for a search warrant.   
 
Section 3(1) implements the recommendation in paragraph 2.40 that the Act should apply to 
indictable offences It also implements the recommendation in paragraph 3.21 that a single 
phrase, “reasonable grounds for suspicion,” should be used to describe the standard of opinion 
that the applicant must have when applying for a search warrant. It also requires the applicant 
to affirm the opinion on oath and in writing.   
 
Section 3(1)(b) implements the recommendations in paragraph 2.71 concerning the application 
of the Act (other than those which refer specifically to the admissibility of evidence in a 
subsequent criminal trial, as to which see section 4(7) and section 10 of the Bill) to enactments 
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that authorise entry and search or inspection for the purposes of regulatory supervision or 
enforcement, rather than where the search is related to suspicion or belief that evidence of or 
relating to an offence is at a place. Thus section 3(1)(b) provides for applications for search 
warrants to be made under the Act where a search warrant is required to carry out regulatory 
functions or powers in any enactment listed in Schedule 1. 
 
Section 3(2) implements the recommendation at paragraph 3.63 that a standard search warrant 
form should be used when applying for a search warrant, which should replace the array of 
search warrant forms that currently exist. It also provides that search warrant information forms 
may be filed electronically. 
 
Section 3(3) implements the recommendation at paragraph 3.110 that the power of the District 
Court to request further information from the applicant should be placed on a statutory footing.  
This provision does not create a mandatory obligation, but simply acknowledges the power to 
request additional information where it is necessary and appropriate to do so. 
 
Section 3(4) implements the recommendation at paragraph 4.39 that the applicant must appear 
in person before a judge of the District Court to apply for a search warrant. This is subject to the 
exception provided for in circumstances of urgency, where an application for a search warrant 
may be made to the High Court, which does not require an appearance in person: see section 9 




Search warrant issued by District Court  
4.— (1) If a judge of the District Court is satisfied by information on oath and in writing provided 
by an applicant—  
 
(a) that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that evidence of or relating to an 
indictable offence may be found at a specified place,  
 
(b) that a search warrant is required to facilitate the applicant in the performance of his 
or her functions under the provisions of any enactment specified in column 3 of 
Schedule 1, or 
 
(c) that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that evidence of or relating to a 
summary offence under the provisions of any enactment specified in column 3 of 
Schedule 2 may be found at a specified place, 
 
the judge may issue a search warrant for the search of that place. 
 
(2) A search warrant issued under this section shall be in the prescribed form. 
 
(3) A judge of the District Court who has issued a search warrant under this section shall 
cause a copy of the warrant, supplied by the applicant, to be retained on the court file. 
 
(4) A warrant under this section shall be expressed to and shall operate to authorise an 
applicant (in this Act referred to as “the person acting under the authority of the 
warrant”), accompanied by such member or members of An Garda Síochána as the 
person acting under the authority of the warrant considers necessary, or such person, if 
any, as may be authorised in accordance with subsection (8)— 
 
(a) to enter, at any reasonable time or times (subject to subsection (5)), within the 
validity period of the warrant (if necessary by the use of reasonable force), the place 
named on the warrant,  
 
(b) to search the place, 
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(c) where the person acting under the authority of the warrant is a member of An Garda 
Síochána, to search any persons present (which power may also be exercised by 
such person, if any, as may be authorised in accordance with subsection (8) who is 
also a member of An Garda Síochána), and 
 
(d) to seize any material found at that place in the possession of a person present at the 
place at the time of the search which—  
 
(i) the person acting under the authority of the warrant reasonably believes to be 
evidence of, or relating to, the commission of an indictable offence (or to a 
summary offence under the provisions of any enactment specified in column 3 of 
Schedule 2) to which the search warrant relates (and the material so seized may 
be retained for use in any criminal proceedings, for such period from the date of 
seizure as is reasonable or, if proceedings are commenced in which the thing so 
seized is required for use in evidence, until the conclusion of the proceedings), or 
   




(5) If the judge of the District Court is satisfied by information on oath and in writing 
provided by an applicant that there are grounds for authorising entry at other than a reasonable 
time or times, the warrant shall specify any such other authorised time or times.  
 
(6) The authority to seize material under this section includes the authority— 
 
(a) to make and retain a copy of any document, record or electronically stored 
information, 
 
(b) where necessary, to use electronic equipment to copy electronically stored 
information, and 
 
(c) where necessary, to seize and retain any computer or other storage medium in which 
any record is kept. 
 
(7) Where in the course of exercising any powers under this Act (other than where the 
search warrant was applied for under paragraph (1)(b)), a person acting under the authority of 
the warrant comes into the possession of anything which he or she reasonably suspects to be 
evidence of, or relating to, an offence, other than an offence to which the search warrant 
relates, it may be seized and retained for use in any criminal proceedings, for such period from 
the date of seizure as is reasonable or, if proceedings are commenced in which the thing so 
seized is required for use in evidence, until the conclusion of the proceedings. 
 
(8) A judge of the District Court, on issuing a search warrant, if he or she believes it is 
necessary, may by endorsement on the warrant, authorise the person acting under the authority 
of the warrant to be accompanied and assisted by such other person or persons (not being a 




Section 4(1) implements the recommendation at paragraph 3.90 that, except in the limited 
circumstances of urgency described in section 9 which provides for urgent applications to 
the High Court, the power to issue a search warrant should be vested in a judge of the 
District Court. While most existing legislative provisions provide that search warrants are 
issued by judges of the District Court, a small number provide for the issuing of search 
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warrants by peace commissioners and members of An Garda Síochána. The Commission 
recommend that all search warrants should be issued by a court.  
 
Section 4(1) also implements the recommendations at paragraphs 2.40, 2.55, and 2.70 that 
the Search Warrants Act should apply where search warrants are sought: (a) in connection 
with evidence of or relating to an indictable offence, or (b) where a search warrant is 
necessary to facilitate a person in carrying out his or her regulatory powers or functions 
under the provisions of an enactment specified in Schedule 1 to the Bill, or (c) in 
connection with evidence of or relating to a summary offence specified in the enactments 
listed in Schedule 2. 
 
Section 4(2) implements the recommendation at paragraph 4.56 that the Act should provide 
for a standard search warrant form, which should replace the current approach whereby 
each statutory search warrant provision has a corresponding search warrant form. 
 
Section 4(3) implements the recommendation at paragraph 4.63 that a copy of each issued 
search warrant, supplied by the applicant, should be kept on file by the Courts Service.  
 
Section 4(4)(a) implements the recommendation at paragraph 5.26 that flexibility as to the 
time of the execution of a search warrant should remain, with a presumption that in general 
terms this should occur at a “reasonable time or times”, subject to an exception where a 
search carried out at other times (broadly speaking, at night, the detai ls of which would be 
set out in the Code of Practice on Search Warrants: see section 11 of the Bill) may be 
justified: this is dealt with in subsection (5), below. It also implements the recommendation 
at paragraph 5.39 that, by using the term “reasonable time or times” the Act should provide 
for re-entry of premises following a short break or overnight break where more than one 
day is needed to execute the warrant. It also implements the recommendation in paragraph 
5.44 that where it is necessary to use force during the execution of a search warrant, any 
force used must be reasonable. 
 
Section 4(4)(b) implements the recommendation at paragraph 5.77 that the Search 
Warrants Act should, where it is necessary and justified in the circumstances, authorise a 
member of An Garda Síochána executing a warrant to search any persons present at the 
search location. 
 
Section 4(4)(c) implements the recommendation at paragraph 5.94 and provides for the 
seizure of material found during the execution of a search warrant where there are 
reasonable grounds for believing that: (i) the material is evidence of the offence or 
suspected offence with which the search warrant is concerned; or (ii) it may be seized in 
accordance with the provisions of an enactment listed in Schedule 1. 
 
Section 4(5) implements the recommendation at paragraph 5.26 that if the applicant satisfies 
the Court by information on oath and in writing that there are grounds for authorising entry at 
other than a reasonable time or times, the warrant must provide for this. 
 
Section 4(6) implements the recommendation at paragraph 5.77 that the scope of the 
authority to seize material includes the authority: (a) to make and retain a copy of any 
document, record or electronically stored information, (b) where necessary, to use electronic 
equipment copy electronically stored information, and (c) where necessary, to seize and retain 
any computer or other storage medium in which any record is kept. 
 
Section 4(7) implements the recommendation at paragraph 5.94 that the person executing the 
search warrant should be permitted to seize incidentally discovered material.  This may include 
material related to the offence being investigated, but not listed in the search warrant, or 
material that does not relate to the offence with which the warrant is concerned, but which is 
evidence of a separate offence. As this provision refers to the use of such material in a 
subsequent criminal trial, it is one of the two provisions of the Bill that does not apply to a 
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search warrant issued for regulatory purposes under section 4(1)(b) (see also section 10 of the 
Bill). 
 
Section 4(8) implements the recommendation at paragraph 5.67 that where a person who is 
not a member of An Garda Síochána is required to assist with the execution of the search, 
specific permission should be sought from the District Court; and that where such 




Period of validity of search warrant  
5.— (1) The period of validity of a warrant issued under section 4 shall be 7 days from its date of 
issue unless that period of validity is later extended under subsection (3). 
 
(2) An applicant may, during the period of validity of a search warrant (including such period 
as may previously have been extended under subsection (3)) apply to the District Court for an 
order extending the period of validity of the warrant and such an application shall be grounded 
on information on oath and in writing provided by the applicant stating, by reference to the 
purpose for which the warrant was issued, the reasons why the applicant considers the 
extension to be necessary. 
 
(3) If the District Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing, having 
regard to that information so provided, that further time is needed so that the purpose or 
purposes for which the warrant was issued can be fulfilled, the judge may make an order 
extending the period of validity of the warrant by a period of 7 days and, where such an order is 
made, the Court shall cause the warrant to be suitably endorsed to indicate its extended period 
of validity. 
 
(4) No more than 3 orders extending the validity of a search warrant under subsection (3) 
shall be made. 
 
(5) Nothing in the preceding subsections prevents a District Court from issuing, on foot of a 
fresh application made under section 4, a further search warrant under that section in relation to 
the same premises. 
 
(6) The periods of validity and extended validity provided for in this section are without 
prejudice to the periods provided for in— 
 
(a) section 28(2) to (4) of the Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 
2013, and 
 




Section 5(1) implements the recommendation at paragraph 5.05 that the Search Warrants Act 
should provide for a standard validity period of 7 days for search warrants issued by a judge of 
the District Court.   
 
Section 5(2) to (4) implement the recommendation at paragraph 5.15 that there should be a 
procedure for extending the validity period of a search warrant, where this is deemed 
necessary. It requires information on oath as to the reasons why the extension in considered 
necessary. The period of validity may be extended for up to 7 days, but section 5(4) provides 
that no more than three orders may be made extending the validity period of a search warrant.  
 
Section 5(5) provides that the introduction of a procedure for extending the validity period of 
search warrants does not prevent an applicant for applying for a fresh warrant. 
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Section 5(6) implements the recommendation at paragraph 5.19 that the 7 day validity period 
and extension of the validity period should be without prejudice to certain legislative provisions 
which specify longer validity periods where necessary, such as for investigations under financial 
services legislation or company law enforcement. As discussed in the Report, the two examples 
given, from the Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013 and the Companies Act 




Executing search warrant  
6.— (1) A person acting under the authority of a warrant issued under section 4 or 9 may— 
 
(a) (i) require any person present at the place where the search is carried out to give 
to him or her his or her name and address,  
 
(ii) request assistance from persons present so as to gain access to material 
sought under the search warrant,  
 
(iii) operate any computer at the place which is being searched or cause any 
such computer to be operated by a person accompanying the person acting 
under the authority of the warrant,  
 
(iv) require any person at that place who appears to him or her to be in a position 
to facilitate access to the information held in any such computer or which can be 
accessed by the use of that computer —  
  
(I) to give to him or her any password or encryption key necessary to 
operate it, 
 
(II) to otherwise enable him or her to examine the information accessible 
by the computer in a form in which the information is visible and legible,  
 
(III) to produce the information in a form in which it can be removed and in 
which it is, or can be made, visible and legible; and 
  
(b) where the person acting under the authority of the warrant is a member of An Garda 
Síochána, he or she may arrest any person— 
  
(i) who obstructs or attempts to obstruct that member in the carrying out of his or 
her duties, 
  
(ii) who fails to comply with a requirement or request under paragraph (a),  
  
(iii) who gives a name or address which the member has reasonable cause for 
believing is false or misleading. 
 
(2) A person who obstructs or attempts to obstruct a person acting under the authority of a 
warrant under this section, who fails to comply with a requirement or request under paragraph 
(a) of subsection (1) or who gives a false name or address to a person acting under the 
authority of the warrant shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on summary conviction 
to a Class A fine or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 6 months, or to both. 
 
(3) A person acting under the authority of a warrant shall have the search warrant in his or 
her possession and show it to the occupier of the place named in the warrant prior to the 
commencement of the search. 
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(4) Where a search warrant has been issued following an application to the High Court 
under section 9, the person acting under the authority of the search warrant shall have in his or 
her possession and show to the occupier of the place named in the warrant either of the 
following, which shall be deemed for all legal purposes to constitute the search warrant— 
 
(a) a search warrant transmitted from the judge of the High Court to the applicant by 
reliable electronic means, or 
 
(b) a printout of a search warrant transmitted from the judge of the High Court to the 
applicant by reliable electronic means. 
 
(5) Subject to subsection (6), a person acting under the authority of a search warrant issued 
under section 4 or 9 shall, upon completion of the search authorised by the search warrant, give 
a copy of the search warrant to the occupier or person in control of the place, unless it is 
reasonably believed by the person that to do so would frustrate or endanger the investigation 
concerned, or any other investigation. 
 
(6) Where there is no occupier or person in control of the place present at the time of the 
search, the person acting under the authority of a search warrant issued under section 4 or, as 
the case may be, 9 shall, upon completion of the search, leave a copy of the search warrant in a 
prominent location at the place. 
 
(7) Where a copy of the search warrant is not given to the occupier or person in control of 
the place in accordance with subsection (6), the occupier or person in control of the place may 
apply to the District Court within 7 days for a copy of the warrant. 
 
(8) A person acting under the authority of a search warrant issued under section 4 or 9 
shall— 
 
(a) ensure that any material seized during the search shall be secured and clearly 
marked before being removed from the place, and 
 
(b) make an inventory of any material seized,  
 
(c) as soon as practicable after any material is seized, provide the occupier or person in 
control of the place with an inventory of the material seized, and 
 




Section 6(1)(a) implements the recommendation at paragraph 5.77 that the Search 
Warrants Act should, where it is necessary and justified in the circumstances, authorise 
executing officers to: (i) search persons present at a search location; (ii) request basic 
personal details from persons present at a search location; (iii) request assistance from 
persons present so as to gain access to material sought under the search warrant; and (iv) 
require any person that appears to be in a position to facilitate access to information held in 
a computer to take certain steps to assist the executing officer to access that information.    
 
Section 6(1)(b) implements the recommendation at paragraph 5.82 that the Act should 
provide that the executing officer may arrest any person who refuses to comply with a 
permissible request by an executing officer, or who obstructs or attempts to obstruct the 
execution of a search warrant. 
 
Section 6(2) provides that implements the recommendation at paragraph 5.82 that it is an 
offence to obstruct or attempt to obstruct a person acting under the authority of a warrant, or fail 
to comply with a requirement under subsection (1)(a) or to give a false name or address.  
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Section 6(3) implements the recommendation at paragraph 4.78 that the executing authority 
should show the search warrant it to the owner or occupier. 
 
Section 6(4) implements the recommendation at paragraph 4.79 concerning the electronic 
process for issuing search warrants in urgent circumstances by the High Court: see section 
9 of the Bill.  It provides that where the applicant has not personally appeared before the 
High Court in such urgent circumstances (where the delay applying in person would 
frustrate the effective execution of the warrant) it is permissible for the search warrant to be 
transmitted to him or her electronically so that he or she can show the owner or occupier 
the search warrant on a device or a printed copy of the electronically transmitted warrant.  
 
Section 6(5) implements the recommendation at paragraph 5.53 that a copy of the search 
warrant should be given to the owner or occupier of the property concerned upon the 
completion of the search.  
 
Section 6(6) implements the recommendation at paragraph 5.54 that when the owner or 
occupier is not present at the place at the time of the execution of the warrant the 
executing authority should, on completion of the search, leave a copy of the search warrant 
in a prominent location at the place. It provides for an exception in cases where an 
executing officer believes that it is not advisable to give a copy of the warrant it may be 
withheld from the person. Section 6(7) allows for an appeal to the District Court from a 
decision to withhold a copy of the search warrant from the owner or occupier. 
 
Section 6(8) implements the recommendation at paragraph 5.122 that an inventory of all 
seized or copied items should be given to the person concerned upon completion of the 
search and seizure under warrant. It also provides that if some, but not all, of the seized 




Saving for privileged information 
7.—(1) Subject to subsection (2), nothing in section 6 shall compel the disclosure by any person 
of privileged material or authorise the seizure or examination of material that is privileged by or 
under any enactment or rule of law (in this section referred to as privileged material). 
 
(2) The disclosure of material may be compelled, or possession of it seized, pursuant to the 
powers in section 6, notwithstanding that it is apprehended that the material is privileged 
material, provided the compelling of its disclosure or the seizing of possession is done by 
means whereby the confidentiality of the material can be maintained pending the determination 
by the court of the issue as to whether the material is privileged material. 
 
(3) Without prejudice to subsection (4), where, in the circumstances referred to in subsection 
(2), material has been disclosed or material seized pursuant to the powers in this 
section, the person—  
 
 (a) to whom such material has been so disclosed, or 
 
 (b) who has seized possession of it, 
 
shall (unless the person has, within the period subsequently mentioned in this 
subsection, been served with notice of an application under subsection (4) in relation to 
the matter), securely seize any material, store it in a safe and secure place and apply to 
the High Court for a determination as to whether the material is privileged material and 
an application under this subsection shall be made within 7 days after the disclosure or 
seizing of possession. 
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(4) A person who, in the circumstances referred to in subsection (2), is compelled to 
disclose information, or from whose possession material is seized, pursuant to the powers in 
section 6, may apply to the Court for a determination as to whether the material is privileged 
material. 
 
(5) Pending the making of a final determination on an application under subsection (3) or 
(4), the court may give such interim or interlocutory directions as the court considers 
appropriate including, without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, directions as 
to— 
 
(a) the preservation of the material, in whole or in part, in a safe and secure place in any 
manner specified by the court, 
 
(b) the appointment of a person with suitable legal qualifications possessing the level of 
experience, and the independence from any interest falling to be determined 
between the parties concerned, that the court considers to be appropriate for the 
purpose of— 
 
  (i) examining the material, and 
 
(ii) preparing a report for the court with a view to assisting or facilitating the court 
in the making by the court of its determination as to whether the material is 
privileged material. 
 
(6) An application under subsection (3) or (4) shall be by motion on notice and may, if the 




Section 7(1) implements the recommendation at paragraph 5.99 that the Act should include 
safeguards for material found during a search which is the subject of privilege, including legal 
privilege or litigation privilege.  It provides that where privileged material is found during the 
course of a search warrant execution, such material may generally not be examined or seized.  
It also implements the recommendations at paragraphs 5.106 and 5.107 that the Act should 
include a specific procedure to deal with claims of privilege asserted over material found during 
the course of a search warrant execution.   
 
Section 7(2) to (6) outline the procedure that the executing authority should follow where 
material which may attract privilege is found, and this is largely based on the comparable 
provisions in the Companies Act 2014.  It provides that the material should be securely sealed 
without being examined by executing officers, and removed from the search location.  The 
sealed material should then be placed in the custody of the High Court for a determination as to 
whether or not the material is to benefit from the protection of privilege.  Where the material is 
certified as privileged it should not be examined by the investigating authority.  If it is determined 
not to be privileged, the material should be placed with the investigating authority if it is 




Extended power of seizure 
8.— (1) Without prejudice to subsection (2), where— 
 
(a) a person acting under the authority of a search warrant issued under section 4 or 9 
finds anything at or in the custody or possession of any person found on the 
premises named in the warrant that the person has reasonable grounds for believing 
may be, or may contain, material which he or she would be entitled to seize in 
accordance with section 4(4)(c) or 4(7), and  
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(b) it is not reasonably practicable for a determination to be made on the premises— 
 
(i) whether what he or she has found is material that he or she is entitled to seize 
under the warrant, or 
 
(ii) the extent to which what he or she has found contains material that he or she 
is entitled to seize under the warrant, 
 
the person’s power of seizure under the warrant shall include power to seize so much of 
what he or she has found as it is necessary to remove from the premises to enable that 




(a) a person acting under the authority of the warrant finds material at, or in the 
custody or possession of any person found on the premises named in the warrant 
which he or she would be entitled to seize in accordance with section 4(4)(c) or 
4(7) (“seizable material”) but for its being comprised in something else that he or 
she has (apart from this subsection) no power to seize, and 
 
(b) it is not reasonably practicable for the seizable material to be separated, on those 
premises, from that in which it is comprised, 
 
the person’s powers of seizure shall include power to seize both the seizable material 
and that from which it is not reasonably practicable to separate it (also referred to 
subsequently as an “extended power of seizure”). 
 
(3) Where, for the purposes of subsections (1) or (2) an issue arises as to either of the 
following matters, namely: 
 
(a) whether or not it is reasonably practicable on particular premises for something 
to be determined; or  
 
(b) whether or not it is reasonably practicable on particular premises for something to 
be separated from something else,  
 
the issue shall be decided by reference solely to the following matters — 
 
(i) how long it would take to carry out the determination or separation on those 
premises; 
 
(ii) the number of persons that would be required to carry out that determination 
or separation on those premises within a reasonable period; 
 
(iii) whether the determination or separation would (or would if carried out on 
those premises) involve damage to property; 
 
(iv) the apparatus or equipment that it would be necessary or appropriate to use 
for the carrying out of the determination or separation; 
 
(v) the costs of carrying out the determination or separation on those premises as 
against the costs of carrying out the separation in another place, and 
 
(vi) in the case of a separation, whether the separation— 
 
  (I) would be likely, or 
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(II) if carried out by the only means that are reasonably practicable on 
those premises, would be likely, 
 
to prejudice the use of some or all of the separated seizable material for a 
purpose for which material seized under the warrant is capable of being used. 
 
(4) Save where the person acting under the authority of the search warrant is of the opinion 
that compliance with this subsection could result in the concealment, falsification, 
destruction or the disposal otherwise of seizable material, an extended power of seizure 
shall not be exercised unless the person has first made the following arrangements in 
relation to the material, the subject of the proposed exercise of that power, namely 
reasonable arrangements— 
 
 (a) providing for the appropriate storage of that material, 
 
(b) allowing reasonable access, from time to time, to that material by the owner, lawful 
custodian or possessor thereof (including, in the case of documents or information in 
non-legible form, by the making of copies or the transmission of matter by electronic 
means), and 
 
(c) providing for confidentiality to be maintained as regards any confidential matter 
comprised in that material, 
 
being arrangements to apply pending the carrying out of the foregoing separation and the 
consequent return of anything to the owner, lawful custodian or possessor that is not 
relevant material. 
 
(5) In deciding what the terms of those arrangements shall be, the person acting under the 
authority of the warrant shall have regard to any representations reasonably made on the 
matter by the owner, lawful custodian or possessor of the material and endeavour, where 




(a) by reason of the person acting under the authority of the warrant being of the opinion 
referred to in subsection (4), the arrangements referred to in paragraphs (a) to (c) of 
that subsection are not made in relation to the material the subject of the proposed 
exercise of the extended power of seizure, or 
 
(b) circumstances arise subsequent to the exercise of the extended power of seizure 
that make it appropriate to vary the arrangements made under that subsection, 
 
 the person shall, as the case may be— 
 
(i) make, as soon as practicable after the exercise of that power of seizure, the 
arrangements referred to in subsections (4)(a) to (c) in relation to the material, or 
 
(ii) vary the arrangements made under that subsection in a manner he or she 
considers appropriate, 
 
and, in deciding what shall be the terms of those arrangements or that variation, the 
person shall have regard to any representations on the matter reasonably made by the 
owner, lawful custodian or possessor of the material and endeavour, where practicable, 
to secure the agreement of that person to those terms. 
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(7) Where an extended power of seizure is exercised, it shall be the duty of the person 
acting under the authority of the warrant— 
 
(a) to carry out the separation concerned as soon as practicable, and, in any event, 
subject to subsection (8), within the prescribed period, after its exercise, and 
 
(b) as respects (as the case may be) — 
 
(i) any material seized in exercise of the power found not to be relevant material 
or,  
 
(ii) any material separated from any other material in the exercise of the power 
that is not relevant material, to return, as soon as practicable, and, in any event, 
subject to subsection (8), within the prescribed period, after that finding or 
separation, the material to its owner or the person appearing to the person to be 
lawfully entitled to the custody or possession of it. 
 
(8) On application to the High Court by an applicant or any person affected by the exercise 
of an extended power of seizure, the court may, if it thinks fit and having had regard, in 
particular, to any submissions made on behalf of the applicant with regard to the 
progress of any investigation being carried on for the purpose of which the powers under 
this section had been exercised, give one or more of the following — 
 
(a) a direction that the doing of an act referred to in subsection (7)(a) or (b) shall be done 
within such lesser or greater period of time than that specified in that provision as 
the court determines, 
 
(b) a direction with respect to the making, variation or operation of arrangements 
referred to in subsection (4)(a) to (c) in relation to any specified material or a 
direction that such arrangements as the court provides for in the direction shall have 
effect in place of any such arrangements that have been or were proposed to be 
made, 
 
(c) a direction of any other kind that the court considers it just to give for the purpose of 
further securing the rights of any person affected by the exercise of an extended 
power of seizure, including, if the exceptional circumstances of the case warrant 
doing so, a direction that material seized be returned to its owner or the person 
appearing to the court to be lawfully entitled to the custody or possession of it, 
notwithstanding that the determination or separation concerned has not occurred, 
 
and any such direction may— 
 
(i) relate to some or all of the material the subject of the exercise of the extended 
power of seizure, 
 
(ii) be expressed to operate subject to such terms and conditions as the court 
specifies, including, in the case of a direction under paragraph (c), a condition 
that an applicant be permitted, during a specified subsequent period, to re-take 
and retain possession of the material returned for the purpose of carrying out the 
relevant separation. 
 
(9) An application under subsection (8) shall be by motion on notice and may, if the court 
directs, be heard otherwise than in public. 
 
(10) In subsection (7) “prescribed period” means— 
 
(a) in the case of paragraph (a)— 
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 (i) unless subparagraph (ii) applies, 3 months, or 
 
(ii) such other period as the Minister prescribes in consequence of a review that 
may, from time to time, be carried out by or on behalf of the Minister of the 
operation and implementation of this section, and 
 
(b) in the case of paragraph (b)— 
 
  (i) unless subparagraph (ii) applies, 7 days, or 
 
(ii) such other period as the Minister prescribes in consequence of such a review 
that may, from time to time, be carried out by or on behalf of the Minister, but no 
regulations made to prescribe such a period shall be read as operating to affect 
any direction given by the court under subsection (8)(a) in force on the 
commencement of those regulations. 
 
(11) The Minister may make regulations providing for such supplementary, consequential 





Section 8 implements the recommendation at paragraph 5.115 that the Act should identify that 
in certain circumstances privileged and non privileged material may be mixed. It provides for the 
seizure of all of the material to examine the non-privileged material. Section 8 is based on the 
detailed provisions regarding privileged material and extended powers of seizure in sections 
787 and 788 of the Companies Act 2014. In this respect section 8 includes a procedure to 
implement the recommendation that the examination process should be strictly controlled so 




Application to High Court for search warrant in urgent circumstances 
9.— (1) The High Court may issue a search warrant, having permitted an application to the 
Court to be made without the applicant appearing in person, where the Court is satisfied that 
circumstances of urgency giving rise to the immediate need for a search warrant mean that the 
delay involved in the applicant appearing in person would frustrate the effective execution of the 
search warrant. 
 
(2) Where an applicant has been permitted to apply to the Court for a search warrant without 
appearing in person in the circumstances described in subsection (1), the applicant 
shall communicate orally with the Court by live television link or telephone and— 
 
(a) provide information on oath—  
 
(i) that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that evidence of or relating to 
an indictable offence may be found at a specified place,  
 
(ii) that a search warrant is required to facilitate the applicant in the performance 
of his or her functions under the provisions of any enactment specified in 
column 3 of Schedule 1, or 
 
(iii) that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that evidence of or relating 
to a summary offence under the provisions of any enactment specified in 





(b) answer any questions or provide any additional information which the Court requests 
so as to ground the application. 
 
(3) A warrant under this section shall be expressed to and shall operate to provide an 
applicant with the same authority as is provided for in section 4(4) and (7). 
 
(4) An applicant who has applied for a search warrant under subsection (1) shall prepare a 
written record of the search warrant application and, as soon as practicable and, in any case, 
not later than 24 hours after the search warrant has been issued, file the written record with the 
Court. 
 
(5) The period of validity of a warrant issued following an application under this section shall 




Section 9 implements the recommendations in Chapter 3 regarding a limited electronic search 
warrant application process in urgent circumstances. 
 
Section 9(1) provides for an exception to the general rule in section 3(4) that a person applying 
for a search warrant should appear personally before a judge of the District Court when 
applying for a search warrant. It implements the recommendation at paragraph 3.90 that the Act 
should provide that an application can be made to the High Court without the applicant 
appearing personally before a judge where circumstances of urgency giving rise to the 
immediate need for a search warrant means that the delay appearing in person before a judge 
would frustrate the effective execution of the search warrant.   
 
Section 9(2) describes the standard of opinion which an applicant must have when applying for 
an urgent search warrant, which is the same standard as required in an application under 
section 3. It also implements the recommendation at paragraph 3.104 that in cases where the 
applicant has not appeared personally before a judge, he or she should be required to 
communicate with the High Court judge considering the application by video link or telephone to 
affirm his or her opinion under oath and answer any questions that the issuing authority deems 
necessary.   
 
Section 9(3) clarifies that a warrant under this section shall be expressed to and shall operate to 
provide an applicant with the same authority as is provided for in section 4(4) and (7) of the Bill. 
 
Section 9(4) provides that where the applicant has affirmed his or her opinion by video link or 
telephone, the applicant should be required to file a record of the search warrant application 
with the High Court as soon as practicable thereafter and not later than 24 hours after the 
issuing of the search warrant. 
 
Section 9(5) provides that notwithstanding the general 7 day validity period in section 5, the 






Effect of failure to comply with Act on admissibility of evidence 
10.— A failure by a person applying for or executing a search warrant to comply with any 
provision of the Act shall not of itself affect the admissibility in evidence of any evidence seized 




Section 10 implements the recommendation in paragraph 6.56 that a failure by a person 
applying for or executing a search warrant to comply with any provision of the Search Warrants 
Act shall not of itself affect the admissibility in evidence of any material obtained during a 
search. In paragraph 6.57, the Commission recommends that the proposed Search Warrant Act 
should not include any provision as to the tests by which the courts determine whether to admit 
evidence that has been obtained illegally, or the tests used to determine the admissibility of 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence (including the 2015 Supreme Court decision in The People 
(DPP) v JC1), and that these should remain a matter for the courts to determine and, where 
required, to develop. As this provision refers to the admissibility of evidence in a subsequent 
criminal trial, it is one of the two provisions of the Bill that does not apply to a search warrant 




Code of practice regarding search warrants 
11.— (1) The Minister shall, as soon as may be, prepare and cause to be published a code of 
practice concerning search warrants issued under this Act. 
 
(2) The code of practice shall— 
 
(a) contain practical guidance concerning the requirements of the Act, including the 
procedural steps involved in the process, 
 
(b) be written in plain, intelligible language and 
 
(c) be easily accessible to all persons, including that it shall be made available on the 
internet. 
 
(3) All persons involved in the execution of a search warrant issued under this Act shall 
have regard to the terms of the code of practice, but a failure on the part of any person to 
observe any provision of the code of practice shall not of itself affect the admissibility of any 




Section 11(1) implements the recommendation in paragraph 6.70 that a code of practice on 
search warrants be prepared.   
 
Section 11(2) implements the recommendation in paragraph 6.70 that the code of practice 
should provide practical guidance on the main elements of the Search Warrants Act, including 
the procedural steps involved in the process; that the code of practice should be written in plain, 
intelligible language; and that it should be easily accessible to all persons, including that it 
should be made available on the internet.  
 
Section 11(3) provides implements the recommendation in paragraph 6.70 that non-compliance 
with the code should not of itself affect the admissibility of evidence seized or otherwise 
obtained under a search warrant.   
                                               
1






12.— (1) The enactments referred to in Schedule 3 are repealed to the extent specified in 




Section 12 implements the recommendation in paragraphs 2.50 to 2.52 concerning the repeal 
of existing search warrant provisions applicable to indictable offences. Schedule 3 contains an 
indicative list of some of the provisions that could be repealed in this respect. A further analysis 
of the search warrant provisions listed in Appendix A to this Report may indicate that more 
provisions could be repealed. Because many of these also contain search warrant powers that 
do not necessarily involve criminal investigations but concern regulatory enforcement, it may be 
more suitable to include these in Schedule 1 of the Bill, which provides that those provisions 
should be subject to the Search Warrants Act (other than those which refer specifically to the 
admissibility of evidence in a subsequent criminal trial, as to which see section 4(7) and section 




Effect of Act on powers to enter property without warrant 
13.— Nothing in this Act shall alter or affect any enactment or rule of law that authorises a 




Section 13 implements the recommendation in paragraph 2.75 that the Search Warrants Act 
should not alter or affect any common law rule or statutory provision that authorises a person to 
enter property without a search warrant. Appendix B of the Report contains an indicative list of 





14.— (1) Nothing in this Act shall affect— 
 
(a) the validity of a search warrant issued under any enactment before the 
commencement of this Act and such warrant shall continue in force in accordance 
with its terms after such commencement, or 
 




Section 14 implements the recommendation in paragraph 2.84 that the Search Warrants Act 
should contain transitional provisions to safeguard the validity of search warrants issued under 




SCHEDULE 1  
 
Application of this Act where search warrant does not involve criminal investigation 
Sections 3, 4 and 9 
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(1) (2) (3) 
Number and Year Act or Statutory Instrument Provision 
   
No. 20 of 2002 Communications Regulation Act 2002 Section 40 
No. 7 of 2007 National Oil Reserves Agency Act 2007 Section 48(1) 
No. 15 of 2013 Animal Health and Welfare Act 2013 Section 45(1) 
SI No.239 of 2013 European Union (Protection of Animals at the Time 





The enactments listed in Schedule 1 are indicative examples of legislation (from the list in 
Appendix A to the Report) which provide for the issuing of a search warrant where suspicion or 
belief that evidence relating to an offence is at a location is not a requirement, or not the only 
requirement, for the issuing of a warrant. In accordance with the recommendations in the 
Report, these search warrants, which usually concern regulatory supervisory and enforcement 
powers, should be subject to the Search Warrants Act (other than those which refer specifically 
to the admissibility of evidence in a subsequent criminal trial, as to which see section 4(7) and 




SCHEDULE 2  
 
Application of this Act to summary offences 
Sections 3, 4 and 9 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Number and Year Act or Statutory Instrument Provision 
SI No.102 of 1996 European Communities (Trade in Certain Animal 
Products) Regulations 1996 
Regulation 27 
SI No.265 of 1991 European Communities (Food Imitations (Safety)) 
Regulations 1991  
Regulation 8 




The enactments listed in Schedule 2 are indicative examples of legislation (from the list in 
Appendix A to the Report) which provide for the issuing of a search warrant in connection with 
summary offences, notably pre-2007 Regulations made under section 3 of the European 













Act Provision Extent of Repeal 
 (1) (2) (3) 
No. 50 of 2001 Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud 
Offences) Act 2001 
Section 48 The whole 
section 
No. 4 of 1997 Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1997 
Section 10 The whole 
section 
No. 12 of 1961 Road Traffic Act 1961 Section 106 Subsection (6) 
No. 13 of 1939 Offences against the State Act 
1939 
Section 29 Subsections (3), 
(4), (5), (7), (11) 
and in 
subsection (12) 
the definition of 
“independent” 
    
  
Explanatory note 
The enactments listed in Schedule 3 are indicative examples of legislative provisions which 
could be repealed on the coming into force of the Bill.  
 
The references to section 10 of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1997 (which 
provides for issuing search warrants in respect of arrestable offences only) and to section 48 of 
the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001 (which provides for issuing search 
warrants in respect of indictable offences under the 2001 Act only) are to provisions that would 
become redundant on the enactment of the Bill (which extends to all indictable offences, and to 
the summary offences in the enactments to be listed in Schedule 2). Further analysis of the 
search warrant provisions listed in Appendix A to this Report may indicate that more provisions 
could be repealed. Because many of these also contain search warrant powers that do not 
necessarily involve criminal investigations but concern regulatory enforcement, it may be more 
suitable to include these in Schedule 1 of the Bill, which in accordance with the 
recommendations in the Report, should be subject to the Search Warrants Act (other than those 
which refer specifically to the admissibility of evidence in a subsequent criminal trial, as to which 
see section 4(7) and section 10 of the Bill).  
 
The reference to section 29 of the Offences against the State Act 1939 is an example of a 
provision that empowers a member of An Garda Síochána to issue a search warrant in urgent 
circumstances, and the reference to section 106(6) of the Road Traffic Act 1961 is to the 
comparable power of a peace commissioner to issue a search warrant in urgent circumstances. 
These are examples of provisions that would be repealed in order to implement the 
Commission’s recommendations in Chapter 4 that only a court should be empowered to issue a 
search warrant. 
 
 
 
